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
L. BENKŐ, K. BOLLA, M. HUTTERER, S. IMRE, GY. LAKÓ,
K. RADICS, S. ROT, GY. SZÉPE, ZS. TELEGDI

REDIGUNT

J. HERMAN ET F. KIEFER

TOMUS XXXVII

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
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EIN BEITRAG ZUR KENNTNIS VON HUMBOLDTS LINGUISTIK: DAS PROBLEM EINER ENTWICKLUNG DER GRAMMATIK*

von
ZS. TELEGDI

1. In einem Brief vom 3.12.1828 an den Hellenisten F.G.Welcker (1784–1868) sucht Humboldt diesem alten Freund einen richtigen Begriff von seiner Sprachforschung zu geben.¹ Er erklärt, sein Zweck sei eigentlich ein Studium, das auf die Sprachfähigkeit gerichtet ist, und die Sprachen, die Wirkungen dieser Fähigkeit, nur als Quellen der Kenntnis und Beispiele bei der Entwicklung benutzt.² „Ich möchte zeigen — fährt er fort —, dass dasjenige, was eine Sprache zu dieser oder jener bestimmten macht, ihr grammatischer Bau ist,³ und nun entwickeln, wie der grammatische Bau in allen seinen Verschiedenheiten doch nur gewissen, einzeln aufzuzählenden Methoden folgen kann, so dass sich bei dem Studium jeder Sprache zeigen lässt, welche Methoden in ihr herrschend oder gemischt sind.“⁴ Die Bestimmung dieser Methoden und ihres

* Vorbemerkung: Ich zitiere Humboldt mit Band und Seitenzahl der Akademieausgabe.

¹ *Briefe an Welcker*. 114 f.(3.12.1828).

² Diese Bestimmung des Gegenstandes, dessen Erforschung die Aufgabe der allgemeinen Sprachkunde bildet — ein Grundgedanke von Humboldts Linguistik — tritt schon im „*Essai sur les langues du nouveau Continent*“ (1812) auf. Er fordert da eine Disziplin, die die Sprachen mit dem Ziel untersucht, das Sprachvermögen der Menschheit nach Umfang und Verfahrungsweise auszumessen, und nachzuweisen, wie sich dieses Vermögen in den besonderen Sprachen auf verschiedene Weise offenbart und so den Mittelpunkt des Sprachstudiums bildet. (III. 308 f.). Vgl. noch V.5, VII.622.

³ Vgl. „In dem Materiale der Sprache, dem Inbegriff der Wörter kann also die Sprachform, welche die Einerleiheit der Sprachen bedingt, nicht anders, als höchstens indirekt gesucht werden ... Dagegen liegt die Sprachform unverkennbar in dem grammatischen Bau, und ein Übergang in einen wesentlich verschiedenen ist, von aller Beschaffenheit der Wörter abgesehen, ein Übergang in eine neue Sprache.“ (VI.248). — Der Ausdruck „der grammatische Bau“ dient dazu, im Unterschied zu „Grammatik“, der ursprünglich ein Studium und dann, sekundär, auch dessen Gegenstand bedeutet, diesen eindeutig zu nennen. (Humboldt selbst macht VI.360 auf diesen Doppelsinn von „Grammatik“ aufmerksam.)

⁴ Vgl. „Die Verschiedenheiten des grammatischen Baues der Sprachen dürfen nicht als ein unbestimmbares, unendliches Mannigfaltiges erscheinen, sondern als innerhalb gewisser, durch die Natur des menschlichen Geistes und der Sprachwerkzeuge, und die Art der Sprachumformung und Überlieferung gezogener Gränzen gehalten und umschlossen.“ (VI.388 f.)

Verhältnisses zueinander gehört somit zu den Hauptaufgaben der Humboldt-schen Sprachkunde, sie hörte nicht auf, ihn zu beschäftigen.

Im Folgenden möchte ich darstellen, wie sich für ihn das gegenseitige Verhältnis dieser Methoden in der Zeit mit dem Fortschreiten seiner Untersuchungen gestaltet hat.

W.von Humboldt war seit 1808 Mitglied der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,⁵ aber die Reihe seiner akademischen Abhandlungen fängt erst mit jener bekannten programmatischen „Über das vergleichende Sprachstudium in Beziehung auf die verschiedenen Epochen der Sprachentwicklung“, die er am 29. Juni 1820 gelesen hat, an.⁶ Das Thema stand seit zwei Jahrzehnten im Mittelpunkt seiner Sprachforschung, es liegt ein Fragment von ihm aus den Jahren 1801 oder 1802 vor, in dem er die umfassende Vergleichung der verschiedenen Sprachen alter und neuer Zeit als „einen reichen, grossen und gemeinnützigen Vorwurf“ einführt, und den Gedanken zu einem Plan, wie das Sprachstudium des weiteren auf dieser Grundlage betrieben müsste, vorlegt.⁷

Im 14. Paragraph der Abhandlung entwirft Humboldt — bei der Untersuchung der Frage, ob irgend eine Sprache zur vollendeten Bildung reif ist, ehe sie mehrere Mittelzustände einer gewissen Art durchgegangen ist — eine Skizze der Entwicklung der menschlichen Sprache. Er nimmt an, dass die Entwicklung von einem Zustand ausging, in dem die Sprache nur über Wörter mit Sachbedeutung verfügte, diese wurden in der Rede unmittelbar aneinander gereiht, die redeverknüpfenden Beziehungen unter ihnen mussten hinzugedacht werden. Der nächste Zustand, zu dem die Entwicklung führt, wird dadurch charakterisiert, dass die Sprache zwar Affixa und grammatische Wörter besitzt, sie aber nur gelegentlich gebraucht, „die Grammatik waltet noch nicht in der Sprache“. Die Entwicklung entfaltet sich völlig erst, wenn kein Element der Sprache mehr formlos gedacht, in jedem die Form hörbar angedeutet wird, ein Zustand, den kaum die „gebildetsten Sprachen“, d.h. die flektierten, erreichen. In dieser Folge von Schritten sieht Humboldt das Streben sich fortschreitend geltend machen, das, was ihm als das Wesen der Sprache erscheint — „die Materie der Erscheinungswelt in die Form der Gedanken zu giessen“ — zu verwirklichen.⁸

⁵ Die Akademie hat ihn in der Sitzung vom 4. August 1808 zu ihrem Ehrenmitglied gewählt, seine Antrittsrede (s.III.219–221) hat er im nächsten Jahr am 19. Januar gehalten.

⁶ IV.1–34.

⁷ VII.598–603.

⁸ IV. 17–19. Vgl. „Die Sprache muss daher die doppelte Natur der Welt und des Men-

Es ist nicht zu verkennen, dass Humboldts drei Stufen der Sprachentwicklung den drei Klassen entsprechen, in die A.W.Schlegel in einer 1818 erschienenen Arbeit die Sprachen der Menschheit eingeteilt hat. Er unterscheidet Sprachen ohne grammatische Struktur, solche die Affixa gebrauchen, und flektierende Sprachen.⁹ (Er gebraucht hier noch nicht die Namen „Isolierung“ und „Agglutination“, die für die zwei ersten seiner Klassen bald geläufig werden sollten.)¹⁰ Diese Konstruktion ist eine Umbildung jener, die der jüngere Bruder, Friedrich zehn Jahre früher in seiner, in den Geschichten der Sprachwissenschaft masslos überschätzten Schrift *Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* (1808) aufgestellt hat. In der Umbildung erscheint die Einteilung der Sprachen aus der Verbindung, in der sie bei Friedrich mit einer theologisch inspirierten dualistischen Ursprungshypothese auftrat, gelöst, als Ergebnis einer rein strukturellen Analyse. Doch ist das Prinzip der ursprünglichen Klassifikation bewahrt, August Wilhelm stellt die seine, ausdrücklich und mit Recht, als eigentlich von seinem Bruder entwickelt hin.¹¹

Humboldt fasst Schlegels Klassen als Stufen einer fortschreitenden Entwicklung auf, einer Entwicklung, die ein Streben ist, den Stoff der Sprache der Form zu unterwerfen.¹²

In seiner nächsten Abhandlung linguistischen Inhalts („Über das Entstehen der grammatischen Formen und ihren Einfluss auf die Ideenentwicklung“, gelesen am 17. Januar 1822)¹³ führt Humboldt die im „Vergleichenden Sprach-

schen annehmen, um die Einwirkung und die Rückwirkung beider auf einander wechselseitig zu befördern; oder sie muss vielmehr in ihrer eignen, neu geschaffenen [Welt], die eigentliche Natur beider, die Realität des Objects und des Subjects, vertilgen, und von beidem nur die ideale Form beibehalten. (III.167).

⁹ A. W. Schlegel (1818) 14–16.

¹⁰ Nach Streitberg (1915: 191) ist „Agglutination“ als grammatisches Fachwort von Humboldt eingeführt worden.

¹¹ A.W. Schlegel, a.a.O., 85 Anm.6. — Für eine eingehende Vergleichung beider Klassifikationen s.S. Timpanaro (1973) 5–10. Bei dieser Gelegenheit möchte ich ein Versehen berichtigen. Timpanaro hebt die Kritik R.Westphals an Fr.Schlegels Charakterisierung der „organischen“ Sprachen als ausgezeichnet hervor. Nach Westphal nämlich hat Schlegel Verhältnisse der organischen Natur ganz unmittelbar auf die Sprache übertragen, und in dieser Unmittelbarkeit liege der Mystizismus und die Rohheit; Timpanaro findet, dies sei vielleicht die beste Exposition von Schlegels Philosophie und seiner Aporien. (Westphal 1873: XI; Timpanaro 1972: 83). Das Lob gebührt aber Steinthal: der erste Teil von Westphals Vorwort (VII – XXII), in dem auch jene Bemerkung steht, ist ein Plagiat, wörtlich aus Steinthal (1860) 1–16 abgeschrieben.

¹² Diese Auffassung wird durch die Anordnung der Sprachen auf einer Linie der steigenden Vollkommenheit bei August Wilhelm nahegelegt, es wäre aber (wie wir sehen werden) gänzlich verkehrt, ihm eine solche Auffassung zuzuschreiben.

¹³ IV.285–313.

studium" gezeichnete Skizze aus; dabei fasst er die dort umrissene Stufenfolge als das Werden der *Grammatik* auf. Der Hauptinhalt der Abhandlung lässt sich in den Thesen zusammenfassen, dass die Vergleichung der Sprachen eine allmähliche, stufenartige Entwicklung der Grammatik in der Menschheit erkennen lässt; dass diese Entwicklung durch das Streben bestimmt wird, dem Gedanken in der Rede den ihm angemessenen Ausdruck zu verschaffen; dass, endlich, dieses Streben sein Ziel erreicht, indem es zur Herausbildung einer Gattung von Sprachen — gemeint sind die indogermanischen — führt, die in der in ihnen vorherrschenden Flexionsmethode das Mittel einer den Forderungen des Geistes entsprechenden Darstellung des Gedankens besitzen.

Humboldt findet es vor allem nötig, den Vorrang der flektierenden Sprachen als Ziel der Entwicklung zu begründen; dazu muss er die Frage klären, in welcher Hinsicht überhaupt unter den Sprachen Unterschiede des Grades bestehen.

Seiner Ansicht nach bewährt sich die wesentliche Gleichheit des Menschengeschlechts auch in seinen Sprachen soweit diese nach ihren realen Möglichkeiten beurteilt werden. Alle haben eine Anlage nicht bloss zum richtigen, sondern selbst zum vollendeten Gebrauch, mit Sorgfalt bearbeitet werden sie fähig, Alles, „das Höchste und Tiefste, Stärkste und Zarteste" auszudrücken. So sind sie als Mittel des Ausdrucks, als Werkzeug, ungefähr gleich an Vorzügen und Mängeln, in dieser Hinsicht ist ihre tatsächliche Ungleichheit Folge ihrer historische bedingten ungleichen Ausbildung.¹⁴

Doch wenn auch möglich ist, meint Humboldt, eine Sprache als ein Werkzeug zu einem Zweck zu betrachten, so ist diese Betrachtungsweise beschränkt, lässt Wesentliches beiseite. Die Sprache ist nicht bloss Mittel, den Gedanken auszudrücken, sie ist auch bildendes Organ des Gedankens, und wenn sie von dieser Seite ins Auge gefasst wird, tritt der unterschiedliche Wert verschiedener Sprachen hervor. Alles, was der Mensch aus sich heraussetzt, wirkt bedingend auf sein weiteres Schaffen zurück, und das gilt auch von der Sprache. Jede wirkt eigentümlich auf das Denken, das sie hervorgebracht, zurück, und darin liegt die wahre Grundlage der Beurteilung der Sprachen. „Nicht, was in einer

¹⁴ a.a.O., 286 f. — Vgl. „Wie herabsetzende Schilderungen man auch von Stämmen einzelner Wilden ... entwerfen mag, so ist, wie man irgend genügende Nachrichten von ihrer Sprache hat, der Mensch ganz und rein darin ... Wenn nun auf diese Weise überall Anklänge von Ideen angetroffen werden, wenn man, bei gehöriger Kenntniss, für keine eine Handhabe vermissen würde, wenn eine Anzahl unläugbar bestimmte Ausdrücke besitzt, wie lässt sich da beschränkend behaupten, dass die Sprache sich noch nicht über diese oder jene Stufe des Menschendaseyns erhoben habe? Ist nicht vielmehr der Stoff zu Allem vorhanden und liegt es an mehr, als dass er innerlich, durch mannigfaches Denken und Sprechen reiner, klarer und vielfacher entwickelt werde?" (VI.227).

Sprache ausgedrückt zu werden vermag, sondern das, wozu sie aus eigener Kraft anfeuert und begeistert, entscheidet über ihre Vorzüge oder Mängel."¹⁵

Die Wirkung einer Sprache auf das Denken (führt Humboldt weiter aus) ist vorzüglich in ihrem grammatischen Bau begründet.¹⁶ Das ganze grammatische Streben der Sprache aber ist auf die Darstellung des Gedankens durch den Laut gerichtet. Humboldt nennt den Gedanken eine Verstandeshandlung, das ist eine Synthesis, Verknüpfung eines Mannigfaltigen zur Einheit. Diese Einheit soll die Rede mit Wörtern, die durch grammatische Verhältnisse verknüpft sind, darstellen; dazu muss dasjenige, was den Bestandteilen des Gedankens (Stoff und Form) entspricht, Wörter und Verknüpfungszeichen, streng unterschieden sein, und zugleich eine feste Einheit bilden.¹⁷

Eine vollständige Lösung der Aufgabe bietet nach Humboldt erst die Flexionsmethode.¹⁸ Betrachten wir eine Verbalform wie gr. *epoiēsas* oder lat. *amavit*. Dadurch, dass in einer solcher Form Stamm und „bedeutungslose“, d.h. rein auf die grammatische Funktion beschränkte Affixe sich deutlich von einander abheben, reflektiert sie den Unterschied zwischen Stofflichem und Formalem in der Bedeutung; andererseits wird durch die „Lauteinheit“ der Verbalform ein „Unzulänglichkeit der grammatischen Bezeichnung“ behoben. An der flektierten Verbalform werden nämlich Person, Zahl, Modus und Genus bezeichnet, die synthesesierende, Einheit schaffende Funktion des Verbs aber erhält keine Bezeichnung. Die Erklärung besteht nach Humboldt darin, dass das Zusammenfassen des Satzes zur Einheit naturgemäss, als eine innere Handlung, nicht durch Exponenten bezeichnet werden kann, dass es aber durch die der Gedankeneinheit entsprechende Lauteinheit der grammatischen Form indirekt-symbolisch angedeutet wird.¹⁹ Humboldt sieht in dieser Lösung der Aufgabe, Stoff und Form streng zu unterscheiden und sie zugleich zu einer

¹⁵ IV. 287 f.

¹⁶ a.a.O., 292. — Vgl. „Von dem grammatischen Baue hängt grösstentheils die Anregung ab, welche die Nationen von den Sprachen empfangen, und aus ihr blühen Philosophie, Dichtung und jedes andre wissenschaftliche Streben hervor.“ (VI.338).

¹⁷ Vgl. „Das zusammenhängende Denken ... besteht in einem Zusammennehmen des Einzelnen zu immer mehr unter sich befassender Einheit. Die Grammatik soll diesem nach Einheit trachtenden Streben in ihrem Ausdruck äusserliche Geltung verschaffen. Ihr Wesen kann also nicht einfacher und nicht allgemeiner beschrieben werden, als indem man es in die Bestimmung setzt, die Sprachelemente in Festigkeit und Innigkeit zu einer, der Gedankeneinheit entsprechenden Lauteinheit zu verknüpfen.“ (VI.339 f.).

¹⁸ IV.300. — Vgl. V.464; VI. 303; VII. 212. f.

¹⁹ VI.340.

festen Einheit zu verknüpfen, den „Abglanz der Macht der Denkkraft, die sie schuf“.²⁰

So ist nach Humboldts Ansicht die Flexionsmethode das allein angemessene Verfahren zur Darstellung des Gedankens, sie „bewahrt in sich das reine Prinzip des Sprachbaus“, alle anderen bleiben hinter den Forderungen des Denkens zurück. Daher gelten ihm die Erzeugnisse dieser Methode allein im eigentlichen Sinn als grammatisch, als grammatische Formen, die Sprachen, in denen diese Methode vorherrscht, als grammatisch gebildet. Durch sie wird die Linearität der Rede praktisch durchbrochen. „Die den Begriff und die grammatische Beziehung bezeichnenden Laute verschmelzen [durch die Lauteinheit] in demselben Wort, der Begriff und die Beziehung werden nicht locker aneinander geknüpft, sondern der Begriff erscheint, als zu dieser Beziehung gestaltet, man erblickt nicht sie und ihn, sondern sie an ihm.“²¹ Erst mit Herausbildung dieser Formen vollendet sich die Grammatik, die Abhandlung über das Entstehen der grammatischen Formen ist in diesem Sinn eine Abhandlung über das Werden der Grammatik.

Auf diese Analyse des Verhältnisses zwischen dem Gedanken und seinem sprachlichen Ausdruck gründet Humboldt seine Auffassung von der Rückwirkung der Sprache auf das Denken.

Er stellt fest, dass, wenn auch die Sprachen allgemein über Mittel zur Satzbildung verfügen, diese — abgesehen von der Flexion — nicht zu einer, den Forderungen des Denkens entsprechenden Darstellung des Gedankens genügen. Auch in einer, in dieser Hinsicht unvollkommneren Sprache gelingt es dem Geist, im Laut den Gedanken grammatisch, als Einheit grammatischer Verhältnisse zu erfassen, indem er das im Ausdruck Fehlende „hinzudenkt“. Die Bestimmtheit jener Verhältnisse aber leidet, soweit sie nicht ausgebildet in der Sprache erscheinen; auch wird der Geist durch die Bemühung des Hinzudenkens und der Unterscheidung von Form und Stoff, die im Ausdruck vermengt sind, niedergedrückt, in der „Ideenentwicklung“, der Entfaltung der Begriffe behindert.²²

Diese Mängel sind nach Humboldt in den flektierenden Sprachen im wesentlichen vermieden. Die Andeutung der notwendigen grammatischen

²⁰ IV.309. — Vgl. Manchester (1985) 128 ff.

²¹ VI.361.

²² IV.291 f., 308 f. — Vgl. „Der Geist muss mehr fremde Hilfsmittel anwenden, wo die Sprachform weniger ihr eigenthümliche hinzubringt, er kann nicht rein scheiden, wo die Sprache Formen vermischt, sein ganzes, auf die Form des Gedanken gerichtetes Streben muss ermatten, wo ihm die Sprache nicht durch klar in die Augen springende Form den wahren Schwung und Antrieb dazu ertheilt.“ (V.472).

Verhältnisse durch auf diese Funktion beschränkte Exponenten befreit den Geist von der Mühe des Hinzudenkens, so dass er sich nun, von jenen sprachlichen Fesseln unbeschwert, der Entwicklung seiner Ideen, der begrifflichen Arbeit zuwenden kann. Auch sind die reinen Exponenten der flektierenden Sprachen mehr als blossе Zeichen der grammatischen Verhältnisse, Hilfsmittel des Verständnisses; ihre hauptsächlichе Wirkung geht in Humboldts Augen auf etwas Anderes. Die klare Unterscheidung von Stoff und Form durch die Flexionsmethode erhebt das Denken auf eine höhere Stufe, auf der es ihm geläufig wird, am Gedanken die Form zu erfassen. So beruht die herausragende Wichtigkeit dieser Methode weniger auf der Hilfe, die sie dem Verständnis, als vielmehr auf der Anregung, die sie dem Geist gibt, indem sie in ihm das Interesse an der blossen Form des sprachlich ausgedrückten Gedankens erweckt.²³ In der Tat geht die Wirkung dieser Anregung nach Humboldt weit über die Förderung der Deutlichkeit und Bestimmtheit der Begriffe hinaus: sie trägt entscheidend zur Herausbildung von Philosophie, Dichtung und jedem höheren geistigen Streben bei.²⁴

Alle Sprachen sind vor die Aufgabe gestellt, die Einheit des Gedankens durch etwas von ihm völlig Verschiedenes, den körperlichen Laut darzustellen. Wir haben gesehen, dass diese Aufgabe nach Humboldts Ansicht erst in den flektierenden Sprachen ihre Lösung findet. Diese Sprachen sind daher nicht bloss vollkommener als die übrigen, die „Sprachen der niedrigeren Stufe“, welche nur unzulängliche, wenn nicht misslungene Lösungsversuche des grammatischen Problems darstellen, der Unterschied ist „nicht gänzlich ein relativer, ein bloss im Mehr oder Weniger bestehender, sondern wirklich ein absoluter“.²⁵

Die Flexionsmethode der Satzbildung ist also durch eine Kluft von den unvollkommneren geschieden; doch stellt sie mit ihnen eine Stufe — die letzte

²³ V. 464 f., 466.

²⁴ Nach Humboldts Ansicht ist im Bau der Sprachen erst mit der Flexion eine Stufe erreicht, von der aus Dichtung und wissenschaftliche Forschung in Klarheit und Freiheit möglich werden. (IV. 420).

Humboldt stellt den Flexionsendungen „grammatische Wörter“ wie Präpositionen an die Seite. Diese drücken ebenfalls bloss ein grammatische Verhältnis aus, bei ihrer Verwendung aber kommt es nicht zu einer die Gedankeneinheit symbolisierenden Lauteinheit. Humboldt unterscheidet daher die „echten“ oder „wahren“ Flexionssprachen von solchen — den modernen indogermanischen Sprachen —, die grammatische Formen weitgehend durch mit Hilfe von grammatischen Wörtern gebildete Verbindungen ersetzt haben, und damit im einzelnen Sprachen einer anderen Gattung nähern (VII. 143, 241); der wahre Begriff einer grammatischen Form bleibt ihm allein die Modifikation der „lexikalischen“ Wörter.

²⁵ IV. 310.

— in einem einheitlichen Vorgang, dem Aufstieg zur Grammatik dar:²⁶ Humboldt leitet sie historisch von der Agglutination her. In einem Brief an Bopp vom 9.2.1820. — dem ersten, den er an diesen richtet — wirft Humboldt, an Bopps *Conjugationssystem* anknüpfend, die Frage auf, ob es, wie Friedrich Schlegel behauptet, einen ursprünglichen Unterschied zwischen flektierenden und agglutinierenden Sprachen geben mag, und erklärt sich „sehr geneigt“, die Flexion, im Gegenteil, von ehemaliger Agglutination herkommend anzusehen, den Unterschied daher, in diesem, Sinn, für einen bloss geschichtlichen zu halten.²⁷ Diese Ansicht trägt er einige Monate später, in seiner ersten akademischen Abhandlung vor, um sie dann in der Abhandlung über das Entstehen der grammatischen Formen breiter auszuführen. Er gesteht in dieser, die Überzeugung nicht verlassen zu können, dass doch alle Sprachen hauptsächlich von Anfügung (d.h. Agglutination) ausgegangen sind.²⁸ Es ist ihm klar, dass diese Annahme sich empirisch nicht nachweisen lässt, gewisse Erwägungen aber lassen sie ihm zwingend erscheinen.²⁹ Er findet auch, dass diese Annahme im einzelnen Fall, wenn man eine Sprache genau analysiert, durch eine Fülle von Beispielen bestätigt wird, und dass es ihm keine Sprache vorgekommen ist, deren grammatische Formen nicht „noch selbst in ihrer höchsten Vollendung“ unverkennbare Spuren der ursprünglichen Agglutination an sich tragen.³⁰

Die Agglutination ihrerseits setzt einen früheren primitiven Zustand voraus, sie ist ja dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass die grammatischen Exponenten die Spuren ihres Ursprungs aus selbstständigen Wörtern noch merkbar an sich tragen. Humboldt nimmt daher, wie wir gesehen haben, an dass die Sprache zuerst die grammatischen Verhältnisse ohne Andeutung liess, sodass aller Zusammenhang hinzugedacht werden musste. „Car il est indubitable — schreibt er an J. Pickering am 12.3.1822. — que tous les affixes ont été autrefois des mots séparés et distincts et ayant un sens en eux-mêmes.“³¹

Was nach Humboldt die Agglutination von der Flexion unterscheidet, ist die unvollkommene Einheit des durch jenes Verfahren gebildeten Wortes; auch

²⁶ In einer nicht gedruckten Abhandlung „Über das Verbum in den Amerikanischen Sprachen“ nennt Humboldt den Unterschied zwischen den „Sprachen der höheren Stufen“ und den übrigen einen wahren und wesentlichen, aber stufenartigen. (Steinthal, 1884:68.91). Die Abhandlung ist nur in der englischen Übersetzung von Daniel G. Brinton (*The Philosophical Grammar of American Languages*. 1885) erhalten, daraus sind einige Seiten von V. Heeschen (1972:67–69) rückübersetzt worden.

²⁷ Briefwechsel mit Bopp. 5.

²⁸ IV.301.

²⁹ a.a.O., 296; Briefwechsel mit A. W. Schlegel. 115 ff. (30.12.1822).

³⁰ IV. 18, 297.

³¹ Müller-Vollmer (1976) 282 f.

hat das Affix seine ursprüngliche Sachbedeutung noch nicht gänzlich abgestreift, das Wort zeigt nur die enge Verbindung von zwei Begriffen, statt eines Begriffs in einer bestimmten Beziehung. Die Agglutination erhebt sich zur Flexion, indem die Verbindung zu einer Einheit zusammenwächst, deren Bestandteile sich nie getrennt vorfinden und semantisch nicht von gleicher Ordnung sind, da einer von ihnen „bedeutungslos“, blosser Andeutung eines grammatischen Verhältnisses ist. Damit entsteht etwas qualitativ Neues, Höheres; „wie dies entstanden — stellt Humboldt fest — ist für die Wirkung gleichgültig“.³² Dieser Vorgang vollzieht sich mit der Zeit, aber nicht allein durch sie, entscheidend ist der schöpferische Akt, in dem die ursprüngliche Verbindung auf eine neue Weise, nach einem neuen Prinzip aufgefasst, strukturell umgedeutet wird.³³

Bopp stimmt mit Humboldt in der Annahme überein, dass die indogermanische Flexion in der Hauptsache auf Agglutination, d.h. auf Zusammensetzung ursprünglich bedeutsamer Bestandteile zurückgeht; in der Bewertung des Vorgangs weicht er gänzlich von ihm ab. Eine Wortform, in der die Funktion des grammatischen Exponenten, die Andeutung, die von ihm ausgeht, nicht mehr in seiner eigenen Bedeutung begründet ist, ihm nur konventionell anhaftet, erscheint Bopp nicht als eine neue, höhere Einheit, sondern, im Gegenteil, als blosser Verdunkelung des ursprünglichen Verhältnisses, ein Herabsteigen von der vollendeten Einrichtung, „in welcher die einzelnen Glieder in genauem Verhältnisse zu einander standen, und alles Abgeleitete noch durch ein sichtbares, ungetrübtes Band an das, wovon es ausgegangen, sich anschloss.“³⁴ Wenn Humboldt betont, dass der Ursprung von Verbalformen wie lat. *amavit*, oder gr. *epoiēsas* für ihre Wirkung gleichgültig ist, so mag das gegen Bopp gesagt sein, der das durch Umwandlung des Alten entstandene Neue nicht gelten lassen will.

Die Flexion als angemessene Darstellung der Gedankeneinheit setzt nach Humboldt eine klare Vorstellung und Unterscheidung der grammatischen Verhältnisse voraus. Er verwirft daher (ohne Namen zu nennen) die den beiden Schlegel gemeinsame Ansicht von der Ursprünglichkeit der Flexion in einem Teile der Menschheit. Er findet, dass diese Denker, indem sie am Anfang der Nationen und Sprachen ein Geschlecht annehmen, das im Besitz einer höchst gebildeten Sprache war, in der Tat ein Wunder annehmen; wer die Entstehung

³² IV.300.

³³ a.a.O., 306. — Vgl. „Die Zusammensetzung wird erst dunkel, wenn ... die Sprache, einem anderen Gefühle folgend, sie als Anbildung [d.h. als Flexion] behandelt.“ (VII.112).

³⁴ Bopp (1816)56;(1827)252.

der Flexion als vorwaltende Methode der Satzbildung natürlich erklären will, müsse in ihr das Resultat, und zwar das letzte und höchste, der vorhergehenden Entwicklung sehen.³⁵

Humboldt weist noch von einer anderen Seite die Friedrich Schlegelsche Einteilung der Sprachen zurück. Er stellt fest, dass die Agglutination in jeder Sprache, auch in den flektierenden, eine grosse Rolle spielt, dass die Erfahrung keine Sprache zeigt, die sich streng auf eine der beiden Methoden beschränkte. Keine ist rein, alle gemischt, eine „Flexionssprache“ ist nur eine solche, in der die Flexion als Methode der Redeverknüpfung vorherrscht, den Bau der Sprache bestimmt.³⁶ Humboldt lehnt daher Friederich Schlegels Ansicht, nach welcher Agglutination und Flexion ursprünglich und wesentlich einander ausschliessende Methoden sind, gegensätzliche Verfahren, in denen sich die uranfängliche Gespaltenheit des Menschengeschlechts widerspiegelt, nachdrücklich ab, er sieht in dieser Ansicht einen aus mangelhafter Sprachkenntnis entstandenen Irrtum.³⁷

In der Abhandlung über das Entstehen der grammatischen Formen schildert Humboldt das Werden der Grammatik als eine stufenweis fortschreitende Entwicklung der Methoden der Satzbildung. Er betont aber, um ein Missverständnis zu verhüten, gleich am Anfang der Abhandlung, dass diese Schilderung nicht unmittelbar auf die einzelnen Sprachen zu beziehen ist, dass er diesen damit keine vollkommen gleiche Entwicklung anweisen will. Die allgemeinen Naturgesetze der Sprachentwicklung — führt er aus — machen sich wohl in allen Sprachen geltend, aber in jeder in einer besonderen, durch das Wirken von Zeit und Nationaleigentümlichkeit bestimmten Weise. Daher sei es nicht zu erwarten, dass jede Nation alle Stufen durchläuft, einige werden diese oder jene überspringen, sogar das Ziel auf einem nicht zu berechnenden, schöpferischen Weg erreichen. Aus dieser Einsicht folgt auch, dass eine

³⁵ IV.296. — Ähnlich wendet Herder gegen die Annahme eines göttlichen Ursprungs der Sprache, wie sie von J.P. Süssmilch vertreten wurde, ein, es sei gänzlich verkehrt, den vollendeten Zustand der Sprache an den Anfang zu stellen, und eine wirkliche „gebildete“ Sprache, „an der auch selbst bei dem rohesten Volk Jahrhunderte arbeiteten“, für eine werdende zu nehmen. (1877[1768]:66–69).

³⁶ IV.298, 299; VI.275; VII.144. — Vgl. „Ich rede mit grossem Bedacht hier immer nur von Methoden, und verwechsle diesen Ausdruck nicht ohne besondere Gründe mit dem der Sprachen. Denn es liesse sich leicht zeigen, dass es wohl keine Sprache giebt, die nicht in ihrer Grammatik alle diese Methoden oder doch die meisten anwendete ... Es gehören allerdings auch einzelne Sprachen einzelnen Methoden hauptsächlich an und tragen entschieden ihren Charakter an sich.“ (VI.387 f.).

³⁷ Zu den in der vorhergehenden Anmerkung angeführten Stellen vgl. noch *Briefwechsel mit Bopp*. 11 (4.1.1821).

vollkommenere Sprache nicht jünger zu sein braucht, als eine weniger vollkommene.³⁸

Damit erhebt sich die Frage nach dem Subjekt der von Humboldt geschilderten Entwicklung.

In der Mannigfaltigkeit der Sprachen unterscheidet Humboldt verschiedene abstrakte Methoden, die zusammen die Art, den Satz aus Wörtern zusammenzufügen, erschöpfen. Sie treten in den einzelnen Sprachen vermischt und individuell bestimmt auf, nach ihrem inneren Verhältnis stellen sie einen Stufengang dar. Dieser reflektiert nach Humboldts Meinung eine wirkliche fortschreitende Entwicklung, die des Sprachvermögens der Menschheit, das der Vielfalt der Sprachen zugrunde liegt, und damit der Mittelpunkt des Sprachstudiums ist.³⁹

2. In der Abhandlung über das Entstehen der grammatischen Formen betrachtet Humboldt, wie wir gesehen haben, die Flexionsmethode als Resultat einer natürlichen Entwicklung, und weist die Ansicht der beiden Schlegel, nach der es Sprachen gegeben habe, in welchen diese Methode von Anfang an vorherrschend war, zurück. Die Frage wird in den Briefen, die Humboldt in den Jahren 1822–1826 mit August Wilhelm Schlegel gewechselt hat, eingehend diskutiert; dabei fällt scharfes Licht auf den weiteren Zusammenhang, in dem sie steht.

Den Anlass zur Diskussion gab Humboldt in seinem Brief vom 1. November 1821 mit der Bemerkung, er habe niemals die Meinung Friedrich Schlegels teilen können, der Flexion und Agglutination als zwei, in ihrem Ursprung streng geschiedene Methoden der Sprachbildung ansah.⁴⁰ August Wilhelm steht in dieser Frage auf der Seite seines Bruders — und nicht nur in dieser. Er teilt im wesentlichen — abgesehen von der religiösen Verankerung — auch die umfassende Konzeption, die bei diesem zugrunde liegt. So muss er am Ende der Diskussion, in einem Brief vom 21. Februar 1826., feststellen, dass die Abweichung ihrer Ansichten sich nicht nur auf das historische Verhältnis von Agglutination und Flexion, sondern in der Tat auf den Ursprung und

³⁸ IV.285; *Briefwechsel mit A.W.Schlegel*. 52f. (19.5.1822), 117f. (30.12.1822).

³⁹ a.a.O., 286. — So wäre es nach Humboldt zu erklären, dass Sprachen und Sprachstämme, die in keinem historischen Zusammenhang stehen, in den Prinzipien ihrer Bildung ein stufenartiges Vorrücken verraten. „Wenn dies aber der Fall ist — erklärt Humboldt —, so muss dieser Zusammenhang äusserlich nicht verbundener Erscheinungen in einer allgemeinen inneren Ursach liegen, welche nur die Entwicklung der wirkenden Kraft [d.h.des Sprachvermögens] sein kann.“ (VII.20).

⁴⁰ *Briefwechsel mit A.W.Schlegel*. 32 (1.11.1821).

den frühesten Gang der menschlichen Kultur bezieht.⁴¹ Es ist zu beachten, dass Humboldt Exemplare seiner in der Akademie im Januar 1822 gelesenen Abhandlung über das Entstehen der grammatischen Formen erst Mitte 1824 versenden konnte, August Wilhelm bezieht sich daher im Laufe der Diskussion nicht auf diese, sondern auf die frühere Abhandlung „Über das vergleichende Sprachstudium“, die er am Ende 1821 erhielt.

Nach August Wilhelms Ansicht ist es bei der Betrachtung der Geschichte der menschlichen Kultur unerlässlich, das Diskursive vom Intuitiven wohl zu unterscheiden. Dieses geht immer dem anderen voraus, stammt aus einer, für unsere Geschichtsforschung unerreichbaren Vorzeit.⁴² Dieser Charakter des Intuitiven kennzeichnet die ersten grossen Grundlagen der menschlichen Kultur, sie sind daher nicht zu begreifen ohne die Annahme einer ursprünglich erleuchteten, vor anderen ausgezeichneten Menschengattung, die, statt der später von aussen her mühsam erworbenen Erfahrung, eine divinatorische „Durchschauung“ der Natur besass.⁴³ Auch die „edleren“ (d.h. die flektierenden) Sprachen gehören zu dieser frühen Phase der mensche Intelligenz, gehen auf die Zeit, die vor der Geschichte liegt, zurück, die Sprache, aus der sie hervorgegangen sind, muss daher „eine unendliche Fülle von intuitiven und imaginativen Reichthümern in Wörtern und Formen“ besessen haben.⁴⁴ So erklärt sich für August Wilhelm seine Beobachtung, dass die Flexionssprachen im Lauf der Zeit in grammatischer (d.h. morphologischer) Hinsicht sich nicht bilden, sondern entbilden, ihren ursprünglichen Charakter allmählich verlieren.⁴⁵

Aufgrund dieser Konzeption behauptet er, in Übereinstimmung mit seinem Bruder, die Ursprünglichkeit der Flexion, und lehnt ihre Ableitung aus der Agglutination ab; diese setzt nach ihm schon einen gewissen Grad von Analyse und Abstraktion voraus, stellt damit ein Herabsteigen von der Intuition dar.⁴⁶

Auch Humboldt will zwei Arten der Entwicklung unterscheiden, eine, die der Kausalität untersteht, und daher logisch verfolgt werden kann, in diesem Sinn mechanisch erscheint, und eine andere, genialische, die weder schrittweise nachzuweisen, noch vorauszusehen ist.⁴⁷ Die Möglichkeit der letzteren aber be-

⁴¹ a.a.0.,187 f.(21.2.1826).

⁴² a.a.0.,71.(4.6.1822).

⁴³ a.a.0.,188.(21.2.1826).

⁴⁴ a.a.0.,73.(4.6.1822).

⁴⁵ a.a.0.,109.(21-23.12.1822).

⁴⁶ a.a.0.,74.(4.6.1822).

⁴⁷ a.a.0.,53.(19.5.1822).

freit uns nicht von der Pflicht, zunächst eine „menschliche und geschichtliche“ Erklärung zu suchen, noch erlaubt es, die Grundlagen der menschlichen Kultur auf ein erdichtetes Geschlecht, das übermenschliche Fähigkeiten besessen habe, zurückzuführen, und in der Sprache das Vollkommene, die Flexion, an den Anfang zu setzen, damit das Wunder als Erklärung hinzustellen.⁴⁸ Er gesteht zwar, auch ihm sei nichts so widrig, als bloss mechanische Erklärung, er findet aber, dass Schlegel das Mechanische, „auch wo es sein kann und ist“, verdrängen will.⁴⁹

Während Schlegel in der Sprachbildung alle wahrhaft fruchtbaren, schöpferischen Prinzipien der entferntesten Urzeit zuschreibt, das Unvollkommene dagegen, „das Zusammenflicken mit dem Verstande“, für das Machwerk späterer Zeiten ansieht,⁵⁰ findet Humboldt in den Sprachen eine fortschreitende Entwicklung, diese nimmt in den einzelnen Fällen verschiedene, auch genialische Wege, doch strebt sie nach demselben Ziel, ist ein Aufstieg zur Flexion, zumeist durch die Stufe der Agglutination hindurch.⁵¹

Die Einheit des Menschengeschlechts an Fähigkeit zur Kultur wird von August Wilhelm verneint. Er unterscheidet ursprünglich selbsttätige, für fremde Anregung empfängliche und endlich ganz „tellurische“ Völker, „bei denen der himmlische Funken niemals zünden konnte“ (Beispiel: die Chinesen), und betrachtet diese Unterschiede als physisch bedingt und erblich.⁵² Indem Humboldt in den Menschengesprächen eine in ihrem Streben gleiche Entwicklung erkennt, beweist er seine Überzeugung, dass die Naturanlage zur Sprache eine allgemeine des Menschen ist, dass — wie er später in dem offenen Brief an Abel Rémusat schreibt — der göttliche Funken durch alle Idiome, selbst die unvollkommensten und am wenigsten gebildeten hindurch leuchtet.⁵³

In dem Brief, mit dem er seine Abhandlung über das Entstehen der grammatischen Formen an August Wilhelm übersendet, fasst Humboldt die Punkte, in denen ihre Ansichten auseinandergehen, zusammen, um zu konstatieren,

⁴⁸ a.a.O., 116. (30.12.1822).

⁴⁹ a.a.O., 195 f. (5.3.1826).

⁵⁰ a.a.O., 72 f. (4.6.1822). — Vgl., in demselben Brief: „Ich kann die Zeit nicht unbedingt als günstig für die Entwicklung der Sprachen betrachten, am wenigsten nach einem chronologischen Maasstabe. Die schöpferische Sprachbildung erscheint wie ein Moment, dann folgten oft lange Zeiträume der Vergessenheit und Verwahrlosung, und endlich die späte Nachhülfe, um sich ein brauchbares Werkzeug zur Handhabung der Erfahrungswelt zu verschaffen.“

⁵¹ a.a.O., 118 f. (30.12.1822).

⁵² a.a.O., 72 (4.6.1822). — Vgl. „Ich glaube nämlich, dass es ursprünglich tellurische, siderische und spirituelle Sprache gibt.“ a.a.O., 187 (21.2.1826).

⁵³ V.287.

dass sie sich nur in einem begegnen: in der Ansicht, dass es zwischen den wahrhaft geformten (d.h. den flektierenden) und den beinahe formlosen Sprachen einen wesentlichen Unterschied gibt.⁵⁴ Das ist ein mageres Ergebnis; man ist versucht einen Lapsus anzunehmen: Humboldts Abhandlung schliesst in der Tat mit der Behauptung, dass die grammatisch gebildeten Sprachen *von allen anderen* durch einen absoluten Unterschied getrennt sind, und das entspricht auch der Ansicht August Wilhelms.

Der Gegensatz zwischen Humboldt und August Wilhelm Schlegel, den wir im Vorhergehenden betrachtet haben, reflektiert einen zu ihrer Zeit aktuellen, gesellschaftlichen.

Mit der Aufklärung kommt eine Auffassung der Geschichte auf, nach der diese einen, ungeachtet aller Rückfälle und Stagnationen unaufhaltsamen Fortschritt der Menschheit, und zwar durch deren eigene Tat, darstellt. Auf diese Geschichtsauffassung, die die historische Natur, und damit die Vergänglichkeit der Gesellschaftsordnungen verkündet, beruft sich das Bürgertum in seinem Kampf gegen die alte Ordnung. Daher die Bemühung der Verteidiger dieser, jene Deutung der Geschichte zu widerlegen, eine andere, entgegengesetzte an ihre Stelle zu setzen.

Eine Version dieser legt Schelling in seiner *Philosophie und Religion* (1804) vor. Er verneint rundweg, dass das „gegenwärtige Menschengeschlecht“ sich von sich selbst aus der Tierheit und dem Instinkt zur Freiheit emporgehoben habe. Zum Beweis beruft er sich darauf, dass die gesamte Geschichte auf einen gemeinschaftlichen Ursprung aller Künste, Wissenschaften, Religionen und gesellschaftlichen Einrichtung hinweise, und der Anfang der Geschichte schon eine von früherer Höhe herabgesunkene Kultur zeige. Aus diesen angeblichen Tatsachen zieht er den Schluss, dass die gegenwärtige Menschengattung die Erziehung höherer Naturen genossen habe, alle seine Kultur und Wissenschaft nur durch Überlieferung und Lehre eines früheren Geschlechtes besitze.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ *Briefwechsel mit A.W.Schlegel*. 167 f. (24.5.1824). — Mit diesem Brief hat Humboldt seine Abhandlung über das Entstehen der grammatischen Formen zugesandt. Ein Jahr später, in einem Brief vom 17.6.1825., kommt er noch einmal auf sie zurück, diesmal um sie zu beurteilen: „Ich halte noch heute die in derselben entwickelten Ideen für die richtigen, aber jene Abhandlung hat zweierlei gegen sich. Sie führt das in ihr Enthaltene nicht genug aus, und ich war auch der darin enthaltenen Ideen, als ich sie schrieb, noch nicht vollkommen Meister. Sie wurden mir erst klar, inddem ich sie schrieb, was immer nicht gut ist.“ (a.a.O.,177).S.noch VI.221.

⁵⁵ Schelling (1804) 64–67.

In seinem Indienbuch (1808) verwirft Friedrich Schlegel die „fast allgemein angenommene“ Meinung, dass der Mensch überhaupt von einem Zustand tierischer Dumpfheit angefangen sich erst allmählich durch Not getrieben zu einer hohen Stufe materieller und geistiger Kultur emporgearbeitet habe. Diese gottlose, in ihrer Tendenz materialistische Annahme qualifiziert er als „willkürliche Dichtung“ ab. Doch weist er sie nicht unbedingt zurück. Er lässt sie für die Menschheit im allgemeinen gelten, behauptet aber, dass es auch ein gottbegnadetes Urvolk gegeben habe, das „gleich von Anfang“ im Besitze der „klarsten und innigsten Besonnenheit“ gewesen und von dem alle Bildung ausgegangen ist. So erklärt sich nach ihm der Unterschied zwischen den Sprachen durch Flexion und den übrigen, die die Spuren eines dürftigen und roheren Ursprungs an sich tragen.⁵⁶

Diese phantastische, dabei tendenziöse Hypothese vom Ursprung der Kultur und der Sprache im Menschengeschlecht hat im Restaurationszeitalter im Kampf mit dem Erbe der Aufklärung einen gewissen Anklang gefunden. Hegel spottet in seinen geschichtsphilosophischen Vorlesungen (1830) über die „von einer gewissen Seite her heutzutage viel in Umlauf gesetzte Vorstellung“, dass es ein erstes und ältestes Volk gegeben habe, das, unmittelbar von Gott belehrt, in vollkommener Einsicht gelebt habe, und von dem alle Wissenschaft uns nur überliefert sei. Er deutet auch die Tendenz dieser „Vorstellung“ an: ihr ist „der erste paradiesische Zustand der Menschen, der schon früher von Theologen nach ihrer Weise ausgebildet wurde, wieder aufgenommen, aber anderen [nämlich restaurativen] Bedürfnissen entsprechend gestaltet worden“.⁵⁷

Humboldt bestätigt zur gleichen Zeit den starken Einfluss dieser rückwärts gewandten Ideologie und seine ablehnende Stellung dazu. In einem Brief vom 22. Mai.1824, mit dem seine Abhandlung über das Entstehen der gramatischen Formen an Welcker zusendet, bemerkt er, dass er sich bei dieser Abhandlung auch von einer Klasse von Lesern wenig versprechen dürfe, welche das höchste Altertum ganz anders als er ansehen, einen Unterschied unter den Nationen machen, der sich kaum noch dem Grade nach messen lässt, eine ursprüngliche Vollkommenheit auch in der Sprache, gewissermassen eine Offenbarung annehmen, von dem man nachher herabgesunken ist.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Fr.Schlegel (1975 [1808]) 167.169.171.193.

⁵⁷ Hegel (1966) 31,158.

⁵⁸ *Briefe an Welcker*.115. — Es heisst weiter: „Diese Ansicht hat Friedrich Schlegel zuerst auf die Sprachen angewendet. So unvollkommen aber auch seine Kenntniss selbst des Indischen war, und so sehr ihm alle nur einigermaßen allgemeine Sprachkunde mangelte, so hat dies System viel Beifall gefunden.“ Humboldt hat schon früher, in einem Brief vom 15.12.1822 bemerkt: „Es scheint mir überhaupt eine Tendenz, welcher man nicht strenge

3. Humboldt hat in den folgenden Jahren im Ergebnis weiterer Untersuchungen seine in der Abhandlung über das Entstehen der grammatischen Formen vertretenen Ansichten in wesentlich Punkten modifiziert.

Am Ende jener Abhandlung suchte er einer möglichen Einwendung gegen das im Vorhergehenden Ausgeführte begegnen.⁵⁹ Das Chinesische galt für eine Sprache, die die grammatischen Verhältnisse nur durch abgesonderte Partikeln und durch Wortstellung andeutet, vom Standpunkt der klassischen Sprachen keine Grammatik besitzt. So musste es, wenn man in den Flexionssprachen den Gipfel der Sprachbildung erblickte, als die unterste Stufe erscheinen;⁶⁰ wie konnte es aber, als eine primitive Sprache, das Organ einer seit Jahrtausenden blühenden Literatur sein? Humboldt bemühte sich, die berechtigte Einwendung, unter anderem, mit der in diesem Zusammenhang mehr geistreichen als befriedigenden Bemerkung zu beantworten, dass das Überwinden einer Schwierigkeit kein Beweis dafür ist, dass sie nicht bestand. In seiner Besprechung von Humboldts Abhandlung⁶¹ machte von seiner Seite der Sinologe Abel Rémusat (1788–1832) auf das Problem aufmerksam, wie es doch einer Sprache, die keine grammatischen Formen kennt und in der so gut wie jedes Wort abwechselnd die Funktionen aller Wortarten verrichten kann, möglich ist, „klare, feste und positive“ Regeln zum genauen Ausdruck des Gedankens mit all seinen möglichen Modifikationen zu finden.

Humboldts im Jahr 1827 erschienener offener Brief an Rémusat zeigt an, dass er nach einem genaueren Studium des Chinesischen seine Ansicht von dieser Sprache gründlich geändert hat.⁶² Er sieht jetzt ihre wesentliche Eigentümlichkeit darin, dass sie die Grammatik, das heisst die Verknüpfung der

genug ihre Beweise abfordern kann, eine vorhistorische Periode anzunehmen, in welcher ein über den ältesten, uns bekannten historischen sich so sehr erhebender Zustand des Menschengeschlechts sollte Statt gefunden haben.“ (a.a.o., 73).

⁵⁹ IV.310–312.

⁶⁰ Vgl. „Im Chinesischen sind die Partikeln, welche die Nebenbestimmung der Bedeutung bezeichnen, für sich bestehende von der Wurzel ganz unabhängige einsilbige Worte. Die Sprache dieser sonst so verfeinerten Nation stünde also grade auf der untersten Stufe ...“ (Fr. Schlegel 1975:157)

⁶¹ *Journal Asiatique* 5(1824) 51–61.

⁶² „Lettre à Monsieur Abel-Rémusat, sur la nature des formes grammaticales en général, et sur le génie de la langue Chinoise en particulier.“ (V.254–308). Die „Lettre“ ist vom 7.3.1826 datiert, sie erschien mit einem „Avertissement“ und „Observations“ von Rémusat selbst im nächsten Jahr (der „Avertissement“ ist abgedruckt V.255 f., die „Observations“ in den *Gesammelten Werken* VII.366–381). Die Abhandlung „Über den grammatischen Bau der Chinesischen Sprache“ (V.300–324) ist „eine beinahe wörtliche Übersetzung einiger Abschnitte des französischen Sendschreibens an Rémusat“ (so Leitzmann V.480), sie wurde in der Klassensitzung des 20.3.1826 gelesen (also vor dem Erscheinen der „Lettre“) und ist nicht veröffentlicht worden. – Harbsmeier (1979) enthält ausser der deutschen Übersetzung

Wörter zur Einheit des Satzes, nicht, wie die flektierenden Sprachen auf die Unterscheidung der Wortarten gründet, die Wörter zum Gebrauch im Satz nicht zubereitet. Sie schlägt auf diese Weise einen anderen Weg überhaupt als jene Sprachen ein, stellt sich auf einen, von dem ihren gänzlich verschiedenen Boden.⁶³ Dadurch steht sie zwar als Organ des Denkens unter ihnen, hindert namentlich den freien Schwung des Gedankens in weit ausholenden Perioden, wozu grammatische Formen unentbehrlich sind.⁶⁴ Auf der anderen Seite gewinnt das Chinesische durch den Verzicht auf die Möglichkeiten, die die Klassifikation der Wörter bietet, eigentümliche Vorzüge, und in der konsequenten Durchführung ihres Prinzips stellt es sich den klassischen Sprachen ebenbürtig zur Seite.⁶⁵

So aufgefasst tritt aber das Chinesische aus dem einheitlichen Entwicklungsgang der Grammatik, den Humboldt noch in seiner Diskussion mit A.W. Schlegel angenommen hat, heraus.

Diese Einsicht wird der Sprachtypologie, die Humboldt nun umreißt, zugrunde gelegt.⁶⁶ Er geht von der Frage aus, mit welcher Konsequenz eine Sprache in ihrem Bau ein Prinzip der Satzbildung durchführt, und gelangt zum Resultat, dass es zunächst zwei Sprachen, bzw. Sprachgruppen gibt, die in dieser Hinsicht zwei feste Endpunkte, zwei Pole bilden. Das Chinesische auf der einen, die indogermanischen Flexionssprachen „und vielleicht noch andere“⁶⁷ auf der anderen Seite beruhen auf entgegengesetzten Prinzipien, sind gleichsam die vollkommene Grammatik und die Grammatiklosigkeit, doch stimmen sie in der Konsequenz, mit der jedes ihr eigenes Prinzip durchführt, überein. Die Masse der übrigen Sprachen befindet sich in der Mitte zwischen diesen

der „Lettre“ eine wichtige, aufschlussreiche Untersuchung „Zur philosophischen Grammatik des Altchinesischen im Anschluss an Humboldts Brief“ (91–279).

⁶³ Eine Zusammenfassung der Humboldtschen Thesen findet sich V.281 f. – Nach einer Bemerkung Humboldts in seinem Brief an Christian K.J. von Bunsen (1791–1860) vom 8. Juni 1827 ist der eigentliche Gegenstand seiner Diskussion mit Rémusat seine Ansicht, dass man, um eine Sprache in ihrer wahren Eigentümlichkeit aufzufassen, ihre ausdrückliche, ihr individuell eigentümliche Grammatik von einer, die beliebig aus einer anderen in sie hineingetragen ist, unterscheiden muss. (Freese 1955:898).

⁶⁴ V.292–294. (Humboldts Urteil in einem Satz zusammengefasst: „Mais malgré cet avantage la langue Chinoise me semble, sans aucun doute, très-inférieure, comme organe de la pensée, aux langues qui sont parvenues à donner un certain degré de perfection au système opposé au sien.“ a.a.O.,292).

⁶⁵ V.291 f. – Die Vorzüge des Chinesischen werden ausführlich geschildert VII.271.

⁶⁶ V. 282 f., ebenso VII.274,344. —Über Humboldts Sprachtypologie ist vor allem an die umfassende und tiefdringende Behandlung des Materials durch E.Coseriu (1972) zu erinnern.

⁶⁷ Humboldt denkt hier an die semitischen Sprachen. Diese sind ihm ebenfalls flektierend, doch weniger vollkommen als die „sanskritischen“. (VII.274).

Endpunkten, sie streben nach der Vollendung, die von den flektierenden erreicht ist, sie unterscheiden sich von diesen nur durch den Grad, nicht der Gattung nach,⁶⁸ an dem Ziel ihres Strebens aber gemessen erweisen sie sich als mangelhaft oder verfehlt.⁶⁹ Entsprechend wird in der Kawi-Eileitung die Agglutination, dieses „Zwitterwesen“ (als Beugung gebrauchte Zusammensetzung) unter den überhaupt möglichen grundsätzlich verschiedenen Methoden der Satzbildung nicht erwähnt, an ihre Stelle tritt die Einverleibung⁷⁰ (die schon in der Abhandlung über das Entstehen der grammatischen Formen, aber nicht in dieser Auffassung angeführt wird).⁷¹

Aus der „Lettre“ geht hervor, dass Humboldt auch seine Auffassung von der Entstehung der flektierenden Sprachen gegenüber der früheren modifiziert hat.

Nach der Abhandlung über das Entstehen der grammatischen Formen stellen jene im wesentlichen Vollendung und Abschluss einer geschichtlichen Entwicklung dar, in dieser Hinsicht ist der Unterschied zwischen ihnen und den übrigen, als mehr oder weniger misslungenen Versuchen absolut. Doch sind sie genetisch überwiegend aus agglutinierenden Sprachen auf „natürlichen, aus dem Wesen des Menschen und den Ereignissen der Nationen erklärlichen Wegen“⁷² hervorgegangen. Daher lehnt Humboldt (wie wir gesehen haben) die Schlegelsche Annahme eines Urvolkes, das vom Anfang an im Besitz einer flektierenden Sprache gewesen wäre, ab; damit würde man nach seiner Ansicht diesem Volk Fähigkeiten und Leistungen, die Menschenkräften sonst unerreichbar sind, zuschreiben.

In der „Lettre“ sehen wir Humboldt diese Konzeption der allmählichen, einheitlich-natürlichen Entwicklung der Grammatik im menschlichen Geschlecht aufgeben, um sich Ansichten zu nähern, die er in der früheren Abhandlung und noch in seinem Briefwechsel mit August Wilhelm Schlegel bekämpft hat.⁷³

Er beteuert zwar, dass er die Nationen, denen wir die flektierenden Sprachen verdanken, aus der fortschreitenden Bewegung, der die Menschheit all-

⁶⁸ VII.117 f.

⁶⁹ Von diesen heisst es VII. 274: „Weiter aber, als diese negativen Eigenschaften, nicht aller grammatischen Bezeichnung zu entbehren, und keine Flexion zu besitzen, haben diese mannigfaltig unter sich verschiedenen Sprachen nichts mit einander gemein, und können daher nur auf ganz unbestimmte Weise in Eine Classe geworfen werden.“

⁷⁰ VII.144.

⁷¹ IV.290,302

⁷² a.a.O.,298.

⁷³ V.285–287.

gemein „unterworfen“ ist, nicht ausnehmen will. Doch kann er nicht zugeben, dass alle Sprachen sich durch eine gleiche mechanische (d.h. ursächlich verknüpfte) Bewegung von ihren rohesten Anfängen zur Vervollkommenung „geschleppt“ hätten; die Vollkommensten unter ihnen weisen nach ihm auf einen anderen Ursprung hin. Er ist nun bereit anzunehmen, dass die allgemeine schöpferische Kraft der Nationen ausnahmsweise, unter besonders glücklichen Umständen (namentlich im primitiven Zustand der noch empfänglicheren Natur) die Grenzen, die dem Rest der Sterblichen gesetzt sind, überschreiten konnte, um Sprachen hervorzubringen, die während einer langen Reihe von Jahrhunderten zu den feinsten und erhabensten Gedanken begeistern sollten. Diese Sprachen — meint Humboldt — setzen nicht unbedingt eine frühere Stufe voraus, von der sie sich erhoben hätten, sie mögen ihre Struktur ihrer ursprünglichen Gestaltung verdanken.⁷⁴

Humboldt hält auch weiterhin daran fest, dass das Verhältnis der verschiedenen Gestaltungen der grammatischen Form zum „vollendeten Begriff“ derselben sich natürlicherweise in Graden ausdrücken, als eine Stufenleiter konstruieren lässt. Aber mit der Typologie, die er in der „Lettre“ aufgestellt hat, und mit der Annahme, dass das Auftreten der flektierenden Sprachen unvermittelt, eine unmittelbar schöpferische Kraft voraussetzend vor sich gegangen sein müsse, gibt er seine frühere, namentlich in der Abhandlung über das Entstehen der grammatischen Formen ausgeführte Ansicht, nach der diese Stufenleiter als Widerspiegelung einer historischen, fortschreitend zusammenhängenden Bewegung aufzufassen sei, auf. „Jene Folge der grammatischen Methoden — stellt er in der Schrift „Von dem grammatischen Bau der Sprachen“ (1828–1829) fest⁷⁵ — soll durchaus nichts, als die Thatsache aussprechen, in welchen steigenden Graden jede die Idee der Grammatik (zugleich auf Vollständigkeit und reine Formalität gesehen) an Lauten der Sprache sinnlich ausdrückt.“

Humboldt selber behauptet in der um die gleiche Zeit verfassten Arbeit „Über die Verschiedenheiten des menschlichen Sprachbaues“, dass er seine Auffassung der grammatische Stufenleiter im Grunde nicht geändert hat; er habe wohl in seiner Abhandlung vom Jahr 1822 die Verschiedenheit der grammatischen Formen in den Sprachen als ein Entstehen dargestellt, doch habe dieser

⁷⁴ V.285.Ebenso VI.275.

⁷⁵ VI.387.—Humboldt fügt zu dieser Erklärung hinzu: „Dies ist schon darum wichtig, weil es das Einzige ist, auf dem man auf diesem Gebiete ganz factisch fassen kann ... Es ist daher dies die Thatsache, welche die Methodik des grammatischen Sprachbaus, die besondern Sprachen zergliedernd, aufstellen muss, und an die sich alle den Einfluss und die Entstehung der Grammatik betreffenden Fragen insofern anschliessen müssen, als sie überhaupt einer historischen (d.h.empirischen) Basis bedürfen.“

„genetische Begriff“ weder damals noch später wesentlich auf seine Ansicht eingewirkt.⁷⁶ Die Abhandlung aber widerstrebt der späteren Erklärung ihres Verfassers. Sie enthält nicht nur keinen Hinweis darauf, dass die Konstruktion der grammatischen Bezeichnungsarten als ein einheitlich zusammenhängender historischer Vorgang nur „idealisch“, als Darstellung ihres inneren Verhältnisses zu nehmen sei,⁷⁷ sie zeigt sich vielmehr durchdrungen von der Überzeugung, dass diese Konstruktion in der Tat die Wirklichkeit reflektiert. Diese Ansicht begegnet uns auch sonst in Humboldts Äußerungen aus der Periode, in der die Abhandlung entstand. Die Diskussion Humboldts mit A.W. Schlegel in 1822 ist in dieser Beziehung besonders lehrreich. Sie dreht sich gerade um die Deutung der grammatischen Stufenleiter und da bekennt sich Humboldt unmissverständlich und mit Nachdruck zu der realistischen Auffassung dieser. „Mir scheint es vielmehr natürlich — schreibt er an A.W. Schlegel am 30.Dez.1822, ein Jahr nachdem er seine Abhandlung über die grammatischen Formen in der Akademie gelesen hat —, dass es zuerst in der Sprache...keine Grammatik gab, d.h. keine, in sich bedeutungslosen Zeichen für das grammatisch Formelle. Lauter Wörter mit materieller Bedeutung standen neben einander, wie in der Schriftsprache der Chinesen. Daraus wurden, der Regel nach, die meisten nachherigen Flexionen. In dem Übergange zu diesen liegen alle mir bekannten Amerikanischen Sprachen mit verschiedenen Fortschritten zu diesem Ziele.“⁷⁸

Wie erklärt sich diese radikale Aenderung in Humboldts Auffassung der grammatischen Stufenleiter? Vor allem natürlich durch die Ausweitung und Vertiefung seiner Untersuchungen; in deren Verlauf musste er zu der Einsicht gelangen, dass es zwischen dem inneren Verhältnis der grammatischen Verfahren und ihrer chronologischen Folge keine notwendige Entsprechung besteht.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ VI.140 f.

⁷⁷ So wird Humboldts Meinung in der Abhandlung über das Entstehen der grammatischen Formen von J.Trabant interpretiert. (1985:194)

⁷⁸ *Briefwechsel mit A.W.Schlegel*. 116. Vgl. „Die Grammatik entsteht allerdings successiv, eine vollkommnere nach einer unvollkommneren, allein sie ist immer ganz, es folgt nicht ein Redeteil nach dem andern.“ a.a.O.,115.

⁷⁹ Vgl. „Die Methode stillschweigender Grammatik, welche hier (:in der Stufenleiter der grammatischen Verfahren) die Reihe eröffnet, ist, in ihrer Allgemeinheit genommen, keineswegs notwendig die, aus welcher sich die andren entwickeln müssen, und die Methode der Hilfsverba geht nicht der echten Formung voran, sondern macht einen Theil derselben aus, und tritt an ihre Stelle, wenn jene sich nach und nach verliert.

Ebensowenig soll jene Stufenleiter eine gradeweis aufsteigende Vollendung des grammatischen Baues anzeigen. Denn die Methode lautloser Grammatik hat, wenn sie sich aller ihr zu Gebote stehender Hilfsmittel bedient, ein viel reineres Gepräge der Formalität des grammatischen Typus als die der Sachbezeichnung jemals zu gewähren vermag.“ (VI.387).

Auch ist wohl nachträglich die Diskussion mit A.W. Schlegel — gewisse Wendungen Humboldts weisen darauf hin — nicht gänzlich ohne Wirkung geblieben, hat dazu beigetragen, dass Humboldt seine noch im Briefwechsel vertretenen Ansichten einer gründlichen Revision unterwarf. Doch ist es nicht zuletzt zu bedenken, dass Humboldt, indem er die „grammatisch gebildeten“ Sprachen aus dem allmählichen, kausal verknüpften und damit verständlichen Fortschreiten der übrigen ausnimmt, sich auf seine Auffassung geschichtlicher Entwicklung überhaupt stützt.

Die Entwicklung der Menschheit stellt sich nach Humboldt zunächst als eine Kette von Begebenheiten, deren Ablauf dem Gesetze der Kausalität untersteht, streng determiniert und insoweit erkennbar ist, dar. Er findet aber die Ansicht, die dabei stehen bleibt, unzulänglich, das Wesentliche verfehlend: jene durch Ursache und Wirkung bedingte, „mechanische“ Bewegung wird von Zeit zu Zeit unerwartet durch das Auftreten grosser, genialer Individualität, das eine früher unvorstellbare Bahn eröffnet, durchkreuzt. Diese Erscheinung deutet nach ihm auf eine ursprüngliche, sich nach unbekannten Bedingungen entwickelnde geistige Kraft, deren Wesen sich unserer Erkenntnis entzieht und deren Wirken sich nicht vorher berechnen lässt; sie liegt als das wahrhaft schaffende Prinzip der Geschichte zugrunde, und äussert sich an gewissen Punkten unmittelbar in ihr, greift in sie ein.⁸⁰ Der Entwicklungsgang der Menschheit ist daher ein zweifacher: in den offenbaren, durch Ursache und Wirkung verketteten ist ein verborgener und gleichsam geheimnisvoller verschlungen; wird diese Unterscheidung — warnt Humboldt — versäumt, so verbannt man aus der Geschichte die Wirkung des **Genies**.⁸¹

Auf Grund dieser Geschichtsauffassung stellt Humboldt die Regel auf, dass, wo sich gesteigerte Erscheinungen derselben Bestrebung wahrnehmen lassen — wenn es die Tatsachen nicht unabweislich verlangen —, kein allmähliches Fortschreiten vorausgesetzt werden darf.⁸² Dieser Regel entspricht es, wenn er die flektierenden Sprachen — „ces prodiges de langues“ — statt sie mechanisch, durch allmählichen Aufstieg von einer niedrigeren Stufe erklären zu wollen, als die unmittelbaren Aeusserungen jener Urkraft in ihrer nationalen Besonderung, als **genialische** Schöpfungen betrachtet.⁸³

Das Genie ist nach Humboldt die geistige Zeugungskraft. Es ist wahrhaft schöpferisch, indem es etwas hervorbringt, das nicht vorauszusehen war, einem

⁸⁰ II.352 f.; IV.35-56; VII.18-27.

⁸¹ VII.26 f.

⁸² a. a. O.

⁸³ V.286.

eigenen Wesen für sich mit eigenem organischen Leben gleicht, und durch seine Natur die Regel gibt, mit ihr die Begeisterung sie zu üben, und damit sein eigenes Geschlecht fortsetzt.⁸⁴ Nach der Auffassung, die er vorfindet, ist das Genie eine Gabe des Individuums, „ein Talent zur Kunst“, wie es bei Kant heisst. Für Humboldt gibt es auch genialische Nationen und Sprachen.⁸⁵ Gewisse Nationen — führt er aus — können, ähnlich genialischen Individuen, der Sprachbildung einen neuen Schwung in eine bisher unentdeckt gebliebene Richtung erteilen, und die Kraft, die eine Sprache in dieser Weise bei ihrer Entstehung empfangen hat, wirkt weiter in der Zeit. Der Auftritt einer solchen Sprache bezeichnet eine Revolution, den Beginn einer neuen Epoche in der Weltgeschichte.⁸⁶ Humboldt denkt dabei an die indogermanischen Sprachen. An einer Stelle der Kawi-Einleitung⁸⁷ überblickt er die Reihe dieser Sprachen von dem „Zend“ und dem Sanskrit bis zu den romanischen um abschliessend festzustellen: „Jene Ursprache bewahrte also ein Lebensprinzip in sich, an welchem sich wenigstens drei Jahrtausende hindurch der Faden der geistigen Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts fortzuspinnen vermochte, und das selbst aus dem Verfallnen und Zersprengten neue Sprachbildungen zu regenerieren, Kraft besass.“⁸⁸

Auf diese Weise, meint Humboldt, bestätigt sich durch die Geschichte, dass die Flexion „ein geniales, aus der wahren Intuition der Sprache hervorgehendes Princip“⁸⁹ ist; es besteht kein Zweifel darüber, dass er diese Ausdrücke hier in ihrer bestimmten, philosophischen Sinn gebraucht. Ein Sprachbau, der dieses Prinzip, soweit es möglich ist, vollständig ausführt, ist daher in seinen Augen der gesetzmässige,⁹⁰ etwas Absolutes in der Sprache, auf das alles Studium der Sprachverschiedenheit bezogen werden muss.⁹¹

⁸⁴ I.316 f.

⁸⁵ Vgl. „das höchste aller Genien, das eines ganzen, lebendig zusammenwirkenden Volkes“ (VII.610).

⁸⁶ VI.339; VII.40 f.

⁸⁷ VII. 210.

⁸⁸ Steinthal macht in seinem grossen Kommentar zur Kawi-Einleitung, in dem er das Ergebnis einer lebenslangen Beschäftigung mit Humboldt ausbreitet, die Bemerkung: „Vergessen wir nicht, dass Humboldt dieser ganzen Schrift (wie auch der Abh.Ueber d.Gesch.) hätte den Titel geben können: Über das Genie. Denn Genie ist ja, was er in den ersten Zeilen unsrer Schrift [VII.13] „Erzeugung menschlicher Geisteskraft“ nennt. Genauer also ist das Thema derselben: das Genie in der Sprache in Zusammenhang mit dem Genie in den Völkern und beider mit dem Genie in der Geschichte.“ (Steinthal 1884:198 f.).

⁸⁹ VII.163.

⁹⁰ a.a.O.,275.

⁹¹ VI.355.

Wenn auch Humboldt den flektierenden Sprachen einen anderen Ursprung als den übrigen zuschreiben will, nimmt er sie — wie er es in der „Lettre“ erklärt hat⁹² — aus der allgemeinen fortschreitenden Bewegung der Menschheit nicht aus. Sprachen wie das Sanskrit oder das Griechische drücken nach ihm die grammatischen Verhältnisse, neben anderen Mitteln, durch „untrennbare, längstverwachsene, ihrem Ursprunge nach grossentheils gar nicht erkennbare Beugungen“⁹³ aus, setzen also Anfügung ohne Worteinheit, Agglutination voraus; nur stellen sie keine blosser Fortentwicklung dieser, sondern das Erscheinen eines neuen Prinzips, eine Umwandlung dar. „Beugungssprachen scheint es natürlich aus Anfügungssprachen abzuleiten... Man muss sich indess über einen solchen allmählichen Uebergang von Anfügungs- in Beugungssprachen nicht täuschen. Eine letztere im wahren Verstande entspringt niemals allmählich, sondern immer nur durch eine im Geist der Nation innerlich aufflammende und nun die Sprache umgestaltende Ansicht, wie die magnetische Kraft unter gewissen Umständen die chemische Mischung der Theile eines Körpers verändert.“⁹⁴

Ich habe im Vorigen versucht, darzustellen, wie sich Humboldts Auffassung von dem „Entstehen der grammatischen Formen“, das heisst von der Stufenfolge der satzbildenden Methoden im Fortschreiten seiner Untersuchungen gestaltet hat. Diese Darstellung bedarf einer Ergänzung: nach Humboldt werden die grammatischen Leistungen von Sprecher und Hörer durch die Verwendung, bzw. Deutung der mehr oder minder vollkommenen Mittel, die ihm seine Sprache für den Ausdruck zur Verfügung stellt, nicht erschöpft. Es bleibt uns noch übrig, diesen Punkt ins Auge zu fassen.

4. Wir haben gesehen, dass nach Humboldt in den weniger vollkommenen Sprachen die Andeutung der grammatischen Verhältnisse im Sprechen unzulänglich ist: es ergeben sich im Fluss der Rede Lücken in der Verbindung der Wörter, Lücken, die der Hörer aus eigenem ergänzen muss, um einen Satz im gegebenen Fall als eine durch solche Verhältnisse verknüpfte Einheit zu erfassen.⁹⁵ Die Erfahrung zeigt, dass es dem Hörer in der Regel gelingt, das im Ausdruck Fehlende „hinzuzudenken“, die grammatische Struktur des Satzes

⁹² V.286.

⁹³ VI.264

⁹⁴ a.a.O., 269 f.

⁹⁵ Vgl. die nachdrückliche Zusammenfassung: „Die Rede wird ... in jeder Sprache, wie sie beschaffen seyn möge, immer grammatisch aufgefasst, sie kann aber die Andeutung dieser Auffassung und der Art derselben in ihre Lautbildung aufnehmen, oder bis auf einen, dem ersten Blick nach unglaublich scheinenden Grad entbehren. Insofern sie das letztere thut, muss der Hörende im Geist den Mangel ersetzen.“ (VI.364)

zu bestimmen. Es fragt sich aber, was ihn dazu befähigt, worin seine Leistung begründet ist.

Humboldt sieht die Lösung des Problems in der Annahme, dass der Hörer in der Deutung des Gehörten nicht auf die „ausdrückliche Grammatik“ seiner Sprache, auf die im Satz enthaltenen Exponenten grammatischer Verhältnisse beschränkt ist, sondern darüber hinaus über eine andere, „stillschweigende Grammatik“ verfügt.⁹⁶ Mit diesem Namen — er gebraucht auch andere, wie „das allgemeine Schema der Redeverknüpfung“, „der allgemeine grammatische Typus“, oder einfach „der grammatische Typus“ — bezeichnet Humboldt die Prinzipien der Satzbildung, die, als gemeinsame Grundlage aller Grammatik, dem Menschen als Menschen unabhängig vom Mass seiner intellektuellen Fähigkeiten eingeprägt sind, zu seinem Sprachvermögen gehören. Beim Sprechen wie beim Vernehmen fasst der Hörer nach dieser Annahme den Satz unbewusst, als folgte er einem intellektuellen Instinkt, gemäss dieser inneren Grammatik auf; Humboldt meint folgerichtig, dass Sprecher und Hörer einen Satz auch dann grammatisch konstruieren würden, wenn die betreffende Sprache keine ausdrückliche Grammatik besitzen sollte.⁹⁷ Diese „lautlose Grammatik“ macht als leitendes Gesetz des Verständnisses den Hörer fähig, die Unzulänglichkeit der in seiner Sprache enthaltenen wirklichen Grammatik zu überwinden.

Diese Unterscheidung von zwei Arten der Grammatik folgt nach einer Bemerkung Humboldts aus der Notwendigkeit, die Sprache immer zugleich als eine innere menschliche Funktion und als einen historisch überlieferten Stoff, der sich dem Individuum als eine fremde Macht entgegenstellt (d.h. als *Energeia* und *Ergon*), zu betrachten.⁹⁸

Der allgemeine grammatische Typus ist für Humboldt keine Abstraktion, er ist wirkend. Die Grammatik entsteht und entwickelt sich im Sprechen und vermittelt seiner; dabei bewirkt der grammatische Typus, dass ihre Erzeugung „einem gewissen Gleise folgt, sich aus gewissen Schranken nicht entfernt“.⁹⁹ Da aber der Typus sich nur als Richtung, als allgemeines Gesetz, den Gedanken durch Rede auszudrücken, geltend macht, während auf die positive Bildung

⁹⁶ V.462-473. Mit der Herausbildung einer ausdrücklichen Grammatik steigt die Grammatik aus dem Kopf der Redenden, wo sie immer auf irgend eine Weise sein muss, in die Sprache hinab. (*Briefwechsel mit A.W.Schlegel*.116,118:30.12.1822). — Zum Problem der Unterscheidung von ausdrücklicher und stillschweigender Grammatik bei Humboldt s. Heesch, 1972,61 ff; Borsche, 1981, 228-230.

⁹⁷ V.258,284,462.

⁹⁸ V.462.

⁹⁹ VI.254,375.

der Grammatik in den einzelnen Sprachen besondere Umstände, namentlich die nationale Individualität einwirken, zeigen uns die wirklichen Grammatiken individuell verschiedene, mehr oder weniger adäquate „Auffassungen“ der stillschweigenden Grammatik.¹⁰⁰ So erklärt sich nach Humboldt, dass der Sprechende immer den Begriff der grammatischen Verhältnisse in die Sprache hineinlegt, aber die Sprache nicht immer auf den reinen und vollständigen Ausdruck derselben organisiert ist.¹⁰¹

Wenn nun der grammatische Typus allgemein menschlich ist, der Sprecher die redeverknüpfenden grammatischen Verhältnisse immer in das Gesagte hineinlegt, bzw. hinzudenkt, wie kann die Verschiedenheit der ausdrücklichen Grammatiken — wie es Humboldts Überzeugung ist — für die geistige Entwicklung der Menschheit entscheidend wichtig sein? Der „grammatische Indifferentismus“ scheint Recht zu behalten, jene Ansicht, für die der Unterschied der „ausdrücklichen“ Grammatiken rein äusserlich ist, da aller Grammatik dasselbe Gewebe grammatischer Verhältnisse zugrunde liegt.

Der allgemeine grammatische Typus — führt Humboldt dagegen aus¹⁰² — ist nur Richtung, Drang, Möglichkeit; um sich zu realisieren und zu entfalten, bedarf er der Materie, des Stoffs der Sprache. „Denn alle grammatische Form im Geiste entfaltet sich nur an dem sinnlichen Werkzeug der Sprache, und bleibt insoweit unausgebildet, als dies Werkzeug sie verlässt.“¹⁰³ Der erste Anstoss zur Bildung der Sprache geht freilich vom Geist aus; doch einmal entstanden, wirkt sie auf ihn zurück, und diese Rückwirkung wird um so mehr anregend, im glücklichen Fall begeisternd, je reiner und vollständiger sich der allgemeine grammatische Typus in der Sprache ausprägt.¹⁰⁴ Humboldt dringt daher auf die strenge Unterscheidung von ausdrücklicher und stillschweigender Grammatik in der Untersuchung, fordert, einerseits, dass das Chinesische (wie jede Sprache) nach seiner, in der Sprache wirklich enthaltenen Grammatik beschrieben und beurteilt werde, ist aber, anderseits, der Ansicht, dass die „allgemeinen grammatischen Formen“ dem Chinesen dennoch auf gewisse Weise gegenwärtig sein, dass dieser den Gesetzen derselben folgen müsse, um die Rede verständlich zu verknüpfen.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰ V.467;VI.375.

¹⁰¹ V.471.

¹⁰² V.462 f.,472 f.;VI.389 ff.

¹⁰³ v.467;VI.342.

¹⁰⁴ V.468.

¹⁰⁵ a.a.O.,453.

Humboldt geht aber noch weiter.¹⁰⁶ Er macht darauf aufmerksam, dass das Grammatische im strengen Sinn des Wortes nicht bezeichnet, nur angedeutet werden kann. Eigentlich muss daher alle Grammatik hinzugedacht werden, der Vorzug der flektierenden Sprachen besteht in dieser Hinsicht nur darin, dass in ihnen den grammatischen Verhältnissen „wahre grammatische Andeutungen“ zugeordnet sind, das heisst solche, denen nichts Lexikalisches beigemischt ist. Daher sagt Humboldt, dass alle Grammatik im Grunde bloss im Verstand des Sprechenden existiert,¹⁰⁷ und dass der Mensch weder sich noch die anderen verstehen würde, wenn nicht die stillschweigende Grammatik als inneres sprachbestimmendes Gesetz in seiner Seele enthalten wäre.¹⁰⁸ Der sprachliche Ausdruck kann also den ihm anvertrauten Sinn nach seiner grammatischen Struktur immer nur andeuten; um ihn zu erfassen, muss der Hörer die Andeutung aufgrund seines Sprachvermögens, das die Prinzipien der Satzbildung in sich begreift, bestimmen.

Humboldt stellt, soweit ich sehe, keine Untersuchungen, um den im Geist der Sprechenden wirkenden Typus der Grammatik für sich näher zu bestimmen, an; nach seiner Annahme wird jener Typus vom Gewebe der grammatischen Verhältnisse, wie die allgemeine Grammatik sie aufstellt, gebildet.¹⁰⁹ Was diese betrifft, betrachtet sie Humboldt, im Einklang mit der rationalistischen Tradition, als eine Vernunftwissenschaft in der die Grammatik, Wortarten und Verknüpfungsregeln, aus der Idee der Sprache und der Natur des Menschen abgeleitet werden, in diesem Sinn als eine ideale Grammatik.¹¹⁰ In dem Nachdruck aber, mit dem er betont, dass alle grammatische Form sich nur an dem „sinnlichen Stoff der Sprache“ in den einzelnen Sprachen entfaltet, dass sie daher ohne ihn unausgebildet, nichts als Richtung, als Gesetz ist, zeigt sich die Ahnung, dass die Grundlagen der Grammatik tiefer, weiter von der Oberfläche, auf der die allgemeine Grammatik als Studium herkömmlich bewegt hat, entfernt, mehr abstrakter Natur sind, wie das in den letzten Jahrzehnten namentlich N.Chomsky eindrücklich klargemacht hat.

¹⁰⁶ VII.649.

¹⁰⁷ Vgl. „Die Grammatik ruht auch, als anordnendes Prinzip der Rede, immer im Geiste des Redenden, und wie ausdrücklich ihre Verhältnisse in der Sprache bezeichnet seyn mögen, so liegt die grammatische Auffassung doch nie darin, sondern bleibt eine rein innerliche, durch jene Andeutung nur angeregte und bestimmte Handlung.“ (VI.389).

¹⁰⁸ V.258,453.

¹⁰⁹ V.468;VI.342,366.

¹¹⁰ III.325 f.

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METAPHORS FOR THE DESCRIPTION OF ACQUISITION DATA: FROM CONSTITUENCY "TREES" TO DEPENDENCY "FRAMES"*

By

P.J. ROBINSON

1.1. Lexical Grammar and Language Learning

Since Levenstons's claim that studies of lexical acquisition had been "discriminated against" (1979) there has been a renewal of interest in the

* These metaphors constitute the bases for separate descriptive paradigms; those of constituency theory and dependency theory respectively. There are points of opposition between these paradigms which I identify in the main body of the paper and these give each paradigm its separate status. Below constituency theory, in the first paradigm, are the basic 'tree' metaphor and the associated concepts of hierarchy and level. Above constituency theory are various models which are based, wholly or in part, on the constituency view of language structure. Similarly with the dependency paradigm; below it is the basic metaphor of the 'frame' and the related concepts of linearity and range. Above the theory are models which derive from it. These points are all expanded in the main text. Previously models based on constituency theory have been in the ascendant in studies of acquisition data. The constituency paradigm has therefore established leadership, or 'hegemony', in the field of describing data. Such descriptions have, of course, been constrained by the underlying metaphor, the modular distinctions between levels, and the related concept of hierarchy. I try to outline the consequences such constraints have had for hypotheses about 'parsing', but the main consequences has been the decoupling of lexis and syntax in studies of L1 and L2 acquisition data. However I attempt in my account of the process of 'fission' to show the continuity between acquiring an initial 'unit' and then storing syntactic evidence of its potential 'range' of distribution in the lexicon. Distinctions between levels and the notion of hierarchy have been motivated to a large extent by the desire to achieve 'modularity' and 'economy' of description in the models concerned. But these do not appear to be as motivating to current investigators as they were previously. For example, modularity is now 'dispreferred' by those like Jackendoff (1977) and Hudson (1984) who prefer to try and characterize the 'interaction' between levels of description in terms of a 'network'. Similarly evidence from acquisition and text analysis points to the regular recurrence of many similar and partly analyzed patterns or chunks, which are stored holistically. Peters has suggested these are the building blocks needed by the learner for subsequent analysis and Pawley and Syder have pointed to the fact that such 'phraseological' patterns continue to be useful to adults. Thus the motivations underlying the constituency paradigm are being questioned, both by those who wish to demonstrate the interrelatedness of levels of description, and of 'everything else' (Hudson 1986) in cognitive structure, and by performance evidence of considerable redundancy in storage. The metaphor of the 'frame', and the related concepts of linearity and range are increasingly important in recent lexicalist theories like LFG and 'Lexicase' (Starosta 1987). Thus 'hegemony' appears to have shifted to the dependency paradigm.

role of lexis in language learning. (See Stubbs 1986; Carter 1986, 1987; McCarthy 1984; Durkin 1986; Ard, Gass 1987; Olshtain 1987; Carter, McCarthy 1988). Underlying this renewed interest in lexical acquisition is a complementary shift in emphasis in current theoretical descriptions of language structure. Such theories as Starosta's 'Lexicase' and Hudson's 'Word Grammar' (see Starosta 1987 and Hudson 1984, 1985, 1986) and to a lesser extent Bresnan's 'Lexical functional grammar' (Bresnan 1982) identify a large part of the grammar with, or in Hudson's case entirely within, the lexicon. Such theories encourage a word by word approach to identifying the mental procedures involved in parsing utterances which fits in well with current evidence from psycholinguistics (Marslen-Wilson 1975; Marslen-Wilson, Tylen 1980) that this is in fact what happens. (See also Aitchison 1987).

This position is, of course, different in many respects to that occupied by psycholinguists working within the framework of 'constituency' based theories like transformational grammar (TG) in its earliest forms. Two of these differences are that the earlier approaches sought to confirm hypotheses about the formation of rules for the generation and parsing of 'phrases', and the role of the lexicon in these parsing (see 1.3.) and production procedures was largely restricted to filling out structural strings. Secondly a distinction was assumed between the cognitive structures involved in 'knowledge' of linguistic structure, and those that weren't.

Hudson (1983) like many others now working in psycholinguistics and cognitive science (Schank 1983; Minsky 1973; Wilensky 1986) is critical of those who assume **any** distinction exists between linguistic structure and knowledge structure in general and argues for the 'null hypothesis' that "the structures of grammatical and other kinds of knowledge have the same formal properties" (1986b, 88). He thus argues for the non-distinctiveness of "syntax, morphology, the lexicon and phonology and ... other kinds of cognitive structure" (1987, 88), as Bolinger has also done (1976), and in favour of an all-embracing theory of linguistic and non-linguistic structure based on 'frame theory', which takes the word as the optimum sized unit necessary in his description. (See Minsky 1973 for the early work on frame theory). Hudson's work thus breaks with both of the assumptions described above, the phrase-structure approach to parsing and the separation of linguistic knowledge from other aspects of general cognitive structure.

Traditionally language teaching has adopted a quite clear distinction between lexis and grammar, and, as McCarthy has observed (1984), seen the initial phase of language teaching in terms of developing a structural competence which is then filled out lexically at a later stage, thus delaying large

scale lexical acquisition. Not only Levenston (1979) but also Meara (1980) and more recently Ard, Gass (1987) have commented on the parallel tendency in studies of acquisition where the focus is placed on how the learners develop a knowledge of grammar, identified almost entirely with the 'syntax' of language. But this direction of dependency (with 'grammar' as the head and 'lexis' as dependent) is being increasingly questioned as a basis for linguistic theory. Wasow, in the postscript to Sells (1985) comments, "syntactic theories seem to be converging on the idea that sentence structure is generally predictable from word meanings, for this seems to be close to the naive view of a great many non-linguists... The surprising thing (to linguists) has been how little needs to be stipulated beyond lexical meaning" (1985, 204).

Pedagogically lexis is assuming greater focus and attention with respect to its facilitative role in developing structural knowledge. Widdowson (1988) has argued that "the function of grammar depends on its being subservient to lexis", and that we should "begin with words, and show how they need to be grammatically modified to be communicatively effective" (1988, 154). Skehan (1986) has pointed to the high correlation between measures of first language vocabulary learning ability and subsequent measures of L2 learning aptitude, while Allwright has commented recently that, "...if we study the processes by which lexis is acquired we may get closer to the way grammar is acquired. When I watch learners working on class, I see them working on words, but I can see them getting all sorts of help with grammar in doing so. In a sense they put their agenda on the lesson through the question they ask about words. So one might end up seeing a natural process of grammar acquisition through the natural process of enquiring about vocabulary" (1986, 187).

One reason why it has taken so long for the study of the acquisition of structure *via* lexis to begin has been the hegemony, or leadership, that constituency has exerted as a basis for descriptive linguistics.¹ Constituency theory has been the basis of structural description in American linguistics since Bloomfield, though not, incidentally, in Europe.²

¹ See Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe for the use of the concept of 'hegemony' in relation to the structuration of ideology in politics. Although the term is unusual in the context of linguistics I think that the two paradigms I have identified maintain themselves in the same way that all ideologies do, by making — and maintaining through argumentation — the distinctions which support their separate existence. One distinction, for example, is between major and minor grammar in constituency theory.

² Hudson makes the following observation, "it (constituency) dates back quite specifically — to the psychologist Wundt, whose work was influential in shaping the ideas of Leonard Bloomfield [...] What constituent structure has been used for is to show that the words in a sentence are more than just beads on a string — some of them are more

However the influence exerted by the concept of constituency is now in decline. Dependency theory, as reflected in the new 'word' based grammars I

closely connected than others. For some reason the early advocates of constituency analysis ignored the possibility of using direct word-word links in order to show these relations" (Hudson 1983, 38-39).

Hudson (1984, 1986) is an attempt to build a theory of grammar which established continuity between the structure of linguistic knowledge and the cognitive representation of 'everything else'. He takes the word as the largest unit necessary in his description of linguistic structure. There are basically five kinds of dependency relation which he describes, and the interaction of each of these cross level dependencies adopts, as its underlying metaphor, the 'frame' and network. For example, there are the 'companion' relations of serial syntactic co-occurrence, which I take as the focus for my discussion of dependency in the last parts of this paper. These can be described or illustrated with the following notation:



There are also dependency relations linking words with their 'utterance events';



those between words and their phonological parts
 between the word and its referent W^* and its stored prototype model in conceptual structure;

 The diagram shows a 'W' label on the left. To its right, there is a box containing '.....' with a 'W' label above it. Below the 'W' label on the left, there is an upward-pointing arrow. Below the 'W' label in the box, there is a downward-pointing arrow.

See the notation for *balloons pop* in Hudson 1984, 29.

These dependency relations constitute 'propositional' information about particular words. In each case the same kinds of proposition are used; very simple propositions containing two relata and a relation [...]. The following are some examples;


- (1) *tummy* is (a noun)
- (2) (referent of *tummy*) is (a stomach)
- (3) (parts of *tummy* is (/tΛm i/))
- (4) (word 3) is (a *tummy*)
- (5) *eat* has (an object)
- (6) (subject of verb) precedes verb
- (7) *tummy* is (a body part)

I will be concerned in this paper with the means at the learners disposal for developing 'frames' relating to propositions (1), (4), (5), and (6) in the above list, though not with the specific lexical item *tummy* or *eat*. (See Hudson: Sociolinguistics and the theory of grammar. Linguistics 24 (1986), 791-815 for the above propositions.)

have cited, is now, I suggest, asserting itself as the basis for descriptive frameworks via which to view the data of language acquisition. I will now explain the differences between constituency and dependency, and give reasons why the former has been responsible for relegating the study of lexis to second place and then move to propose a notation based on dependency theory for describing the learner's segmentation of initially unanalyzed wholes into variable units within a larger 'frame'.

1.2. Major and Minor Grammar in Constituency Theory

Constituency theory (see Matthews 1981; Hudson 1980; Halliday 1985) is basically a proposition about the hierarchical structure of language in which a succession of 'empty' nodes is gradually broken up, or filled, by smaller units or constituents until the level of the word is reached. So at the top we have an S1, divided into smaller 'phrases', NP and VP, which may themselves be further broken up — as in this example:



Two assumptions that constituency has involved are that a) the ordering of the constituents is done in some way 'above' the level of the words themselves, and that b) this is the domain of 'syntax', the 'major' part of grammar. The words just exemplify this grammatical ordering. This in turn is a consequence of the distinction between major syntactic grammar and the grammar of the lexicon. As Lyons (1968) notes, the classical Greek scope of


grammar embraced the 'whole study of language', but in recent times it has become more narrowly interpretable as the study of syntax and inflection — and 'competence' is predominantly treated as synonymous with the first of these; an idealised knowledge of the grammatical rules governing the ordering of constituents.

Much has been made by psycholinguists working within assumptions a) and b) above, of the evidence of perceived ambiguity in parsing syntactic structures for the precedence of one set of rules over another, and therefore of the particular model of competence in generating constituent structure which these rules derive from. The extent of the debates is vast (see Johnson-Laird 1983 for a survey), particularly over the possible alternative realisations of assumptions a) — that ordering is done 'above' the level of the words themselves. For example, here is one 'parsing principle' that has been proposed (see Johnson-Laird 1983, 332) — that in interpreting or parsing syntactic strings we are biased towards attaching constituents to the rightmost of the previously constructed nodes. This heuristic, it is imagined, is valuable because it reduces the possible load on working memory. A principle of instant right attachment.

However, the interpretation given above of the sentence:

John bought the book for Susan

seems to be the most natural and basic, i.e. that the book was bought for Susan, rather than the book for Susan was bought, as in this analysis:



Yet it is this second structure that attaches *for Susan* to the rightmost node of the previous analysis. Working within the assumption that ordering is done above the level of the word, it has been hypothesized that this rightmost attachment principle can be overridden by a desire to restrict the number of nodes involved in an analysis (by having only two NPs below VP, not three as there are in the second analysis, see Frazier, Fodor 1978), or by a reluctance to modify an established syntactic structure, (again by avoiding the requirements for the additional NP in the second analysis, see Kimball 1973; Fodor, Frazier 1980). Though it is easy to 'lose track of all the ways they might interact' (Johnson-Laird 1983, 332) these parsing principles each share the assumption of constituency I described as a) above.

For further reading on constituency see Hudson 1980; Matthews 1981; Halliday 1985. My claim about constituency as 'ideology' is that it has ushered in assumptions that are, or have been, made about acquisition data. These derive from the view that what I have called major-grammar is separate from lexis, and involving prior ordering and selectional restrictions. Such assumptions, for example, are built in to hypotheses like those above about the operation of the 'mental parser'. The effects may have been muted in recent years, as grammar and lexis have moved closer together in important theories, (see Steedman for a review of 'Lexical functional grammar' as psychologically plausible model of grammatical structure) but the effects are still there to be felt none-the-less (see Bauer 1986). However, as Johnson-Laird points out (1983, 329-331) a different proposition about the heuristics underlying the inclination to favour the analysis *book-was-bought-for-Susan* is, "that parsing is sensitive to the structure of grammatical functions favoured by specific lexical items" (1983, 331), and this is a move towards locating a theory of grammar 'within' the lexicon- towards, therefore, negating assumption b) in 4.2. above. Obviously a lexicon constructed along such lines includes a lot more than 'inflection', it includes information about the valency requirements of individual lexical items. Specifically, Ford, Bresnan and Kaplan (1983) suggest that the verb *bought* favours a specific 'frame' or functional structure i.e. i) rather than ii) below:

- i) (SUBJECT) (OBJECT) (PREPOSITIONAL COMPLEMENT)
- ii) (SUBJECT) (OBJECT)

The word itself is tagged with functional prerequisites.³ Now, to claim this as psychologically real involves a further claim about memory and storage; that 'frames' for words are stored independently of each other and that our memory is equal to the job of building and maintaining a lexicon in which individually perceived items are stored together with a set of co-occurrence preferences for each item. (See Becker's 'phrasal lexicon' 1975).

It is clear that this orientation to looking at evidence of language structure (from the 'bottom up' as it were if we adopt the constituency metaphor of 'hierarchy') involves the assumption that we have a great deal of storage capacity in memory, and leads us to forsake many of the 'top down' mechanisms for generalising about units which are based on the principle of 'economy' or 'parsimony' of description, i.e. that in order to save all the storage space taken up by tagging each item with grammatical co-occurrence restrictions we can generalize about groups of these units store this rule once (instead of individually for each item) and call on the words only when the rule requires that we do so.

One reason for forsaking these mechanisms and adopting the 'bottom up' orientation is that mentioned by Bolinger (1976) who quotes Antilla (1972, 349), "our memory or brain storage is on a much more extravagant scale than we like to think; even the most 'obvious' cases can be stored separately". Bolinger further observes that, "speakers do at least as much remembering as they do putting together, and a great deal of what we have been regarding as syntactic will have to be put down as morphological" (see 2.2. (1976, 2).

Whereas constituency has the effect of maintaining the distinctions between levels which Bolinger questions, a dependency orientation to describing learner syntax will allow us to demonstrate their interrelatedness more easily. I will briefly sketch the notations and assumptions of 'dependency' theory here,

³ To be more precise, the manner in which this is done is as follows. Each word has entered with it a logical form consisting of a 'predicate argument structure', 'an abstract characterization of those arguments of a semantic predicate that are open to grammatical interpretation' (Bresnan 1980). This is the structure of 'thematic' relations given below. There is also a designation of the grammatical function e.g. subject, object, to-object, that is associated with each argument.

Here is the lexical form for *hand* in:

Fred handed a toy to the baby

grammatical function	SUBJ	OBJ	TO OBJ
'hand'	Arg 1	Arg 2	Arg 3
thematic relations	'Agent'	'theme'	'goal'

(See Selkirk (1981))


before returning to the topic of relatedness between levels of description, and the role of dependency as a framework for describing the learner's analysis of formulaic 'chunks', using data from Peters (1983).

1.3. Dependency in Language Structure

It has been argued that constituency and dependency form the two "basic relations of grammar" (Vater 1975, 125; Baumgartner 1970, 52). Attempts have been made to incorporate one into the other (Hudson 1976) or to demonstrate their equivalence (Robinson 1970; Hays 1964) but here I will be concerned to show their basic differences. Firstly constituency posits a number of 'empty' nodes like NP, VP etc. in the analyses above, whereas dependency analyses require no nodes above the level of the words themselves. The arcs below show dependencies between words:



There is also the additional advantage in dependency notation of being able to indicate the 'direction' of the dependency, or the asymmetry between a head and its modifiers through the convention of drawing arrow heads on the arcs linking co-occurring words. So whether *man* occurs depends on *speaks* (the verb being the main element in the sentence on which all others ultimately depend), and whether *the* occurs depends on *man*, as in this diagram:





This option is not available in a strictly constituency based description, although the relationship of head to modifier can be shown indirectly in terms of lexical subcategorisation of constituents like 'verb', thus including more information in a separate lexicon by introducing 'case' frames, or by classifying the 'mother' node. (See Sells 1985 for a survey of current syntactic theories

which developed out of TG and to which the notion of headness is now central. Increasingly ordering restrictions have been attached to lexical entries in the form of frames, and this constitutes evidence of the shift towards dependency in these theories. However, some ordering is still done above the word in the theories Sells discusses and so they still share some of the assumptions of constituency I have discussed. Principally some ordering is still done above the word, assumption a) in 1.2., and a distinction exists between two sorts of grammar; the grammar of the lexicon, and in the case of Government and Binding theory (Chomsky 1982) the grammar associated with "move α ", assumption b) in 1.2.)

In contrast dependency notation can show directly the 'connexion' between verbs and their particular 'actants' which determine their 'valance' (Tesnière 1959), and is well suited therefore to approaches to grammatical description which seek to attach structural 'frames' or functional descriptions to individual verbs. In the case of *bought* in the examples above, this can be described as preferring the frame [S O PP] as opposed to [S O].

To use Tesnière's terms the first frame indicates the verb prefers an 'actant' (the object), a unit which essential to an understanding of the verb (semanteme constituting in Herbst's terms 1984), as well as a more peripheral 'circonstant' (the prepositional phrase). (See Somers 1987 and Matthews 1981 for a critical assessment of the distinction between actant and circonstant in Tesnière's theory).⁴

Bresnan, Ford and Kaplan's (1983) explanation why the second of the constituency analyses in 1.2. above seems to be preferable, (that the-book-was-bought-for-Susan), can thus be translated into dependency terms. The prototypical dependency frame for *bought* is the one associated with the functional frame [S O PP], or the prototypical dependency pattern.  The functional frame [S O], and the dependency pattern  are thus deviations from the prototype and this,

⁴ Some tests, like those of Helbig, Schenkel (1973) are concerned to discover whether or not the item is freely deletable or not. If it is then it is a 'circonstant'. For example, *in Berlin* is freely deletable in the following sentences, whereas *in Dresden* isn't.

He visited her in Berlin.

My friend lives in Dresden.


Somers (1987) notes that the *do so* test (Lakoff, Ross 1976) can be used to identify actants. Lakoff and Ross claim that 'do so' replaces all the constituents of the verb phrase and only these (1976, 105) when used as a pro-form in for the verb phrase. All elements occurring after it are therefore non-essential, or circonstants, e.g. *tomorrow* in the following example:


John took a trip last Tuesday, and I'm going to do so tomorrow.


not the parsing principles explained in 1.2., explains why it seems the more natural interpretation.

Following Brown and Miller (1980, 254–260) we can distinguish three types of dependency relation which are as follows (I have not included the relationship they term 'mutual exclusion' here).

i) Bilateral or mutual dependency where the distribution of individual constituents in the construction is different from the distribution of the construction as a whole, as in the following cases:

transitive verb object (V+NP) e.g. *writing*  *a paper*

copula complement (V+Pred) e.g. *Peter is*  *correct*

locative verb locative complement (V+PP) e.g. *she stood*  *on the beach*

These constructions are termed 'exocentric'.

ii) Endocentric constructions involve unilateral dependency, where the distribution of the construction itself parallels that of the obligatory, dominating or governing constituent, as in:

det N e.g. *the*  *notebook*

where the Noun is the head and the determiner the modifier (though Hudson considers determiners to be heads in his theory, Hudson 1984).

iii) Finally in co-ordinate dependency neither constituent depends syntactically on the other. Each constituent has the distribution of the construction as a whole, as in:

adj adj N e.g. *large* *red* *umbrella*






where the adjectives are freely substitutable for each other and

appositives e.g. *Doctor* *Johnson*



where again each part can be freely substituted for its counterpart. These relationships can be diagrammatized as:

- i) bilateral (m)h m(h)
- 
- ii) unilateral h m
- 
- iii) co-ordinate h h
- 

These relations extend below the level of the word to morphology, so the suffix 'fy' can be shown to dominate the root as in:

beauti *fy* (see Williams 1981; Selkirk 1981)



And compound verbs can also be broken down into headmodifier relationships, as in:

furniture  shop (see Hudson 1984, 88)

Brown and Miller comment about such dependency relations: "We need not be surprised that dependency relations cannot always be captured in a straight forward fashion in constituent structure grammars: constituent structure grammars are constructed in terms of formally established categories and the constructions they form, whereas dependency relations are, as the name suggests, relations" (1980, 259). Whereas the metaphor for constituent structure is one of hierarchy with distinctions between separate levels, the metaphor which characterises dependency descriptions is that of language structure as a 'network' of relations across levels. Such metaphors do of course have consequences for the models which stem from them.

2.1. Unit-Frame Relations in The Language Learner's Lexicon

Peters' work has shown the centrality of idiomatic chunks to the first stages of language acquisition, and text linguists (Sinclair 1984, 1985) and others working with data drawn from actual use (Pawley, Syder 1983; Nattinger 1980) have shown that much of "what we may have taken to be freely generable" (Bolinger 1976) is in fact evidence of remembered patterns and phrases. Evidence from corpora of text support this view: in Sinclair's words, "The model of a highly generalised formal syntax with slots into which fall neat lists of words is suitable only in rare uses and specialised texts. The majority of text by far is made up of the occurrence of common words in common patterns or in slight variants of these common patterns. Most everyday words do not have an independent meaning, or meanings, but are components of a rich repertoire of multi-word patterns that make up text. This is totally obscured by the procedures of conventional grammar." (Sinclair 1986, 11-12).


Sinclair makes a further distinction between 'natural' and 'well-formed' sentences and utterances which is relevant here. He makes three points regarding this distinction. Firstly some well-formed sentences do not seem natural to

a sensitive native speaker, and there "is no reason to believe that the restrictions (or naturalness) are any less central to language structure than those for well-formedness" (1984, 203). Secondly, decisions about well-formedness are usually made on sentences in isolation, but well-formedness in text ('naturalness') has been little studied. Finally, he makes the point that 'naturalness' is likely to be an important concept for the second language learner. Naturalness and well-formedness are independent variables, as Sinclair illustrated using this matrix:


	well-formed	ill-formed
natural	1	2
non-natural	3	4

- 1) *I am writing this paper for you to read*
- 2) *If you like*
- 3) *Look forward to clapping eyes on you*
- 4) *Book the*

Sinclair's distinction is central to the processes I am about to describe, since the learner will be involved in 'parameter' setting with regard to dependencies within frames that are both well-formed and natural. The extent to which the dependency parameters, or frame relations established by 2) e.g.



interfere with or accompany the determination of parameters suggested by 1) and 4) below is a complex, but important question:
e.g.







As Sinclair notes, the restrictions on appearing and sounding 'natural' (2 v. 3) are as central to an analysis of the learner's development of 'structure' as are abstract hypotheses about what is 'well-formed' for the linguist (2 v. 1).

It is how the second language learner becomes familiar with 'central patterns' of usage (as Sinclair calls **natural** frames by generalising about possible dependencies within and between initially acquired holophrases that I will be attempting to characterize.

In her study of second language learners Lily Wong Fillmore (1976) stresses the importance to Nora, the most successful learner, of developing social strategies for manipulating the required input on which to build an awareness of the structure of the language she was learning, "the typical language learner must play an active role in inviting interaction" she concluded (1979, 205). Cognitive strategies which interact with these social strategies require the learner to identify formulae used in relevant situations the use them as initially unanalyzed wholes, using this heuristic, "work on the big things first, save the details for later" (1979, 209). Eventually the learner decomposes the frame by analysing slots that are identified.

Fillmore gives as an example of this formulaic breakdown, or 'fission' as Peters (1983) terms it, an extract from the speech of Nora in which an initial unit or formula becomes segmented into three separate units. "Thus the analytic process carried out on formulae yielded formulaic frames with abstract slots representing constituent types which could substitute in them, and it also freed constituent parts of the formula to function in other constructions either as formulaic units or as wholly analysed items" (1979, 213; see also Peters 1983, 50).

Utterance	Analysis
Iwannaplaywidese	(UNIT)
	
	

In this way both the prototypical frame itself, and the variable items which occupy slots in the frame, are generalised. This leads to an important conclusion. Since the 'analysed slots' themselves function as 'frames' for further analysis the question, "what is a frame and what is a unit", becomes hard to answer. The traditionally conceived of relationship between syntax and lexis appears much more fluid, as Peters notes, when we look at actual data like this, and leads us to question the necessity for such a distinction. As Peters again observes, both the initial units and the later ones remain available and are stored for further use: the descriptive linguist's principle of 'economy' does not correspond to any 'user', reality.

Peters, developing Fillmore's work by studying the use of unanalyzed wholes in first language acquisition, claims that the linguists' assumption that children move from smaller units of language to larger syntactic structures through mastery of rules is wrong. The units of acquisition are much larger. Their presence as 'chunks' or remembered and imitated phrases has been identified by previous investigators of child language (Burling 1973; Clark 1974, 1975) though, as with idioms, their significance has been overlooked. "The linguists' bias of looking for words and morphemes has probably contributed to their overlooking the fact that the earliest units the child uses are not simply words but units of another kind" (Peters 1983, 6). Peters identifies a series of heuristics whereby the learner is able to isolate potentially useful units then 'fission' or break them down, and 'fuse' or reconstitute them. Like idioms, both the initial units and the later ones are stored in memory, and like idioms too, "the lack of a place for them in any existing model of learning or of language" (Peters 1983, 12) has led to their neglect.

Consideration of the status of the initial units of language acquisition, and of idioms, leads both Bolinger and Peters (1975, 1976) to question the distinction between "the fiery zones of syntax" (Bolinger 1976, 3) and lexical knowledge which constituency based models of description uphold. "Although frames are different from lexical units in that they contain a variable part they are a possible way to generalize units. That is they could be viewed as a more general kind of unit, namely, one that has a variable part. Pursuing this line of inference could lead the child (or us) to a lexically based (theory of) syntax in which syntactic information is naturally stored in the lexicon" (Peters 1983, 46). This position is similar to that proposed by Ford, Bresnan, Kaplan and described above (Ford et al 1983).

2.2. Collocatoin, Colligation, and Lexicalised Stems

Similarly Pawley and Syder (1983) have identified the prevalence of ready made memorized expressions in everyday expressions. These require little encoding and free the language user from the necessity, assumed as central to Chomskyan psycholinguistics, to creatively compose each sequence of speech on a word-by-word basis. They comment, "we believe that memorized sentences and phrases are the normal building blocks of fluent spoken discourse, and at the same time they provide models for the creation of many (partly) new sequences which are memorable and in their turn enter the stock of familiar usages." (1983, 208). At one extreme of this process lie idioms, or fixed expressions, but these are distinct from what they call 'lexicalised sentence stems', which are basically the same as the frames referred to by Peters above; a collocational string with fixed and variable parts. For example, based on evidence of conventional expressions of apology like:

I'm sorry to keep you waiting.

I'm so sorry to have kept you waiting.

Mr X is sorry to keep you waiting all this time.


they identify an underlying 'stem' or frame which is lexicalised in slightly different ways on each occasion. e.g.

NP *be* - TENSE *sorry to keep* — TENSE *you waiting*

"Such a collocation, with the obligatory elements in its associated sentence structure, is a sentence 'stem'. The realizations of the variable constituents in the stem are termed its 'inflections'. If there are additional constituents of an optional kind these are its 'expansions'" (1983, 210).

The work of Pawley and Syder was, to an extent, anticipated by that of Mitchell (1971) on 'colligation', the underlying syntactic restrictions of collocations. "The division between morphology and syntax", he claimed, "is in fact a great deal less clear cut than is often assumed. . . . Lexical peculiarities are considered to derive their formal meaning not only from contextual extension of a lexical kind but also from the generalised grammatical patterns within which they appear, and conversely, the recognition of general patterns is seen as justifiable only in selected comparisons of lexical combinations" (1971, 47-48). It is precisely the fluidity, and reciprocity of relationship between collocation and structural pattern that Peters and Pawley and Syder describe that Mitchell captures in his account of 'colligation'. "A collocation is a composite structural element in its own right", and it is to be distinguished from a colligation on a

scale of generality. For example hard work is a collocation, the result of a particular distributional preference of two particular words. Similarly tore up is a collocation, but underlying this collocation is a generalised pattern as evidenced by the similarity between tore up and leaped across stumbled into etc. This pattern can be represented as ✓ tvr + ✓ up for tore up, and the frame is, "clearly a member of a generalizable class of collocations involving in this case a subclass of the word-class 'verb' and 'particle', namable perhaps as 'motive verbs' and 'directional particles'. Such a class of collocations may be termed a 'colligation'. As collocations are namable by words, so colligations involve the use of word classes to name the collocational class" (1971, 53).



2.3. Patterns and Ranges

A more distant antecedent of the approach is McIntosh (1961) who distinguished between the 'range' of particular collocations and "patterns" based upon them: "...systemic knowledge of range... is crucial when we are considering certain aspects of the use of English by experienced native speakers of writers. For it is very much tied up with the generative or range — extending process whereby it is possible for unusual collocations to be added to those already experienced. ... Since collocations, in larger and larger units, are the material out of which instances of sentences are made it is these considerations of range which we must take into account, within dictates of pattern, in dealing with the text of actual sentences." (1961, 335) Similarly Peters' description of the process of 'fission' suggests that **range extending** has much in common with

the learner's analysis of individual slots in structural frames which are then generalised to form productive structural patterns. It is to a characterization of this process, using a dependency notation, that I now turn, remembering of course that the analytic process is contingent (as Fillmore points out) on social strategies and that, "the nature of the particular kinds of interaction dictates not only the function and content of the language but which parts will be learned first and how those parts will be put together or broken down for reassembly" (Nelson 1981, 182).

I will distinguish between two aspects of the word-formula relationship; the first, unit-frame relations, are colligational and seek, thereby, to establish the formal equivalence of units belonging to the same syntactic category. The second are form-function relations and these seek to establish the semantic and pragmatic values of both the words and the frames (see Blum-Kulka, Levenston 1987). Both sets of relations interact in establishing the prototypical categories i.e. 'subject', 'verb' etc. (see Clark and Clark 1981) which serve to systematize the user's knowledge of the fissioned units. Having acknowledged that the interact I will deal largely with the first of these two types relation below.

2.4. Combinatorial Privilege, Category Formation and Dependency

Following Maratsos (1979, 1982) a category is a set of items with the same 'combinatorial privileges', e.g. a set of items which have the privilege of combining with a particular item or set of items. "In other words what marks items as members of a category is the fact that they occur in the same contexts" (Chiat 1981, 243). However, to the extent that items may occur in 'disjunctive' contexts their degree of category membership can be measured in terms of distance from a prototypical category member (see Hudson 1984; Clark, Clark 1981; Smith, Medlin 1981). Ross has proposed a similar analysis as explanation for the distributional differences between nouns like *Harpo* and *headway*, using evidence from transformations as the basis for measuring distance from the prototypical behaviour of the category (Ross 1973).

Maratsos claims that noun, verb syntactic categories are the summation of combinatorial privileges shared by specific lexical items. This categorisation is based by the child, or learner, on evidence from perceived lexical co-occurrence. In terms of the 'Word Grammar' model (see Hudson 1984, note 3), we can say that the perceived dependencies between co-occurring items — the 'companion' relations they contract — leads to generalisations about their syntactic category, and in order to test hypotheses arrived at in this way the learner substitutes items in frames to see if they are acceptable to an interlocutor. This

is what motivates Peters' processes of fission and fusion: the development of abstract categories by extrapolating across specific combinatorial privileges. For example items taking the plural morpheme and the possessive morpheme (two combinatorial privileges) can be differentiated from those items of a different category taking *ed* and *ing* morphemes. Subsequently these two broad categories will be further defined by their relations to each other, nouns preceding or following verbs etc. This will lead to an elaboration of the valency frames for particular verbs (see Allerton 1982).

The earliest perceived combinatorial privileges will be co-occurrences of particular words or units, e.g. a child may acquire the combinations *daddy sleep* and *baby sleep*, and on the basis of the perceived co-occurrence with *sleep* transfer *daddy* to a context in which only *baby* had previously occurred, *daddy cry*. This allows what Braine (1976) calls 'positional associative' patterns to become 'positional productive' patterns a shift from closed syntagmatic associations to open class paradigmatic sets. We can see the results of this process of generalizing on the basis of substituting units in Nora's fission of the 'How do you do dese?' pattern, cited in Fillmore (1979, 213). Four stages can be shown to mark the transition from unanalyzed, holistic, unit to productive frame; in the following description of these stages I use the notation already introduced: for the frame and \curvearrowright for the dependency, which is in every case 'unilateral'.

- 1) How do you do dese?
- 2) How do you do dese? \curvearrowright + NP or VP ?
- 3) How \curvearrowright did/do \curvearrowright you \curvearrowright + VP ?
- 4) How \curvearrowright does/did/do \curvearrowright + clause ?

In the final stage of this analytic process 'How' is used alone in constructing questions. The frames would then be stored for each unit in the lexicon.

The particular case of *do* here illustrates the way prototypical category members are determined. The struggle of *do* to gain autonomy and independence from its initial frame is partly the result of establishing its distributional

equivalence with other items with which it can share contexts and so become productive. The frame for *do* is originally:

How _____ you _____ these?

Then co-occurrence of *did* in the environment:

How _____ you

leads to their identifications. Subsequently both *do* and *did* co-occur with *does* in the environment:

How _____ + clause.

Do, sharing more environments with each of the others is therefore the prototype of the category.

2.5. Segmentation and Reconstruction: Identifying and Generalizing Dependencies

We can also see this process of discovering shared combinatorial privileges as the basis for categorial generalization in this extract from Wagner-Gough, Hatch 1975, and the speech patterns of Homer. I have used the additional symbol \vee here to indicate a trial dependency as Homer goes about 'fissioning' an initial frame.

Sometimes the amalgamated pattern What is this this is NP became;

What \vee this is NP as evidence of *is this* deletion, e.g.

1a) $\overline{\text{What}} \curvearrowright \overline{\text{this is Homer}}$

1b) $\overline{\text{What}} \curvearrowright \overline{\text{this is airplane}}$

Sometimes *this is* deletion occurred and the pattern became:

$\overline{\text{What is this}} \vee \overline{\text{NP}}$ e.g.

2a) $\overline{\text{What is this}} \curvearrowright \overline{\text{airplane}}$

2b) $\overline{\text{What is this}} \curvearrowright \overline{\text{screaming}}$

Sometimes only *this* was deleted, giving $\overline{\text{What is}} \vee \overline{\text{this is NP}}$

3a) $\overline{\text{What is}} \curvearrowright \overline{\text{this is car}}$

Homer sometimes deleted the NP and either 'is this', 'this is' or 'this' when asking a question, e.g.

4a) $\overline{\text{What}} \curvearrowleft \overline{\text{is}} \curvearrowright \overline{\text{this}}$

4b) $\overline{\text{What}} \curvearrowright \overline{\text{this}} \curvearrowleft \overline{\text{is}}$

4c) $\overline{\text{What}} \curvearrowleft \overline{\text{is}} \curvearrowright \overline{\text{this}} \curvearrowleft \overline{\text{is}}$

(adapted from data in Wagner-Gough, Hatch 1975, 303)

As Wagner-Gough, Hatch conclude the article from this data has been, taken, and adapted to my dependency analysis, "an analysis of language learning based on sentence grammars may not capture the essence of the process" (1975, 305) and one reason for this, I have suggested, is because the process is lexical: "First it assumes an extremely sensitive memory: the child must recall not only large numbers of lexical items but also frames for such items' (Chiat 1981, 245).


Here is another example for these fissioning processes at work, using the above notation, this time from Hakuta (1974).

Initially this Japanese child (5.4) learns question forms holistically. Subsequently they become the object of hypotheses regarding the inter-frame dependencies between words, as evidenced in the productions from month 2. of the data collection.

- | | |
|---------|--|
| Month 1 | <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block; margin-bottom: 10px;"><i>Do you know</i></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block; margin-bottom: 10px;"><i>How do you do it</i></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block; margin-bottom: 10px;"><i>Do you have coffee</i></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;"><i>Do you want this one</i></div> |
| Month 2 | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block; margin-bottom: 10px;"><i>What do you doing</i></div> 2. <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block; margin-bottom: 10px;"><i>What do you doing, this boy</i></div> 3. <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block; margin-bottom: 10px;"><i>What do you drinking</i></div> 4. <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;"><i>What do you do it , this, froggie</i></div> |

The progression 1, → 2, → 4, shows the learner's gradual expansion of the initial structural frame in 1, the sort of accretive pattern-building via collocational range-finding described by McIntosh (2.3.).

Adults aid learners in the process of fission through taking up the child's attempts to fission a frame and demonstrating the correct relations of unit to frame via repetition and repetition with variation. This may have the dual purpose of both aiding segmentation and demonstrating how units can be fused or reconstituted once isolated. Here is an example (from Peters, 63), of repetition with variation that has the effect of identifying the common element in a construction and its variable slots:



The analysis that I have identified would suggest that this demonstrated the lexical frame:



In the same way that individual variation affects the manipulation of input (see Seliger (1977) who distinguishes between LIGs and HIGs, low and high input generators) so also there appears to be variation in the extent to which formulae are subsequently segmented by second language learners as Fillmore observed of one of her learners, "he eventually did analyse some of his expressions and was able to use the structure productively. It was not that he could not see the structural possibilities of the expressions in his repertoire; he was just not looking for them" (1979, 227).

Peters, adopting and adding to Slobin's (1973) 'operation principles' identifies a set of heuristics relating to phonological identification of units (segmentation based on initial and final syllables; rhythmical and intonational saliency; stressed syllables), and comparative 'matching' strategies based on identifying recurring units. These matching strategies are exemplified in the extract given immediately above. Segments identified using such 'cut off' clues don't, of course, always correspond to individual words and units are progressively reanalyzed.

L1 acquisition research by Tunmer et al (1983) suggests that 4-5 year olds use stress as the principle basis of segmentation; 5-6 year olds are more influenced by perceived morphemic structure and 7 year olds appear to segment on the basis of word concept. Phonological contrasts with the L1 can

cause L2 learners problems in extracting initial units on the basis of phonological information alone. For example the variability of stress within words in English often mis-cues French and Arabic native speakers used to regular stress patterns in their L1, causing mis-segmentation.

2.6. Head-Modifier Patterns and Word Order

Let me turn briefly to the problems a dependency analysis predicts with respect to the L2 learner and 'categoriality'; here there is the complication that the L1 and the L2 may have differing patterns of head-modifier relationship. For example what Greenberg calls 'centripetal' (modifiers preceding heads as in Japanese) as opposed to 'centrifugal' (heads preceding modifiers as in Welsh) contrasts with the target language may become the basis of a competing plan which will result in interlanguage deviations. Alternatively the generalisation about the head modifier relationship made by learners could be seen as L1 independent and developmental, e.g. the late acquisition of determiners in English could be accounted for by the fact that determiners branch counter to the head modifier relationship which is normal in English (Rutherford 1984), i.e. that determiners precede the head, whereas the normal pattern is for modifiers to follow heads, as with objects of transitive verbs. Zobl (1980) supports the idea of developmental generalisations based on dependency relations with his suggestion that French-English interlanguage possible constructions, 'friend-for-her', are evidence of the creation of a head-modifier dependency harmonic with verb-object typology.

2.7. Formal and Functional Co-Prediction

I have been mainly concerned with those purely formal aspects of category generalisations made on the basis of perceived 'combinatorial privilege' resulting from the unit-frame dialectic, i.e. the contribution made by perceived 'companion' relations (Hudson 1984) between units and their frames or formulaic contexts. I have claimed this is consistent with the position Maratsos adopts — "In the account given here the child constructs grammatical categories such as noun, verb gender class by analyzing the groups of grammatical uses or operations that groups of terms tend to take in common, thereby learning how uses in such operations predict each other" (Maratsos, 1982, 247). This I have characterized using a dependency notation. The entirely formal operation involved here seems to be required, e.g. in the case of the German gender system which cannot be explained in functional terms (see Bates, MacWhinney 1982, 189, and Gleitman, Wanner 1982, 32, "for such categories there is no alternative

but to learn co-members word by word on the basis of the syntactic contexts in which they appear”).

I have not, however, dealt with the relevance of ‘dependency’ notation as a means for demonstrating the learners developing awareness of case role relationships within the frames I have⁵ suggested are built up in the lexicon. However semantic (see Fillmore 1971; Starosta 1987; Somers 1987) and pragmatic criteria (see Hudson 1986) provide another ‘handle’ on acquisition data which can ‘co-predict’ the emergence of grammatical categories, and dependency notation can show these relations in the lexical entries for particular ‘heads’ and their dependents in case relational terms in the ways I have demonstrated for purely syntactic knowledge. Combinatorial privileges, supplemented by notions of agency, and topic — themselves composed of features like animacy, intention, cause, givenness and thematicity — form the criterial features around which the prototypical ‘subject’, for example, is built up. It is in this respect, as Tarone (1979) notes, that interlanguage is ‘chameleon’, the result of category generalizations made on the basis of both entirely formal considerations, like those demonstrated above, and of semantic and pragmatic functions familiar from the L1. Interlanguage therefore needs to be approached from the perspective of Heubner’s ‘dynamic paradigm’ (1979) as “transcending anything that can be described in structural terms alone”. (Rutherford, 1984, 132).

It is in this way that the unit-frame dialectic I have described, which is concerned to discover the formal distributional characteristics of categories, can be seen as a form-function dialectic from which the semantic and pragmatic valencies of the words and their larger formulaic contexts are determined.

3. Conclusion: Patterns and Ranges

I have suggested that pattern analysis as revealed in the process of fissioning formulaic chunks takes place along two different dimensions. Unit-frame relations are concerned to establish patterns of lexical co-occurrence or ‘range’; form-function relations are concerned to establish semantic valencies

⁵ Although valency theory is usually presented as a theory of syntax the dependency notations I have introduced are equally capable of being extended to cover the relations of semantic heads to their modifiers or dependents. Leech (1981) provides examples of how semantic valencies map on to syntactic ones. In discussing the bivalent and monovalent verbs *say* and *speak* he points out that this syntactic difference belies the fact that they have the ‘same basic meaning’ (1981, 198). “... the point is that valency has both a syntactic and a corresponding semantic aspect [...] Both verbs *say* and *speaks* express the same two place predicate ‘say’, and yet their syntactic valencies are different” (1981, 198).

and pragmatic function. The processes I have described involve the assumption that analysis is conducted largely in dependency terms, with the result that the learner analyses and stores syntactic and semantic dependency patterns for words. The subsequent development of structure can be seen to be partly the result of the learner's developing elaboration of 'pattern' of dependencies between frames, and generalizations about individual lexical items within those frames. In this way continuity can be established between the processes involved in acquiring language and the processes hypothesized by Pawley and Syder (1983), and Sinclair (1984) as underlying the storage and retrieval of lexicalized sentence stems, and recognizing 'natural' patterns of language use. 'Formulaicity' and 'naturalness' as opposed to 'well-formedness' of 'freely generable' strings in actually occurring speech and texts, can thus be seen as continuous with the lexical strategies involved in acquisition. This involves the development of a lexicon composed of a large number of structural 'frames' along the line I have suggested in my dependency analyses of the processes of fission and fusion. This analysis has involved a rather different metaphor for 'structure' than the one which is basic to the 'trees' through which constituency theory views acquisition data. This metaphor for structure (see note 1) underlies a great current models of grammar, and as such it has been, I have claimed, the almost unacknowledged legislator of research into L1 and L2 structural acquisition.

Schumann (1984, 52) has argued that in viewing acquisition data we need to adopt 'multiple perspectives' on what is 'out there', because, as Popper has observed, our descriptive frameworks necessarily 'constrain' and so shape our way of seeing (Popper 1976). Rutherford has made another germane point, that "there is always the extreme possibility, as argued by Erica Garcia (1979) that IL syntax does not really exist at all, that syntax is rather a figment of our erstwhile transformational imaginations" (1984, 149). I have suggested that we should not seek to describe syntax separately from lexis, and in this I have been following the line taken by Hudson (1984). The dependency notation I have used, and the simple frames I have identified are the basis for his proposal to relate grammatical structure, the information we have about words, to similar formalisms for describing other aspects of cognitive structure; frames for semantic and contextual information. Finally, in following this line I have been aware that Hallidayan systemic linguistics has had as an ideal or 'grammarian's dream' as Hasan (1987) describes it, the ability to conflate the levels of lexis and grammar. In Halliday's words, "lexis is most delicate grammar" (1978, 121). For Allwright (1986 and 1.1.) this notion appears to

have an operational validity for the language learner, who gathers grammatical information via the questions asked about words.

In summarising comments by Keyser (1985) and MacWhinney (1986) on the primacy of the lexicon in language learning Ard and Gass (1987) comment: "Thus, what may appear to be syntactic learning is in actuality a matter of learning the structural frames into which lexical items can enter" (1987, 238). The dependency notation I have illustrated with regard to the fissioning of formulaic chunks, or holistic units, is one perspective we can take on data as hypothetical evidence for the accretive process of second language structural acquisition in a way that established continuity with the acquisition of lexical knowledge.

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SPECIFICITY, DONELLAN'S DICHOTOMY AND VAGUENESS*

By

I. KOYA

The question of specificity has become a central topic in recent linguistic philosophy. It is well-known that indefinite noun phrases are said to be ambiguous in relation to the specific/non-specific distinction. This distinction, however, can be easily confused with Donnellan's attributive/referential distinction in definite descriptions. The aim of the present paper is to point out differences between the two distinctions and to show that Donnellan's distinction is a further specification within the sphere of specific reading. In conclusion, the specific/non-specific distinction is regarded as a phenomenon of vagueness.

1. Opacity and specificity

The notion "specificity" is based on opacity phenomena, and we should begin with the relevance of opacity to specificity. The definition of opacity is provided in two similar but distinct ways.

The first definition is given by the substitutivity of identicals which plays a crucial role in inference relation. Let us take the following inference.

(1)(a) *Peter Meyer is a Swiss.*

(b) *Peter Meyer is a chairman of the linguistic department.*

Therefore:

(c) *The chairman of the linguistic department is a Swiss.*

Given the condition that *Peter Meyer* is identical with *the chairman of the linguistic department*, whatever is true of one of them will be also true of the other. Thus, we can substitute the term *Peter Meyer* for *the chairman of the linguistic department*, without changing the truth value. But take now the following inference.

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(2)(a) *John believes Peter Meyer is a Swiss.*

(b) *Peter Meyer is the chairman of the linguistic department.*

Therefore:

(c) **John believes the chairman of the linguistic department is a Swiss.*

We cannot infer (c) from the two premises, even if the identity condition is satisfied. The verb *believe* offers the context where co-referential terms are not mutually substitutable. The definition of opacity, in this case, depends on the applicability of Leibniz's Law.

(3) If:	F(a)
and if:	a=b
then:	F(b)

When the inference of (3) is valid, the context is called "transparent", and when not, the context is referred to as "opaque".

The second definition of opacity is given by existential generalization. For instance, we can represent (4) as (5), using the existential quantifier.

(4) *John kissed a beautiful woman.*

(5) $\exists x(x \text{ is a beautiful woman} \ \& \ \text{John kissed } x)$

The same thing, however, does not go for (6).

(6) *John wants to marry a beautiful woman.*

(7) $\exists x(x \text{ is a beautiful woman} \ \& \ \text{John wants to marry } x)$

The representation (7) might fail, since it is possible that the existential condition of *a beautiful woman* is not satisfied. For (4) to be true, it is indispensable that *a beautiful woman* really existed, while in the case of (6) the existence of *a beautiful woman* is not a necessary condition. In this sense, contexts such as (4) are called "transparent" and those like (6) are referred to as "opaque". The semantic interpretation of opaque constructions is often symbolized as "F(a)", whereas the transparent construction requires a further specification as in " $\exists x(x=a \ \& \ F(x))$ ". Cf. Hintikka (1973, 203).

Specificity is characterized in the linguistic literature by this existential generalization.¹ However, the term "specificity" is used in linguistics for indefinite NPs rather than for contexts which reflect the property of predicates.

¹ See Fodor (1970, 8). She states that the definition of opacity based on the substitutivity of identicals is referred to as the opacity of descriptive content.

Specificity in this use is accounted for roughly as follows. If *John* in (6) has a particular beautiful woman in mind, then the interpretation given to *a beautiful woman* is referred to as "specific", and if he does not have any particular woman in mind but has only a certain type of beautiful woman, then the interpretation is called "non-specific". On the specific reading of (6), the existence of *a beautiful woman* will be inferred and we can make a paraphrase of (6) as (7), in ordinary language as (8).

(8) *There is a beautiful woman that John wants to marry.*

Notice that (7) or (8) simply implies that the existential condition of *a beautiful woman* is satisfied. We cannot replace this phrase with some other extensionally equivalent term. On the non-specific reading, the existential condition is not guaranteed and (6) will be, therefore, paraphrased as (9) which corresponds to (10) in the logical notation.

(9) *John wants there to be a beautiful woman whom he can marry.*

(10) John wants $\exists x(x \text{ is a beautiful woman} \ \& \ \text{John marries } x)$

As is shown above, (6) permits two logically independent interpretations. An interesting point to notice here is that these two logical forms are closely related to each other. " $\exists x(x=a \ \& \ F(x))$ " is given by way of the restricted quantification of " $F(a)$ ". Thus, the restricted quantification of the non-specific reading makes the specific reading possible. They bear the "whole-part" relation in their meanings.

The specific/non-specific ambiguity does not appear when a sentence has no opaque context. The sentence (4) does not have the non-specific counterpart, since it can be uniquely represented as (5). Needless to say, indefinite NPs are not in themselves ambiguous. The semantic relationship between the indefinite NP and the remainder of a sentence contributes to the ambiguity.

2. The attributive/referential distinction

The attributive/referential distinction was first pointed out by Donnellan (1966) concerning the speaker's use of definite descriptions. A definite description is an expression which picks up a certain individual object by describing it as the object which has such and such a property. Let us take Donnellan's example.

(11) *Smith's murderer is insane.*

According to Donnellan, (11) can be used in two different ways. When a speaker uses (11) attributively, he states something about whoever is Smith's murderer. In this use of definite descriptions, what is described in words is all important. We can use (11) attributively, for instance, when a newspaper informs us of the horrible murder of Smith by an unknown robber. When a speaker uses (11) referentially, he utilizes the description to pick up some individual and states something about this individual. In this case, the speaker could succeed in referring to a certain person by uttering *Smith's murderer*. Thus, if the speaker of (11) believes that some individual, say Jones, is Smith's murderer, he could refer to Jones by expressing (11), even if his belief is wrong.²

3. Specificity and Donnellan's distinction

We are now in a position to compare specificity with Donnellan's distinction. Some linguists and scholars like Partee (1972) and Hintikka (1973) consider that the specific/non-specific distinction corresponds to the referential/attributional distinction. This correspondence, however, involves a mistake in its interpretation. Let us examine the specific/referential correspondence. Take the following sentence as an example.

(12) *John wants to buy a Japanese car.*

The specific reading of (12) guarantees the existential condition of *a Japanese car*. Thus, the specific reading is compatible with the situation where John has some idea about such and such a type of Japanese car in its color, size and so forth. Such a Japanese car is a particular car for John. But this is not the same as the referential reading in Donnellan's sense. The referential reading requires a more restricted object like *that Japanese car over there*. The existence of *a Japanese car* that John wants to buy is merely a necessary condition for the referential reading. Except for misdescribed cases, the referential interpretation could be paraphrased as:

(13) *There exists a single object which is a Japanese car that John wants to buy.*

² I am ignoring the hearer's position here. For the pragmatics between speakers and hearers, see Schoorl (1980).

The referential reading should be interpreted more demonstratively or rigidly like proper names. The characterization of the specific reading is not enough to make the referential reading equivalent.³

Let us turn now to the non-specific/attributive correspondence. Consider (14).

(14) *John is looking for an informant who speaks Swiss German.*

When (14) is interpreted non-specifically, it may permit both the plurality of individuals (one or more informants) and the lack of particularity (some informant or other). But neither of these characteristics is compatible with Donnellan's attributive reading. First, the attributive reading can be used with the *particular* sense. Donnellan (1966, 299–300) states:

“A definite description can be used attributively even when the speaker believes that some particular thing or person fits the description.”

Second, the attributive reading does require the *uniqueness of the object*, exactly a single object which satisfies the description. Donnellan (1966, 303) writes:

“There is a φ and only one such any φ is ψ . We might put this in a slightly different way. If there is anything which might be identified as reference here, it is reference in a very weak sense — namely, reference to *whatever* is the one and only one φ , if there is any such. Now this is something we might well say about the attributive use of definite descriptions.”

From these discrepancies, it is clear that the specific/non-specific distinction cannot be identified with Donnellan's distinction. The attributive/referential distinction is a further specification within the sphere of specific reading, since both of the attributive and referential readings require the existential generalization. Thus, the relation among the four readings could be shown as (15).

³ The difference between the specific and the referential readings may be due to the definiteness in the sense that the referential reading can uniquely identify the referent.

(15)

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{specific} \\ \text{non - specific} \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{referential} \\ \text{attributive} \end{array} \right.$$

The misinterpretation of this relationship seems to result from the differing definition of opacity. The substitutivity of identicals is compatible with Donnellan's distinction, though definite descriptions can occur without opaque contexts. Consider (11) again.

(11) *Smith's murderer is insane.*

The referential reading of (11) can single out an individual who is described as *Smith's murderer*. And if the speaker uses the description to refer to Jones, then (11) would be equivalent to (16) for the speaker.

(16) *Jones is insane.*

It is, therefore, possible to substitute the term *Smith's murderer* for the co-referential term *Jones*. On the attributive reading, we cannot substitute *Smith's murderer* for some proper name, since the definite description is not being used to pick out a certain individual. The speaker states about Smith's murderer that *he* is insane, but does not say that Jones is insane, even if Jones really killed Smith.

From the standpoints of substitutivity, the transparent interpretation is related to the referential reading and the opaque interpretation to the attributive reading. It might be significant, then, to give the following supplement to (15).

(17)

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{specific} \\ \text{(transparent)}_2 \\ \text{non - specific} \\ \text{(opaque)}_2 \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{referential} \\ \text{(transparent)}_1 \\ \text{attributive} \\ \text{(opaque)}_1 \end{array} \right.$$

(The numbers 1 and 2 show the definition of opacity by the substitutivity of identicals and that by existential generalization, respectively.)

4. The meaning of specificity

We have observed how the specific/non-specific distinction should be seen in relation to Donnellan's distinction. In this section, we will examine the linguistic characteristic of specificity. As is shown by (7) and (10), the logical representation of specificity phenomena is given in terms of the scope distinction of the existential quantifier. This representation, however, seems to give rise to some problems. When a sentence has two modal constructions as in (18), we have three different scope interpretations.

- (18) *Mary believes John wants to buy a Japanese car.*
- (19) $\exists x(x \text{ is a Japanese car} \ \& \ \text{Mary believes John wants to buy } x)$
- (20) *Mary believes $\exists x(x \text{ is a Japanese car} \ \& \ \text{John wants to buy } x)$*
- (21) *Mary believes John wants $\exists x(x \text{ is a Japanese car} \ \& \ \text{John buys } x)$*

In (19), *a Japanese car* is specific both to Mary and to John, whereas it is non-specific to both of them in (21). There is, moreover, an intermediate scope interpretation where *a Japanese car* is specific to John, but not to Mary. It is difficult to imagine that *a Japanese car* is specific to John (subject of the embedded sentence), when Mary has no particular Japanese car in her mind. The proposition of the embedded sentence would be within Mary's belief world. But, if specificity can be relativized to an individual person,⁴ we cannot simply say that a certain indefinite NP is specific or non-specific in such and such a sentence. The indefinite NP can be, depending on an individual person, both specific and non-specific at the same time. The speaker's role is also responsible in this respect, since he can utter a sentence, with having a particular object in mind. The scope representation, however, has no means to indicate his commitment to specificity. Furthermore, there exist sentences which involve the discrepancy between linguistic specificity and ontological existence. For example:

- (22) *John wants to design an optical computer.*

The above sentence, as well as sentences with fictional terms, does not have any ontological reality. *An optical computer* is not yet available at the present stage of computer science. In spite of this fact, (22) can be still specific when John has a particular optical computer in mind. This is why we must expand,

⁴ It is worth discussing whether the reverse case of (20) is possible, i.e., whether *a Japanese car* is specific to Mary but not to John. Such a situation is not likely to exist, but if it should exist, the scope representation could not deal with this case.

like Fodor (1970), the interpretation of the existential quantifier to linguistic existence, so that the logical notation can cover the non-existent indefinite NP. But, specificity interpreted in this way shades off the difference between the following two sentences.

(23) *There is an optical computer that John wants to design.*

(24) *John has a particular optical computer in mind that he wants to design.*

(24) would be generally preferable as a paraphrased sentence of the specific reading, since in any case someone, be it a speaker or a subject, has a particular object in mind, whether it is existent now (a Japanese car), or will be existent in the future (an optical computer), or is fictional (a unicorn).⁵ Note, however, that the reading of a *particular NP* does not presuppose the identification of the referent. In this sense, the specific NP will be what Declerck (1983, 218) calls "weakly referential." The paraphrased sentence like (24) can uniquely apply to all of the sentences that involve indefinite NPs in their modal constructions, and it reflects the fact that specificity is characterized as a notion which is concerned with one's mind.

Putting things in this way, the specific/non-specific ambiguity could be regarded as a phenomenon of vagueness. There is an example which seems to support this claim. Suppose that the speaker of (12), with the subject *I* instead of *John*, uttered this sentence, without having fully decided on a particular Japanese car. If someone says to him *You mean a particular one*, he will possibly answer *I think so*. This is a borderline example between the specific and the non-specific interpretations, and it suggests that specificity is basically a pragmatic notion rather than a semantically-based phenomenon. We could therefore say the specific reading is a special case of the meaning which is expressed by an indefinite NP. Whether or not a particular object is in-minded will be a matter of vagueness.

⁵ Linguistic existence should be, therefore, included in existential generalization in (17).

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CONTRE UNE TRANSPOSITION DE LA THEORIE X' A LA MORPHOLOGIE DERIVATIONNELLE*

par

D. CORBIN

Je me propose d'apporter ici des arguments contre les tentatives actuelles de la grammaire générative pour transposer la théorie «X-barre» (désormais X') à l'analyse de la structure des mots construits. Ces tentatives renouent avec une tentation ancienne: appliquer à l'étude des mots construits les modes et principes d'analyse éprouvés dans le domaine syntaxique. Je m'attacherai à démontrer que, même s'il convient de chercher des principes d'organisation et/ou de fonctionnement analogues dans le composant lexical et dans le composant syntaxique, les principes de la théorie X' ne peuvent pas être transposés tels quels à la structure des mots. Ma discussion argumentera donc en faveur d'un composant lexical autonome, où oeuvrent des principes d'organisation spécifiques. Je prendrai pour base de discussion les trois textes suivants: Toman (1980), Williams (1981), Selkirk (1982). Après avoir rappelé en quoi consiste la transposition de la théorie X' à la morphologie dérivationnelle (1.), j'avancerai des arguments contre cette transposition (2.); la première série argumentera contre l'assimilation de la tête d'un mot construit à la tête d'un constituant syntaxique (2.1.), la seconde contre l'engendrement des structures de mots construits par des règles de réécriture (2.2.).¹ Je terminerai par l'esquisse d'un modèle alternatif, dont on trouvera le détail dans D. Corbin (1987).

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¹ Booij (1985), dans son compte rendu de Toman (1980), avance un certain nombre de critiques contre ce type de théorie, avec certaines desquelles les objections qui sont formulées ici sont en accord. Le présent travail a été rédigé en grande partie avant la lecture de cet article.

1. La transposition de la théorie X' à la morphologie dérivationnelle

Appliquer X' à l'analyse de la structure des mots construits revient à adopter les quatre principes suivants:

1) Les constituants internes des mots appartiennent sans solution de continuité à la hiérarchie X', c'est-à-dire qu'ils peuvent en principe être affectés d'un indice -1 , -2 , $-n$, et qu'ils sont tous dominés par un constituant de niveau 0.

2) La structure des mots construits est engendrée par des règles de réécriture indépendantes du contexte, analogues aux règles syntagmatiques, et est interprétée par des règles sémantiques dissociées. Autrement dit, les partisans de la théorie X' dans le domaine lexical sont également et nécessairement partisans d'une morphologie dissociative, dans laquelle les régularités structurales et les régularités sémantiques des mots construits sont exprimées par des règles dissociées, appartenant à des composants indépendants.

3) Tout constituant mère domine une tête de même catégorie.

4) Certaines propriétés (notamment syntaxiques) de la tête sont percolées sur la mère. Selkirk (1982, 21) pose ainsi le principe suivant:

- (1) «If a constituent α is the head of a constituent β , α and β are associated with an identical set of features (syntactic and diacritic).»



Ce principe ne s'étend pas, précise Selkirk, aux traits de sous-catégorisation stricte, que Toman, quant à lui, percole depuis le noeud soeur. La percolation du trait catégoriel de la tête à la mère présente deux cas de figure pour les mots construits affixés:

- Si le mot construit n'a pas la même catégorie que sa base, il découle de la théorie X' que l'**affixe** est responsable de la catégorie du mot construit. C'est pourquoi les partisans de cette théorie attribuent aux affixes têtes des catégories majeures. Ainsi, dans la figure (2), (2a) représente la structure d'un mot comme *mangeable* selon Toman, (2b) cette même structure selon Selkirk.²

La différence entre les deux représentations tient au fait que, pour Selkirk, les affixes appartiennent fondamentalement à la catégorie «Affixe» pour des raisons sur lesquelles nous reviendrons (cf. ci-dessous 3.1.). J'adopterai désormais le formalisme de Selkirk.

² Je néglige, pour des raisons de commodité, la différence qu'établit Selkirk entre le niveau du «mot» et celui de la «racine», sans incidence sur la discussion.

Dans la suite de ce texte, les têtes seront encadrées dans les représentations arborescentes.




A partir de la constatation que les suffixes, contrairement aux préfixes, déterminent en général la catégorie du mot construit, Williams (1981, 248) pose le principe de la «tête à droite» (désormais RHR):

(3) Righthand Head Rule

«In morphology, we define the head of a morphologically complex word to be the righthand member of that word.»

Ainsi, *-able* est la tête de *mangeable*, *coudre* celle de *découdre*. Ce principe admet toutefois, selon les termes de Williams, des «exceptions systématiques», dans les cas où le préfixe semble responsable de la catégorie du mot construit, dans *enrichir* par exemple:³



Pour Selkirk, RHR n'est probablement pas universel. Elle cite notamment (p. 21) l'exemple du mot composé français *timbre poste*, où la marque du pluriel (*timbres poste*) identifie *timbre* comme la tête (à gauche) de la construction. Elle propose donc une version révisée de RHR:


³ Il existe des variantes plus «radicales» que RHR, qui multiplient le nombre des exceptions, par exemple dans Hoekstra, van der Hulst & Moortgat (1981, 21-22):

«The affixes are considered to be the heads of the construction»

Les auteurs considèrent comme des exceptions à cette formulation les préfixes qui ne changent pas la catégorie de la base, et qui sont, selon eux, la majorité.

(5) RHR révisé


«In a word-internal configuration,



where X stands for a syntactic feature complex and where Q contains no category with the feature complex X, X^m is the head of X^n » (p. 20)

D'après cette définition, le constituant le plus à droite de X^n qui a les mêmes traits syntaxiques que X^n est la tête de X^n . C'est le cas de *-able* dans *mangeable*, et de *en-* dans *enrichir*, où *riche* ne peut pas être considéré comme un verbe. Autrement dit, le principe RHR de Williams est positionnel, celui de Selkirk est syntaxique, et résout le problème des «exceptions systématiques» de Williams.

– Le deuxième cas de figure est celui où l'affixe n'est pas automatiquement identifié comme la tête d'un mot construit, si la catégorie des noeuds filles est identique. Dans ce cas en effet, RHR révisé ne fournit pas de critère permettant de localiser la tête (dans la figure ci-dessus, X^m et Q sont alors deux candidats possibles au rôle de tête). J'illustrerai cette situation, en français, par trois exemples (et une argumentation) analogues aux exemples anglais de Selkirk (1982, 79, 82), et à la façon dont elle identifie la tête dans ces exemples. Soit *maisonnette*, nom construit sur le nom *maison*, *héroïsme*, nom construit sur le nom *héros*, *richard*, adjectif construit sur l'adjectif *riche*. Leur structure est représentée en (6), telle que Selkirk les analyserait:



Dans les trois cas, le suffixe est identifié comme la tête du mot construit, pour des raisons différentes: *-ette* est la tête de *maisonnette* parce qu'on prédit ainsi que ce suffixe construit toujours des noms en français; *-isme* est la tête de *héroïsme* parce que le nom construit est d'un type sémantique différent de celui du nom de base; *-ard* est la tête de *richard* parce que *-ard* sert aussi à construire des adjectifs sur des bases nominales (*campagnard*). Selkirk conclut que «suffixes in English are basically the heads of their constituents» (p. 82). On pourrait en dire autant, sur ces bases, du français.

Il ressort de ce qui précède que, quels que soient les auteurs, les principes qui permettent de localiser la tête des mots construits affixés sont les suivants:

- (7) 1. Si le mot affixé n'a pas la même catégorie que sa base, c'est l'affixe qui en est la tête (*mangeable*, *enrichir*).
2. Si le mot affixé a la même catégorie que sa base, c'est le constituant de droite qui en est la tête, c'est-à-dire le suffixe (*maisonnette*, *héroïsme*, *richard*) ou la base dans le cas d'un mot préfixé (*découdre*).

2. Contre-argumentation

2.1. La tête d'un mot construit n'est pas assimilable à la tête d'un constituant syntaxique

Au moins cinq types de propriétés linguistiques différencient le comportement de la tête d'un constituant syntaxique et celui du morphème que les principes (7) permettent d'identifier comme la tête d'un mot construit: la localisation, le rôle sémantique, le rôle d'origine des traits diacritiques percolés, les relations avec les constituants soeurs, le rôle «structurel».

2.1.1. Localisation de la tête

Dans le cas d'un mot construit de même catégorie que sa base, la localisation de la tête est problématique. Les arguments utilisés par Selkirk, et adaptés ci-dessus au français, sont en effet critiquables: l'argument utilisé pour un mot comme *héroïsme* (le nom construit est d'un type sémantique différent du nom de base) ne s'applique pas à un mot comme *maisonnette*, qui est du même type sémantique que *maison*, et où *-ette* est néanmoins identifié comme la tête, sur la base d'arguments autres. L'argument utilisé pour identifier *-ette* comme la tête de *maisonnette* (on prédit ainsi que tous les mots construits par *-ette* seront des noms) est contradictoire avec celui utilisé pour identifier *-ard* comme la tête de *richard* (*-ard* sert également à construire des adjectifs sur des bases nominales). En effet, de deux choses l'une: ou bien l'on pose un principe d'unicité catégorielle de la base pour un affixe donné, ce que Selkirk

semble faire par ailleurs,⁴ mais dans ce cas, l'argument utilisé pour *richard* n'est plus valide, car il s'agit alors dans *richard* et *campagnard* de deux suffixes différents homonymes,⁵ et l'on ne peut pas utiliser les propriétés de l'un pour argumenter sur l'autre; ou bien l'on ne pose pas un tel principe, et l'argument utilisé pour *richard* reste valide. Mais dans ce cas, c'est l'argument utilisé pour *maisonnette* qui ne l'est plus, puisque *-et(te)* construit non seulement des noms (*maisonnette*, *jardinet*), mais aussi des adjectifs (*propret*) et des verbes (*voleter*).

D'autre part, pour une même catégorie, la place de la tête des constituants syntaxiques et celle de la tête des mots construits n'est ni nécessairement la même, ni nécessairement stable dans le cas des mots. Par exemple, en anglais et en français, dans les projections de V, la tête est toujours à gauche. Dans les verbes construits, en vertu des principes (7), la tête n'est à gauche que si le verbe est du type *enrichir*, c'est-à-dire s'il comporte un préfixe changeant la catégorie de la base. Dans tous les autres cas (*découdre*, *banaliser*), la tête est à droite.

2.1.2. Rôle sémantique de la tête

Dans les constituants syntaxiques, la tête syntaxique est aussi *grosso modo* la tête sémantique. Dans les mots construits, ce n'est pas toujours le cas. Le sens d'un mot construit se construit compositionnellement à partir du sens de la soeur et de celui de la tête, mais le rôle de cette dernière n'est pas toujours prépondérant: certes, le sens d'un mot comme *héroïsme* est d'un type différent de celui de *héros* (l'héroïsme est une attitude, sens que l'on peut associer à la tête suffixale *-isme*), mais celui d'un mot comme *maisonnette* est du même type que celui de *maison* (une maisonnette est un genre de maison, sens qui provient de la base soeur *maison*).

Cette observation est corroborée par le fait que certaines contraintes sémantiques pesant sur la construction des mots trouvent leur origine dans


⁴ A propos de la différenciation entre les préfixes et les catégories majeures figurant en premier terme de mots composés, elle signale que les préfixes se distinguent des catégories majeures en ce qu'ils ne sont pas «cross-categorial in their subcategorization». Et elle ajoute (1982, 83):

« This is a property which in general seems to characterize affixes, as a type, and oppose them to the nonaffix categories of morphology »

⁵ Cette homonymie est confirmée par le fait que les adjectifs construits sur des bases adjectivales correspondent sémantiquement à une évaluation péjorative du sens de leur base, tandis que les adjectifs construits sur des bases nominales n'ont pas ce sens évaluatif.

Pour une argumentation en faveur de l'homonymie affixale, et une description de ses conditions d'apparition, voir D. Corbin (1987, 242-254).

le noeud soeur, et non dans le noeud tête. Par exemple, Zimmer (1964) avait émis l'hypothèse que seuls les adjectifs de sens évaluatif «positif» pouvaient être préfixés négativement (par *in-* par exemple). Il n'est pas sûr que cette hypothèse puisse être conservée telle quelle.⁶ Mais elle présente en tout cas l'avantage de rendre compte du fait que les règles de préfixation négative de bases adjectivales ne sont pas immédiatement récursives en français (*injuste*, mais **ininjuste*, *immoral*, mais **inimmoral*, etc.). Si cette corrélation est exacte, alors il faut admettre que l'origine de cette contrainte sémantique se trouve dans la présence de l'affixe *in-*, noeud soeur et non tête, comme le montre la structure (8):




2.1.3. L'origine des traits diacritiques percolés

Rappelons que, dans un souci d'assimiler les propriétés d'une tête de mot construit à celles d'une tête de constituant syntaxique, Selkirk suppose que les traits syntaxiques (à l'exception des traits de sous-catégorisation stricte) et diacritiques du mot construit lui viennent de sa tête (cf. principe (1)). Je traiterai ici des traits diacritiques. S'il est vrai que certains traits doivent être percolés depuis la tête, par exemple, en français, le genre dans le cas des suffixes assignant un genre spécifique aux mots qu'ils servent à construire (parmi les suffixes servant à construire des noms d'action sur des bases verbales, *-age* et *-ment* construisent des noms masculins, *-ade*, *-tion*, *-ure* des noms féminins), ou l'appartenance à un type de conjugaison, dans le cas des suffixes servant à construire des verbes (tous les verbes suffixés appartiennent à la première conjugaison, quelles que soient les propriétés de la base: *vivre/vivoter*), ou des préfixes servant à construire des verbes sur des bases verbales (le type de conjugaison est celui de la base tête: *brancher/débrancher*, *coudre/découdre*),

⁶ Voir une ébauche de discussion dans D. Corbin (1987, 581-582).

dans d'autres cas, les traits diacritiques doivent être percolés **conjointement** depuis le noeud tête et le noeud soeur.

Soient par exemple les traits d'allomorphie. On admettra ici qu'il s'agit de traits diacritiques définissant des entrées lexicales, dont les instructions sont susceptibles de réalisation contextuelle dans un environnement favorable.⁷ Parmi ces traits, le français a besoin d'un trait qui permette de rendre compte du passage de /oi/ à /o/ dans certaines conditions. On baptisera ce trait [M] (= monophthongaison). C'est ce trait qui explique par exemple l'allomorphie de *gloire* quand s'y applique le suffixe *-eux* (*glorieux* et non **gloireux*). Si l'on supposait que les traits diacritiques ne sont percolés que depuis le noeud tête, on ferait la prédiction — fausse — que tous les adjectifs suffixés par *-eux* (tête) sur une base nominale (soeur) comportant la diphtongue /oi/ doivent subir une monophthongaison. Or, l'adjectif correspondant à *goître* est *goîtreux*, et non **gotrieux*. Pour expliquer le contraste entre *glorieux* et *goîtreux*, il faut donc supposer que le trait [M] ne peut provoquer une allomorphie que si la tête *et* la soeur en sont marqués:



2.1.4. Structures acéphales et polycéphales


D'ordinaire, les constituants syntaxiques sont monocéphales, comme l'affirme Jackendoff (1977, 30):

- (10) «the head is unique, that is, each X^n will dominate one and only one X^{n-1} ».

⁷ Cf. sur ce point Dell & Selkirk (1978), D. Corbin (1985) et (1987, 283–340).



C'est aussi le cas des mots construits. Je voudrais montrer ici que, bien que l'on retrouve dans la structure des mots construits les deux types d'exceptions que signale Jackendoff pour les constituants syntaxiques, des structures à plusieurs têtes et des structures sans tête, ces structures ne sont néanmoins pas semblables dans les constituants syntaxiques et dans les mots.

Soit l'exemple *androgynie*, attesté comme nom et adjectif ('Individu qui présente certains des caractères sexuels du sexe opposé') PR77). En tant que nom, il s'agit d'un mot composé de deux constituants nominaux dont il serait artificiel et inadéquat, d'un point de vue sémantique et d'un point de vue structurel, d'identifier l'un comme tête plutôt que l'autre. Ce mot a donc une structure analogue à celle des constituants syntaxiques coordonnés, à plusieurs têtes. Mais, à la différence de ces constituants, la structure de *androgynie* ne comporte que des têtes, à l'exclusion de tout autre noeud:



En tant qu'adjectif, *androgynie* peut être expliqué comme le résultat de la conversion du nom *androgynie*. Dans un formalisme comme celui qui est imposé par la théorie X', il y a deux façons de rendre compte du changement catégoriel: ou bien le faire dépendre d'un noeud tête sans réalisation lexicale (12a), mécanisme *ad hoc* dans la mesure où il n'est pas motivé indépendamment du formalisme adopté,⁸ ou bien considérer que cette structure est acéphale (12b). Mais rien, dans cette structure, ne motive l'acéphalité, contrairement aux structures syntaxiques acéphales citées par Jackendoff. (12b) est donc également *ad hoc*, dans cette perspective.

⁸ Il serait trop long de justifier ici cette assertion. Je renvoie le lecteur à D. Corbin (1987, 272-279).



2.1.5. Rôle structurel et rôle non structurel des suffixes têtes: le cas particulier des suffixes «contextuels»

Il va s'agir ici de cas où la théorie X' ne pourrait pas faire autrement que d'identifier comme tête d'un mot construit un élément qui a la forme d'un suffixe, mais qui n'en a pas la fonction dérivationnelle.

Soit les exemples *démoustiquer* ('supprimer les moustiques de quelque part') et *désinsectiser* ('supprimer les insectes de quelque part'). L'interprétation sémantique de ces deux verbes est absolument parallèle. Tout se passe comme si *désinsectiser* était synonyme d'un verbe °*désinsecter*,⁹ où n'apparaît pas *-is(er)*, et *démoustiquer* synonyme d'un verbe °*démoustiquiser*, où apparaît *-is(er)*.

Cette terminaison suffixale *-is(er)* (il en va de même pour *-ifi(er)* dans les mêmes conditions), en l'occurrence, ne joue pas de rôle sémantique à proprement parler. D'autre part, elle n'apparaît que dans des conditions contextuelles très précises:

– Il faut que le verbe sur lequel elle s'applique soit construit: ainsi s'explique le contraste entre *budgétiser* 'inscrire au budget', possible parce que sa «base» °*budgéter* est elle-même construite par conversion sur *budget*, et **polluier*, impossible parce que sa «base» *polluer* n'est pas construite.

– Il faut que le verbe sur lequel elle s'applique soit construit sur une base adjectivale ou nominale: ainsi s'explique le contraste entre *dénébuliser*, possible parce que *dénébuler* est construit sur une base nominale °*nébule* 'brouillard', ou °*détorifier* (attesté indirectement par *détorification*), possible parce

⁹ Le signe ° marque les mots bien construits non attestés dans le lexique conventionnel (représenté par l'ensemble des dictionnaires français contemporains), contrairement au signe * qui marque les mots mal construits.

que *détoriquer*, sa «base» tronquée,¹⁰ est construite sur l'adjectif *toxique*, et **dépolluier*, impossible parce que *dépolluer* est construit sur la base verbale *polluer*.



– Enfin, cette terminaison suffixale est obligatoire lorsque l'adjectif qui sert de base au verbe sur lequel elle s'applique est suffixé par *-al*, *-aire* ou *-el*: contraster par exemple *décléricaliser* 'rendre moins clérical', et **décléricaler*, *dénucléariser* 'supprimer les armements nucléaires', et **dénucléa(i)rer*, *déssexualiser* 'enlever le caractère sexuel', et **déssexu(a+e)ler*.

Cette terminaison suffixale a donc des propriétés différentes de celles des suffixes: elle ne joue pas de rôle sémantique, ne provoque aucun changement catégoriel, enfin viole la condition atomique formulée par Williams (1981, 253), qui succède à la condition d'adjacence proposée par Siegel (1977) et Allen (1978), selon laquelle une opération affixale ne peut référer qu'au matériel immédiatement adjacent à l'affixe. Pour toutes ces raisons, il serait inadéquat de lui donner le statut d'un véritable suffixe, appliqué par une règle de construction des mots. Il s'agit en fait d'un élément «contextuel», analogue à celui qui apparaît dans des adjectifs comme *anticancéreux* ('contre le cancer', et non 'contre les cancéreux'), *antigrippal* ('contre la grippe'), etc. Dans une théorie comme celle qui est exposée dans D. Corbin (1987), cet élément est introduit postérieurement à l'application des règles de construction des mots, par un «principe de copie» non dérivationnel, qui tend à calquer la forme d'un mot préfixé sur une base non suffixée sur celle du mot non préfixé correspondant suffixé sur la même base.¹¹ Autrement dit, on a *anticancéreux*, *antigrippal*, parallèlement à °*anticancer*_A, *antigrippe*_A parce que les adjectifs construits sur *cancer* et *grippe* ont la forme *cancéreux* et *grippal*. De la même façon, on a *désinsectiser* parallèlement à °*désinsecter* parce que, si l'on construisait un verbe non préfixé ayant le sens «introduire des insectes quelque part», il aurait la forme °*insectiser* ou °*insecter*.

Dans la théorie X', les deux seules structures attribuables à un mot comme *désinsectiser* seraient les suivantes:


¹⁰ Pour la troncation de *-ique* devant *-is(er)* ou *-ifi(er)*, cf. D. Corbin (1987, 355–356).

¹¹ Sur ce principe de copie, cf. D. Corbin (1987, 135–137, 407–408, 654–655).



(13b) est inadéquante parce qu'elle ne correspond pas au sens attesté de *désinsectiser* mais au sens 'annuler le résultat de l'action d'°*insectiser*'. (13a) est inadéquante pour trois raisons:

- la tête de *désinsectiser* y est l'élément suffixal *-is(er)*, dont on a vu qu'il ne joue ni rôle catégoriel, ni rôle sémantique;
- dans (13a), *-iser* est identifié à un suffixe;
- enfin, (13a) est différente de la structure (13c), qui serait attribuée à °*désinsecter* dans la même théorie, où *dés-* serait la tête, alors que *désinsectiser* et °*désinsecter* sont synonymes.



2.1.6. Conclusion

J'ai tenté de mettre en évidence les points suivants:

- La tête d'un mot construit a des localisations variables pour une même catégorie, et l'on ne dispose pas de critère clair permettant de la localiser dans le cas des mots construits qui ont la même catégorie que leur base.

- Le rôle de la tête d'un mot construit n'est pas le même que celui de la tête d'un constituant syntaxique, et, notamment, il faut admettre que certains traits sémantiques et diacritiques doivent être percolés à partir d'autres noeuds que ceux que la théorie X' identifierait comme les têtes.

– Les structures acéphales et polycéphales des mots construits ne sont pas semblables aux structures syntaxiques correspondantes, ce qui a pour conséquence un traitement inadéquat de la conversion.

– Il y a des cas où le constituant identifié comme la tête d'un mot construit n'en a pas les propriétés syntaxiques et sémantiques.


Il est donc possible que la notion de tête puisse avoir un intérêt dans l'analyse des mots construits, et notamment des mots composés, mais le rôle et le statut attribués à cette notion par la théorie X' dans l'analyse des mots affixés ne sont pas adéquats.

2.2. Contre l'engendrement des structures de mots construits par des règles de réécriture

Mon argumentation tiendra en quatre points: il est inadéquat d'engendrer les structures de mots construits par des règles de réécriture analogues aux règles syntagmatiques parce que les affixes ne sont pas des catégories majeures (2.2.1.); il est impossible dans ce cas de rendre compte adéquatement de la structure des mots complexes non construits (2.2.2.); aux règles de réécriture échappent des généralités (2.2.3.); cela implique une théorie dissociative (2.2.4.).

2.2.1. Les affixes ne sont pas des catégories majeures

Ce premier argument est dirigé contre la version «dure» de la théorie X', représentée notamment par Toman (cf. ci-dessus figure (2a)), qui assimile les affixes à des catégories majeures. Cette théorie a pour conséquence que les règles qui engendrent la structure des mots composés ont la même forme que celles qui engendrent la structure des mots affixés. Par exemple, en français, la structure de *perce-oreille* (qui, en première analyse, peut être considéré comme construit à partir d'un verbe et d'un nom) et celles de *perceur* et *percement* (noms construits sur une base verbale) seraient toutes trois engendrables à partir de la règle (14):

(14) $N \rightarrow V \ N$ 

Or, au moins deux arguments s'opposent à un tel dispositif:

– La construction du sens d'un mot affixé n'est pas nécessairement analogue à celle d'un mot composé. Même si *perce-oreille* et *perceur* désignent tous deux des agents (ou des instruments) de l'action verbale, il n'y a que dans *perceur* que ce rôle sémantique peut être associé au constituant de droite (trivialement, un perceur est un agent qui perce, un *perce-oreille* n'est pas une oreille).


– A la même règle catégorielle peuvent correspondre des interprétations sémantiques différentes, et certaines classes de sens sont strictement associées à une construction affixale. Il n'est pas possible, en français du moins, de faire correspondre à la règle (14) un sens de nom d'action si le N 'tête' n'est pas un affixe (*perçage* ou *percement* signifient 'action de percer', mais *perce-oreille*, *perce-neige* ne peuvent pas avoir le sens '*action de percer (l'oreille, la neige)'). Booij (1985) signale, de la même façon, l'exemple des verbes de changement d'état, eux aussi constructibles sur des bases adjectivales uniquement par affixation (cf. ci-dessous 2.2.3.).

Il est donc préférable d'opter, comme le propose Selkirk, pour une catégorisation spécifique des affixes, ce que confirme le fait, signalé par Beard (1981, 17) que dans les erreurs de performance, il peut y avoir des substitutions de catégories majeures entre elles, mais qu'il n'y a jamais de substitution d'un affixe à une catégorie majeure, ni inversement.

2.2.2. La structure des mots complexes non construits

Engendrer la structure des mots construits par des règles de réécriture implique que tous les constituants puissent être catégorisés, et remplis par des entrées lexicales. Or, il existe des mots dont la structure interne ne satisfait pas à ces conditions.

Soit par exemple le mot *mensonge*: il entretient avec *mentir* les mêmes relations formelles (allomorphie /t/ ~ /s/) et sémantiques (nom d'action, de produit de l'action) que *discussion* avec *discuter*, à la seule différence que *-onge* n'est pas un suffixe, c'est-à-dire qu'il n'est susceptible de construire aucun autre mot du français, attesté ou possible, qui entretienne avec sa base verbale éventuelle les mêmes relations que celles que *mensonge* entretient avec *mentir*. Dans une théorie X', ou bien *mensonge* n'aurait pas de structure interne, ce qui reviendrait à considérer comme aussi arbitraire sa relation avec *mentir* que celle de *coup* avec *frapper*, ou bien, s'il en avait une, les seules structures imaginables seraient les structures (15a) et (15b):



(15a) est inadéquate parce que *-onge* y est assimilé à un suffixe, (15b) parce que cette configuration implique qu'à côté d'une règle $N \rightarrow V N^{af}$ (utile pour engendrer *menteur* par exemple) existe une règle $N \rightarrow V \alpha$, où α serait une variable susceptible de se réaliser différemment selon le contexte verbal (*-onge* dans *mensonge*, mais *-our* dans *amour* etc.), règle qui n'aurait aucun pouvoir explicatif.

Au contraire, si l'on ne se situe pas dans la perspective de règles de réécriture, il est possible de rendre compte du fait que *mensonge* a une structure interne différente de celle d'un mot construit en n'en faisant pas le produit d'une règle de construction des mots, mais en décrivant sa structure interne à l'aide de règles spécifiques. On contrastera ainsi la structure de *menteur*, mot construit, dont tous les constituants sont catégorisés et correspondent à des entrées lexicales, et celle de *mensonge*, mot complexe non construit, dont un seul des constituants est catégorisé et correspond à une entrée lexicale:¹²

¹² Dans D. Corbin (1987: 455-465), je suppose que les mots complexes non construits comme *mensonge* sont des entrées lexicales, au même titre que les mots non complexes comme *mentir*, mais dotés d'une structure interne (16b). Contrairement à ce qui se passe pour des mots construits comme *menteur*, engendré sur la base *mentir* par une règle de construction des mots, *mensonge* et *mentir* sont reliés par des «règles de structure interne», c'est-à-dire des règles de redondance évaluant la régularité structurelle (et la régularité sémantique) des entrées lexicales complexes.

(16a) [[ment]_v (eur)_{af}]_N

(16b) [[ment]_v onge]_N

2.2.3. Aux règles de réécriture échappent des généralités

Soit l'exemple des verbes de changement d'état construits sur des bases adjectivales. Trois structures de mots correspondent à ce sens en français: une structure de préfixation, une de suffixation, une de conversion. Dans une théorie X', où la conversion est assimilée à une suffixation, deux règles de réécriture seraient nécessaires pour engendrer ces trois structures:

(17a) $V \rightarrow A \quad V^{af}$ (ex.: *banaliser*, *blanchir*)

(17b) $V \rightarrow V^{af} \quad A$ (ex.: *appauvrir*, *élargir*, *enrichir*)

Outre le fait, déjà signalé, que dans ce dispositif, à un même sens correspond une localisation différente de la tête, il lui échappe au moins trois types de généralités:

1) Aux deux règles (17a) et (17b) correspond la même interprétation sémantique, que l'on peut paraphraser par «rendre A». Cette observation est confirmée par la synonymie, au niveau du sens prédictible et souvent à celui du sens attesté, de verbes construits différemment sur la même base, allomorphisée ou non:

abonnir / *bonifier*
appauvrir / *paupériser*
éclaircir / *clarifier*
ennoblir / *noblifier*
 etc.

2) A la règle (17a) ne peut correspondre en français que cette interprétation, à l'exclusion de toute autre.

3) Dans la théorie X', c'est la place de l'affixe, et donc de la tête, qui différencie (17a) et (17b). Or, ce n'est pas tant cette différence qui est pertinente que deux autres observations, dont la théorie X' ne peut pas rendre compte:

– La règle (17b) ne correspond qu'à des processus non disponibles. Soit par exemple les deux adjectifs *obèse* et *fluet*, auxquels ne correspond pas de verbe de changement d'état dans le lexique attesté. Les seuls verbes constructibles correspondant au sens 'rendre obèse, fluet' sont, semble-t-il, °*obésifier*, °*fluétiser*, à l'exclusion des préfixés **enobéser* (-ir), **afluéter* (-ir), **éfluéter* (-ir), **enfluéter* (-ir).

- A la règle (17b) ne correspondent que des adjectifs de base non construits, ou construits à l'aide du suffixe *-ant* (les deux seuls verbes de changement d'état préfixés construits sur des adjectifs de base construits sont, dans Juilland (1965), *appesantir* et *empuantir*). Cette contrainte n'existe pas pour la règle (17a), du moins pour la suffixation (*immortaliser* est construit sur l'adjectif construit *immortel*).

Dans une théorie X' comme celle de Toman, où les contraintes sélectionnelles entre les affixes et les bases sont décrites dans un autre composant que celui des règles de réécriture, on ne peut pas rendre compte des deux dernières observations.

Dans une théorie X' quelle qu'elle soit, on ne peut rendre compte ni du fait qu'à une structure donnée peut ne correspondre qu'une interprétation, ni du fait qu'à une interprétation donnée peuvent correspondre plusieurs structures.

2.2.4. Une théorie X' est inadéquate parce que dissociative

L'une des raisons essentielles pour lesquelles la transposition de la théorie X' à l'analyse de la structure des mots construits est inadéquate, c'est qu'elle est dissociative, c'est-à-dire qu'elle renvoie l'interprétation des mots construits à un composant différent de celui qui construit leur structure. Ce serait un autre sujet que de plaider en faveur d'un modèle associatif.¹³ Je me bornerai ici à une observation.

En plus des inadéquations diverses dont souffre une théorie dissociative, et dont certaines ont été mentionnées au § précédent, elle est actuellement impossible à valider, dans la mesure où les auteurs qui travaillent dans cette perspective ne se sont intéressés jusqu'à présent qu'à la partie structurelle de la construction des mots, et sont muets sur la façon dont des règles pourraient interpréter les structures engendrées. Tant que des propositions ne sont pas faites en ce sens, et notamment des propositions qui permettent d'expliquer le fait crucial que le sens prédictible d'un mot construit est toujours compositionnel par rapport à sa structure interne,¹⁴ les théories dissociatives resteront incomplètes, et donc invérifiables.

¹³ Voir sur ce point D. Corbin (1984a et b) et (1987, 208-256).

¹⁴ Un exemple illustrera ce point. Soit l'adjectif *invalidable*. Il est intrinsèquement ambigu, et signifie (1) 'qui ne peut pas être validé' et (2) 'qui peut être invalidé'. Le sens (1) correspond à la préfixation de l'adjectif *validable*, lui-même construit par suffixation sur le verbe *valider*, issu par conversion de l'adjectif *valide* (structure (a)), le sens (2) à la suffixation du verbe *invalider*, issu de la conversion de l'adjectif *invalide*, lui-même construit par préfixation sur l'adjectif *valide* (structure (b)):

(a) [(in)_{af} [[[valide]_A]_V (able)_{af}]_A]_A

(b) [[[(in)_{af} [valide]_A]_A]_V (able)_{af}]_A

3. Conclusion

J'ai essayé de montrer que les tentatives de transposition de la théorie X' à l'analyse de la structure des mots construits étaient inadéquates, pour des raisons diverses qui tiennent à la fois au fait que l'on ne peut pas assimiler la structure des mots construits à celle des phrases, et au fait que le formalisme lié à cette théorie induisait lui-même des inadéquations.

Je voudrais pour terminer situer en quelques lignes, très rapides, la théorie alternative que je propose. J'opte pour

- une théorie **stratifiée**, où l'organisation du composant lexical reflète la hiérarchie des régularités, sous-régularités et irrégularités à l'oeuvre dans le lexique, et notamment attribue un statut différent aux mots construits et aux mots complexes non construits, aux propriétés prédictibles et à celles qui ne le sont pas;

- une théorie **associative**, où une règle de construction des mots (RCM) consiste en un ensemble d'opérations conjointes. Pour illustrer ce point, je reprendrai la règle de construction des verbes de changement d'état.

Dans ma théorie, cette règle comporterait quatre composants:

- 1) La construction d'une structure morphologique. On a vu qu'à cette règle sont associées en français trois structures de mots, respectant toutes les trois le même rapport catégoriel (A/V) entre la base et le mot construit:

$$V \rightarrow [[X]_A (Y)_{af}]_V \text{ (banaliser)}$$

$$V \rightarrow [[X]_A]_V \text{ (blanchir)}$$

$$V \rightarrow [(Y)_{af}[X]_A]_V \text{ (appauvrir)}$$
- 2) La construction d'une interprétation sémantique: «rendre (plus) A». Tous les mots construits par cette règle auront ce sens prédictible, susceptible de se spécialiser, de s'idiosyncratiser dans le lexique conventionnel.
- 3) Un paradigme morphologique, qui représente l'ensemble des moyens dérivationnels dont dispose la règle pour construire des mots:¹⁵

¹⁵ Chacun des processus figurant dans ce paradigme est accompagné des traits diacritiques qui le caractérisent et figurent dans son entrée lexicale. Ainsi, seuls *-is(er)* et *-ifi(er)* sont marqués comme disponibles, *a-* et *en-* sont marqués pour s'appliquer à des adjectifs sufixés par *-ant*, etc.

conversion

-is(er)

-ifi(er)

a-

é-

en-

L'intérêt de ce regroupement est d'exprimer le fait qu'à tous ces processus sont associés la même opération sémantique et le même rapport catégoriel A/V.

- 4) Des contraintes communes à tous les membres du paradigme précédent, et notamment des contraintes sémantiques. On peut citer ici la contrainte qui impose de ne construire des verbes de changement d'état que sur des adjectifs désignant un état résultatif.¹⁶

L'application de cette RCM à une catégorie majeure remplissant les conditions catégorielles et sémantiques adéquates consiste en:

- la construction de l'une des trois structures associées à la RCM;
- la construction de l'opération sémantique associée;
- l'insertion dans la structure morphologique de cette catégorie majeure;
- l'insertion dans la structure morphologique de l'un des processus appartenant au paradigme morphologique, en respectant les contraintes propres à chacun.

Un tel dispositif permet de rendre compte des généralités mentionnées au § 2.2.3., et qui échappent à la théorie X':

- l'interprétation sémantique étant associée aux structures morphologiques, on rend compte de la similitude du sens compositionnel des verbes préfixés, suffixés, convertis;

- on ne retrouve associées dans aucune autre RCM du français les deux structures suffixée et convertie sur une base adjectivale. Ainsi rend-on compte de l'exclusivité de l'interprétation sémantique associée à ces structures;

¹⁶ Par exemple, il est impossible de construire **impubériser* (au sens physiologique de *impubère*), parce qu'*impubère* désigne en ce sens un état initial et non résultatif. Comparer avec °*pubériser* 'rendre pubère' (par exemple par l'effet de médicaments).

– les propriétés de disponibilité différente des processus de préfixation et de suffixation, ainsi que les contraintes contextuelles particulières à tel ou tel processus sont listées, pour chaque processus, dans le paradigme morphologique associé à la règle.

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THE CASES OF HUNGARIAN NOUNS

By

F. KIEFER

1. In his "The Hungarian Case System," László Antal rejected the traditional account of Hungarian case endings usually distinguishing 28 cases and concluded, on the basis of new, formal criteria, that Hungarian nouns had 17 cases altogether (Antal 1961). Which of the two views is correct, one may wonder, Antal's or the traditional one? The issue appears not to have been settled as yet, Hungarian grammars still recognizing 28 cases in the traditional vein. The traditional description is based on a syntactic definition of 'case', whereas Antal looked at the regularities of occurrence of case endings ('distributional criterion'). In this paper I intend to show that Antal's distributional criterion is unsatisfactory on several counts even though, for Hungarian, it gives the right result in most cases. Thus, Antal's distributional criterion will be replaced by another syntactic criterion. On the other hand, I basically agree with Antal's criticism of the traditional view. Since this paper deals with noun cases, I will disregard what are called adjectival case forms. In particular, there are three case endings that attach exclusively to adjectives and/or numerals: 1. modal-essive *-n, -an/-en*, 2. modal-essive *-lag/-leg*, and 3. multiplicative *-szor/-szer/-ször*. Thus, we have to consider 25 out of the traditional list of 28 case endings.

2. As has been pointed out above, the traditional account starts from a syntactic definition of the notion 'case'. Such definition can be found, for instance, in Bencédy *et al.* (1968, 196): "Case is an inflectional category, respectively inflected form, of nominals in which the nominal can occur alone as some particular syntactic constituent in a given sentence." In this definition, the notion 'case' appears in two distinct senses: 'inflectional category' obviously refers to case as a relation, i.e. a syntactic/semantic category, whereas 'inflected form' refers to a nominal with a case ending, hence a morphological category. Case relations and case endings are different things: in principle, the same case relation can be expressed by two different case endings, and two different case relations can be embodied in the same ending. The reason why the above definition mentions both case relation and case ending is probably the fact that genitive *-nak/-nek* and dative *-nak/-nek* could not otherwise have

been distinguished. Irrespective of the way we analyse dative and genitive as case relations, it is undoubtedly true that *-nak/-nek* is one case ending rather than two. However, considering case relations and case endings as entities of the same order (and hence 'mixing levels') is but a minor flaw in the above definition. The crucial point of the definition is that a nominal inflected for case can be some particular syntactic constituent in itself. This, however, makes it impossible to distinguish case endings from denominal derivational suffixes. Forms like *asztalocska* 'little table', *asztalos* 'joiner', *asztalosság* 'joinery' could, by this definition, be case forms of *asztal* 'table' since each can be a syntactic constituent, in particular: the subject, of a sentence. This hitch can be avoided as follows. It is clear that *asztalocska*, *asztalos*, *asztalosság* can be further inflected: *asztalocskát*, *asztalost*, *asztalosságot* (acc.) — but no word form can contain more than one case ending. This observation immediately takes us to a weaker version of Antal's distributional criterion. It is not only the case that a word form cannot contain more than one case ending, but also that a case ending is always the final morpheme of a word form. Taking the first property for granted, we can use the second property to define case endings. Let us call derivational and inflectional suffixes **bound morphemes**.

Theorem One: A case ending is a bound morpheme that (with some exceptions) cannot be followed by another bound morpheme in a nominal form. This definition states a formal criterion based on an observation concerning the location of occurrence of case endings and covers all (and only) traditionally recognized cases.

It is, however, yet to be seen if position and the impossibility of attaching further inflectional suffixes are sufficient to define the set of case endings. Theorem One would, for instance, lump productive and unproductive suffixes together as case endings. Also, this definition does not distinguish nouns from non-nouns, although a noun ending should produce noun forms only.

Antal could not criticize Theorem One for being semantic in character: this definition is based on a formal criterion that does not contradict structuralist principles. What happens though if we try to refine this distributional analysis? Antal, in particular, tested if items traditionally taken for case endings were able to combine with a) pronouns, b) proper nouns, c) adjectives, d) numerals, and e) plural or possessive markers, and whether their combinability was independent of the meaning of the noun. For the last point, the only distinction Antal considered was abstract vs. concrete. One further issue he investigated was word initial occurrence, but finally he discarded that from the set of crucial criteria. On the basis of the five properties listed a) to e) above, he concluded that Hungarian nouns had 17 cases as follows: 1. nominative: *ember*

'man', 2. accusative: *ember*, 3. dative: *embernek*, 4. instrumental: *emberrel*, 5. causal: *emberért*, 6. factive: *emberré*, 7. superessive: *emberen*, 8. sublative: *emberre*, 9. inessive: *emberben*, 10. delative: *emberről*, 11. elative: *emberből*, 12. illative: *emberbe*, 13. adessive: *embernél*, 14. allative: *emberhez*, 15. ablative: *embertől*, 16. terminative: *emberig*, 17. formative: *emberként* (Antal 1961, 32-49). Essive-modal *-ul/-ül* is 'almost' a case ending as it combines with adjectives and numerals and, with certain restrictions, also with plural or possessive markers. Nevertheless, Antal excludes it from the set of case endings. He further excludes *-kor*, *-stul/-stül*, *-nta/-nte*, *-nként*, *-képpen*, and locative *-t*.

Let us consider how reliable Antal's method is.

Before going into details, we should state Antal's definition once more: Theorem Two: **A case ending is a bound morpheme characterized by properties a) to e).**

The first thing to point out about Antal's definition is that the distinction between what is and is not a case ending is not at all as clear-cut as the definition might suggest. For *-ul/-ül*, Antal himself admits this (*op.cit.* 48). Thus, this item combines with adjectives and numerals, and may even follow plural or possessive markers in a number of cases. It can also attach to abstract nouns: *segítségül* 'in order to help', *támaszomul* 'to support me' — these are not strange at all. We cannot even exclude, for all the unlikelihood of occurrence of plural forms, instances like *barátaimul* 'as my friends', *ellenségeitekül* 'as your (pl) enemies'. And with proper names, *-ul/-ül* is not more unusual than *-ként* that Antal does accept: *Lajosul*, *Lajosként* 'as a Lewis'. Speaking of *-ként*, we might remark that it is even less expected to combine with a plural proper noun: *Lajosokként* 'as Lewises'. It is hard to imagine a speech situation in which such a form would sound natural. It is also difficult to interpret *-ként* when attached to abstract nouns: *jóságként* 'like goodness', *szépségként* 'like beauty'. Finally, *-ként* is reluctant to combine with the possessive marker *-é* 'that of': *házéként* 'like that of a house', *autóéként* 'like that of a car'. It has also been observed that *-ig* is relatively infrequent with abstract nouns: *?szomjúságig* 'as far as sadness', *?örömig* 'as far as joy', *?melegségig* 'as far as warmth', a fact that obviously has to do with meaning. All that prompts the conclusion that Antal was not all that rigorous about his own criteria. If *-ul/-ül* is excluded from the set of case endings, *-ként* and *-ig* will have to be excluded as well. In fact, *-ként* is less frequent than *-ul/-ül* and is generally equivalent with (or, a variant of) it.

Distributional analysis, to be sure, cannot be held responsible for such inconsistencies. However, there are other, quite fundamental problems about

that type of analysis. Distributional analysis was meant to determine whether a particular suffix was derivational or inflectional. If it turned out not to be the latter, it was automatically taken to be the former. Yet, in terms of combinability, the only difference between derivational and inflectional suffixes is in the particular order they occur in. As is well-known, derivational suffixes cannot be preceded by inflectional ones in Hungarian, and the order of bound morphemes is such that case endings are always word final, not to be followed by any bound morpheme at all. If this is taken as the only distributional criterion, we get back to the traditional view since, as was pointed out above, Theorem One gives us 27 case endings. On the other hand, if we disregard the possible order of bound morphemes, combinability alone will not be sufficient to tell inflectional suffixes from derivational ones. In particular, if an item productively combines with various types of stems, it does not follow that that item is a case ending, and conversely, if an item refuses to combine with some types of stems, it does not follow that it is not a case ending. Linguistic typology tells us that inflectional paradigms are often defective, and that the combinability of suffixes can exhibit systematic, as well as accidental, gaps. Recall once more the cases of *-ul/-ül*, *-ként*, and *-ig* in that connection. And if ordering restrictions on bound morphemes are disregarded, the fact remains that some noun-to-noun derivational suffixes (such as diminutive *-cska/-cske* or *-ság/-ség* 'ity') will combine with various types of stems (adjectives, numerals, abstract nouns, etc.) just as freely as most case endings do, and hence the distributional criterion would classify them as case endings.

In sum, Antal's distributional criterion is an inadequate tool for sorting out case endings from non-case-endings.

3. If by criterion one we have too many case endings and criterion two is unreliable, how can we decide what is a case ending and what is not? Recall that three of the traditionally listed 28 case endings, those that are restricted to adjectives and numerals, are excluded from this investigation. Also, it has been pointed out above that it is wrong to distinguish a dative and a genitive *-nak/-nek*. Two further items, *-nta/-nte* and *-t*, *-tt* can be excluded on the grounds that they only occur with a handful of nouns each, i.e. they are not productive any more in present-day Hungarian. Indeed, fully unproductive endings must not be considered case endings. Hence, we have to inspect 22 out of 28 items here.

Inflectional suffixes have a fundamental property that makes it possible to tell them from derivational suffixes. Inflections never change the part-of-speech status of the word they are added to. In other words (Theorem Three): **Inflectional suffixes are irrelevant for part-of-speech classification whereas deriva-**

tional suffixes are not necessarily so. It follows that part-of-speech stability is a necessary but not sufficient criterion. That is, an item that does not interfere with part-of-speech status is not necessarily inflectional. On the other hand, if the new word belongs to a different part of speech, we can be quite certain that the suffix is derivational, rather than inflectional.

Concentrating now on noun case endings, the theorem can be rephrased like this (Theorem Four): **If a case ending is attached to a noun, the resulting form will also be a noun.** — How do we know if a word form is a noun or not? All nouns are modifiable, therefore if the word form in question cannot be modified, it is not a noun. Let us consider if candidate forms can be modified by an adjective. a) *Az új házat már építik* 'The new house is being built' — b) *Az új háznak nem elég nagy az ablaka* 'The window of the new house is not large enough' — c) *Már az új házban laknak* 'They already live in the new house' — d) *Beköltöztek az új házba* 'They have moved into the new house' — e) *A régi házból elköltöztek* 'They have moved out of the old house' — f) *A régi házban nem volt vakolat* 'There was no plaster on the old house' — g) *Az öreg házról hullik a vakolat* 'The old house is shedding its plaster' — h) *A legnagyobb házra kitűzték a zászlót* 'They displayed a flag on the tallest house' — i) *Annál a nagy háznál megállunk* 'We stop by that big house' — j) *Attól a sárga háztól hazáig futott* 'He ran home from that yellow house' — k) *Az új házhoz vitték a homokot* 'The sand has been taken to the new house' — l) *A sárga házig futott* 'He ran as far as the yellow house' — m) *A romépület szép házzá alakult* 'The ruined building was transformed into a nice house' — n) *A új házzal kertet is vettek* 'They bought a garden along with the new house' — o) *Sokat dolgozott az új házért* 'He worked a lot for the new house' — p) *Új csoportvezetőként őt ajánlották* 'He has been recommended as a new group leader' — q) *Új vezetőül őt választották* 'He has been elected the new leader' — r) **Kis házanként jutalmat osztottak* 'Rewards were distributed small house by small house' — s) **A telkeket régi házastul sajátították ki* 'Building-sites were expropriated including the old houses' — t) **Jó példaképpen a Balaton szót említette* 'He mentioned the word Balaton as a good example' — u) **Holdfényes éjjélkor érkezett meg a vonat* 'The train arrived at moonlit midnight'. The last four items are also impossible if modified by relative clauses: **Házanként, amely..., jutalmat osztottak* 'Rewards were distributed house by house which...', **A telkeket házastul, amely..., sajátították ki* 'Building-sites were expropriated including houses which...', **Példaképpen, amely..., a Balaton szót említette* 'He mentioned the word Balaton as an example which...', **Éjjélkor, amely..., érkezett meg a vonat* 'The train arrived at midnight which...'. Hence we must conclude that *házanként*, *házastul*, *példaképpen*, and *éjjélkor* are not nouns, therefore

-nként, *-stul*, *-képpen*, and *-kor* cannot be case endings. Descriptive grammars also tell us that *házanként* is a distributive adverb, *példaképpen* is an adverb of state, and *éjjélkor* is an adverb of time. Thus, *-nként*, *-képpen*, and *-kor* can be considered adverbial derivational suffixes. The function of *-stul* is less clear.

In sum, we are left with 18 case endings (including the null ending of the nominative), one ending more than in Antal's list (the additional item is *-ul/-ül*). Since, however, our criterion only works in one direction (i.e. an ending that turns a noun into a non-noun cannot be a case ending but an ending that does not change part-of-speech status may or may not be a case ending) we still cannot be sure if the remaining 18 items are all in fact case endings. Thus, Theorem Four does not provide us with an adequate criterion to decide how many cases a Hungarian noun has, either.

4. As is well-known, the various forms of a noun can appear as arguments governed by a verb. Governed items are (lexically-specified) obligatory complements to a verb; they fall into the following types: direct object (*fogja a tollat* 'he holds the pen'), object-like adverbial (*békére vágyik* 'he longs for peace'), adverbial alternating with direct object (*golyóvá formál valamit* 'he turns sg into a ball'), adverbial required by a verbal prefix (*beleesik az árokba* 'he falls into the ditch'), and obligatory adverbials whose obligatoriness is due to the lack of a verbal prefix (*a füre heveredik* 'he lies down on the grass') (cf. H. Molnár 1969, 242). The same verb may govern several different structures. Thus, *alakít* '(trans)form' may have the following argument frames: a) *alakít*+*-t* (+*-ból/-ből* +*-vá/-vé* or *-ra/-re*), e.g. *A kabátot divatjamúltból divatosra alakítja* 'She alters the coat from outmoded into fashionable' — b) *alakít*+*-t*+*-vá/-vé* or *-ra/-re*, e.g. *A divatjamúltat divatosra alakítja* 'She alters what is outmoded into something fashionable' — c) *alakít*+*-t*+*-ból/-ből*, e.g. *A divatjamúltból divatosat alakít* 'She makes something fashionable out of what is outmoded' — d) *alakít*+*-t*, e.g. *Bánkot alakítja* 'He plays [the role of] Bánk' (H. Molnár *op.cit.* 247). Thus, all verbs have at least one argument frame that essentially (i.e. short of free adverbials) determines the structure of the sentences containing that verb. Of course, not only verbs can have arguments: *büszke valamire* 'proud of sg', *jó valakihez/valamihez* 'good to sy/sg', *jó valamire* 'good for sg', *tudós valamiben* 'educated in sg', *válogatós valamiben* 'particular about sg', *szerelmes valakibe* 'in love with sy', etc. The governing elements (i.e. those essentially determining the structure of the sentence) will be called **predicates**, and the governed ones their **arguments**. All predicates have at least one argument. Every argument represents a relation between the predicate and itself. Let us call the relation between a predicate and its

argument a **case relation**. Of course, this does not tell us what a case relation really is. But it will soon turn out that this is in fact not necessary.

With these preliminaries in mind, we can now propose the following criterion for defining case endings (Theorem Five): **A bound morpheme is a case ending iff (if and only if) it is capable of expressing a case relation.** — Notice that this theorem states a necessary *and* sufficient condition: if a bound morpheme is capable of expressing a case relation, it is a case ending; and if it is a case ending, it has to be capable of expressing a case relation. However, Theorem Five does not claim that a case-marked noun is necessarily an argument of the predicate in *any* sentence. What is required is that the noun form in question should be capable of expressing a case relation in *some* sentence, otherwise the bound morpheme in that noun form cannot be a case ending. As was pointed out earlier, there is no one-to-one correspondence between case relations and case endings. In other words, one particular case relation may be realized in several ways, i.e. represented by various case endings. For instance, one of the argument frames of the verb *alkalmaz* 'employ' is *alkalmaz vkit vmire vminek/vmiül/vmiként* 'employ sy for sg as sg' [where 'as' may be expressed by three different case endings]. E.g. *Az utazási iroda alkalmazta őt az útra csoportvezetőnek* 'The travel agency employed her for the tour as a guide'. Obviously, the relation between *vminek/vmiül/vmiként* and *alkalmaz* is the same in all three cases, thus the case endings *-nek*, *-ül*, and *-ként* express the same case relation here. — A case relation can also be expressed by a postposition: *bújkál vki elől* 'hide from sy'. E.g. *Bújkál ellenségei elől* 'He tries to avoid his enemies'. — Sometimes a case ending and a postposition represent alternative realizations of the same case relation: *bújttat vkit vkitől/vki elől* 'hide sy from sy'. E.g. *Barátját üldözői elől a nádasba bújttatja. Barátját üldözőitől a nádasba bújttatja* 'He hides his friend from his pursuers in the reeds'. Of course, the same case ending can represent several different case relations, too. For instance, *-ra/-re* expresses different case relations in each of the following sentences: a) *A kabátot a gyerekre adja* 'She puts the coat on the child'; b) *A vegyület elemeire bomlik* 'The compound breaks down into its components'; c) *Lopásra csábította* 'He tempted her to steal'.

'Case relation' is an abstract category; it is no simple task to take stock of, and characterize accurately, the case relations that are expressed in a language. Descriptive studies therefore generally avoid tackling this problem altogether. Argument frames are usually identified by the corresponding case endings, the way we did above, following Molnár. From our point of view, then, the following version of Theorem Five is just as adequate (Theorem Six): **A bound morpheme is a case ending iff it occurs in some argument frame.**

Let us see now which bound morphemes actually occur in argument frames. (The examples are taken from Molnár's study as above, *op.cit.* 256–66). a) *agyonlő vki vkit* 'sy shoots sy dead'; b) *adózik vki vmiért vkinek* 'sy pays tribute to sy for sg'; c) *céloz vkire vmivel* 'sy takes aim at sy with sg'; d) *átbújik vki/vmi vmin* 'sy/sg sneaks through sg'; e) *átruház vki vmit vkiről vkire* 'sy transfers sg from sy to sy'; f) *alakul vmi vmiből vmivé* 'sg changes from sg into sg'; g) *belép vki vmibe* 'sy enters/joins sg'; h) *borzad vki vkitől/vmitől* 'sy is horrified at sy/sg'; i) *tart vmi vmeddig* 'sg lasts for some time'; j) *bevágódik vki vkinél* 'sy works his way into sy's patronage'; k) *alkalmaz vki vkit vminek/vmiül/vmiként* 'sy employs sy as sg'; l) *alkalmazkodik vki vmihez/vkihez* 'sy complies with sg/sy'; m) *akadályoz vki vkit vmiben* 'sy hinders sy in sg'. — In these argument frames we find a total of 18 case endings, including the null ending of the nominative. It appears that others than these cannot occur in argument frames; in other words, there is no verb (or predicate in general) whose argument frame would include any of the following bound morphemes: *-nként*, *-stul/-stül*, *-képpen*, *-kor*. On the basis of Theorem Six, then, we can safely conclude that Hungarian nouns have 18 cases in the present-day language. Antal's list, consequently, has to be completed with one additional case: 18. essive-modal: *emberül*. Further changes of this 18-member case system are not hard to predict, however: it seems probable that *-ul/-ül* and *-ként* are going to drop out, yielding to *-nak/-nek* whose optional version they mostly occur as today. Theorem Six is underlain by the more or less generally accepted view, formulated in various ways in particular theoretical frameworks, that nouns receive their cases from verbs (predicates of sentences). This criterion is independent of the language under investigation, hence it can be taken as universal.

It might come as a surprise that the result we get by criterion six is identical with that of criterion four. Whatever is excluded by criterion four is also excluded by criterion six, since arguments are necessarily nouns or words used as nouns. Criterion Six also excludes noun-to-noun derivational suffixes: *-ság/-ség* or *-cska/-cske* do not appear in any argument frame. On the other hand, as we saw above, these latter are not excluded by Theorem Four. If, however, we combine Theorems One and Four, we get back to the right result. Thus (Theorem Seven): **A case ending is a bound morpheme that cannot be followed by another bound morpheme within a nominal form and, if attached to a noun, produces a noun again.** The first part of Theorem Seven (=criterion one) is language specific: although it is true for a large number of languages, it cannot be claimed to be universal. The second part (=criterion four), on the other hand, follows from criterion six and can therefore be regarded as

universal. In principle, it would be possible to find a bound morpheme that is a case ending by criterion seven but not by criterion six. That this is not the case is a fact about Hungarian.

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ANAPHORA RESOLUTION IN HUNGARIAN

By

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How do listeners integrate divergent data sources when understanding sentences? Are all cues integrated on an equal footing or do certain types of cues have a temporal priority over others? Writers such as Smaby (1979) and Charniak (1975) argue that top-down processes have logical priority over bottom-up processes. On the other hand, Fodor (1982) and Forster (1981) believe that bottom-up processes have temporal priority over top-down processes. These modularists propose that the analysis of formal cues occur in an “encapsulated module” where all processing is obligatory, automatic, and self-contained. Yet another approach to information integration is found in interactive models such as the competition model of MacWhinney, Bates, and Kliegl (1984) or the on-line interactive approach of Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (1980) and Marslen-Wilson, Levy and Tyler (1982), and Tyler (1983). These interactive models attempt to explain how divergent cue types can be placed on an equal footing during sentence comprehension.

One critical proving-ground for these alternative approaches is the study of the disambiguation of the references of pronouns. In this paper we explore the integration of divergent cues to the resolution of pronominal anaphora in Hungarian. We will confine our attention to the resolution of anaphoric reference. MacWhinney (1984) points out that reference may be based on anaphora, cataphora (backwards anaphora), metaphora (reference to a whole speech act), or exophora (reference to the situation). However, we will not concern ourselves here with these last three types of reference, focusing only on the kinds of anaphora that arise when two simple clauses are joined together.

The literature on anaphora resolution in English has focused on the use of these five cues:

1. Referent-Pronoun Agreement: The third person pronouns *he*, *she*, *it*, and *they* must match their antecedents in gender, number, and animacy. This match is quite often a deciding factor in deciding between two competing alternative antecedents. Although there may be cases where these cues are ambiguous, it is never the case that these cues are misleading. If MacWhinney, Bates, and Kliegl (1985) are correct in claiming that cue

reliability is the primary determinant of cue strength, then these cues should be very high in reliability. Research by Springston (1975) and Chang (1980) indicates that this is in fact the case.

2. Cross-Over Constraint: Most formal analysts hold that the c-command relation or the cross-over constraint blocks coreference between *he* and *Bill* in a sequence such as *He wanted to buy the diamond, but Bill didn't get to the store in time.*
3. Parallel Function: When a lexical item is bound to a particular role in the first clause of a two-clause sequence, there is a tendency to continue this binding into the second clause. Perhaps the easiest way of thinking of this is to imagine that the connection between roles and lexical items is "sticky" and that the listener has to go to extra work to pry a lexical item loose from a role.
4. Verb-based Factive Role Frames: Interpersonal NP-complement verbs like *apologize*, *blame*, *praise*, or *criticize* seem to place presuppositional restrictions on the role relations in the complement clause. It is fine to say *Mary criticized Bill because he was late*, but it is strange to say *Mary criticized Bill because she was late*. The verbs involved here are factive in the sense that they presuppose that the complement clause is actually true.
5. Verb-based Action readiness: Verbs also differ in the extent to which they presuppose activity on the part of the different participants. Both *chase* and *hit* presuppose activity on the part of the subject. However, *chase* also presupposes activity on the part of the object. Thus, if there is a sequence such as *The dog chased the bear, and he ran into a cave* the pronoun *he* may refer to the *bear*, since the *bear* is already moving in the first clause. This effect is somewhat different from that of the role frame cue for verbs such as *criticize*, since the object of *criticize* is not engaging in any activity. Unfortunately, there has been little detailed study of the ways in which first-clause verbs affect action readiness. One of the goals of the present study is to clarify the status of this factor.

The psycholinguistic research literature on anaphor resolution is fairly rich. One set of studies has examined the competition between parallel function and factive role frames, as cues to pronominal anaphora resolution. Garvey and Caramazza (1974), Garvey, Caramazza, and Yates (1975) and Grober, Beardsley, and Caramazza (1978) and Caramazza and Gupta (1979) studies sentences such as (1) and (2) in which the gender and animacy cues are not

available since the possible antecedents of the pronoun both agree in gender and animacy.

- (1) *John scolded Bill, because he was annoyed.*
- (2) *John scolded Bill, because he was annoying.*

These studies found that the pronouns in these sentences are interpreted on the basis of parallel function. In sentence (1), the choice of *John* as the referent of *he* is supported by parallel function since *John* is the subject of the first clause. In (2), on the other hand, there is a competition between parallel function which supports *John* as the referent of *he* and the role frame strategy which supports *Bill* as the referent of *he*. In fact, subjects are more divided in their choice of a referent for the pronoun in (2) than they are in (1). Similar results with reaction times are reported by Corbett and Chang (1983).

A study by Hirst and Brill (1980) examined the competition between parallel function, the cross-over constraint, and action readiness. They used sentences such as:

- (3) *John stood watching while Henry fell down some stairs. He ran for a doctor.*
- (4) *John stood watching while Henry fell down some stairs. He thought of the future.*
- (5) *John stood watching. He ran for a doctor after Henry fell down some stairs.*
- (6) *John stood watching, He thought of the future after Henry fell down some stairs.*

In (3) both perspective and plausibility are on the side of *John* as the referent of *he* and decisions are quick. In (4) there is a conflict and decisions are slower. More importantly, in (5) and (6) the syntactic cross-over constraint mitigates against identification of *he* with *Henry*. Nonetheless, (5) is faster than (6), indicating that, even with an relatively absolute syntactic constraint, listeners compute event plausibility.

Similar results are reported by Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (1981). In their experiment subjects listened to context sentences such as (7),

- (7) *As Philip was walking back from the shop he saw an old woman trip and fall flat on her face. She seemed to be unable to get up again.*

This context was followed by three types of continuation fragments:

- (8) *Philip ran towards...* (repeated name)
- (9) *He ran towards...* (pronoun)
- (10) *Running towards...* (zero anaphora)

At the end of the continuations, subjects received a further continuation word visually and were asked to name it. That further continuation was either *he* (appropriate) or *she* (inappropriate). For all three continuation types, subjects responded significantly faster for the appropriate continuation than for the inappropriate continuation. These results indicate that, even in the case of zero-anaphora, subjects are assuming that it is *Philip* who is doing the running. Presumably, the mental model they construct from the first clauses has in it the fact that only *Philip* is prepared to engage in further action.

Neither Hirst and Brill nor Marslen-Wilson and Tyler make specific use of the concept of action readiness to explain their results. However, this notion is very much in keeping with the emphasis that Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (1981) place on the extent to which the recognition system has adapted to the task of immediate interpretation. It may be the case that listeners continually compute the action readiness of each discourse entity. By doing this, they would be able to facilitate the on-line resolution of subsequent anaphors. Not all aspects of the discourse context have the same relevance to anaphora resolution as do action readiness. For example, spatial relations are generally less important to anaphora resolution. Consider a sequence such as *John watched Bill fall down the stairs. He looked up at the light.* Here, spatial considerations might favor *Bill* as the referent of *he*. However, action readiness favors *John*. In general, listeners do not need to compute a full mental model of a sentence (as in Anderson and Ortony, 1975) in order to extract action readiness relations. In the studies we report on here, we will examine some further approaches to the concept of action readiness.

All of the studies we have discussed were performed in English. However, there are ways in which the structure of English both facilitates and limits the ways in which we can understand the general process of pronoun disambiguation. English provides us with strong and reliable lexical constraints on the third person singular pronouns *he*, *she*, *it*, and *they*. These pronouns must agree with the gender of the antecedent. Chang (1980) and Springston (1975) have shown that this cue is so powerful that items that do not match by gender receive no detectable activation at all.

In Hungarian, on the other hand, there is no grammatical gender and no grammatical animacy contrast. Because third person pronoun disambiguation is not chained to strong lexical forces as in English, we would expect that

it would be able to show a somewhat greater sensitivity to inter-clausal cues for reference identification, such as parallel function, factive role frames, action readiness, topicality, and contrastivity. Although experiments in English have made good use of the absolute nature of the English gender cue for pronoun disambiguation, excessive reliance on these English data may provide us with a limited understanding of fundamental aspects of reference identification. In particular, the English data tell us fairly little about what happens when anaphora resolution is not driven by strong gender/animacy agreement relations.

Hungarian is also interesting as a topic of study because it is a "pro-drop" language. In fact, Hungarian can drop both subject and object pronouns. Pro-dropping is simply the omission of pronouns under specified syntactic and discourse conditions. In Hungarian, it is fairly easy to omit subject pronouns because, as in the case of other pro-drop languages like Italian (Napoli 1984) and Chinese (Li and Thompson 1976), the agreement markers on the verb indicate in a quite reliable fashion (MacWhinney, Bates, and Kliegl, 1984) the person and number of the subject. In English the pronoun can be dropped in (11) but not in (12). In Hungarian, the pronoun can be dropped in both (11) and (12). (To simplify the presentation only English translations of Hungarian sentences will be given in the text. The Hungarian sentences used in the experiments are given in the Appendix.)

- (11)(a) ENGLISH: *The boy noticed the man and Ø sat down.*
- (b) HUNGARIAN: *The boy noticed the man and Ø sat down.*
- (12)(a) ENGLISH: *The boy noticed the man. He sat down.*
- (b) HUNGARIAN: *The boy noticed the man. Ø Sat down.*

The use of third person anaphoric forms, however, is regulated according to the grammatical roles of the noun phrases relative to each other in consecutive sentences. The basic rule stated by Pléh and Radics (1978) is rather simple. When subjects are repeated they can be dropped. But, if a noun is selected as subject that was in the previous clause, but was not the subject, then it must be pronominalized by the demonstrative pronoun *az* (that) as in (14). In the terms of Hale (1975), the pronoun *az* is used to mark "switch reference."

The third person personal pronoun is used when coreference violates some pragmatic presupposition. For example, in the sentence *John asked Paul to pick up the brick, but he picked up the boulder*, Hungarian uses the personal pronoun *ő* 'he' in the second clause rather than a zero-anaphora because the

action of picking up the boulder is unexpected in view of the fact that John asked Bill to pick up the brick. In such sentences, the third person pronoun must be used contrastively and must carry intonational and syntactic focus.

In general, instead of reflecting identification based on use of the lexical category of gender, Hungarian shows anaphoric resolution based on interclausal connections such as parallel function, verb-based expectations, and switch reference marking. To understand the nature of anaphoric resolution in Hungarian, the reader might think about what the situation would be like in English if there were only a single personal pronoun which was usually omitted. This fundamental difference between the languages is the subject of the experiments reported in this paper. Three types of cues to anaphoric resolution will be studied in these experiments:

1. switch reference: the use of the deictic pronoun as a marker of switch reference,
2. factive role frame: the allocation of roles in the second clause on the basis of presupposition contained in the verb of the first clause,
3. action readiness: the allocation of roles in the second clause on the basis of the nature of the activity of the participants in the first clause.

Experiment I: A developmental study of anaphora interpretation

In the first two experiments we focused on the competition between action readiness, parallel function, and the switch reference function of the deictic pronoun. Sentences were constructed with first clause verbs implying an activity on the part of the patient (e.g. *chase*) and verbs not implying such an activity (e.g. *kiss*). In the second clause, the shape of the verb was held constant but the reference used either the zero-anaphora or the switch reference deictic pronoun.

Karmiloff-Smith (1978) has shown that, during the period between ages five and seven, children begin to bring the use of pronominal anaphora under the control of discourse structure. For comprehension, Tyler (1883) shows that, before the age of seven, children do not always allow discourse structure to govern the processing anaphora. Along a similar vein, MacWhinney and Price (1980) and Bates, MacWhinney, Caselli, Devescovi, Natale, and Venza (1984) have reported that devices specifically designed to reverse normal syntactic expectations in English and Italian appear to be learned in the early school years, perhaps under the influence of training in literacy. Since the Hungarian switch reference deictic pronoun appears to be a device of this

type, we decided to investigate the comprehension of these sentences types in both adults and children, focusing on learning in the early school years.

Method

Subjects. Seven groups of subjects were used with 20 Ss in each group. The two youngest groups came from the nursery of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. These children had an average age of 3;4 and 5;5. The four groups of school-aged children came from a public elementary school in Budapest; these groups had mean ages of 6;5, 7;5 8;5 and 9;5. Finally, a group of undergraduate psychology students from Lorand Eotvos University in Budapest supplemented the sample. Males and females were roughly equally represented in all groups.

Materials and design. We used a $7 (\text{Age}) \times 2 (\text{Anaphora Type}) \times 2 (\text{Patient Activity}) \times 3 (\text{Verb Replicate})$ design with the last three (stimulus) factors nested within the first (subject group) factor.

A list of 12 coordinate sentences was constructed based on the form given in 13 and 14.

(13) *The bear pets the lamb and then Ø jumps into the box.*

(14) *The elephant sniffs the pig and then that jumps into the car.*

The predication in the second clause of the sentences was always *jumped into*. The actual identity of the object being jumped into was sometimes a box, sometimes a car, and sometimes a house. This random variation in destination locations was introduced to increase the interest in the task. The first factor that we varied systematically was the use of zero-anaphora or the deictic pronoun in the second predicate. The second factor was the type of the verb in the first clause: three tokens were used for first-clause verbs with an active patient (*chase, frighten, accompany*) and three for first-clause verbs with an inactive patient (*pet, sniff, kiss*). Verbs of the first type would prepare both the agent and the patient as further actors. Verbs of the second type were hypothesized to prepare only the agent. The 12 sentences obtained in this way were supplemented by 6 additional filler sentences containing the pronoun *ő*. These were used as fillers only, since there is no clear grammatical prediction for the coreferent of the personal pronoun, unless a fuller discourse context is established.

Procedure. Subjects were tested individually in their school environment. Children were asked to enact the sentences with toys. Sentences were spoken by the experimenter in a neutral intonation. Adults had to listen to the sentences

and tell immediately after each sentence who had jumped into the destination location.

We hypothesized that the use of the deictic pronoun to express switch reference may first arise under the impact of written language. Therefore, a few weeks after the initial oral testing, the school children and the adults worked with the same list in a written form. They had to read the sentences and answer a question (e. g. *Who jumped into the car?*) in writing after each sentence. For this subsample of five groups we have one additional repeated measures factor in the design-presentation mode.

Results

Answers were coded in terms of numbers of uses of the repeated subject strategy, and an analysis of variance was performed for the choice of subject. Table 1 presents the analysis of variance, and Table 2 the means for those effects that reached significance.

Table 1
Summary of the analysis of variance in Experiment I.

Factor	d.f.	F	p
Age	6,133	8.97	.00001
Anaphora	1,133	2.01	n.s
Activity	1,133	139.01	.00001
Verb token	4,532	12.52	.00001
AgeXAna	6,133	1.28	n.s
AgeXAct	6,133	13.65	.00001
AnaXAct	1,133	< 1	n.s.
AgeXV	24,532	6.70	.00001
AnaXV	4,532	11.24	.00001
AgeXAnaXAct	6,133	1.38	n.s.
AgeXAnaXV	24,532	1.09	n.s.

Table 2.
Choice of the repeated subject alternative for different verb types in Experiment I (%)

	3	5	6	7	8	9	Adult	All
pet	50	80	95	78	90	85	75	79
sniff	68	95	100	98	98	90	83	90
kiss	95	83	98	92	83	90	98	85
chase	45	75	85	80	80	68	3	62
frighten	50	70	85	82	60	68	5	60
accompany	45	70	88	80	72	88	88	76
All inac.	58	86	98	90	90	88	85	85
All act.	47	72	86	81	71	74	32	66
Overall	52	79	92	85	80	81	58	75

The first and most surprising effect was a negative one: the anaphora type used had no effect at all on the interpretation selected for the agent of the second predication. At the same time, in the ANOVA, the type of the verb was by far the most significant determiner of sentence interpretation. As the lower part of Table 2 shows, there was a strong general preference (75%) for the repeated subject strategy. This preference does not show up as an effect in the ANOVA, since it appears merely as an overall shift in the dependent variable. If the patient was active in the first clause, the repeated subject option was selected only in 66% of the sentence, while if it was not active the anaphor was identified with the subject 88% of the time. This preference for a repeated subject is clearly present at age 5, but not at age 3 where the results are essentially random. We cannot determine from these results whether the strategy is missing at the younger age or whether the three-year-olds simply failed to understand the task.

Not only was there no main effect of anaphora type, there was also no interaction between anaphora type and the activity of the patient in the first clause. The strong interaction of age with activity of the patient was due to the fact that adults relied far more than children on the action readiness constraint.

There were large differences between the individual verb tokens originally allocated to the antecedent classes. These differences were especially clearcut in adults: following *chase* and *frighten* there was an almost exclusive use of the patient as subject of the second predication, while *accompany* (which was also grouped in this class) did not show these effect. These results indicate

clearly that we had made a mistake in grouping *accompany* together with the other two verbs. In fact, the verb *accompany* 'elkíséri' does not generate any strong action readiness for either the agent or the patient.

Finally, we should note that the results for the written and oral versions of the experiment were identical. Thus, there was no particular evidence that anaphoric relations are controlled earlier in written discourse.

Discussion

The results of this experiment went against the expectations we had derived both from research in English comprehension and from our own earlier studies of adult Hungarians. The fact that even adults did not apply the switch reference interpretation to the deictic pronoun indicates that the application of switch reference is far less automatic than we had thought. Most probably, the switch reference interpretation of the deictic requires the establishment of a convincing discourse frame within which there is an active competition between actors for roles.

What we have here is a formal morphological anaphoric marking that behaves very differently from the formal morphological anaphoric marking for gender found in English. In English, processing of the formal marking appears to pre-empt, precede, or dominate over processing of other sources of information (Chang 1980; Springston 1975). Simply put, pronoun gender is a highly reliable cue (MacWhinney et al. 1985) in English. In Hungarian, the formal cue is much lower in reliability and requires much more complex processing. From a functionalist perspective (Bates and MacWhinney 1982), the absence of gender and animacy marking means that this cue cannot depend on lexical cues, therefore it must be determined by cues that require inter-clausal processing. Because of this, in Hungarian, cues such as parallel function and action readiness preempt the formal morphological marking rather than the other way around. Given this, we will need to be quite careful in making generalizations about universal tendencies to give preference for formal cues over discourse cues, as suggested by the modularists. Smaby (1979) has proposed the opposite type of precedence—pragmatic constraints dominating over formal constraints. Although this principle might work for Hungarian, it is not clear how his principle could work for the English data. Together, the data from Hungarian and English seem to fit most adequately with models that allow for a general integration of various cue types as in the on-line account of Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (1981) and the competition model of MacWhinney, Bates, and Kliegl (1984).

Experiment II was designed to clarify these precedence relations between the formal and the pragmatic cues. We wanted to see whether anaphoras are obligatorily processed even if they are not required for the interpretation of the sentence. A reading time experiment was designed to obtain some rough measures of processing load with the same list used in Experiment I.

Experiment II: Anaphora resolution in reading

Methods

Subjects. Sixteen undergraduate psychology students from Lorand Eotvos University in Budapest participated in the experiment on a volunteer basis. All had already some experience as subjects in reading time experiments using a video screen.

Design. The same list was used as in Experiment I in the same random order. However, half of the subjects were presented with an ascending and half of them with a descending version of the list. This was done to counterbalance possible ordering effects. Since an initial analysis of variance indicated that order of presentation had no effect here, data will be treated in a $2 \times 2 \times 3$ within subject design with Anaphora Type, Verb activity and Verb token as factors, the same way as in Experiment I.

Procedure. Subjects had to read the sentences on a video screen controlled by a special-purpose microcomputer. Each sentence was broken down to its two clauses. The first clause was presented for 5 seconds. Immediately after the first clause disappeared, the second clause appeared on the screen. The subject could read this as long as he wanted. When he was ready to answer the "who jumped" question he pushed the space bar and gave his answer orally. Following a 10 seconds inter-stimulus interval the next sentence appeared on the screen. In this way two dependent measures were obtained: 1) the time from the onset of the second clause until the subject indicated the beginning of his answer and 2) the choice of the repeated subject alternative in the answers themselves. These two measures will be referred to as "reading time" and "choice".

Results

For the choice measure, the only significant effect was that of the anaphora type used $F(1,15) = 9.56$, $p < .01$ (see Figure 1). In contrast, the time to read the second clause was only influenced by the nature of the verb of the first

clause. As the lower part of Figure 1 indicates, this means that sentences with a pragmatic bias towards a switch reference interpretation took longer to read.




Figure 1. Selection of the antecedent subject and reading times for the proform sentence when a subject change is implied (broken lines) and when it is not (solid lines)

Discussion

We can understand these superficially conflicting results by thinking about the differences between the tasks in Experiments I and II. In Experiment I the two clauses were processed as a single unit. In Experiment II, subjects were given a fairly long time (5 seconds) to read and encode the first clause. This allowed them to "set up" a parallel function strategy that would cut down their response times for the reading of the second clause. This strategy would allow them to provide the subject of the first clause as the subject of the second clause whenever there was no information in the second clause conflicting with this assignment. In such cases choice of the previous subject as the referent was close to 100%. Overall, choice of the previous subject as referent was higher than in the previous experiment, indicating that this parallel function strategy was indeed in effect. However, what is most interesting is that subjects were unable to simply override the information contained in the relation between the verb of the first clause and the verb of the second clause. When the patient was active in the first clause, this tended to facilitate a switch reference reading of the second clause which then was in competition with the parallel function strategy that the subjects were trying to enforce.

The results for the effects of the type of anaphoric marking have to be understood in a somewhat different fashion. The shape of the anaphor had no influence on reading times for the second clause, only on the choice itself. For sentences where parallel function and action readiness go against a switch reference reading, it appears that the presence of the deictic does not slow down reading. Thus, unlike the action readiness cue, the pronominal switch reference cue can easily be overruled. This conforms with our intuitions as Hungarian speakers regarding the lability of the switch reference assignment induced by the pronoun. If the stage for a switch of reference has already been set, the pronoun can tip the balances in favor of the switch reference reading. If the stage has not yet been set, the deictic pronoun can trigger a switch reference reading or it can be ignored and the parallel function reading maintained.

The results of this experiment set some limits on the possible relations between the formal and the pragmatic cues for anaphora resolution in Hungarian. The fact that the verb-based pragmatic bias actually slowed down processing rather than speeding it up clearly suggests that one cannot presuppose a strategy where implicit processes would always precede the application of the formal means. But this is only to say that, even for Hungarian, we cannot follow Smaby (1979) in imagining that consideration of pragmatic factors

always takes precedence over consideration of formal cues. In Experiment III we try to shed some further light on these issues by examining a construction in which a verb-based lexical cue for switch reference competes with the pronominal cue for switch reference.

Experiment III: Verb-based switch reference versus pronominal switch reference

Grober et al. (1978) made use of interpersonal communication verbs which promote a switch reference in order to study pronoun disambiguation. We can study a similar competition in Hungarian between verb-based switch reference and the switch reference interpretation of the deictic pronoun. Consider sentences such as (15) and (16). In (15) the formal constraint on anaphora interpretation provided in English by gender agreement is consonant with the semantics of *apologize*, while in (16) this semantics is contradicted by gender agreement.

(15) *John apologized to Mary because he forgot to mail the letter.*

(16) *John apologized to Mary because she forgot to mail the letter.*

In Experiment III we crossed this feature of verb semantics with the zero anaphora – deictic pronoun anaphora contrast in Hungarian. Interpersonal verbs were selected which either presupposed that the agent of the main verb did something which was the reason for her/him of doing the activity denoted by the main verb, or on the contrary presupposed the patient of doing something which served as the cause of the main action. By crossing this with the zero–that contrast sentences like (17) and (18) were used. In 17 the (a) version while in (18) the (b) version is the one where there was no contradiction between the two sources of information concerning co-reference relations, since the zero anaphora assigns the subject role in the second clause to the previous subject, while that suggests a switch subject according to the formal model. At the same time there was a contradiction between the formal anaphora model and verbal semantics in 17b and 18a.

(17)(a) *John apologized to Bill because Ø forgot to mail the letter.*

(b) *John apologized to Bill because that forgot to mail the letter.*

(18)(a) *John blamed Bill because Ø forgot to mail the letter.*

(b) *John blamed Bill because that forgot to mail the letter.*

A reading time experiment was performed with sentences of this kind to see whether the conflicts introduced by contradictions influence ease of processing.

Methods

Subjects. Twenty undergraduate psychology students of Lorand Eotvos University in Budapest participated voluntarily in the experiment. They all had some previous experience participating in computer controlled reading time experiments.

Materials and design. An experimental list of 28 sentences was constructed in the following way. Seven pairs of interpersonal verbs were selected. In each pair there was a contrast between presuppositions favoring agent or the patient as the cause of the main action. The following pairs were selected:

Agent Presupposed	Patient Presupposed
<i>apologized</i>	<i>condemned</i>
<i>begged</i>	<i>congratulated</i>
<i>confessed</i>	<i>blamed</i>
<i>asked for directions</i>	<i>gave directions</i>
<i>begged pardon</i>	<i>reprimanded</i>
<i>confessed</i>	<i>pardoned</i>
<i>acknowledged</i>	<i>criticize</i>

Compound sentences with the selected verb as the main verb and a *because*-clause were constructed in the following way: with each verb pair the causal clause was always the same except that there was one version with zero and one with that *az* the subject in the second clause with each verb. This insured control for word length, frequency and other factors affecting reading speed.

The design was as follows: 2 (Anaphora Type) \times 2 (verb-based switch reference) \times T (verb tokens). The list of 28 sentences was administered in the context of a much longer list of 168 sentences containing relative clauses. This was done to minimize the use of task-specific strategies. The entire list was divided into five blocks with each subject receiving a different ordering of the blocks.

Procedure. Subjects read the sentences on a television screen directed by a special purpose microcomputer. They had to push the space bar when they

had finished understanding the sentence. After that, a question concerning the agent of the second sentence appeared on the screen (e.g. for (17) and (18) this would be *Who has forgotten to mail the letter?*). They had to push the bar again when they were ready to respond and give their response orally. Three dependent measures were obtained in this way: reading time, decision time and selection of the repeated subject option.

Results and discussion

Table 3 presents the most important effects of the analysis of variance and Figure 2 shows the means.

Table 3.
Analysis of variance tables for the three dependent measures in Experiment III.

	d.f.	Reading		Decision		Choice	
		F	P	F	P	F	P
Anaphora	1,19	6.38	.002	< 1	n.s.	58.68	.00001
Pragmat.	1,19	11.09	.005	3.76	n.s.	227.07	.00001
ProxPrag.	1,19	21.11	.0002	4.70	.05	87.61	.00001

The effects of the verb tokens themselves were minimal, so we will focus on a discussion of the verb-based and pronoun-based cues. For choice, the verb-based cue had an overwhelming effect. As the upper part of Figure 2 shows, the average selection of the repeated subject option in the agent biased sentences was 62% while in the patient biased sentences it was only 3%. This asymmetry indicates that the bias is in fact a stronger bias for verbs such as *criticize* than it is for verbs such as *apologize*. The main effect of the anaphora type and the strong interaction between the anaphora type and the pragmatic bias is due to the agent biased sentences. For these sentences, the use of switch reference anaphora (that) produced a 71% interpretation against the pragmatic bias. In patient presupposed sentences (see the flat broken line) the anaphora type did not matter in choice: it was exclusively based on verbal pragmatics. The absence of an effect of switch reference in patient-presupposed sentences is probably best understood as due to a floor effect for these sentences.

The reading and decision times show the interactions between the two cues even more clearly. In reading times there was a main effect of pronominal switch reference (sentences with the switch reference anaphora taking longer to read) and pragmatic bias (patient bias being faster). However, the interaction between these two factors was much stronger as the middle part of Figure 2




Figure 2. Choice of main clause subject as coreferent (above) reading times (middle), and decision times (lower chart) in pragmatically different "because" sentences

shows. The use of the switch anaphora slowed down reading in the agent biased sentences, while it slightly speeded up reading when the two cues pointed towards the same coreferent. In decision times only this latter interaction reached significance (see the bottom of Figure 2).

General discussion

The most important results of these studies relate to the ways in which the cue to switch reference is integrated with the other cues to anaphora resolution. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that, at all ages, switch reference marking is a much weaker than either verb-based expectations or the parallel function strategy as a cue to sentence interpretation. Although switch reference had a significant effect in Experiment 2, this effect was conditioned on the presence of a verb-based expectation for role switching. Experiment 2 indicated that processing of the switch reference pronoun does not slow up reading in the same way that action readiness of the patient slows down application of the parallel function strategy. We can think of this as a contrast in the relative reliability of the two cues. The switch reference cue is an important one, but it is conditioned by many other cues and easily overridden. Action readiness, on the other hand, is a highly reliable cue — at least for the verbs *chase* and *frighten*.

However, it is also probably the case that the effect of switch reference in Experiment II is muted by the presence of the 5 second gap between first and second clauses. In Experiment III there was no interclausal gap and there we found the same pattern of statistical interactions indicating cue summation that we have found in many other studies testing aspects of the cue integration in the competition model (MacWhinney et al 1984, MacWhinney et al. 1985). Thus, although the switch reference marker was relatively weak in all three studies, it was strongest when the discourse context was presented in a smooth and natural way. This again indicates that processing of the switch referent marker is dependent upon a wide variety of cues occurring in integrated natural discourse.

How can Hungarians achieve on-line integration of parallel function, action readiness, factive switch reference, and pronominal switch reference? Does processing of these four types of cues require access to all of the listener's knowledge or can we define a constrained set of processes required for this integration?

The competition model can be extended to provide a reasonable account of this integration. Let us consider how the model will need to account for the four basic cue types:

1. Parallel function: We must assume that, during the processing of a clause, listeners bind NP referents to a handful of roles. For our current purposes, these roles are: perspective (MacWhinney, 1977), topic, given, agent, and patient. Referents associated with these roles carry over their association into subsequent clauses (Bock, 1982)
2. Action readiness: In addition to these basic roles, listeners use verbs to determine additional activity properties for these roles such as action readiness. More work will be needed to determine the status of additional properties of this type. Like the roles discussed above, these roles will carry over into subsequent clauses. However, these roles will not simply continue in the next clause unchanged. Instead they will potentiate the treatment of their referents as actors in the next clause.
3. Implicit causality: In the case of verbs such as *criticize* the listener will associate with the arguments of the verb in the first clause an implicit "factive cause" role. In the case of *criticize* the factive cause role is associated with the patient. In the case of *apologize* the factive cause role is associated with the agent. These roles are then expanded in the subsequent clause.

For the last two factors, the generation of roles in the first clause is governed by specific verbs. But note that the roles established in the first clause in this way need not be continued or expanded. A switch reference marker can defeat parallel function binding. In the case of action readiness and the factive cause role, the discourse may simply continue without saying what the rabbit did after it was frightened or why Bill apologized to Fred. The point is not that these roles must be filled, but that they are generated in the first clause so that when the listener reaches the second clause he can choose between a small set of well-delimited roles that will allow him to disambiguate pronominal coreference.

This proposal resembles in various ways the proposal for the processing of givenness and coreference offered by Sanford and Garrod (1980). In its emphasis on the dynamics of binding to roles, the proposal offered above is very much like the principle of maximum efficiency proposed by Tyler and Marslen-Wilson. By making role assignments available from clause to clause, the processing of each subsequent clause is made faster and backtracking is

minimized. At the same time, there is a certain way in which the delimiting of a small set of discourse and syntactic roles that can be carried over between clauses tends to insulate the processing system from the whole of cognition. Because inter-clausal processing is governed by a small set of assigned roles, the competition between alternative referents for an anaphor can occur in a semi-insulated space. This space allows for all lexical influences and for the influences of a small set of discourse entities. What is most important about this proposal is that it opens the door for an integration between the analysis of clausally-based syntax and discourse-based syntax, as occurs in the processing of switch reference in Hungarian.

Appendix I. List of sentences used in experiments I and II

In this appendix, sentences with zero anaphora are always given first, followed then by sentences with the deictic anaphoric pronoun *az*.

INACTIVE PATIENT

A medve simogatja a bárányt és aztán beugrik a kocsiba.

'The bear pets the lamb and then jumps into the car.'

A szarvas simogatja a medvét és aztán az beugrik a kocsiba.

'The deer hugs the bear and then that jumps into the car.'

A bárány megszagolja az elefántot és aztán beugrik a kocsiba.

'The lamb sniffs the elephant and then jumps into the car.'

Az elefánt megszagolja a malacot és aztán az beugrik a kocsiba.

'The elephant sniffs the pig and then that jumps into the car.'

A bárány megpusztilja a szarvast és aztán beugrik a kocsiba.

'The lamb kisses the deer and then jumps into the car.'

A malac megpusztilja az oroszlánt és aztán az beugrik a kocsiba.

'The pig kisses the lion and then that jumps into the car.'

ACTIVE PATIENT

Az elefánt kergeti a bárányt és aztán beugrik a dobozba.

'The elephant chases the lamb and then jumps into the car.'

A kecske kergeti a vízilovat és aztán az beugrik a dobozba.

'The goat chases the hippopotamus and then that jumps into the box.'

A ló megijeszti a medvét és aztán beugrik a szobába.

'The horse frightens the bear and then jumps into the room.'

A medve megijeszti a lovat és aztán az beugrik a szobába.

'The bear frightens the horse and then that jumps into the room.'

Az oroszlán elkíséri a malacot és aztán beugrik a kocsiba.

'The lion accompanies the pig and then jumps into the car.'

A gorilla elkíséri az oroszlánt és aztán az beugrik a dobozba.

'The gorilla accompanies the lion and then that jumps into the box.'

Appendix II. List of sentences used in experiment III.

Within all units of four sentences everything was the same except that in the first two sentences the verb implying the cause on the part of the agent and in the second two that on the part of the patient was used and (a) and (c) sentences used a zero (b) and (d) a that-anaphora. Therefore we only give the first four sentences in detail, with the others only the a sentence and the two verbs used.

APOLOGIZED – CRITICIZE / ENÉZÉST KÉRT – MEGBÍRÁLT

- (a) *Pali elnézést kért Ágitól, mert nem ment haza.*

'Paul apologized to Mary because did not go home.'

- (b) *Pali elnézést kért Ágitól, mert az nem ment haza.*

'Paul apologized to Mary because that did not go home.'

- (c) *Pali megbíráltta Ágit, mert nem ment haza.*

'Paul criticized Agnes because did not go home.'

- (d) *Pali megbíráltta Ágit, mert az nem ment haza.*

'Paul criticized Agnes because that did not go home.'

BEGGED – CONGRATULATED / SZABADKOZOTT – GRATULÁLT

- (a) *Józsi szabadkozott Verának, mert beengedte a vendégeket.*

'Joseph begged Vera because let in the guests.'

CONFESSED - BLAMED / VALLOMÁST TETT - BEOLVASOTT

- (a) *Imre vallomást tett Győzőnek, mert elvesztette a kéziratot.*
 'Imre made a confession to Victor because last the manuscript.'

ASKED FOR DIRECTIONS - GAVE DIRECTION / ÚTMUTATÁST
 KÉRT - ÚTMUTATÁST ADOTT

- (a) *Tibor útmutatást kért Iréntől, mert elfelejtette a receptet.*
 'Tibor asked directions from Iren because forgot the recipe.'

BEGGED PARDON - REPRIMANDED / BOCSÁNATOT KÉRT - RÁRIPAKODOTT

- (a) *Ádám bocsánatot kért Gézától mert nem hozta el a füzetet.*
 'Adam begged pardon from Geza because did not bring the copy book.'

CONFESSED - PARDONED / BEVALLOTTA - MEBOCSÁTOTTA

- (a) *Gyuri bevallotta Dezsőnek, hogy nem olvasta el a könyvet.*
 'George confessed to Dezso that did not read the book.'

AGKNOWLEDGED - CRITICIZED / BEISMERTE - FELHÁNYTORGATTA

- (a) *Gizi beismerte Tóninak, hogy megette a főzeléket.*
 'Gizi acknowledged to Tony, that ate the cooked vegetables.'

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE HUNGARIAN QUANTIFIERS *MIND* 'EVERY' AND *AKÁR* 'ANY'

By

L. HUNYADI

There are several aspects of language that appear to be equally interesting for a linguist and a logician. Among them is the realm of quantifiers in which both parties make their excursions. If there were only two lexems for the representation of the two quantifiers, everything would seem much clearer, but in most languages linguistic forms are rich enough to present a logical problem as well. The present paper is a contribution of a linguist to the discussion of how certain quantifiers can be treated. An attempt will be made to show that a deeper analysis of the linguistic form may reveal certain "hidden" semantic properties of this form that can also influence its logical representation.

1. The problem

Quantifiers with the prefix *mind-* (*mindenki* 'everybody', *mindenhol* 'everywhere', etc.) and *akár-* (*akárki* 'anybody', *akárhol* 'anywhere', etc.) are generally treated as lexical representations of the universal quantifier. However, they differ at least in two points: a) *akár-* can normally appear only with a modal, whereas *mind-* need not, b) (and it is perhaps an even more apparent difference) there is no logical contradiction in (1):

- (1) *Akármit megvehetsz, de nem vehetsz meg mindent.*
any- CONV-buy-you-can but not buy-you-can CONV every-
thing-acc. thing-acc.
'You can buy anything, but you cannot buy everything.'

Thus, (1) can be composed of (2) and the negation of (3):

- (2) *Akármit megvehetsz.*
'You can buy anything.'
(3) *Mindent megvehetsz.*
'You can buy everything.'

There is no logical contradiction in (1), since (2) and (3) are not synonymous. Being equally universally quantified expressions, (2) and (3) can technically be

demonstrated to be non-synonymous by assuming that the universal quantifier and the modal operator (expressed on the verb by *-het*) have different scope relations in the two sentences: the modal operator has wide scope in (2) but narrow scope in (3), cf. (2') and (3'), resp.:

(2') $\Diamond \forall x$ (you buy *x*)

(3') $\forall x \Diamond$ (you buy *x*)

In connection with this logical reconstruction, a linguistic question may arise: by what means are these opposite scope relations expressed in the linguistic form.

From previous work we know (cf. Hunyadi 1981, É. Kiss 1983, 1987) that scope in Hungarian is expressed by heavy stressed and linear order. Considering (2) and (3) we find that they have the same linear order and the same stress pattern: both can be pronounced with neutral stress on both constituents or heavy stress on the quantifier, even the reverse word-order with the only possible two main stresses (on the verb and the quantifier) yields synonymous sentences, cf. (4) and (5):

(4) '*Megvehetsz 'akármit.*

'You can buy anything.'

(5) '*Megvehetsz 'mindent.*

'You can buy everything.'

On the basis of these examples we have to conclude that the basic linguistic means of stress and linear order do not express different scope relations in (2), (3) and (4), (5). But if the scope relations are different — and they are indeed —, we may attempt to find it in the semantic structure of the quantifiers *mind-* and *akár-*.

2. A proposal for the semantic interpretation of *mind-* and *akár-*

As it is well known, it is convenient to regard a universally quantified sentence with *mind-* 'every' as a complex expression of sentences connected with 'and', i.e. the quantifier *mind-* represents conjunction. Luckily enough, this overt conjunction also appears on the surface, in the form of the quantifier-prefix *mind-*. Namely, we find the connective *mind* in sentence like (6):

(6) *Mind Péter, mind Kati eljött.*

'Both Peter and Kate came.'

(*Mind* ... *mind* is a double operator of conjunction, standing for 'both ... and'.)

Although (6) contains only predicate (*eljött* 'came'), *mind ... mind* clearly indicates the conjunction of sentences, cf. (7):

- (7) *Mind Péter eljött, mind Kati telefonált.*
'Both Peter came, and Kate phoned.'

The negation of (7), (8) yields the negation of conjunction, (8'):

- (8) *Nem igaz, hogy mind Péter eljött, mind Kati telefonált.*
not true that both Peter CONV-came and Kate phoned.
'It is not true that both Peter came and Kate phoned.'

- (8') $\sim (p \wedge q) \implies \sim p \vee q$
where $p = \text{Peter came}$, $q = \text{Kate phoned}$

The same analysis can be applied to the quantifier *mind*- in the familiar fashion, cf. (9) and (9'):

- (9) *Mindenki eljött.*
everybody CONV came
'Everybody came.'

- (9') $\forall x (\text{came}(x)) \iff \text{came}(p) \ \& \ \text{came}(K)$, if the set of everybody consists of P(eter) and K(ate).

Let us now turn to the quantifier *akár*- and find out, what semantic/logical relation its morphological form reveals. Etymologically, the quantifiers with the prefix *akár*- derive from the connective *akár* which is still in normal use in sentences like (10):

- (10) *Megveheted akár ezt a könyvet, akár azt a könyvet.*
'You can buy both this book and that book.'

Akár ... akár is again a double operator, interpreted here as 'both ... and', however it represents alternation, rather than conjunction. This function is clearly seen in (11), where — in contrast to (10) — both sentences connected by *akár* cannot be true at the same time:

- (11) *Akár megveszed ezt a könyvet, akár nem, én is megveszem.*
'Whether you buy this book or not, I will also buy it.'

From the fact that it is only semantically excluded in (11) to buy the book and not to buy the book at the same time and that (10) can be true both if you buy both of the books and if you only buy one of them we know that *akár ... akár* is a double operator standing for alternation.

Thus, as we have seen, the double operator *mind ... mind* stands for conjunction and the quantifier *mind-* can also be regarded as a complex form expressing conjunction. Similarly, I assume that whereas the double operator *akár ... akár* expresses alternation, this very operation makes a significant part of the quantifier *akár-* as well and thus the quantifier *akár-* can be regarded as a complex form expressing alternation. In what follows I will analyze sentences with *akár ... akár* and apply the results to the treatment of the quantifier *akár-*.

3. Alternation and what is beyond it

As I noted earlier, one of the differences between *akár-* and *mind-* is that *akár-* cannot in most cases be found without a modal, this being especially the case in simple sentences. We have the same restriction with *akár ... akár*, cf. (12) and (13):

- (12) *Akár Péter jön el, akár Kati, örülni fogok.*
 either Peter comes CONV or Kate to be glad I-will-be
 'Either Peter comes or Kate (comes), I will be glad.'

- (13) **Akár Péter jön, akár Kati.*

We shall get closer to the reason of the ill-formedness of (13) comparing (12) and (14), its equivalent:

- (14) (*Akkor is*) *örülni fogok, ha Péter jön el, és*
 then also to be glad I-will-be if Peter comes CONV and
 (*akkor is*) *örülni fogok, ha Kati jön el.*
 then also to be glad I-will-be if Kate comes CONV
 'I will (also) be glad if Peter comes and I will (also)
 be glad if Kate comes.'

As we see, (12) is not simply understood as an alternation but also as a construction that requires a condition, too. Namely, we have the following equivalence relation of (12) and (14):

- (15) $(p \vee q) \supset r \implies p \supset r \ \& \ q \supset r$
 where *p* is the name of the sentence 'Peter comes' and
q is the name of the sentence 'Kate comes', whereas
r is the second part of the conditional structure.

Thus, a construction with the double connective *akár ... akár* can be regarded as a complex form of a conditional structure with the same second part referring to two (or more) conditions. It is obvious that there is no well formed

conditional structure giving just the condition (i.e. where the conditional connective is out of place with no second part to connect the first to). In (12) the second part, *r* is 'I will be glad' and (12) is grammatical. Consequently, with no *r*, (13) is out.

We can make (13) grammatical in the form of (16):

- (16) *Akár Péter eljöhet,* *akár Kati (eljöhet).*
 Peter CONV-come-may-he Kate

'Both Peter can come and Kate can come.'

Using the equivalence relation (15), (16) is equivalent to (17):

- (17) If Peter comes or Kate comes, it is permitted \Rightarrow
 If Peter comes, it is permitted, and if Kate comes, it is permitted.

As is seen from (17), (16) became grammatical by adding to (13) the modal operator which occupies the position of *r*, i.e. the second part of the conditional structure. From this we may conclude that, in contrast to *mind*, *akár* requires a modal in a simple sentence because it represents an alternation in a conditional with the predicates connected by *akár ... akár* being the first part of the condition only and the second part must come from "outside", normally in the form of a modal.

There are, however, at least two other cases where it is difficult to attribute a conditional character to the interpretation: they are the cases of a) questions and b) 'outside' negation. Consider the following examples:

- (18) *Láttad-e akár Pétert,* *akár Katit?*
 you saw either Peter-acc. either Kate-acc.

'Did you see either Peter or Kate?'

- (19) *Nem igaz, hogy láttad akár Pétert,* *akár Katit?*
 not true that you saw either Peter-acc. either Kate-acc.

'It is not true that you saw Peter or Kate.'

At the same time, similarly to (13), both (18) and (19) would be ill-formed without the additional operators of question and negation, respectively. Thus, we may formulate the condition of the well-formedness of a sentence with the double operator *akár ... akár*:

- (20) Alternation expressed by *akár ... akár* has to be included in the scope of interrogation or negation, or be the first part of a conditional construction in which case the second part of the conditional construction has to be a modal expression.

Thus, we do not have a conditional construction in (18) or (19), but alternation is still expressed. The equivalence relation expressed in (18) and (19) can be formulated in this way:

- (18') $? (p \vee q) \implies ? p \ \& \ ? q$
 where ? is the sign of the interrogative operator, p and q are the names of the sentences 'You saw Peter' and 'You saw Kate', respectively.
- (19') $\sim (p \vee q) \iff \sim p \ \& \ \sim q$
 with p and q having the same references as in (18')

4. Alternation realized in the quantifier *akár*-

According to my assumption, the quantifier *akár*- has the same semantic properties as the connective pair *akár ... akár*, and thus it can be analyzed according to it. Namely, it will be assumed again, that — in contrast to the quantifier *mind*- with its conjunctive function — *akár*- has the function to express alternation of sentences. The restrictions are expected to be the same, too, i.e. (20) is to apply. One important remark has to be made, however: when applying the concept of alternation to *akár*- sentences it is necessary to assume that we have to do with finite sets of elements, i.e. the number of elements in the given set must somehow be identified. It is very often the case that we, too, in our everyday usage, further define the range of elements put forward in an *akár*- sentence, cf. (20):

- (20) *Akármit megvehetsz, amit (csak) akarsz.*
 anything-acc. CONV-buy-can-you what-acc. (only) want-you
 'You can buy whatever you want'

Consider first an example with a hidden conditional:

- (21) *Akármit megvehetsz.*
 anything-acc. CONV-buy-you-can
 'You can buy anything.'

Let us suppose that the set of elements you can buy consists of the elements a and b . Then, following the equivalence relation (15), (21) can be represented as (21'):

- (21') if (you buy *a* or you buy *b*) then it is permitted \Rightarrow if you buy *a* then it is permitted and if you buy *b* then it is permitted
 You can buy *a* and you can buy *b*

Here, the second part of the conditional construction is represented by the modal attached to the verb, i.e. 'it is permitted'. In this simple sentence, in a conditional construction, following rule (20), this modal is required to make (21) grammatical, since (22) is not grammatical:

- (22) **Akármit megveszel.*

(I have to admit, that, probably for pragmatic reasons, we are often "too" cooperative and can accept (22), too, but only if some modal operator is also understood, e.g. in the sense 'You are able/ready to buy anything (without selection).' But even in such a case, the modal operator has to appear in the semantic representation.)

In a complex sentence, such as (23), however, the modal operator does not necessarily appear at either level in the *akár*- clause. But here, again, there must be a second part of the conditional construction there, and, as a rule, it is in the other clause:

- (23) *Akárki jön el, örülni fogok.*
 anybody comes CONV to be glad I-will-be
 'Whoever comes, I will be glad.'

If the set of *akárki* consists of *a* and *b*, (23) is represented by (23'):

- (23') if (*a* comes or *b* comes) then I will be glad \Rightarrow
 if *a* comes I will be glad and if *b* comes I will be glad

This conjunction under the conditional can often appear on the surface as well, as a variant of (23) we can have (24) or (25):

- (24) *Akárki jön is el, örülni fogok.*
 (25) *Akárki is jön el, örülni fogok.*

(In both cases *is* represents conjunction, similarly to the way we interpreted (14).)

Its exact nature is not quite clear to me, but it is interesting that although in (23)–(25) the conditional is hidden, some non-indicative can appear in the *akár* clause, apparently with synonymous meaning, as the imperative/subjunctive in (26):

- (26) *Akárki jöjjön el, örülni fogok.*

(Here *jōjjōn* is non-indicative and it does not allow for an additional *ha* 'if', unlike the indicative *jōn* 'comes' in (23)–(25).)

It appears that the *akár*- clause with *ha* 'if' (cf. (27)) only differs from (23) in the word order of the CONV, the verbal prefix, but without representing a special structure to be analyzed in a different way:

(27) *Ha akárki eljōn, ōrūlni fogok.*

It can probably be assumed that the *ha* — owing to the inner semantics of *akár*- — is simply redundant.

Similarly to the analysis of *akár ... akár*, no conditional has to be identified in *akár*- questions. It is simply the interrogative operator that includes in its scope the alternation, cf. (28) and (28'):

(28) *Megvettél-e akármit?*
CONV-bought-you anything-acc.

'Did you buy anything?'

(28') ? (you bought *a* or you bought *b*) \iff
? you bought *a* and you bought *b*

Again, there is an *is*-variant of (28) with synonymous meaning:

(29) *Megvettél-e akármit is?*

Here, too, the hidden conjunction may be represented on the surface.

It has to be mentioned, that in certain cases the universal quantifier *akár*- can be replaced by the existential quantifier *vala*- with synonymous meaning. (30) and (31) are such pairs of (27) and (28), respectively:

(30) *Ha valaki eljōn, ōrūlni fogok.*
if someone CONV-comes to-be-glad I-will-be
'I will be glad if anyone comes.'

(31) *Megvettél-e valamit?*
CONV-bought-you something-acc.
'Did you buy anything?'

The condition is that *vala*- 'some' has to be [–specific], realized in cases when it is included in the scope of the interrogative operator or the conditional *ha* (without *ha*, (30) would be out, unlike (27), since "behind" *vala*- there is no conditional hiding).

Let us now remember the negative (19):

(19) *Nem igaz, hogy Láttad akár Pétert, akár Katit?*

'It is not true that you saw Peter or Kate.'

It means that "You did not see Peter and you did not see Kate", i.e. (19) represents the equivalence $\sim (p \vee q) \iff \sim p \ \& \ \sim q$. It is expected to find a similar relation in an *akár*- sentence as well:

(32) *Nem igaz, hogy akárkit láttál.*

Indeed, (32) has the meaning 'You did not see anyone.' But there are two interesting points in this example: a) the *akár*- clause cannot be independent, i.e. **Akárkit láttál* (violating rule (20)), nevertheless it can be negated; b) there are examples where this meaning does not hold.

Turning to the first point first, we have to assume that if **Akárkit láttál* is ill-formed, then it cannot be logically negated either. What we have here, instead, is just the case of the fulfillment of rule (20), i.e. it must be included in the scope of the negative (or the interrogative) operator. In this way it is one logical expression ($\sim (p \vee q)$) rather than a complex sentence with two clauses.

As to the second point, we can find examples, seemingly contradictory to (32), cf. (33):

(33) *Nem igaz, hogy akármit megvehetsz.*
not true that anything-acc. CONV-buy-you-can

This sentence has two interpretations: a) 'You cannot buy just anything', b) 'You cannot buy anything at all.' How do these readings come about?

We can notice that readings a) and b) differ in the scope of the quantifier and the negation. According to the general rule of scope assignment in Hungarian we have to find this difference in linear order and/or stress. Well, the two readings principally differ in that the a) reading has heavy stress on the quantifier, whereas b) neutral stress on every constituent:

(33a) *Nem igaz, hogy 'akármit megvehetsz.*

'You cannot buy just anything.'

Nem igaz, hogy 'akármit (is) 'megvehetsz.

'You cannot buy just anything (at all).'

I assume that the following "trick" is played by language here: in (32) *akár*-represents simply 'or', i.e. (32') $\sim (p \vee q)$. The condition for this is that there should be no operator to represent the equivalence of (15), i.e. the equivalence of the alternation. As soon as the modal operator appears (as in (33)), we have the case of (15). In case of (33a), i.e. the heavily stressed quantifier, the

heavy stress indicated (as in any ordinary case, even unquantified) the scope of the negation, i.e. here the conjunction:

- (33a') – (you can buy *a* or you can buy *b* \iff
(you cannot buy *a* or you can buy *b*)

In (33b), however, the even stress, especially with the (facultative) *is* 'also' indicates that it is not just the conjunction that is negated but the sentence as a whole, i.e. the negation is distributed among the members of the conjunction:

- (33a') – you can buy *a* and – you can buy *b*

The presence of *is* in (33b) is a proper indicator of this kind of scope, cf. (34) and (35):

- (34) *Nem igaz, hogy Péter angolul is tud.*
not true that Peter English also knows
'It is not true that Peter knows even English.'

- (35) *Nem igaz, hogy Péter akár 'angolul is 'tudna.*
not true that Peter English also knows-would-he
even
'It is not true that Peter knows English (Peter does not
even know English).'

Thus, we can see that the appearance of *is* in the embedded sentence is a guarantee for the negation to be distributed among the members of the conjunction, i.e. negative sentences will be connected by *is*, as is seen from (36), the equivalent of (35) as well:

- (36) *Péter angolul sem tud.*
Peter English neither knows
'Peter does not even know English.'

where *sem* is a compound form of *is* + *nem* with the linear order of these words also telling us that this is a case of the conjunction of negations and not vice versa. This is the way this trick works.

5. Further peculiarities

One may find some further peculiarities in the semantic-lexical structure of the quantifier *akár*- which are worth mentioning here, even if they do not, in my view, significantly modify the representation proposed earlier.

The *akár*- element is not simply identical with the connective *akár*, but it goes back in its etymology to the verb *akar* 'want'. Furthermore, it is not just a peculiarity of the Hungarian language to derive this quantifier from 'want', other instances are Latin (*quantumvis* from *quantum vis* 'any amount, as much as you want'), Slovak (*koľko* from *koľi kto* 'who(ever)' you want') or even Arabic (*ayya sha'* 'which you want, whatever you want'). I do not want to enter the exciting world of etymology here, but I think that this peculiarity need not be left unnoticed either. The fact that there is a sense of 'want' in the quantifier *akár*-, can be supported by the observation that in simple sentences of the type (20) *Akármit megvehetsz (amit csak akarsz)* 'You can buy anything (whatever you want)' this 'want' often appears as an additional clause without changing the basic meaning of the *akár*-clause. Thus, instead of (21'), we can represent (21) in (21'') including 'want':

(21'') if (you want to buy *a* or you want to buy *b*) then it is permitted
 \iff if you want to buy *a* then it is permitted and if you want
 to buy *b* then it is permitted

As it is seen, the introduction of 'want' into the sentences 'you buy *a*' and 'you buy *b*' does not change the original structure and the principle of representation, at the same time, it adds an operator whose sense is present in many cases. It has to be noted, however, that it would be difficult to find this sense of *akár*- in all cases, especially questions or externally negative sentences.

6. Conclusions

It has been assumed that there is an exact correspondance between the *mind* ... *mind* and the quantifier *mind*- on the one hand, and the connective *akár* ... *akár* and the quantifier *akár*- on the other. A comparison of a set of parallellous examples proves this assumption. Then, it is also assumed that, similarly to *mind* ... *mind*, the quantifier *mind*- expresses conjunction, and similarly to *akár* ... *akár*, the quantifier *akár*- expresses alternation. Both quantifiers being the representations of the universal quantifier, in their inner structure they mainly differ in this respect. It is also found that in simple sentences the *akár*- expression is only grammatical if it is a conditional construction (the condition is hidden) in which case the *akár*-clause is necessarily modal. In other cases, too, the alternation expression cannot be "left alone", it has to be included in the scope of the interrogative operator or external negation. In the latter case, stress plays the only role in deciding the scope of the negation (whether it extends on the conjunction as a whole or it is distributed

over the members of the conjunction) if the negated is modal, otherwise only one reading (the distributed negation) is possible with either stress pattern.

It has also been demonstrated that the quantifier *akár-* has the same (relatively free) word order characteristics as the better known *mind-* has with the same significant function of stress as well.

It has also been demonstrated that in certain cases the quantifier *akár-* can be replaced by the existential *vala-* with synonymous meaning. The condition for this is that *vala-* be [-specific].

With all this I hope to have supplied the reader with some evidence that lexical form is more or less directly related to logical form on the surface with Hungarian quantifiers more directly, representing in a compound form quite complex logical operations.

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MORE ON GERMAN PAST PARTICIPLES AND SIMPLICITY

By

R.A. WOLFF

In my paper "German Past Participles and the Simplicity Metric" (*Linguistics* 19 (1981), 3-13 — henceforth Wolff) I attempted to demonstrate, on the basis of a test designed to elicit the past participles of a set of German non-sense verbs, that a significant percentage of the test subjects had internalized a rule strikingly at variance with the principle of simplicity; and that these results argue against the assumption of the usefulness of notions such as the simplicity metric in our speculations regarding the nature of a speaker's competence, his internalized grammar. Bernd Wiese, in a rather detailed critique (*Linguistics* 20 (1982), 573-582 — henceforth Wiese), takes issue with the assumptions, procedures and conclusions presented in my paper. Since Wiese's arguments involve what I consider to be misinterpretations of my case, as well as some misleading conclusions and counter arguments on his part, I feel that certain clarifications are in order.

Wiese's first objection involves my alleged involvement with the notion of "psychological reality." To quote Wiese: "...a skeptical attitude toward claims of psychological reality is surely indicated [and] thus one may feel sympathetic toward W[olff]'s attack on the sanctuary of simplicity as a psychological must ... however, it seems all the odder that W[olff] bases his argument against assuming the psychological equivalent to the simplicity metric on the most naive claims for the psychological reality of grammatical rules..." (575). I will not counter with the observation that in my paper I never made use of the phrase, nor appealed to the notion, of "psychological reality"; for this would merely sidetrack us back into the fascinating, but (for our purposes) irrelevant, debate regarding the usefulness and the validity of that notion. Also, the fact is that my arguments *did* proceed from a fundamental assumption often associated with "psychological reality": that speakers of a language have internalized something which for lack of a better term we call a grammar, and that it is possible on the basis of a speaker's output to speculate meaningfully on what such a grammar probably involves. Although honest differences of opinion on this point can and do exist (and Black and Chiat's paper is essential reading), I continue to hold with those that consider the above assumption

about grammar to be an absolute prerequisite to any coherent discussion of linguistic phenomena.

One of Wiese's more misleading criticisms involves his taking me to task for my "vague speculations" (576) regarding the possible relationship between the test subjects' educational level and their responses to the test. In fact, in footnote 3 Wiese demonstrates — with intimidating mathematical detail — that such speculations are statistically unwarranted (580). I agree completely. My speculations here were never intended to be anything *but* exceedingly tentative, and a careful reading of my paper will reveal that I had taken pains to point out the obvious: a) that my test involved far too few subjects for anything other than what Wiese quite accurately calls "vague speculations," and b) that, consequently, analysis of whatever socio- and psycholinguistic considerations might underly the test results would require an "in-depth investigation ... beyond the scope and intent of the present discussion" (9–10). Wiese's belabored attempt at refutation of what I had merely thrown out as a possibility, and what I already willingly conceded to be highly speculative, is not only puzzling but again very misleading — especially to those who may not have read my paper.

Regarding my conclusion that a significant percentage of the test subjects had evidently internalized a rule at variance with the principle of simplicity, Wiese asserts that one "ought to look for interfering factors if a simple and general rule fails in a limited domain" (575), and then goes on to describe the kind of interference he thinks might be operating in the case of the verbs used in my test, specifically *putzgären*, *blickzühnen* and *dotschkitten*. He develops two points. His first point is that the three verbs' constituent morphemes could "at least in some vague manner" (577) be interpreted by the test subjects as semantically motivated, and that this (alleged) semantic transparency constitutes an interfering factor, causing the test subjects to handle the verbs anomalously (i.e., to generate past participles with *ge-*, even though the verbs have an unaccented first syllable and therefore would be expected to yield minus *ge-* past participles). Despite the involved detail with which he develops this point, Wiese never tells us why we should think that semantic transparency (assuming my three verbs manifest it) should be suspected of constituting an interfering factor in the first place. He seems to attempt to demonstrate as much in the development of his second point, which is that for my test to work, my nonsense verbs (again, *putzgären*, *blickzühnen* and *dotschkitten*) must — "in a sense [be] possible German verbs ... in fact, there are hardly any verbs of the form $A+B+en$ where A is not a prefix ... and such verbs are stylistically marked; they may be expected in religious contexts, for instance, but not in

everyday spoken language...the active vocabulary of average speakers is not likely to include a generalizable verb pattern of which they are instances. Result: the existence of verbs like *putzgären* in ordinary spoken German is not an established fact" (578). This argument lacks foundation. Although it is undeniable that verbs of the type in question are not common, the likes of *miáuen*, *posáunen*, *spektákeln*, *aláunen*, *scharmützel* (*A+B+en*) — not to mention accentually anomalous (native German) nouns like *Paderbórn*, *Heilbrónn* — are in fact not anywhere near as vanishingly rare as Wiese implies they are; thus one can hardly claim that my *putzgären* etc. are unlikely candidates for status as "possible" German verbs. However, Wiese's arguments on this score do not end here. He argues (and pursues the argument in his footnote 13) that since Wolff's nonsense verbs like *putzgären* are (allegedly) analogous to the "stylistically marked" German verbs *lobpréisen*, *frohlócken*, it is no wonder that the test subjects handled the nonsense verbs anomalously, producing past participles both with and without *ge-*; for in actual German, *frohlócken* etc. also yield past participles with and without *ge-*, i.e. *frohlóckt/gefróhlockt* (579). Indeed, Wiese asserts that at least some of my test subjects were probably unsure how they should handle my nonsense verbs, since "by their very nature we cannot be sure what properties [*putzgären*, *dotschkíten*, *blickzúhnen*] have...(577) their morphological structure does not fit their accent...Thus, when presented with [such verbs], participants who have no access to 'unfamiliar verbs' face a dilemma. They can choose to ignore the 'false accent' and form plus-*ge*-PPs ... or they may choose to ignore the lack of a suitable verb class and form minus-*ge*-PPs according to the general rule...(579)". It would be tempting to counter with the observation that this analysis, which attempts to explain in intricate detail what went on inside the heads of my test subjects, involves the same kind of "vague speculation" regarding unobservable psychological processes for which Wiese earlier took me to task. But better to stick to the empirical data and point out that what Wiese describes is *not* what happened in my test. My test subjects did not generate the past participles *putzgärt/gepútzgärt* (note accent), but rather *putzgärt/geputzgärt*. So Wiese's arguments on the basis of analogy with *frohlóckt/gefróhlockt* and the ignoring of "false accent" etc. do not apply. However, evidently to bolster his argument, Wiese in footnote 13 suggests that I was perhaps less than accurate (candid?) in reporting the responses of my subjects: "I wonder whether W[olff]'s representations of elicited forms ... reflect responses accurately enough to exclude the possibility that the second syllable had some accent" (581). The question of "some" accent is irrelevant to the whole matter of *ge-* attachment in German. What is important is main accent. After all, the *be-* of *besúchen* has "some"

accent, but since it's not the verb's primary accent, the past participle lacks *ge-*: *besúcht*.

Wiese similarly confuses the matter of *ge-* attachment in German when he points out in footnote 14 that compound verbs "...based on minus *ge* verbs do not have *ge-* past participles even if they are accented on the first syllable. Examples: *ánempfehlen*, PP *ánempfohlen*" etc. (581). This is an erroneous, hence pointless, argument, for all of the so-called "separable-prefix" verbs are accented on the first syllable. Actually, the *verb* of the "verb" *ánempfehlen* is *empfehlen*, whose minus *ge-* past participle (*emfóhlen*) is formed without regard to the syntactically later attachment of the "prefix" *an*. (Cf. *áufstehen*, past participle *áufgestanden*, not **geáufstanden*.)

Wiese criticizes my classifying the nonsense verbs like *putzgären* (which are accented on a non-initial syllable but are neither separable-prefix nor *-ieren* verbs) with the actually occurring German verbs *miáuen*, *posáunen* etc. (which are accented on a non-initial syllable but are neither separable-prefix nor *-ieren* verbs). His argument: Since word accent is irrelevant for "group 1" speakers (those who generated the anomalous past participles *geputzgárt* etc.), classifying these nonsense verbs in a category based on word accent is unmotivated, and hence (for group 1 subjects) there is no proven "similarity between the two groups of verbs" (576). This is a strange argument. Obviously, my purpose was to establish a set of nonsense verbs which would in fact be similar to German *miáuen*, *posáunen* etc., and then see what the test subjects would do with them. Wiese's confusion here results from his misinterpretation of my opening discussion: I never intended to claim (as Wiese implies I did) that class C verbs (*miáuen*, *posáunen*) *are* in fact "verbs belonging to a limited category simply marked in the lexicon as arbitrarily and ideosyncratically 'minus *ge-*'" (5); rather, my point was that if one ignores the crucial factor of accent placement (and I thus indicated that accent placement is in fact a common feature of *A+B+en* verbs), one would then have to class *miáuen* (and hence also my *dotschkitten*) in a category marked as "arbitrarily and ideosyncratically 'minus *ge-*'". I assume, since my test subjects heard the nonsense verbs and repeated them accurately, that for all of my subjects the nonsense verbs like *dotschkitten* do belong to the same accent-placement category as *miáuen*, but that a minority of the subjects, while "recognizing" the accent placement of my *A+B+en* verbs, had nevertheless not internalized a rule establishing accent placement as the basis for *ge-*attachment.

A number of Wiese's other criticisms seem rather picky. Example: In his footnote 6 he points out that "W[olff] does not give [the reader] the exact pronunciation of his nonsense verbs, but only orthographic representations"

(581). Obviously, the reason for my not providing the exact pronunciation of, say, *blickzűhnen* is that a speaker of German will know that this orthographic representation cannot realistically be anything but [blik'tsy:nən].

In all fairness, it must be conceded that most of the foregoing rebuttle is somewhat irrelevant. Even if Wiese's central argument, that the structural character of my nonsense verbs might constitute an interfering factor, had been developed and presented more convincingly than was the case in his paper, this would in fact not refute my basic thesis. For although it is interesting and potentially illuminating to speculate regarding the factors involved, as Wiese has attempted to do, such speculations, even if they were to lead to clear and concrete conclusions, could not refute, but at most could merely explain, the phenomenon revealed in my test: that on the basis of forms elicited from native Germans, it is evident that the maximally simple rule for *ge*-attachment is not **necessarily** the one which those speakers have internalized and which they generalize in actual practice.

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ON ASPECT – TENSE – TEMPORAL REFERENCE IN PRESENT-DAY ENGLISH

By

S. ROT

The voluminous literature devoted to the problems of Aspect – Tense – Temporal Reference in English verbal forms,¹ beginning with the work of the famous J. Harris, written in 1771, under the hypnosis of the Port-Royal grammar and ending with recent inspiring key works by I. Ivanova,² G. Leech (1971),³ J. D. M. McCawley (1971),⁴ A. Schopf (1974),⁵ D. Nehls (1974),⁶ J. Scheffer (1975),⁷ M. Ljung (1980),⁸ and others brought to the surface a great deal of controversy, producing diametrically opposite views on the very essence of verbal categories in English. This enormously rich literature, comprising a wide divergence of views, justifies a somewhat hesitant attitude towards new attempts at treating these problems. What more is there to be said about the essence of Aspect – Tense – Temporal Reference in English? However, one feels about this, if there is anything to be said, it can be done only at the cost of a stringent sifting of earlier treatments combined with a thorough diachronic analysis which would take into account the results of profound researches into these verbal categories, especially the Aspects, in

¹ See: Rot, S.: On the Origins and the Development of the Perfect and Progressive Forms in English (A retrospective analysis of aspect-tense relations in Late Old English and Middle English). In: *Annales Univ. Scientiarum de Rolando Eötvös nomine*, sectio ling. XI (1980), 74–78. Rot, S.: Inherent variability and linguistic interference of Anglo-Old Scandinavian and Anglo-Norman French language contacts in the formation of grammatical innovations in Late Old English and Middle English. In: Blake, N. F. and Jones, Ch. (eds): *English Historical Linguistics: Studies in Development*. Cential conference Papers Series, N°3, Sheffield 1984, 67–86.

² Иванова, И. П.: Вид и время в современном английском языке. Ленинград 1961.

³ Leech, G.: *Meaning and the English Verb*. London 1971.

⁴ McCawley, J. D. M.: Tense and time reference in English. In: Filmore, C. J. and Langendoen, D. T. (eds): *Studies in Linguistic Semantics*. New York 1971, 298–317.

⁵ See: Schopf, A.: Neure Arbeiten zur Frage des Verbalaspekts in Englischen. In: Schopf, A. (ed.): *Der Englische Aspekt*. Darmstadt 1974, 248–307.

⁶ Nehls, D.: *Synchron-diachron Untersuchungen zur Expanded Form im Englischen*. München 1974.

⁷ Scheffer, J.: *The Progressive in English*. Amsterdam 1975.

⁸ Ljung, M.: *Reflections on the English Progressive*. Göteborg 1980.

Slavic,⁹ Finno-Ugric,¹⁰ Semitic,¹¹ Romance,¹² Turkish,¹³ Chinese,¹⁴ Bantu,¹⁵

⁹ From among the huge literature devoted to the to Slavic verbal aspect we'll give here only a random selection of insightfull works:

Mazon, A.: *Emplois des aspects du verbe russe*. Paris 1914.

van Dijk, N.: *Sur l'origine des aspects du verbe slave*. In: *Revue des études slaves* IX (1929), 237–252.

Koschmieder, E.: *Nauka o aspektach czasownika polskiego w zarysie*. Wilno 1934.

Waillant, A.: *L'aspect verbal du slave commun: sa morphologisation*. In: *Revue des études slaves* XIX (1939).

Regnéll, C.: *Über den Ursprung des slavischen Verbalaspektes*. Lund 1946.

Dostál, A.: *Studie o vidovém systému v staroslovenštině*. Praha 1954 (with an exhaustive bibliography).

Némec, I.: *Genese slovanského systému vidového*. Praha 1958.

Machek, V.: *Sur l'origine des aspects verbaux en slave*. In: *IV Международный съезд славистов. Славянская филология. Сборник статей, т.V., Москва 1958*.

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Hoepelman, J.: *Verb Classification and the Russian Verbal Aspect. A Formal Analysis*. Tübingen 1981.

Leinonen, M.: *Russian Aspect, "temporal'na lokalizacija" and Definiteness/Indefiniteness*. Helsinki 1982.

¹⁰ See: Серебrenников, Б.: *Категория времени и вида в финно-угорских языках пермской и волжской группы*. Москва 1960.

Tommola, H.: *On the semantics of 'situations' and 'events'*. In: *Vasaan korkeakoulun julkaisu. Tutkimuksia* 80 (1981), *Philologia* N° 7.

¹¹ Kurylowicz, J.: *Verbal Aspect in Semitic*. Gelb volume, *Approaches to the study of the Ancient Middle East*. In: *Orientalia* 42, fasc 1–2, 114–120.

¹² Hilty, G.: *Tempus, Aspekt, Modus*. In: *Vox Romanica* 24 (1965), N°2

Pollak, W.: *Studien zum "Verbalaspekt" im Französischen*. Wien 1960.

Krazav, M.: *Pitanja glagolskoga vida u latinskom jeziku*. Skopje 1980.

¹³ Johanson, J.: *Aspekt in Türkischen. Vorstudien Zu einer Beschreibung der türkeitürkischen Aspektsystem*. Uppsala 1971.

Кошмидер, Э.: *Турецкий глагол и глагольный вид*. In: *Вопросы глагольного вида*. Москва 1962.

¹⁴ Яхонтов, Ц. Е.: *Категория глагола в китайском языке*. Ленинград 1957.

Chao, Y. R.: *A Grammar of Spoken Chinese*. Berkeley and Los Angeles 1968.

¹⁵ See: Givón, T.: *Studies in Chi Bemba and Bantu grammar*. *Studies in African Lin-*

Lithuanian,¹⁶ and other languages and the recent achievements of their general linguistic approach.¹⁷ Before embarking on this study and in order that the ensuing analysis might be objective and dispassionate, a definition of Aspect, Aktionsart, and Tense should be given.

The linguistic literature produced, sometimes even in an adventitious fashion, a long row of such definitions, out of which the following are a random selection:

"Aspects have to do, not with the location of an event in time but with its temporal distribution or contour".¹⁸

"Aspects are 'relative' or 'secondary' tenses".¹⁹

Aspects are "different ways of conceiving the flow of the process itself".²⁰

Aspects are "temporal relations qualitatively defining events in the relation to the time axis".²¹ Some researchers tackling the problems of Aspects avoid a definition of what this grammatical category is.²²

guistics. Supplement 3, New York 1972.

¹⁶ Buchiene, T.: Būtojo kartinio laiko vartojimas lietuvių literatūrinėje kalboje. In: Труды АН Литовской ССР. серия А, №2. 1957, 219–228.

¹⁷ Schneider, K.: Aktionaltet, aktionsart och aspekt i svenskan och dauskan jamförda med tyskan och nederlandskan. Turku 1977.

Schrerer, Ph.: Aspect in Gothic. In: Language 30 (1954), 211–223.

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Мерчанд, Г.: Об одном вопросе из области вида (сравнение английской прогрессивной формы с итальянской и испанской). In: Вопросы глагольного вида. Москва 1962.

Verkuyl, H. J.: On Compositional Nature of Aspect. Dordrecht 1972.

Comrie, B.: Aspect. An Introduction to Verbal Aspect and Related Problems. Cambridge 1976.

Rohren, C. (ed.): On the Logical Analysis of Tense and Aspect. Tübingen 1977.

Rohrer, C. (ed.): Papers on Tense, Aspect and Verb Classification. Tübingen 1978.

Rohrer, C. (ed.): Time, Tense and Quantifiers. Tübingen 1980.

Hopper, P. (ed.) Tense and Aspect. Between Semantics and Pragmatics. Amsterdam 1982.

Маслов, Ю.: Очерки по аспектологии. Ленинград 1984.

Kiefer, F.: The aspectual system of Hungarian. In: Kiefer, F. (ed.): Hungarian General Linguistics. Amsterdam 1983.

¹⁸ Hockett, Ch.: A Course in Modern Linguistics. Chicago 1958, 237.

¹⁹ Anderson, J.: An Essay Concerning Aspect. The Hague 1973, 40.

²⁰ Holt, J.: Études d'aspect. Acta Jutlandica 43 15/2, 6.

²¹ Thelin, N. B.: Towards a Theory of Aspects, Tense and Actionality in Slavic. Uppsala 1978, 40.

²² See: Dostál, A.: Studie o vidovém systému v staroslovenštině. Praha 1954.

As the general definition of Aspect, we may take the formulation by B. Comrie that "aspects are different way of viewing the internal temporal constituency of situation".²³

The essential result of traditional aspect research is the recognition of the intimate connection of Aspect and Aktionsart 'the way of action'.²⁴

What is the difference between Aspect and Aktionsart? Many attempts have been made to answer this question. The term Aktionsart, coined by German linguists, denotes the way and mode of the internal motion of an action along the time axis. A. Isačenko put forward the idea that Aktionsart is characterized by "additional modifying of the primary notion of a concret verb".²⁵

In our view Aktionsart has to denote linguistic phenomena of verbs which in the process of the "grammatical quanting"²⁶ of its assignment of additional 'qualifying' and 'modifying' monosemes developed only the 2nd or the 3rd degree of their grammaticalisation, i. e. relevant semantic distinctions remain expressed lexically. This approach to Aktionsart is very similar to the interesting views of Comrie, who suggests that Aktionsart "represents lexicalisation of the relevant semantic distinctions irrespective of how these distinctions are lexicalized".²⁷

Together with J. Kuryłowicz,²⁸ N. B. Thelin,²⁹ and others we believe that the category of Aspect arose from oppositions within the system of Aktionsart. (From the term Aktionsart 'the way of action' Aktionalität 'actionality' was developed; Maslov 1984, 14). Our investigations have shown that a further "grammatical quanting" of the 'qualifying' and 'modifying' monosemes added

²³ See: Comrie, B.: *Aspect. An Introduction to the Study of Verbal Aspect and Related Problems*. Cambridge 1976, 3.

²⁴ See: Hofman, E.: *Zu Aspekt und Aktionsart*. In: *Corolla linguistica* 1955, 86-91.

²⁵ Isačenko, A.: *Die russische Sprache der Gegenwart. Teil I: Formlehre*. Halle 1968, 385.

²⁶ On the problems of "grammatical quanting" see: Rot, S.: *On the origins and the development of the perfect and progressive forms in English (A retrospective analysis of aspect-tense relations in late Old English and Middle English)*. *Annales Univ. Scientiarum de Rolando Eötvös nominatae, Sectio Ling. XI* (1980), 74-78.

²⁷ Comrie, B.: *Aspect. An Introduction to the study of Verbal Aspect and related Problems*. Cambridge 1976.

²⁸ Kuryłowicz, J.: *Verbal aspect in Semitic*. In: *Gelb: Approaches to the Study of the Ancient Middle East*. *Orientalia* 42, fasc. 1-2, 114-120.

²⁹ Thelin, N. B.: *Towards a Theory of Aspects Tense and Actionality in Slavic*. Uppsala 1978.

as assignment leads to the 4th or 5th degree of their grammaticalisation, i. e. relevant semantic distinctions are expressed grammatically.³⁰

The central grammatical category of the Verb, i. e. tense has occupied linguists for a long time. Tense relates the speech-situation, the temporal-deictic distinctions, projected onto the time axis. We agree with W. E. Bull when he says: "No satisfactory understanding of the problems of time and tense appears to be possible without the observation that time is inferred from the perception of order and seriality in cosmic events, and that the order of events ... is meaningless unless set in direct relation to the ego perceiving order".³¹

It is noteworthy that the idea about time was in the "days of yore", when human beings observing the cycling recurrence of seasons perceived life as a recreation of the past, related to a movement in a circle. This may be attested by the etymology of words denoting the concept 'time' in different languages. Thus, for example, the Russ. время (Old Russ. веремѣ), Bulg. време, Serbo-Croat. vrijeme, Slov. vréme: 'time' have their etymon in Slav. *vrъtěti 'to turn (round and round)'; cf. Church-Slav. врѣтѣти, Russ. вертеть, Ukr. вертіти, Bulg. врѣтѣ, Serbo-Croat. vrtjeti, Slov. vrtéti, Slk. vrteť, Pol. wiercić; Lith. verčtiū-versti, Lett. vērst, Old Pruss. wartint, Lat. verto -ere: 'to turn (round and round)' (Vasmer ESRY, I. 301). In the imagination of civilized people time moves straightward in the direction either from the right to the left (ancient views) or from the left to the right (modern views).

Thus the extralinguistic presupposition of time for an utterance is constituted by speaker's consciousness of the speech situation referred to the primary point of reference, usually to the moment of speaking.

Temporal-deictic distinctions on the time axis can be said to be based on the semantic oppositions 'anteriority': 'posteriority'. If events are characterized by the feature [+TIME], this means that they are attached to a more or less concretely defined temporal context. This temporal context should clearly be kept apart from the temporal order.

³⁰ Rot, S.: On the origins and the development of the perfect and progressive forms in English (A retrospective analysis of aspect-tense relations in Late Old English and Middle English). In: *Annales Univ. Scientiarum de Rolando Eötvös nominatae*, sectio ling. XI (1980), 74-78.

³¹ Bull, W. E.: *Time, Tense and the Verb*. University of Carolina Publications in Linguistics 19, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1960, 11-12.

In our previous papers³² we made an attempt to give a detailed analysis of the origins and originality of grammatical categories of aspects and tense in English. Our investigations have shown that these grammatical categories together with the category of temporal reference³³ make up in the macrosystem of Present-Day English³⁴ a rather complicated dynamic linguistic hierarchy. The combination of the functional-semantic peculiarities of all these grammatical categories offers the language user vast possibilities of varying semantic/semasiological³⁵ modifications of any given verb.

The combinations and possibilities become more easily explicable and more regular, but at the same time more intricate in the same way that a three dimensional chess game offers the player a far wide range of possibilities in comparison with the traditional game. Each English verb, a chess piece on the playing board, is restricted to certain moves, not only forward and backward on the time axis (tense) but upwards and downwards onto the playing surface of aspect and temporal reference. In chess each piece has a certain pattern in which it may move and this pattern is always constant otherwise the rules of the game are broken. So it is with present-day English verbs. It is proposed in this paper that every verb may be defined as one of three types, and that depending on its type it will function a certain way within the framework of aspect, tense and temporal reference. However, in describing a three dimensional chess game it is deceiving to examine but one board at a time of any game in progress and a true picture is only possible if one considers all three layers at once as a whole. Unfortunately to attempt to successfully describe the complex intervening of the three simultaneous verbal modes it is necessary to deal with each one in succession, but is it stressed that the reader

³² See: Rot, S.: On the origins and the development of the perfect and progressive forms in English (A retrospective analysis of aspect – tense relations in Late Old English and Middle English). In: *Annales Univ. Scientiarum de Rolando Eötvös nominatae, sectio ling. XI* (1980), 74–98.

Rot, S.: Inherent variability and linguistic interference of Anglo-Old Scandinavian and Anglo-Norman French language contacts in the formation of grammatical innovations in Late Old English and Middle English. In: Blake, N. F. and Jones, Charles (eds.): *English Historical Linguistics: Studies in Development. CECTAL Conference Papers, Series No. 3, Sheffield 1964*, 67–86.

³³ See: Ilyish, B.: *The Structure of Modern English*. Leningrad 1965.

³⁴ On the essence of the macrosystem of Present-Day English see: Rot S.: *Old English*, Budapest 1986.

³⁵ On the difference between “semantics” and “semasiology” see: Coseriu, E. and Geckeler, P.: *Trends in Structural Semantics*. Tübingen 1981, 9–10.

should remember that the system is integrated. The importance of regarding each 'playing board' as only a facet of a "whole" cannot be overemphasized.

Our studies have shown that from a general linguistic and structural-typological approach to the grammatical category of Aspect in macrosystem of Present-day English it is useful to replace the diachronically viewed terms of aspectual oppositions "Perfective : : non-Perfective" : : "Progressive" by dynamic-synchronously viewed terms Stative : : Totalitative : : Progressive: reflecting an aspectual trichotomy (Rot, 1988).³⁶ Each of these aspects may be combined with three distinct lexico-grammatical verbal categories: Event, Activity, and State. With this synthesis a grid is compiled in which each of three aspects overlaps with each of the three lexico-grammatical verbal categories, giving a total of nine possible combinations. These combinations, however, are purely theoretical. As will be demonstrated below, Modern English grammar imposes limitations on the combination of these two verbal modes, and within each mode, limitations on tense and temporal reference so that not all combinations are possible. It is interesting to note, however, that other Indo-European, Finno-Ugric, Turkic and other languages with similar verbal categories do not coincide totally with Modern English and it is primarily these minor differences which trouble students of these languages to such an extent. Thus the gride depends upon Modern English and other languages and offers varying possibilities of expressing the same idea in different ways and in different forms. These alternatives will be pointed out by way of comparison where appropriate.

Not only are there limitations which depend upon the verbal category in question, but as well, a verb in one category when used in a certain tense and with a certain aspect may differ somewhat in meaning from a verb of another category used in the same tense and with the same aspect. Thus it is only by mapping out the combination of all modes (aspect, lexico-grammatical verbal category, tense) along with the accompanying "temporal reference" where necessary, that permits the succesful explanation of the many nuances of each discrete semantic use (plane of content or internal form) rather than form (plane of expression or external form) in Modern English conjugation. Explanations of readings which differ widely in their meaning even though the verbs compared seem to be in the same grammatical tense may be obtained in this manner.

³⁶ Rot, S.: On Crucial Problems of the English Verb. Frankfurt/Main - Bern - New York - Paris 1988.

The classification of verbs into Event, Activity, and State verbs may be compared to the verbal classifications of transitive and intransitive verbs. Such a distinction is part of the lexico-semantic field of the verb and, thus, it cannot change categories at will without becoming ungrammatical or without taking on a new meaning. This opens up interesting possibilities as to what exactly constitutes a single verb. Is, indeed, the intransitive verb *tu run* '(of person) progress at pace faster than walk by advancing each foot alternatively, (of animal) go at a quicker than walking pace, amble, trot, canter, gallop, etc.' the same verb as *to run* 'control, manage (a business, theatre, home)'?

Logics tells us that they are related but the semantic difference is such that they cannot honestly be considered exactly the same verb. It is maintained in this paper that the same is true of Activity, Event and State verbs, although generally it may be said that their mutual relation is closer semantically than that of the transitive-intransitive pair. This is not to say that certain verbs may not be classified in more than one category. Just as many verbs are both transitive and intransitive, so many verbs are both Event and Activity verbs or both State and Activity verbs, yet as in the case of the intransitive-transitive pairs, these verbs behave differently in each category and for our purposes will be considered as different verbs. It might be advantageous on the model of phonological studies to posit a verb with 'allaverbs' with function in varying categories. The obvious connection between such verbs as *to walk* (Activity verb) and *to walk* (Event verb) cannot be ignored, yet there is a distinct semantic difference. There is room for much research in this area.

The fact that many Modern English verbs have the same form transitively and intransitively lends credence to the idea that, although the form of the Event or Activity verb may be the same, the semantic base is not. Slavic languages distinguish fairly regularly their aspectual pairs. e. g., Czech *otvíráti* – 'to open' (imperf.) – *otevřítí* 'to open' (perf.) and similarly differentiates the form of transitive and intransitive verbs: *státi* 'to stand' (intransitive) and *stavěti* 'to stand, put' (transitive); *zavíráti* 'to close, lock, shut' (transitive) and *zavíráti se* 'to close, lock, shut oneself; be closed, be locked, be shut' (intransitive, reflex., passive). Therefore it is not illogical to posit two English verbs that differ in aspect only from a single form. However, just as there are certain verbs in MoE which do reflect the grammatical distinction of transitivity and intransitivity, (e. g., *to moan*, *to bemoan*, *to fall*, *to fell*, etc.), so there are certain Event and Activity verbs which, although different in form, are basically the same semantically but belong to different verbal categories: *to see*, *to watch*; *to chase*, *to catch*; *to know*, *to find out*, etc. The taxonomy of verbs into Event, Activity and State verbs may differ in languages, and the

planes of expression (external form) do not always mark this difference. They do not always give clear representation of the 'deep structure': giving plenty of room for interlingual paranomy (cognate words, faux amies).

Thus, Fr. *il savait*, Sp. *sabia* translates correctly as *he knew*, while *il sut il a su, el supo* can only mean 'he found out', i. e. all at once he entered a state of knowing. The semantic content is identical, but Spanish and French, among other languages choose to express this notion with an Event verb that is the same in form (*savoir, saber*) as the State verb. In Modern English we see an aspectual pair, which like the Russian equivalents ЗНАТЬ, УЗНАВАТЬ are different in form as well as in verbal category, (*to know, to find out*).

Compare too, the German *jagen, erjagen* and *kämpfen, erkämpfen* which are clear cuts of the plane of expression of one verbal stem yet in English they are represented as two sets of two pairs: *to hunt, to capture; to fight (wage war), to conquer*, where the first of each pair is the Activity verb and the second that of Event. The first is a particularly noteworthy example as even Russian does not have an aspectual pair similar in form ЛОВИТЬ 'to hunt' – ПОЙМАТЬ 'to capture'.

As examples of Modern English verbs that have one form but that appear in more than one verbal category, one may cite: *to think* as a State verb in the sentence *I think therefore I am*, while it may also represent an Activity as in *I often think about you*. Z. Vendler³⁷ offers the proof for this by suggesting that the first is always true whether one is sleeping, working, eating, etc., but the second involves a particular effort on the part of the speakers which may be determinated at any time.

Likewise: "walk" in *I walked to the park*, is a clear case of an Event verb as there is a terminal point which must be reached in order that the action be completed and the statement valid, while "walk" in *I walked in the park* is an Activity verb, as no such terminal point exists. The subject of this sentence, i. e. the speaker may at any point stop walking in the park and it will still be true that he walked in the park. This entailment is not true of the sentence "walked to the park". Here one may argue that the preposition is the distinctive feature in this sentence and that is perhaps true, in that it might be necessary to list two verbs *to walk in* and *to walk to*, or more generally to distinguish terminative and nonterminative motion. This parallels the Slavic system of such verbs to a certain extent in that they distinguish determinate and indeterminate verbs of motion in this way, although not all true verbs of motion are classed as such in these languages. Once again, English relies

³⁷ Vendler, Z.: *Linguistics in Philosophy*. Ithaca 1967, chap. 4.

on "right hand" and "left hand" lexico-semantic distribution, i. e. context rather than different "planes of expression" (external forms) to indicate verbal distinction. Nevertheless, it is clear that the verb in each example of Modern English does not belong to the same category.

Necessarily, one is faced with the task of classifying the verbs in MoE into Event, Activity, and State verbs since it will be impossible to successfully predict what any verb will do in the aspectual-temporal-referential framework if one does not designate to which lexico-semantic verbal category a given verb belongs. This classification is purely semantic and has been determined by grammarians to be of great importance in many other languages. Chinese verbs, for example, have long been divided into Process, State and Action verbs, a division which closely parallels the above. Briefly, one may define State verbs as verbs which indicate a non-dynamic state, that is, a verb which does not signify any action as such, e. g., Eng. *to love*, *to know*, *to need*, *to be*, etc. However, there are a very small number of State verbs which do not behave in exactly the same way. These are denoted as semi-dynamic State verbs in this analysis (as opposed to non-dynamic State verbs), e.g.: *to hear*, *to see*. Note that this is a distinction in the lexico-grammatical verbal category only and the aspectual distinction in the Stative (non-dynamic and habitual) is a different matter. It will be seen that semi-dynamic state verbs function frequently in the Stative non-dynamic aspect.

Event verbs and Activity verbs both indicate action as opposed to a state, with the mutual distinction that the action of an Event has a certain logical termination point which automatically signifies the completion of the action, while Activity verbs do not have this constraint. Consider: *to learn* (Event verb) which has the logical termination point of mastering something, whether it be a word, a language, or a trade; *to study* (Activity verb) is a process in itself and may be extended indefinitely. "He studies the word list for hours but didn't learn a single word" or "He studied constantly but never learns a thing." In Russian these verbs are differentiated by aspect which is, as usual, reflected in the verbal form: *изучать* (Activity verb, i. e. imperfective) 'to study', 'be studying', and *изучить* (Event verb, i. e. perfective) 'to master', 'learn'; consider also *to open* (Event verb) as in *He opened the window*; once the window was open the event was necessarily over; *to travel* (Activity verb) as in *He travelled all over the world*. Here the process is of his volition and theoretically could have continued for as long as he wished; *to die* as in *He is dying* is obviously an Event verb since the activity may only continue until he is dead and the forceably must come to an end; *to speak* (Activity verb) as *He*

speaks Hungarian indicates that he has that ability it will not come to an end at any precise, previously determined point.

Thus all verbs may be designated as belonging to one of the three categories described above and, as such, will function in a certain way when combined with aspect and tense. Still further possible combinations arise with the consideration of temporal reference and these will be discussed in relation to aspect and tense. 'Reference' is used here to mean a particular temporal focus on a moment which is not identical with the point of event (or activity). H. Reichenbach³⁸ and B. A. Ilyish³⁹ discussed reference in considerable detail, and although their suggestions concerning Modern English are perhaps somewhat more complex than necessary, their terminology: 'reference', 'point of event' will be used. Thus: *He had come* indicates past reference as the action is in reference to a point further back in time than a designated past moment. Compare: *He has come* where the tense is semantically past but statement indicates that he is here now, (i. e. a designated present moment), hence present reference.

Two further distinctions must be clarified in order that the following explanations not be ambiguous. The first is the difference between semantic tense and grammatical tense, the latter being the traditional tenses, i. e. the numerous verbal grammemes⁴⁰ such as the present perfect, the past progressive, the future perfect, etc. while the former indicates the derivative structure of monosemes⁴¹ of a given verbal form of "time" lexico-grammatically quanted. Only three "semantic tenses" exist to our knowledge and they are present, past and future and shall be referred to as the (sem)present, the (sem)past, and the (sem)future, while the grammatical tenses will be indicated by (gram) to avoid any possible confusion. This distinction would not be necessary in such languages as Hungarian or Russian, for instance, where the semantic tenses coincide with the grammatical tenses: although in both languages, as in English. the (gram)present may at times be used to indicate a (sem)future, e. g. Eng. *These girls graduate from our University in two years* (instead of *will graduate*). Hung. *Holnap otthon dolgozom* 'Tomorrow I'll work at home' (literally: 'I work'); Russ. В следующем году он едет в Ленинград 'Next year he'll go to Leningrad. (literally: *he goes*). (Gram)present may also be used in these languages to indicate a (sem)past, e. g., Eng. *I walked yesterday in the park. I walk*

³⁸ See: Reichenbach, H.: *Elements of Symbolic Logic*. New York, chap. 51.

³⁹ See: Ilyish, B.: *The structure of Modern English*. Leningrad 1965.

⁴⁰ On the essence of grammemes see: Rot, S.: *Old English*. Budapest 1986, 165.

⁴¹ See: Rot, S.: *Problems of Modern British and American Slang*. Budapest 1987, 19.

and walk and suddenly I see my friend; Hung. Tegnap sétáltam az erdőben. Sétálok, sétálok és egyszerre csak egy gyönyörű szarvast látok. 'Yesterday I walked in the forest. I walk, walk and suddenly I see a beautiful deer'. Russ. "Вчера вечером я смотрел телевизионную программу. Смотрю, смотрю и вдруг вижу, что мой сын тоже играет в новом фильме". 'Last night I watched the TV program. I watch and watch, and suddenly I realize that my son plays in the new film, too' (Praesens historicum [historic present]).

The second distinction which must be clarified is that of specific and non-specific nouns in relation to Event verbs. In standard English grammars this opposition has never been considered particularly meaningful with reference to morphology but such should not be the case. The difference between specificity and non-specificity lies in the subject of intransitive verbs and the object of transitive verbs and is purely a semantic notion. Specific Event verbs have an object (or subject) which is not a representative of its class, but rather is distinct in the mind of the speaker. Non-specific Event verbs logically are those which do not have such a distinct, defined subject or object. For instance, a *book* in *John read a book* is clearly a specific object as there was only one book that John started and finished. Conversely, *Water boils 100°C* is an example of a non-specific Event verb. Any water boils at 100°C, not just a specific amount. Compare: *The water boiled for tea*, which in this case is specific as there is a determined amount of water which is being referred to. The specificity and non-specificity of objects is not uniformly represented by English usage but generally all definite nouns are specific and so are usually the indefinite singular nouns. As well, all proper nouns are logically specific unless they refer to a class of objects. For instance: *He reads the TIME*. Here *the TIME* is a specific magazine but is not specific grammatically, as the very magazine which is being read at different times is not the same. Other examples of interesting usage in Modern English may be found. *Every time the office furniture is renewed he buys half of it*. Here *it*, the object of *to buy* might be considered specific as the furniture that the man buys is, naturally, not the same each time. This is a question of hierarchy of syntax, which is discussed in the section concerned with the Stative (Habitual).

This distinction has long been recognized as important in many other languages; for instance, in Hungarian and some other Finno-Ugric languages there is an entirely separate conjugation for transitive verbs, if the Object is definite. And this definiteness may have either a specific or non-specific Object.

Specific Object	
Subjective Conjugation	<i>Keresek egy gombot, mert elvesztettem.</i> 'I am looking for a button because I lost it.' <i>Szeretek egy könyvet, amit rég olvastam.</i> 'I like a book which I read long ago.'
Objective Conjugation	<i>Keresem a gombot, amit elvesztettem.</i> 'I am looking for the button which I lost.' <i>Szeretem ezt a könyvet.</i> 'I like this book.', etc.
Non-Specific Object	
Subjective Conjugation	<i>Keresek egy gombot, mert szükségem van rá.</i> 'I am looking for a button because I need it.' <i>Könyveket szeretek.</i> 'I like books.'
Objective Conjugation	<i>Gyűjtöm a könyveket.</i> 'I am gathering books.' <i>Olvasom a magyar könyveket.</i> 'I read Hungarian books.', etc. ⁴²

Likewise in Chinese there exist certain constructions which are only feasible if the speaker has one particular object in mind: For example: *Ta ba shu fangzai shuku*. 'He puts a book on the stack' (known as the *ba* construction) and *Shu ta fangzai shuku*. 'He puts book(s) on stack(s)' (the indefinite construction).⁴³ It should be noted that in Chinese there are no articles and plural is not expressed in the grammeme, i. e. the plane of expression" (or external form) of the word so that such constructions become all important in distinguishing meaning. Therefore, it is obvious that just as in the distinction between Event, Activity and State verbs, the opposition of specificity and

⁴² Some ideas on "specific" and "non-specific" object in Hungarian were suggested to me by Prof. Sándor Károly and I would like to express him my heartfelt gratitude for it.

⁴³ See: Chao, Y. R.: A grammar of Spoken Chinese. Berkeley and Los Angeles 1968.

non-specificity is purely semantic and one must rely on the meaning of the utterance or sentence to make this distinction. It is paramount importance when discussing the Stative aspect to distinguish two sub-aspects: the Habitual and the Non-Dynamic. The relationship between the two is tenuous to say the least and it might, indeed, be more advantageous to consider them as two separate aspects: The Stative and the Habitual. However, since the notion of a habit or an iterative event is close to that of a true state, we shall retain H. Kučera's terminology⁴⁴ and class habitual action as a state. It is necessary, though, to constantly distinguish the two as: non-dynamic and habitual.

The non-dynamic Stative aspect is most restricted in its application in English. Unlike the Progressive and the Totalitive when each has certain verbal forms that primarily denote that aspect only, the Stative does not have any such forms. That a verb is in the Stative is only clear if one examines the lexico-grammatical verbal category. State verbs are the only verbs which may function in the (non-dynamic) Stative, although they may function in the Progressive as well, but never in the Totalitive.

It will be remembered that State verbs can be divided into non-dynamic and semi-dynamic categories. This distinction, so important in the Progressive use of the verbs, is not marked in the Stative use. In the (gram)present and (gram)past the use of both categories has the same connotation, that is, a state which is ongoing in the present or past. It is necessary to mention that a semi-dynamic verb primarily denotes a shorter state or what may be designated a state/action: *I see the book* 'I am in state of seeing' may be a fairly short occurrence, while *I know the book* is a state of long standing and more resistant to change. Semi-dynamic states in the (gram)past, therefore, approach the Totalitive in meaning: *I saw the film*. Here the state was in effect for only two hours: an even more abrupt example is *I saw him as he got out of the car* which lasted only for as long as defined by the second clause.

There are distinctions between the Progressive aspect of State verbs and the Stative aspect, however, it is necessary to distinguish the Stative (non-dynamic) use of these verbs as opposed to the Stative (habitual use). This is yet another argument in favour of separating these two sub-aspects into independent categories as a State verb may function in both. It should be underlined that only a semi-dynamic functions in this way, however, as truly non-dynamic verbs can never be habitual: *I know him* and *I knew him* can

⁴⁴ This terminology was kindly suggested to me by Prof. Kučera (Brown University, Providence, R.I.) during my lecturing as a Fulbright Professor (in the years 1981-1982) at the same University. Many thanks for it.

never have an iterative connotation while *I see him* or *I saw him* can indeed, when the ambiguity is clarified by the necessary adverbial modifiers: *I see him (every Tuesday)*; *I heard her on the radio every week*, etc. Therefore, it may be seen that there is no distinction in the grammemes (planes of expression or external forms) between the two Stative uses of a semi-dynamic verb and the hearer (reader, metareader, or the recipient of information) must rely upon context as the distinguishing factor.

The difference between the two sub-categories of the State verb becomes apparent when the question of reference is addressed. In the perfect tenses the focus of the reference gives an entirely different reading with non-dynamic State verbs, i. e. continuing state in the present or past, than with semi-dynamic State verbs which, like Event verbs indicate a result but in this aspect a resulting state which is still valid.

Compare: *I have known him for two years* ; *I have hated Mary all my life* with *I have seen that film* , *I have heard that word before*. In the first set of examples the 'knowing' and the 'hating' are unquestionably still valid, while in the second set the 'seeing' and the 'hearing' are not, rather the result of the action/state is. However, this result is not exactly like the resultative perfect of Event verbs, which is much more concrete: *He has built a house* (and there it is), instead, it is a result only in that one's state is presently altered because of the state/action which occurred in the past. In this way perhaps it approaches the experiential reading with the notion that one has the experience of the state/action. But it may not be considered a true Activity perfect as there is a distinct Stative nuance. Compare: *He has studied Hungarian* (and he can now actively speak using that experience), and *He has seen the film* whereby only his state has been modified by the state/action and not actively as in the above example. The distinction is fine, but still apparent. Nevertheless, it is obvious that in the perfect the semi-dynamic verbs are much closer in meaning to Activity verbs than they are to non-dynamic verbs. In the past perfect a similar distinction is to be found: *I had known her for a year before she died* and *I had seen her only once before she died*. The first sentence indicates that the 'knowing' (non-dynamic) was still in progress at the time of her death, while the second instance happened previously and indicates that the person's state had been altered because of his 'seeing' and that he was in this altered state at the time of her death.

It is interesting to note that both the present and past perfect tenses of non-dynamic State verbs are used in English, while the present and the imperfect (or past) are used in most other languages. This parallels the use of the present perfect progressive with Activity and Event verbs to express

action which is still going on. In this instance it is rather a state which is still valid. The following examples show how the meaning of 'I have known him already for two years' is linguistically in languages of different genetic origin and structural-typological character moulded:

- (Engl.) *I have known him already for two years.*
 (Germ.) *Ich kenne ihn schon zwei Jahre.*
 (Fr.) *Cela fait déjà deux ans que je le connais.*
 (Port.) *Conheco-o ja dois anos.*
 (Hung.) *Már két éve ismerem őt.*
 (Russ.) **Я его знаю уже два года.**
 (Bulg.) **Аз зная него уже две години.**
 (Czech) *Znám ho už dva roky.*
 (Afrik.) *Ek ken hom twee jaare.*
 (Yid.) *Ich ken im schoin tsvai joren.*
 (Hindi.) *Men usk do sal se peh chan pa hun.*
 (Arabic.) *Lakad araftahu min sanataymi.*
 (Fin.) *Olen tuntenut hänet jo kaksi vuotta.*
 (Welsh) *Yr wyf i'n ei adnabod ef dry flwyddyn.*
 (Basque) *Ezauntzen diot orain dele bi urte.*

We see here different ways of reflecting the reality. English focuses lexico-grammatically on the fact that is in the past and uses a present perfect form to indicate that it is still in effect. While other languages prefer to emphasize the ongoing nature of the state. With semi-dynamic verbs, however, languages that have a perfect form use it as Modern English.

- (Engl.) *He has seen that film.*
 (Port.) *Tem visto este filme.*
 (Sp.) *Ha visto esta película.*
 (Bulg.) **Той е видал този филм.**

All of these have the same notion of a resultative state, but leave no doubt as to the fact that the action is over.

The future-in-the-past is possible both with truly non-dynamic State verbs: *He said that he would need her*, and with semi-dynamic State verbs: *He said that he would hear the details later*. In this tense the distinction with the simple past is purely referential and there is no resultative or experiential connotation. It should be noted, however, that certain verbs such as *to know*, and *to love* resist a time limitation which implies volition as one is supposedly in these states passively without being able to start and stop at will. **He said*

that he would know/hate her for the weeks/ on Saturday. Similarly one cannot say **I finished knowing/loving*, etc. as this also implies volition. The colloquial expression *get to* may be used in such a situation in order to clarify the volition but only indicates the beginning of the state without specifying its end: *He said he would get to know her on Saturday* (and afterwards he would be in a state of knowing).

The Stative (habitual), like the non-dynamic, is not represented by its own set of tenses, rather it uses all tenses and can be distinguished only by considering the verbal category of the verb involved as well as accompanying temporal modifiers. Thus, with one exception, any verb form in the Stative (habitual) can be never identified as such when out of context as it may indicate another aspect. Fortunately, in most cases, the habitual Stative aspect may be considered the marked aspect of the verb and the other uses unmarked, in that if there is no accompanying signal of habit, the verb is automatically considered in the Totalitive, Progressive or, of semi-dynamic State verbs, the Stative non-dynamic, while the speaker must clarify the use of the verb as habitual by contextual means. The primary means of identifying habit is the use of an adverbial modifier of time:

He bought a house - (once) Totalitive

He bought a house every five years - Stative (habitual)

He is playing tennis - (now) Progressive

He is playing tennis every time I walk by - Stative (habitual)

It should be underlined that in each case there has to be the temporal modifier (either a clause or a word) in order for there to be a Stative (habitual) reading. Adverbial modifiers are not the only means, however, of stressing a repeated habit. In the case of Event verbs the distinction between a specific and a non-specific subject/object indicates a distinction between the Totalitive and the Stative (habitual): *He builds a house* (- last year; Praesens historicum or historical present)=Totalitive; *He builds houses* (generally)=Stative (habitual). Here there is no need for any other marker since the object or subject of the verb which is non-specific, logically entails that the action was repeated; otherwise the very fact that it was only done once specifies the noun. However, as described in the definition of specificity or non-specificity, a noun, which, unmodified, may indicate one object or a class of objects, demands a modifier in order to clarify the situation: *He reads the Times* can be either an Event verb, (gram)present, (sem)past in the Totalitive, or an Event verb, (gram)present, (sem)present in the Stative (habitual); that is, *He read Monday the 4th of September's issue of the Times* (once in the past); or *He read every issue of*

the Times (as they came out). Hence, with Event verbs, the aspect is denoted primarily with the specificity of the object (or subject of intransitive verbs), while in default of this the ambiguity must be clarified by using adverbials.

It is necessary to mention that the specificity indicated by an article, or lack thereof, may be neutralized by an adverbial modifier (rather than the other way around). In *He builds a house every year* the temporal modifier automatically overrides the specificity of the article (*a house*) by clearly showing that it was not the same house. This is why unequivocally specific nouns can never take a reiterative temporal modifier with an Event verb as the result is contradictory: **The Greeks build the Parthenon every year*. Thus the hierarchy of specificity is of the utmost importance in determining the aspect.

There is only one tense-verbal category combination which gives an unambiguous Stative habitual reading and that is the simple tense of activity verb. It will be remembered that ongoing activities are expressed by the present Progressive and therefore there is no possibility of confusion: *She walks in the park* can only mean that she makes this a habit. *He smokes cigarettes* ; *He studies Hungarian*; *She speaks English* all indicate habits and which necessitate the Progressive to indicate an ongoing activity: *He is smoking a cigarette*; *He is studying Hungarian* ; *She is speaking English*, etc. It is true that the simple present tense of semi-dynamic State verbs also indicate a habit, but not exclusively. *I see the man* (may be right now, or may be every week, etc.). This ambiguity is only clarified by the use of temporal modifiers. The specific, non-specific distinction does not suffice as *He hears bells*, even though it is non-specific may indicate a present reading if one is referring to imaginary bells. This usage is more commonly expressed with the Progressive aspect: *He is hearing bells*, but not exclusively so.

So it may be concluded that the primary tense which expresses ongoing habitual states is the present (simple) with or without the necessary non-specific nouns or iterative temporal modifiers. Thus, it follows that the primary tense to indicate a past habitual state is the simple past. This is the case. However, the ambiguity which existed in the present is magnified, as there are no longer any tenses which solely indicate a habitual state. The simple past of Activity verbs it will be remembered, serves a two fold purpose: a habitual state and also a Totalitive expression of a past action as a whole. *He walked in the park* may be once or it may be every afternoon, only a modifying word or clause can clarify the sentence out of context. The same is true of semi-dynamic Stative verbs: *He saw her once/often*; with Event verbs the same conditions are true as in the (gram)present tense: *He built houses* is obviously

Stative, but the specific: *He built a house* may be despecified by an additional iterative modifier: *He built a house every year*.

Likewise the present and past perfect, and also the future-in-the-past may all indicate an iterative action when such a use in the Stative is made clear by a modifier. Otherwise the reading is automatically Totalitive or Progressive. Compare:

He has built a house (only one, specific)

He has built a house every year since I have known him

(Stative of habit)

He has walked in the park (Experimental perfect)

He has walked in the park every afternoon this week

(Stative of habit)

He has seen an elephant (Resultative state, Stative non-dynamic)

He has seen an elephant many times at the zoo (Stative habitual).

It will be seen that the resultative-experiential and resultative-stative readings of the perfect remain unchanged, but instead of a one-time action or state there is a habitual or iterative reading. Notice that with Activity verbs the meaning is only expanded, not changed in any way. Since the perfect of such verbs indicate experience there is a likelihood that the activity may have been repeated: *She has studied Hungarian* may indicate one long process in the past or may indicate a process at various times in her life. In such cases it is not necessary to qualify the Stative habitual with a modifier as the meaning is changed very little: *She has studied Hungarian every year since I have known her* is basically the same form as the simple: *She has studied Hungarian*. (Often a larger time span will admit interruptions which do not impinge on the validity of the statement.)

This then, is the principle mode of expressing neutral habitual action, but there are other alternatives in Modern English, each with a particular nuance. All the progressive tenses may indicate habitual action, if this is made clear by a modifier which is necessary to neutralize their primary function as an ongoing action or background tense, etc. However, a Stative (habitual) reading of a progressive tense is not identical with a Stative habitual reading of a simple tense in that it imposes a limited time span on the repeated action. This use can be contrasted with true Progressive use, but when used habitually, the tense is still progressive but the aspect is, of course, Stative (habitual). Hence, *He is walking in the park these days* is purely Stative and the progressive tense replaces the more general *He walks in the park every day*. Not surprisingly, the same rules and limitations hold true for specifying a

stative habitual usage, so that non-specific Event verbs automatically indicate a habit if not contradicted, or more precisely, overridden by *s* modifier: *He is building houses* (these days) where the modifier in brackets is superfluous as an English native hearer automatically assumes a Stative reading. However, *He is walking to school* (Activity verb) may indicate at this very moment, or may mean: recently, these days, and therefore must be clarified. In this case an English speaker would probably assume a non-habitual usage and understand that he is on his way to school now. Naturally, the role of an iterative adverbial modifier may be taken by a clause, or indeed the surrounding context, which would specify to a listener unambiguously which usage the speaker has in mind.

With any Event or Activity verb, the Progressive aspect may be used to denote iterative action with heavy emphasis on the repetition of that action and with a somewhat negative connotation. It is worth mentioning that this use is always signalled by an adverbial modifier of the type *always*, *constantly*, *all the time*, etc. and that without the modifier the construction is not possible: E. g., *I am always doing that* (aren't I stupid); *She's always coming at a bad time* (I wish she would stop doing so); *He's constantly nagging me about my smoking* (and I don't like it), etc. Note that even where repetition is clearly indicated this formula does not work without one of the above words: *Every single day she is complaining*. Normally the repetition of an event is expressed by an Event or Activity verb in the Stative (habitual) where the use is clear even when no adverbial modifier is used: *She reads books* (often, every month, etc.); *She complains all the time*, etc. Here there is no derogatory nuance as the statement is completely neutral.

In the perfect tenses the perfective nuances of the progressive tense in the Stative are the same as they are in the progressive aspect: that is, an indication of recent occurrence: *I have been watching Johnny Carson every evening* (habitual but only recently); *I had been seeing her often before she married* (recently before the second action); *He said that he would be writing to his mother every week* (future-in-the-past, repetitive but here, as in the Progressive, the recent nuance is lost since obviously something cannot be recent in the future). So the progressive serves only to emphasize the repeated process rather than a single action: *He said that he would write to his mother every week* has an almost identical semantic value.

There are a number of English verbal paraphrases which may often be employed to avoid the ambiguity of the Stative (habitual) aspect and these are more common in the colloquial language, although acceptable in written English. Certainly one of the most common expressions of past habit is the

form *used to*: *I used to walk in the park* clearly indicates a habit and thus it is preferable to *I walked in the park*. The *used to* phrase is limited to Event and Activity verbs which indicate an action which is likely to be repeated. So a non-specific Event verb as in *He built houses* is equivalent to *He used to build houses* whereas the specific Event verb such as *He built a house* may not be transferred to the Stative by *used to*: *He used to build a house*. To indicate such a repetition one needs an adverbial modifier (every year, for example). Thus, it may be seen that a verbal paraphrase is unlike a temporal modifier in that it is not powerful enough to override the semantic value of the specific, non-specific distinction. This paraphrase is particularly interesting as it may also be used with a non-dynamic State verb in a completely different meaning: *The house used to stand on the hill*. Obviously the house did not keep coming and going so that the reading of *used to* with State verbs is equivalent to that of the simple past. *I used to know it* = 'I knew it': *I used to like ice cream* = 'I liked ice cream', etc.

Another more formal paraphrase is the use of *would* in an iterative sense. This should not be confused with either the future-in-the past 'would' or the conditional 'would' with which it is exactly the same in form. Hence, its practicability as a distinguishing verb form is severely limited and it is only in a context which excludes both other readings that one might employ this form. Even with an iterative adverbial modifier there is still a possibility of confusion as a conditional expression may also be habitual: *He would build houses every year* (frequently in the past, or once in the future if he could), etc. Perhaps this is the reason this tense is rapidly being relegated to formal written English where one can ensure its clarity by means of the context.

The relationship between the English and the traditional Slavic aspectual forms coincides most closely in the Totalitive aspect. The Totalitive in English serves almost an identical function to the Slavic perfective, that is, it denotes an action with a concrete starting point and most important, a concrete termination point. In English it is the true 'completedness' aspect, a term which has been used inappropriately for so long as the primary descriptive adjective for the perfective in Russian, which in addition to denoting 'completedness', is used for other purposes. Because of this distinction it was deemed advisable not to use the same term for the English counterpart. Apart from the fact that the Totalitive does not serve exactly the same function as the Perfective, the latter term is misleading in itself and often leads to unnecessary confusion with the perfect tenses.

The Totalitive, unique among the aspects, does not have a present focus and, therefore, has no (sem)present tense. This is logically given by the semantic notion of the aspect itself: one cannot view an event or an activity as a whole while it is still in progress; it must be either totally in the past or totally in the future (hence the name: the Totalitive). This aspect is most productive in the (sem)past tense and is represented by a number of (gram)tenses within this temporal focus. The most common is unquestionably the simple past: *John wrote a book.* ; *Mike rented an office*, etc., each denoting a single action which was completed or terminated before the moment of speech. As discussed above, it is very important that the object of a transitive event verb, and the subject of an intransitive verb, be specific. If the object (subject) is non-specific then the verb is no longer in the Totalitive aspect, but rather in the Stative (habitual): *John wrote books* ; *Mr Smith rented offices*, etc. Such constructions without a specific object (subject) have a semantic equivalent in 'doer' type nouns: *John was a book writer* ; *Mr Smith was an office renter*, i. e. someone who rented offices, etc. Similarly intransitive verbs must have specific subjects: *The snow melted when the sun came out* refers to one particular snow fall, unlike *Snow melted on that part of the roof because of the steam from the kitchen*, meaning every time it snowed, giving therefore a habitual reading of the verb. Note that both Activity verbs and Event verbs may function in the Totalitive as long as they have specific objects or subjects. However, in the case of Activity verbs, there is an ambiguity of form even when the object is specific, so that it is only by means of adverbial modifiers that one may ascertain whether indeed the verb is in the Totalitive or if it is in the Stative (habitual). Compare, for example: *He walked in the park yesterday* and *He walked in the park everyday of his life*. The former as a 'whole, completed action' is Totalitive, while the latter is Stative (habitual). It is only with Activity verbs that this ambiguity arises.

A much less common representation of the (sem)past is the use of the (gram)present tense of activity or event verbs. Once again, the Event verb only functions in the Totalitive when specific. In meaning, this (gram)tense is entirely equivalent to the simple past, but is marked stylistically. *He built that house in 1921* and *He builds that house in 1921* both express the same completion of the same event but the latter is almost entirely restricted to the written form of the macrosystem of Present-day English. Known as the *praesens historicum* (historical present), this (gram)tense usage predominates in encyclopaedias, short histories and other works where a list of historical events is given. Such a usage is distinctly limited by its lexical content: *Davy wakes up and begins playing with his toys* is grammatically correct but somewhat

unusual as it is an everyday action expressed in *praesens historicum* (historical present) which is usually reserved for events which have a somewhat more elevated status.

This tense is not only known as the historical present, but in a different use, as the narrative present, which may be employed to relate any story or series of events. However, this usage is falling out of the standard language and is being restricted to dialects or to express extremely colloquial narration: 'Jimmy,' he says, 'You go home' and I say to him, I do, 'No Sam, you go.', etc.

Recently, within the past sixty years or so, usage of this tense has been extended to the media as a means of reporting up to the minute events. There are various possible explanations of this phenomenon, not the least logical being simple abbreviation. To (gram)present progressive tense in English would normally be used to describe an ongoing event (that is, in the Progressive aspect), but this form is more cumbersome in English and media reporters are conscious of time. To describe the rapid fire events of a hockey game while they are taking place it is necessary to use the shortest form possible: this being the simple present. Thus *Y is passing to X and X is breaking away down the ice towards Y who is getting the puck and is scoring* becomes much more manageable and concise as *Y passes to X and X breaks away down the ice to Y who gets the puck and scores*. Both Spanish and Portuguese, which have a full complement of progressive tenses, consistently use the simple present for this narration because by the use of this (gram)tense in newspaper headings: *X declares war on Y*. By using a (gram)present tense even though it has a (sem)past meaning the present reference is stressed and indeed, in this case, the use of the (gram)present may be an abbreviated form of the present perfect rather than the present progressive: *X has declared war on Y* is identical in meaning, but is much longer than the simple present and therefore less desirable.

Another possibility may be that such a usage retains a (sem)past meaning and that when the reporter says: *J. passes to Q*. He is describing an action which has already occurred by the time the listener hears the report. Likewise, *X declares war on Y* may indeed indicate the (sem)past tense in that, obviously by the time the newspaper was printed, the 'event' of declaring war was completed. Still, this raises the question of why reporters do not use the simple past which is as short in form as the (gram)present: *J passed to O*; *X declared war on Y*. Here there is a noticeable semantic distinction connected with temporal reference which is undesirable in reporting. A simple past conveys the same (sem)tense as the historical present but is completely neutral

in reference. In the media 'present reference' is all important as their primary goal is to attempt to give the public the sensation of being present at any past or ongoing event. In the instance *X declares war on Y* this present reference makes the heading much more immediate. Therefore the use of the historical present by the media may be regarded as an abbreviated form of the present perfect with which it is totally identical semantically, but far shorter and more practicable in newspapers where space is of the essence and on radio or television where time is equally important. Thus one may divide the (sem)past use of the (gram)present into three categories: 1. the usage equivalent to the present perfect (i. e. with present reference) used primarily by the media and therefore designated in this paper as the 'media present'; 2. the usage with a purely past focus which is restricted to more formal accounts; and 3. the narrative present which is also purely past in focus but which has a distinctly colloquial colouring. The distinction between the first two becomes obvious in the examples: *Gorbachev travels to Washington. Charlemagne invades Italy* where one implies 'recently' and the other quite the opposite.

Three more (gram)past tenses function in the Totalitive aspect and all three are temporally identical to the simple past but have, in addition, a reference point different in time to that of the (gram)tense. In the present perfect the reference point is present and this indicates that the action which occurred in the past, has some present relevance. Thus: *I have torn my shirt* indicates that the shirt is now torn, *I have broken a window* stresses the fact that the window is now broken. Compare *I tore my shirt* (It may have since been mended); *I broke a window*. (It may have since been fixed). In the latter examples there is no present reference and therefore no information is given relating to the present moment. Hence the shirt (or window) may or may not have since been mended while the first two examples clearly show that they have not been.

When concerned with reference, the category of the verb involved is of the utmost importance. Compare the following sentences which have the same temporal reference (present), the same (gram)tense (past), and the same aspect (Totalitive): 1. *I have built a house* (Event verb); 2. *I have studied Hungarian* (Activity verb) and in the Stative aspect; 3. *I have known him for two years* (State verb). The present perfect has a distinctly different function in each: 1. result, consequence with a nuance of recent occurrence; 2. experience; and 3. present continuation of a state begun in the past. The Event verb in this tense shows that the result of the action (in this case 'building') is here, in existence. This usage mirrors the above examples concerning the *shirt* and the *window*. In the second sentence the activity itself is over (hence the past

focus), but the experience gained through the activity is still valid and warrants the present perfect. He still knows the Hungarian that he studied and is benefitting from that experience. In the latter case (3.), the usage is uniquely English and the emphasis is laid on the duration of the action in the past while the present reference indicates that the process is still going on.

It is worthy to notice that the first sentence contains an additional nuance which may or not be brought into focus depending on the context. This is the notion of recent occurrence. As well as indicating that the house now exists, the use of the present perfect in sentences one also suggests that it was completed not long ago. Compare: *My grandfather came to this country in 1891. He has built a house.* Even though the house may still be standing, it is incorrect to use the present perfect when dealing with an event that is so far in the past. This example would only make sense if one took the last sentence to be a *non-sequitur* of the first and that, in fact, the speaker's grandfather has only just finished building the house in question. Considering his age this is improbable and therefore the two sentences are not acceptable in juxtaposition. Note that in sentence two (that is, with Activity verbs), this is not the case. *He has studied Hungarian* can quite conceivably refer to the case of an eighty year old man who studied Hungarian at the Péter Pázmány University of Budapest. Presumably, though, because of the experiential nuance, he still knows, or benefits from, what he studied all those years ago. In the last sentence (3) there is no question of recent occurrence since the state is ongoing.

Stative (habitual) use of Event verbs, i. e. non-specific Event verbs, usually parallel the usage of Activity verbs and thus is the case when used in the present perfect: *He has built houses* stresses the fact that he has the experience of building houses, not that the houses are now in existence and certainly not that they only recently have been built. This again non-specific Event verbs seem to cross the verbal category boundary and are indistinguishable from Activity verbs in their meaning. This usage is, of course, Stative (habitual).

The same relationship and restrictions occur in the past perfect except that the reference is rather to a point before the (sem)tense of the verb: *He had built a house before I arrived.* indicates that the house was in existence upon my arrival: *He had studied Hungarian before going to Budapest* indicates that he was benefitting from the experience of having studied Hungarian at that time, although he may have since forgotten every word. This is not clarified in this verb tense. Obviously, because of the past focus, there is no longer any notion of recent occurrence associated with the perfect of specific Event verbs.

The third and final (gram)past tense which may exist in the Totalitive aspect is not specified in many English grammars as a distinct tense, but

because of its reference and its form it should be. This is the past tense with *would* which indicates future-in-the past: *He said that he would come*. Here the reference point is future in relation to the (sem)tense. One need only compare the direct speech: *He says, 'I will come'* which is a simple future tense. At the time when he said *I will come*, the action was future, and this is expressed quite clearly in English by means of reference in a past tense, often overlooked by grammarians as such, because it is similar in form to both the conditional and the past iterative. The latter only exists in the Stative (habitual) aspect and refers to such usage as: *He would get up every morning at six o'clock*. Obviously, in the Totalitive, the use of the future-in-the past is restricted to events which are viewed as a whole. Compare: *He said he would be waiting for me over there* (Progressive aspect).

As in the Totalitive, there is a series of (gram)tenses which functions in the Progressive aspect, however, it is interesting to note that these two series of tenses are mutually exclusive. Each of the simple or compound tenses in the Totalitive has a Progressive counterpart and each series of tenses is unique to each of the two aspects.

It will be obvious to the reader that the discussion of crucial problems of the verb in Present-Day English is the most concise possible at this time and will have to suffice until further research is conducted.

Abbreviations

Affrik.	= Afrikaans (Boyerish)	PGerm.	= Proto-Germanic
Bulg.	= Bulgarian	Pol.	= Polish
Chin.	= Chinese	Port.	= Portugese
Chruch-Slav.	= Church-Slavic	Russ.	= Russian
Dan.	= Danish	Serbo-Croat.	= Serbo-Croatian
Engl.	= English	Slav.	= Slavic
Fin.	= Finnish	Slk.	= Slovak
Fr.	= French	Slov.	= Slovenian
Germ.	= German (High German)	Skeat CED	= W. V. Skeat, A Concise Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, Oxford 1967
Icel.	= Icelandic	Sp.	= Spanish
Hung.	= Hungarian	Vasmer ESRY	= М. Фасмер, Этимологический словарь русского языка. Перевод с русского и дополнения О. Трубачева, I-IV, Москва 1964-1973
Lat.	= Latin	Yid.	= Yiddish
Lett.	= Lettish		
Lith.	= Lithuanian		
OPruss.	= Old Prussian		
ORuss.	= Old Russian		
PIE	= Proto-Indo-European		

EIN KLEINER BEITRAG ZUR DEUTUNG DES RUSSISCHEN ZAHLWORTES ДЕВЯНОСТО '90'

von

L. HONTI

1. Unter den Namen für die Zehnerzahlen im Ostslavischen erscheint das Zahlwort russ. ДЕВЯНОСТО, ukr. ДЕВ'ЯНОСТО, blr. ДЗЕВЯНОСТА '90' als ein seiner Struktur nach nicht in das System passendes Element (ähnlich auch СОРОК '40', das jedoch ein anderes und bereits befriedigend gelöstes Problem darstellt). Lange Zeit war es als eine ostslavische Eigentümlichkeit betrachtet worden (s. z. B. Vasmer 1953, 334; Šanskij 1973, 39). Kuraszkiewicz hat jedoch in einem Manuskript aus dem Jahre 1420 eine genau dem ostslavischen Lexem entsprechende altpolnische Zahlwortform *dziewiętnosto* '90' gefunden (Kuraszkiewicz 1966). Die gegenwärtigen süd- und westslavischen Sprachen kennen nur die Fortsetzungen von urslav. **devęť desęť*, dessen Vertreter auch im Altrussischen belegt ist; er kommt ebenfalls im Belorussischen sowie in ukrainischen Mundarten vor (s. Trubačev 1977, 223).

Trubačev hält die form **devęť desęť* für allgemein im Urslavischen, die andere Variante dagegen für eine urslavische dialektale Form (loc. cit.). Aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach ist es berechtigt, beide für das Urslavisches zu postulieren. In der überwiegenden Mehrheit der slavischen Sprachen hat sich die Variante durchgesetzt, die nach dem Muster der übrigen Zehnerzahlwörter gebildet ist, nur im Ostslavischen wurde das von der gegebenen Struktur abweichende urslav. „**devę(t)nosъto/ *devęsъto?*“ (so Trubačev op. cit. 220) allgemein. Dieses seiner Konstruktion nach besondere Zahlwort hat seit langem die Forscher beschäftigt und für seine Interpretation sind eine ganze Reihe Erklärungsversuche vorgelegt worden (Kritiken über sie s. u. a. Szemerényi 1960, 63-65; Stang 1964, 124-125; Trubačev op. cit. 220).

M. W. erweisen sich die folgenden Hypothesen zur Erklärung des Problems von ДЕВЯНОСТО heutzutage wenigstens als einigermaßen wahrscheinlich:

1. Der urslavische Vorgänger von ДЕВЯНОСТО wäre **newĩnsъ(n)* oder **devĩnsъ(n)*, das aus dem ieur. **newĩkont* stamme, und dessen Lautform zuerst von ebenso aus der ieur. Grundsprache ererbten **ostāsъ(n)* '80', dann später von **sъto* '100' beeinflusst worden sei (Szemerényi 1960, 64-65).

2. Strukturell habe das Zahlwort '90' im Frühurrussischen mit den Namen der übrigen Dekaden noch übereingestimmt: **devę(t)desętъ*, dessen Lautgestalt unter dem Einfluß von **s(ъ)to* modifiziert worden sei; infolge der darauf folgenden Assimilation habe sich **devędosto* ergeben, woraus durch Dissimilation -*d*- > -*n*- der unmittelbare Vorgänger der heutigen Form **devęnosto* entstanden sei. In bezug auf die letztere Phase merkt Szemerényi an: „the dissimilation would be supported by morphological considerations (for the speakers) since both *devę-* and *-sto* were clear but not the function of the intervening -*d*-“ (op. cit. 65–66).

3. Das Russische hätte die Reste einer ehemaligen Neunerzählung beibehalten, die sich in Ausdrücken wie за тридевять морей erhalten hätte. „Hauptsache ist, daß die Russen, vielleicht unter dem Einfluß von Nachbarn, gewisse Dinge nach dem Neunteilungssystem gezählt haben, und daß »90« bei der Zählung dieser Dinge dieselbe Rolle gespielt hat, wie sonst »100.«“ (Stang 1964, 127). So sollte девѧносто als 'Kleinhundert, Neunerhundert' neben сто '100' aufgefaßt werden, und dies wäre nach der Meinung von Stang eine ähnliche Erscheinung wie '100'~'120' im germanischen Bereich, z. B. dt. *hundert*~*Großhundert* (op. cit. 127–128).

4. Die im Этимологический словарь славянских языков vorgelegte Hypothese scheint einen Kompromiß zwischen den Erklärungsversuchen Nr. 1 und 3 darzustellen, dementsprechend wäre nicht auszuschließen, daß das Urslavische das archaische Zahlwort für 90 aus der ieur. Grundsprache ererbt hätte, welches „Воз[ожно], отражает своеобразный, девятиричный счет, мыслимый как бы на фоне десятиричного, откуда наиболее вероятное истолкование **neueŋkŋto* или **neueŋa-kŋta* как 'девятиричная сотня', »малая сотня«, т.е. »сотня« из девяток, в отличие, напр., от »большой сотни« (так у германцев обозначалось число 120)“ (Trubačev) op. cit. 220).

Anmerkung zu Nr. 3, 4: Bei der Betrachtung von девѧносто ist auch Šerech für ein ehemaliges nonales System im Slavischen eingetreten (Šerech 1952, 94).

Szemerényis zweite Hypothese wirkt plausibler, weil sie ein urslavisches Zahlwortsystem postuliert, in dem die Namen für die Zehner einheitlich gebildet sind. Es wäre nämlich befremdend, daß die Zahlwörter '20'–'80' auf der Basis '10' konstruiert sind, nur '90' würde ein anderes Prinzip vertreten; dies bezieht sich natürlich nicht auf die vor der Rangschwelle 100 subtraktiv gebildeten Zehnerzahlwörter (s. unter 3.).

2. Es ist ganz allgemein und gut bekannt, daß nicht wenige Zahlwörter in verschiedenen Sprachen nicht in erwartungsgemäßer, „lautgesetzmäßiger“ Gestalt erscheinen, „jotenkin näitä sanoja täytyy käsitellä jonkin verran toisella tavalla kuin kielen muita sanoja“ [„deshalb müssen diese Wörter einigermaßen anders als die übrigen Wörter in der Sprache behandelt werden“] (Donner 1933, 387).

Die lautlichen Unregelmäßigkeiten sind i. a. auf drei Ursachen zurückzuführen:

1. Die Lautgestalt einiger Zahlwörter kann durch Assimilation oder Disassimilation „deformiert“ werden, z. B. germ. **fēmf(e)* ‘5’ < ieur. **penkue* (Kluge 1975, 224), lat. *quinque* id. ist wiederum das Ergebnis einer regressiven Assimilation (loc. cit.); das anlautende *d-* für ‘9’ in den baltischen und slavischen Sprachen ist nach der Ansicht vieler Forscher durch Dissimilation zu erklären: lit. *devyni*, lett. *deviņi*, aksl. *devętъ*, vgl. lat. *novem*, skr. *náva* usw. (so z. B. Endzelīns 1971, 181).

2. „Állandó számsorok, felsorolások tagjait... szoros külső asszociatív kapcsolatot fűzi össze, amely gyakran az egyes tagok egymásrahatásában nyer kifejezést” [„Die Glieder ständiger Wörterreihen, Aufzählungen werden äußerlich eng assoziativ verbunden, was oft als gegenseitiger Einfluß zwischen ihnen zum Ausdruck kommt“] (Gombocz 1922, 37). Gombocz erwähnt die Monatsnamen und die Zahlwörter als Beispiele (loc. cit.) Eine Wortdeformation dieser Art kann mit dem Terminus technicus des Dravidologen M. B. Emeneau zutreffend als „paradigmatische Assimilation“ (zitiert von Andronov 1978, 239) bezeichnet werden. Man hat u. a. das bereits erwähnte anlautende *-d* bei ‘9’ in den balto-slavischen Sprachen durch Analogie von ‘10’ mit anlautendem *d-* erklärt (so z. B. Szemerényi 1960, 145 Anm. 19; Arumaa 1985, 194). (Weitere Beispiele s. z. B. Gombocz 1922, 37; Collinder 1928, 362; Brugmann 1933, 365; Stang 1964, 279–282; Holmer 1966, 18–19; Arumaa 1985, 193–194).

3. Bei schnellem Sprechtempo, insbesondere bei schnellem Zählen, können Allegroformen entstehen, wie z. B. fi. umgangsspr. *seit(s)kytt yks* ‘71’ ~ literaturspr. *seitsemänkymmentä yksi* id. Solche Allegroformen können auch allgemein werden.

Mir scheint, daß es aufgrund der zweiten und plausiblen Hypothese Szemerényis genügt, nur eine urslavische Form **devętъ desętъ* für ‘90’ zu erschließen, aus der sich beide Varianten in den slavischen Sprachen ableiten lassen: **devętъ desętъ* > **devętdesętъ*, dessen Lautgestalt im Laufe der Sprachgeschichte folgenden Deformierungen, die zum Endergebnis *девяносто* führten, unterworfen war: In einem Teil des Sprachgebietes rief die Dissimilation *d...*-*d*- >

*d-...-n- *devętnesęť* hervor, dann wurde diese neue Variante unter dem analogen Einfluß des Zahlwortes **sъto > sto* '100' zu **devętnesto* umgestaltet und endlich entstand durch die Assimilation *-e-...-o > -o-...-o* die uns bereits bekannte Form **devętnosto*. Das altpolnische Zahlwort, das Szemerényi hat noch nicht kennen können, hat noch das inlautende *t* erhalten, im Ostslavischen ist es dagegen geschwunden. Das Positive dieser Erklärung besteht vor allem darin, daß sit mit einem einheitlichen Zehnerzahlwortsystem im Urslavischen rechnet und девяносто sowie seine Entsprechungen in den übrigen ostslavischen Idiomen und im Altpolnischen anhand natürlicher Lautwandel, besonders im Bereich der Numeralien häufiger Dissimilation und Assimilation herleiten läßt. Dissimilation und Assimilation sowie Analogie sind nur Möglichkeiten und keineswegs ein obligatorisch eintretendes Lautgesetz; so ist es verständlich, daß im größten Teil des slavischen Sprachraumes Forsetzungen des deformationsfreien **devętdesęť* auftreten, man kann sogar von einer gewissen Koexistenz beider Varianten im Ostslavischen (und im Altpolnischen) sprechen. — Im Gegensatz zu einer Erklärung dieser Art hält Szemerényi seine erste Hypothese jedoch für überzeugender, da in jenem Fall die lautlichen Probleme sowohl bei '90' als auch bei '100' befriedigend erklärt werden könnten (op. cit. 65). Das Zahlwort '90' läßt sich aber durch natürliche, übliche Lautveränderungen verschiedener Art aus einer einzigen grundsprachlichen Form herleiten, die dem allgemeinen Muster der übrigen urslavischen Zehnerzahlwörter entspricht, und **sъto* kann sicherlich, wie von Szemerényi selbst etwas später (op. cit. 150), ohne Schwierigkeiten als Allegroform von **sęto* erklärt werden.

3. Wie oben erwähnt, wäre ein einheitlich herausgebildetes Zehnerzahlwortsystem mit abweichenden Bildungen erst vor der Rangeschwelle, d. h. '100' befremdend. Dies ist jedoch nicht der Fall, wenn z. B. '80' und '90' subtraktiv aus dem Zahlwort für '100' gebildet sind (unlängst wollte man auch russ. девяносто erneut als subtraktiv deuten, s. Berezkina – Rosenfeld 1970, 13; über frühere derartige Versuche s. Stang 1964, 124–125; Trubačev 1977, 220). Am besten kann dies mit Hilfe der obugrischen Sprachen, insbesondere durch Zahlwörter des Ostjakischen veranschaulicht werden, z. B. urostj. **ěj-ěrt-sat* '90', wörtl.: 'ohne eins hundert, d. h. ohne einen Zehner hundert' > ostostj. *ěj-ěr-sat*, südostj. *ăr-sot*, nordostj. *jăr-sot*, urostj. **ěj-ěrt-cōrās* '900', wörtl.: 'ohne eins tausend d. h. ohne einen Hunderter tausend' > ostostj. *ěj-ěr-t'ōrās*, vgl. noch urostj. **ěj-ěrt-jōŋ* '9', wörtl.: 'ohne eins zehn' > ostostj. *ěj-ěr-jōŋ*, jěr-jeŋ, südostj. *ăr-joŋ*, nordostj. *jăr(t)-jaŋ*, urostj. **ěj-ěrt-kōs* '19', wörtl.:

‘ohne eins zwanzig’ > südostj. *ār-χus*, urostj. **ěj*, ‘1’, **jōŋ* ‘10’, **kəs* ‘20’, **sat* ‘100’ *čöräs* ‘1000’, **ěrt* ‘ohne, mangelnd’.

Die ostjakischen Zahlwörter ‘90’ un ‘900’ zeigen eindeutig, daß sie mit Abzug einer Einheit (d. h. eines Zehners oder Hunderter) von der nächsten Rangschwelle (d. h. ‘100’ oder ‘1000’) gebildet sind. Ich halte es für wahrscheinlich, daß die Subtraktion bei der Bildung der Zehner oder Hunderter nur in dem Falle zur Geltung kommen kann, wenn dasselbe Prinzip auch bei Einern verwendet wird (vgl. ostj. ‘9’). In diesem Zusammenhang muß noch erwähnt werden, daß mögliche unterschiedliche Bildungsweisen einer gewissen Reihe von Zahlwörtern mit der Basis des Zählens und des Zahlwortsystems nichts zu tun haben; also spricht weder das Ostjakische noch das Russische für ein ehemaliges Neunersystem.

Und noch ein Argument gegen die Erklärung *деветносто* ‘Neuner-Hundert’. Die Sprachen kennen natürlich keine Koexistenz von einem nonalen und einem dezimalen System (ganz zu schweigen davon, wie unpraktisch ein Neunersystem wäre); das konnte folglich auch nicht im Urslavischen der Fall sein. Ein gemischtes Zahlwortsystem kann vorkommen, wenn die Basis und ihre Vielfachen die „Wendepunkte“ bilden, so kann z. B. in einigen Sprachen ein quinares, dezimales und vigesimales System einander ergänzend existieren. In Europa ist das System im Französischen und Dänischen gemischt, dezimal und vigesimal, dominant in ihnen ist jedoch das dezimale System.

Um die Annahme des Neunersystems im Slavischen zu unterstützen, hat man sich auf russ. *тридцать* ‘27’, eigtl.: ‘drei Neuner’, berufen, das eigentlich nur in für die Folklore charakteristischen Formeln auftritt (aus dem Russischen ist es ins Lappische gelangt, s. Bergsland 1953, 46–47 Anm.). Hier handelt es sich jedoch nicht um ein Zähl- oder Zahlwortsystem, sondern um eine magische Zahl, welche wiederum nichts mit der Zählweise oder Bildung der Zahlwörter zu tun hat. Die Zahl 9 ist übrigens bei den Mongolen und bei den Kirgisen beliebt (s. Ramstedt 1907, 18), aber auch ihre Sprachen verfügen über ein reines dezimales Zahlwortsystem.

Der Mensch kann Dinge, Gegenstände, auch in größeren Haufen, Bündeln zählen, z. B. je zehn oder hundert; dementsprechend können manchmal die Rangschwellen anders als mit einem isolierten Lexem benannt werden, so ist z. B. 100 in vielen Sprachen der Welt ‘zehn Zehner’ oder ‘große Zehn’ (s. z. B. Fettweis 1927, 76), 1000 kann als ‘großes Hundert’ ausgedrückt werden. Z. B. ingrischer Dialekt des Finnischen *kümmen kүүmmet* ‘100’ ~ *sada* id. (Porkka 1885, 76–77), permjakischer Dialekt des Syrjänischen *das das* ‘100’ (Wiedemann 1884, 7), südlicher Dialekt des Lappischen *stoere-luhkie* ‘100’, wörtl.: ‘große Zehn’ ~ *tjuetie* ‘100’ (Bergsland 1982, 128) (~ fi. *sata* id.), vgl.

stoere 'groß', *luhkie* '10', Zigeunersprache von Wales *baro deš* '100', eigtl.: 'große Zehn' (Menninger 1958, 59), Hottentottisch *gli-disi* id. (loc. cit.). — Von diesen Gebilden unterscheiden sich jedoch dt. *Großhundert* '120', engl. *long* oder *great hundred* id. prinzipiell, sie drücken nämlich nicht das Zehnfache oder die Potenz von 100 aus; ihr Vorgänger ist im Handel entstanden, und die Quelle mag das Westnordische gewesen sein (Sommer 1950, 66, 68).

Was nun das Attribut 'klein' in Zahlwörtern betrifft, kann festgestellt werden, daß es äußerst selten ist, mir sind nur zwei Fälle bekannt:

a) Südlappisch *ütt'je nīimme* '100', eigtl.: 'kleines Tausend' ~ *stuor(r)e nīimme* 'großes Tausend' (Hasselbrink 1981, 110, 111), arithmetisch spiegelt sich hier also wieder dasselbe Verhältnis wider, wie wir es bei den vorangehenden Beispielen gesehen haben (*ütt'je* 'klein', *stuor(r)e* 'groß'; *nīimme* ist ein ziemlich junges, vorwiegend oder ausschließlich beim Zählen von Rentieren verwendetes Zahlwort, dessen eigentliche Bedeutung 'Name' ist, ebenso wie die Bedeutung seiner etymologischen Entsprechungen im Finnischen, *nimi*, und Ungarischen, *név*).

b) Nordostjakisch (Kazym-Dialekt) *ай нивалсот* '80' (~ *нивалъянг* id. [= *нивал* '8', *янг* '10']) ~ *вэн нивалсот* '800' (Moldanova et al. 1983, 156), wo '80' (**ñil-sat*) und '800' (**ñilǝ-sat*) phonetisch — infolge u. a. eines gegenseitigen Einflusses — zusammengefallen sind, und die störende Homophonie wird entweder durch eine sekundär entstandene Form *нивалъянг* '80' (eigtl. 'acht Zehner') oder durch die Attribute *ай* 'маленький' (op. cit. 11) und *вэн* 'большой' (op. cit. 29) aufgehoben. Das arithmetische Verhältnis zwischen ostj. *ай нивалсот* '80' und *вэн нивалсот* '800' ist dasselbe wie zwischen *ütt'je nīimme* '100' und *stuor(r)e nīimme* '1000' im Südlappischen.

Also erweist sich auch die Deutung 'Kleinhundert' für russ. *девяносто* '90' als falsch.

4. Alles in allem: Nur Szemerényis zweite Hypothese läßt das nichterwartungsgemäße Zahlwort für 90 im Ostslavischen und Altpolnischen mühe-los und auf natürliche Weise ohne Kunstgriff aus einem Zahlwort als ein ins System passendes Glied des urslavischen Zahlwortbestandes ableiten, welches das Zahlwort '10' — und nur dies — als Grundlage hatte.

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ON COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE OF A BILINGUAL CHILD: A CASE STUDY*

By

A. JAROVINSKIJ – I. FABRICIUS

Parallel acquisition of two languages has systematically been studied for decades. Ronjat (1913) made longitudinal linguistic observations on his own child learning French and German synchronically. Another linguist named Pavlovitch (1920) studied joint acquisition processes of the French and Serbian languages on his son. Leopold (1949-1954) made prolonged observations concerning parallel learning of English and German on his children. Among more recent publications we find Imedadze (1960, 1967), a Georgian psychologist reporting psychological properties of Georgian-Russian bilingualism in early childhood, based again on data from her daughter.

The aforementioned authors discuss findings pertinent to the acquisition of the two language systems as well as psychological aspects of "language alternation." Communicative strategies of bilingual children have not been analysed in detail.

Development of communicative processes can be described in a framework provided by research on monolingual children.

According to Slama-Cazacu (1961) the speech of two to three-year-old children is dominated by the exertion of communicative functions. An evolving age-specific need to talk to others is manifested in turning towards partners, giving answers, or engaging in dialogues.

Jakobson (1960) presents a systematic analysis of the components of communicative process. These are: the sender (speaker), the receiver (addressee), the context, the message, the contact (a physical and psychological channel connecting sender and receiver), and a code which is entirely or partially shared by speaker and hearer.

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The components are conceptualized in close connection with diverse linguistic functions. As it is well known, Jakobson differentiates the following functions:

- (i) Emotive (speaker intending to express affections concerning the phenomenon under discussion),
- (ii) referential (speaker referring to an object, event, or to a concept),
- (iii) conative (speaker intending to influence the hearer and induce a motivation in the hearer to execute some act),
- (iv) phatic (speaker attempting to establish a contact with the person he/she speaks to),
- (v) meta-language function (the speaker checks whether the code used by him/her is known for the partner), and eventually,
- (vi) poetic (by which a text directs the hearer's attention to itself — the textual structure —).

In addition to these, Hymes (1962) postulates a situative function.

In the present study some observations concerning development of bilingualism in early childhood are reported with special respect to functions of language.

Method of observation

Hungarian-Russian bilingualism in early childhood was studied in our own child in the framework of Jakobson's analysis of linguistic function. The subject (referred to hereinafter as Igor) has been living in Hungary. His mother is Hungarian, the father Russian. He was the first child with a baby sister of a few months during the period discussed here. Observational data are reported from the period between (1;8) and (2;1) years of age (the period between October 1975 – April 1976).

Igor has been brought up in a home environment from birth to the end of the investigation phase. Development in the motor-manipulative and affective domains has been undisturbed.

From the set of observational data gained continually for a longer period in a natural family setting only the manifestations relevant to the delimited topic are selected for the present analyses.

Data were recorded as notes resembling a diary in which speech acts and communicative (verbal) interactions were systematically described. At recurrent times, minimum once a week, verbalisations in given interactive contexts were recorded on tape.

Communicative strategies in the parent — child interaction

In communicating with the child from his birth the authors consciously followed the principle advocated by Ronjat. In brief, this scheme proposes **one person — one language**. Consequently, the father spoke standard Russian while the mother the same sociolect in Hungarian.

In mother-father-child situations the mother spoke to the child in Hungarian, the father — in Russian. In this case the parents used among themselves their respective native languages but in situations with the child absent communicated in Hungarian. In the presence of other speakers, the father communicated with Igor in Russian while with the remaining persons of the setting, in Hungarian.

The father participated in all procedure of care (giving a bath, feeding, playing games, walking and the like) to the greatest possible degree. Duration of exposure to both languages through taking care of the child was approximately equal. First full words were recorded in both languages at the same age level (11 months). From the age of 15 months, Igor was enabled to have recurrent daily acquaintance with both Hungarian and Russian story books and gramophone records.

(i) In the following, we shall inquire into the ways in which a young bilingual child may communicate with parents, the strategies he uses, and relations of the two linguistic codes to the functions mentioned earlier in the specific case of bilingualism studied here preserving the code originally used in situation.

Example. The use of the inappropriate code was observed with the bilingual child in connection with a **dominance of the situative elements**. Even if prompted by a question of the Russian-speaking father (e.g., the equivalent of *What have you done today?*), an experience originally associated with the Hungarian language will usually be told via the inappropriate code (in Hungarian).

Age (2;0,12). Igor: *Játszottunk és ettem almát és banánt is, azután kugliztunk. Bizony!* ('We were playing and I ate apple and banana. Then we played skittles. So it was.')

If a question is formulated by the Hungarian-speaking mother concerning an experience associated with the Russian-speaking father, the same phenomenon will emerge. The Hungarian question elicits a Russian response.

Example. Age: (1;11,16). Mother: *Hova utaztatok?* ('Which place did you travel to?').

Igor: *Vo dvorec!...Na poezde ezdili!* ('To the palace...we travelled by train.')

As a consequence of the dominant of the situativity, the child remained — at least in these communication processes — within the language system connected to the situation experienced.

(ii) If the child turns to the father in order to ask for some object to be handed over, or activity to be performed, a **conative function** will dominate. In these cases, **Russian code** will be used. Confusion of the two language systems, or switches to the Hungarian code were not recorded in such a case.

In various interactions with the father, the child tried to confine verbal behavior to one language system. In order to keep to this as long as possible, he utilized all available verbal or non-verbal means.¹

Example. Age: (1;10;18). Igor asks for a ball among the toys on the toy shelf.

Igor: *Papa, daj mne etu!* ('Daddy, give me that (one).')

Points at the ball.

Father: *Čto — etu?* ('Which one?... this one?')

Igor: *Ėtu, papa!* ('That one, Daddy!') He is gesturing and shouting excitedly.

Father: *Kakuju etu?* ('What kind of that?')

Igor: *Papa, pozovi mamu!* ('Daddy, call Mommy (here)!')

When the mother appears, Igor says to her in Hungarian:

Add ide azt a pöttyös labdát! ('Give me that dotted ball.')

A similar type of remaining within one language system could be demonstrated for Hungarian.

Example. Age: (1;11,22). On being asked by his mother, Igor is ready to name the objects pictured in the story book, one after the other. Later, the father asks Igor to name the same objects also for him. Igor reacts:

Igor: *Ėto cvetok...* — 'This is a flower...'

and turning to his mother, adds:

Egyszer már megbeszéltük (Hungarian for 'We have talked that over once'). With this, he stops naming the objects.

A question is, why does the child attend, at such an early age, to remain withing one language system at any price. He has, at least in our case, all possible rights to mix up the two languages, as his vocabulary as well as grammatical knowledge are severely limited. According to our **explanatory hypothesis**, a sharp and early discrimination has been developed on the basis of emotional contacts "via different languages". A projection of this phenomenon

¹ Grammatical interference and "mixed language" utterances were observed, too in other speech situations. We are not analysing them here.

is supposed to be found in verbal utterances of the type *Don't disturb me Daddy/Mommy* produced in settings when a face to face interaction is entered by a third person representing the other language. In such cases, the child is hypothesized to express an intention not to confuse the situation by introducing another language system.

The process of differentiation shows up in intensive emotional reactions. The first characteristic affective response of this type occurred at the age of 1;5,3.

The father purposefully started to confabulate on the pictures of the Russian story book in Hungarian. Igor rushed to his mother with concomitant extreme emotional manifestation (crying, shouting) thereby rejecting his father's behaviour. The refusal of disturbing acts performed by the person representing the language different from the one actually used was expressed later in various other forms. These extended from usual verbal reactions (*Nem kell papa/mama*. Hungarian for 'I do not need Daddy/Mommy, *Ne zavarj minket* — 'Do not disturb us'; *Elment papa/mama* — 'Daddy/Mommy has gone') to intensely aggressive clashes (shutting the door, pushing the third person forcibly out of the room, etc.)

A definitive form of expressing complementary assignation in the use of the two languages appeared when a fourth person — a Hungarian-speaking grandmother — told Hungarian tales over pictures in a Russian story book. Igor protested against this with the following words: *Ez orosz könyv!* — 'This is a Russian book.' (Age: 2;0,11).

(iv) The separation of the two language systems is further illustrated by phenomena of **children's interpretation**.

The first case of **spontaneous situative interpretation (translation)** occurred at the age of 1;7,5. Having caught sight of a cat, the child turned consecutively to each of the parents and verbalised the sight in the respective languages.

From spontaneous, situative one-word translations, he proceeded to the level of **translating schematic sentences**. A stereotyped character of these sentences was predicted by the fact that both situations and their linguistic representation had previously been repeated numerous times. In these cases, the child seems to have mastered two signs associated with the same situation. They were later produced specifically for the respective person.

Example. *Dom Stroit'!* — Russian, *Házát építeni!* — Hungarian. ('(to) build a house.')

Pojdem prutik iskat'! — *Menjünk botocskát keresni!* 'Let us go and look for a stick.'

V futbol igrat' budem! — *Labdázni fogunk!* ('We shall play soccer,' or — Hungarian version — 'with the ball.')

Ne nado kupat'sja! — *Nem kell fürödni!* 'No need to take a bath.'

Mama prisla. — *Mama megérkezett.* 'Mammy's arrived.'

The stereotypes frequently served no other purpose than that of establishing contacts or leading to a collective activity. Igor received, e.g., for a long period the homecoming father each time with the words *V futbol igrat'!* (Russian for '(Let us) play soccer!'). If the father proposed some other activity the child readily cooperated. These sentence schemes were used, consequently, as ones dominated by the **phatic function** of verbal communication.

Translation near to the level of, or suggesting the involment of abstractions (e.g., delivering a message) were introduced as follows. On being requested, the child turned toward the other parent. He sought avoidance practices to evade the task. Later he attempted to translate.

Example. Age: (2;0,18).

Father: *Skaži babuške, čto u menja slomalas pišuščaja mašinka.* ('(Go and) tell Granny that my typewriter has gone wrong.')

Igor (running to his grandmother and telling in Russian): *Pečatnaja mašinka slomalas!* ('The typewriter has gone wrong.' — *pečatnaja* is a childish neologism.)

Grandmother: *Nem értem.* ('I do not understand.')

Igor utters the same in Russian loudly shouting and continues with the Hungarian sentence:

Az autó...megállt. ('The car...has stopped.')

Another example. Age: (2;0,23).

Grandmother: *Mondd papának, mit ettél!* ('(Go and) tell your father what you have eaten.')

Igor: *Kenyeret és sajtot.* ('Bread and cheese.')

Father: *Ne ponimaju.* (Russian for 'I do not understand.')

Igor (shouting loudly): *Kenyeret és sajtot!* (and afterwards): *Xleb s maslom...i kašu!* ('Bread and butter...and gruel.')

A translation of the situative type minimally needs an inductive linguistic sign, or some object (image, situation) associated in the child with the other language. The sign allows to build up further connections in the semantic field of similar items. The pauses of varying length interrupting translation performance at several points seem to indicated a search process by which the child may select an appropriate sign in a semantic field already spotted.

The examples cited earlier suggest that the child would name a situation-specific, habitual, well-known object (car, gruel) without identifying the concept actually appropriate (typewriter, cheese). In this respect, we may remember that, while translating *kenyeret és sajtot*, the child did not simply appeal to *zleb* as an equivalent of *bread* (Hungarian 'kenyér') but to *zleb s maslom* (Russian 'bread and butter') which is a more frequently practised, better acquired form.

(v) **A functional practice of both language systems** was realised through **monological speech** in the "intimate loneliness" before falling asleep. Daily events were verbalised in this period alternately in both languages.

The child treated various phrases, word associations (aggregates) and isolated words. Among observed forms were permutations of word order, disruption of syntagmes, completing sentences, changing intonation contours, interspersing pauses. Thereby he could consolidate and practise structures already under formation.

Analysis of monologue contents revealed that the child never confused two linguistic signs within one structure. Monologues had a "stratified" layer by layer design.

Example. Age: (1;9,16).

...*Ide, nem oda...* (Hungarian for 'Here, not there...')

— an extension,

... *a vízben úszik, úszik a vízben!* ('on the water (it) is swimming, (it) is swimming on the water.')

— permutation,

nem kérek, nem kérek többet! ('I do not want, I do not want any more')

extension

— ...*dym idet, iz truby dym idet...* (Russian for 'smoke comes out, from the chimney (the) smoke comes out')

— extension,

...*pas pape, pape pas!...b'et po vorotam! b'et! b'et!* ('a pass to Daddy, to Daddy (I) pass (it)...(he) hits into the goal...hits (it)!...hits (it)!')

permutation, dissociation, repetitions,

...*Piroska erdőben...virágot szed...* ('...Little Red in wood...is picking flowers,' in Hungarian again) — sentence completion.

In the monograph of R.H. Weir (1962) observations concerning an English-language child from the age of two to 2;5 years were reported. In her opinion, monologues preceding sleep have an (accessory) social function. The utterances serve, on the one hand, as dialogues with imaginary partners — persons, objects, with which the child had real contacts, during daily activity. On the

other hand, monologues can also have a **poetic function** (word and phonetic play) as well as a meta-linguistic one.

Our findings appear to corroborate the thesis of dual content in monologues preceding sleep proposed by the above author. It seems reasonable for us, too, to suppose that monologues in the age investigated include imaginary replay of certain communicative interactions as well as a practice of language use. The two functions may, of course, occur together.

This kind of monologue was perpetuated until the age of 1;10,12 when it suddenly ceased. Hypothetically, one may explain this block by the disturbing, inhibitory effect exerted by the babbling of younger sister, which started approximately in the same days.

(6) We have a set of protocol data concerning the particular phenomenon occurring in a situation when an adult (apart from the parents) entered verbal interaction in Russian. Igor reacted to this stimulus by being shocked, by flight to mother or father, as well as an active rejection of the whole event.

* * * * *

Hymes (1971) points at the fact that a child acquires not only a language system but also the conduct associated with a language (i.e., rules of language use specific to the addressees and the situation). The data reported allow us to suggest that the child had a restricted **communicative competence**. He proved to be unable to generalize the communicative use of a language learned exclusively from one person.

Ervin-Tripp (1973) emphasized the role of identification as a fundamental psycho-social factor in the acquisition of either the mothertongue or, in bilingual cases, two parallel languages.

The basis of identification is a relative dependence of the child on the adult model. Identification is most overt in early childhood when all significant, vital needs of the child are satisfied by the parent serving as a model. While being cared for with respect to those needs the child builds associative contacts with various stimuli speech, gestures by the adult during interactive events.

When psychological properties of differentiating two languages in early-childhood bilingualism are considered, two explanatory principles are most frequently called forth. One of them relies on the child's getting early awareness of his/her own bilingualism. The other, on differential attitudes or sets.

Ronjat (1913) proposed that after the age of 1;8 a child was able to discriminate between his/her parents speaking different languages as well as the respective language systems.

Imedadze (1960, 1967) explains the alternative use of languages in the bilingual child's speech by D. Uznadze's (1966) concept of speech set.

The emergence of a speech set presupposes a need in the subject to communicate with the environment. The latter need can be satisfied only in adequate settings, in a given language system, and in the presence of sufficient lexical and grammatical competence.

Alternative language use is determined by the type of speech situation, and the field of activity constantly connected with a person who uses the respective language.

If the child recurrently listens to an individual speaking the given language, the situation 'actualizing' the speech set will tend to be more deeply rooted in the child. Speech sets are later differentiated as abilities (mastery) of speaking the respective language. The more differentiated the speech sets are, the more probable a successful switch from one language to the other will be and the less frequently interlinguistic confusions will occur.

Summary

Our observations and experiences covering two years permit some specific conclusions to be drawn on the basis of the material.

- (i) The two language systems show an approximate balance all along the period reported (age: 1;8 to 2;1).
- (ii) A dominance of the situative events cause the use of the inappropriate code by the child. He will fail to break the limit of a language system, associated with a situation earlier experienced as embedded in a communication process.
- (iii) In face to face interactions (two persons only), no confusion of the two language systems is observed in the given period of life. The child tries to remain within the confines of one language system at any rate by appealing to all verbal and non-verbal means available to him.
- (iv) An early but clear-cut discrimination is proposed to evolve on the basis of emotional relations "via different languages."
- (v) A phenomenon of early-childhood "interpreting" grows out of (the use of) equivalent, setting-specific linguistic schemes and pre-abstractional, situative translations.
- (vi) Monologues serve both for practising of functions and for a social form of imaginary dialogue. In the case reported, they display a stratified structure with no confusions of signs from the two languages within one unit.

- (vii) Deficiency of communicative competence is recorded, in our case, concerning Russian language. The child is unable to generalize the communicative use of a language acquired exclusively through interaction with one person. Early acquisition of two languages is intimately tied to specific situations and personal relations.

* * * * *

At the request of the Editor we try to indicate briefly Igor's subsequent bilingual development, his emotional and personal attitude to Russian-speaking people.

In 1983 he is nine. Igor attends the third class of a Hungarian elementary school, learns very well. Schoolboys and peers like him, he has some close friends. Everybody knows that he can speak two languages. We are astonished by his sensitiveness to foreign language, for example, to English. In a summer English camp he picked up words, and phrases very easily, memorized little verses and songs almost at once.

His emotional development is quite steady, he does not differ from other children at the same age. As to ethnic identity he considers himself Hungarian but with "Russian blood streams in my veins, too."

Because of strong emotional attachment to his father, he has formed a positive attitude towards Russian culture, Russian people and, of course, he idealizes that country, in which he has never been yet.

His Hungarian is dominant, in certain interactions with his father (play chess, sport, fishing and so on) however he uses Russian only.

He can read on "father's language" but not so fluently as in Hungarian. Sometimes his Russian is ungrammatical. His "good" or developmental errors directly relate to the various strategies of the acquisition process, his other types of errors are connected to transfer strategies.

The parents' rigid principle of communicating with the child is the same as described in the article. For Igor, however this rigidity is not applied. It means that he may choose the language when he speaks to one of the parents. At the same time he protests against an inappropriate language used by the parents (when the father, for instance, uses Hungarian communicating with him). Till now the situativity is dominant in his verbal behaviour. "Hungarian events" are told to the Russian-speaking father in Hungarian, but this phenomenon is not completely mirrored for Russian events: sometimes they are translated into Hungarian.

His emotional-communicative problems connected with Russian-speaking people were resolved very easily during common interactions with his Russian

grandmother who arrived in Budapest for a month. At that time Igor was about three years old and we have not noticed emotinal problems connected to language since that moment.

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CHRONICA

HINTIKKA AND KULAS ON ANAPHORA AND DESCRIPTION*

By

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0.1. One of the major difficulties to appreciate the new perspectives offered by game-theoretical semantics has been its lack of respect for certain commonly accepted distinction requiring thereby a completely new start in linguistic theoretizing. Since the theoretical foundations of game-theoretical understanding of language use are basically different from those of previous approaches one should rather try to see this theory works and assess how much it can do with linguists' notorious examples than launch a criticism from the platform of some more canonical theory. In choosing my critical strategy I shall do both, i.e. give a look at some underlying principles governing the application of game-theoretical tools to linguistic data and confront them with the interpretation of some related examples. Since Hintikka, however, refuses linguists' attempts to test their theories by exposing them to controversial cases themselves have very skillfully fabricated, in selecting my examples I have tried to deviate the least as possible from the standards of common usage. The focal problem around which my critical remarks revolve will be the way of extending the boundaries of what once seemed to me to be the proper field of game-theoretical semantics toward territories which have been taken to fall under the umbrella of discourse linguistics. Undoubtedly, the problem of anaphora is the most intriguing example to be used for pulling down the distinction between semantic interpretation and understanding of discourse. What remains to be questioned is whether the extension to discourse data leaves intact the ground and explanatory power of the game-theoretical semantic apparatus.

0.2. To start with, I could advise the general reader to appreciate two basic characteristics of the game-theoretical approach, its clarity and simplicity, in

* A review of Jaakko Hintikka and Jack Kulas: *Anaphora and Definite Descriptions*. SLL, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1985, xii+250.

which respects it might well be considered unrivalled at present in linguistic circles. In reading "Anaphora and Definite Descriptions" I had the feeling, however, that simplicity may sometimes have its drawbacks especially when there is a wide range of different kinds of phenomena to be covered; the decision of what should be left distinct or vague, explained or blurred, can always be the target of some competing theoretician dissatisfied with what, he thinks, the given theory overlooks. I am not going to rival game-theoretical linguistics, however, some of my remarks may be thought to belong to meta-theoretical investigation, yet I am concerned here with cases of vagueness or ambiguity which can spring up within the terms of the authors' approach itself, also because I agree basically with most of the principles presupposed by a game-theoretical understanding and what I am going to say belongs rather to the way such a theory is being put to use here.

1.0. In many respects Hintikka can be called, in a very popular term, a linguistic deconstructor, that is, a man who can claim to have shattered the firmest strongholds of the usual triad of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics by deconstructing some fundamental distinctions between them such as pure syntactic representation and semantic interpretation, meaning in isolation and contextual meaning, etc. This time it comes to anaphoric head-relations. To understand the sources of such a new situation in linguistic investigation one should point out some basic explanatory principles introduced mostly elsewhere but well exploited in this book on anaphora. For the sake of further reference I enumerate them below with a brief description of how they are meant to work.

1.1. First and foremost, one might compare Hintikka's meta-theoretical deconstructivism with his strategy-oriented deconstruction of compound sentences to minimal units, which he parallels with the outside-in process of understanding linguistic data. Now, since this process is conceived of as a way of playing a game, the first and most general explanatory principle is couched in the idea of what players are allowed to do throughout the play, i.e. in the way how rules can be applied by them; it may be put as follows:

(EP1) A linguistic problem should be formulated in a way that it could be accounted for by the order of rule applications as assigned to any of the players — Nature or Myself — in the game.

(EP1) is considered a heuristic principle in that it is aimed partly at explaining away speakers' uncertainties or differences in judging the acceptability of certain sentences as well as exceptions to linguists' syntactic — or other —

generalizations; thus it does not ask for black-and-white ordering principles but ones which reflect preferences, strong or weaker, of which two stand out, (O.LR) that confirms the preference for processing sentences in the left-to-right order — thus it encodes a pragmatic observation, and (O.Comm) that gives priority to rules applying to components in higher clauses — thus it translates a syntactic consideration. The first vague point to be noticed follows from the heuristic aspect of rule orderings compared with a game-theoretical important distinction between what one can and is supposed to do in a game; in other words, this is the distinction between a possible and the best strategy of a player when winning is considered. What is left obscure is the strategical status of wholly or partially excluded forms of sentences, whether they should be seen as violations of game rules or only as parts of losing strategies. This problem is especially clear when rule applications have to be blocked not to give way to amorphous syntactic constructions (cf. the case of the rule (G. believes to) on p. 186) in contrast to cases of dispensable semantic readings; one may be inspired to ask whether the old distinction between syntactic form and semantic reading could be translated into the distinction between possible and winning strategies. This idea may be denied by finding independent syntactic motivations for the filtering out of certain interpretations as it will be pointed out in relation to some of the forthcoming examples. A second point to be raised about (EP1) is the problem of generalizing over what can happen to the relative order of certain rules in games correlated with different sentences; the explanatory character of (EP1) would prompt us to accept the knowledge resulting from such a generalization as competence for, or a mastery over, the use of language. This is, however, basically determined by our ability to justify why the same ordering of rules is a strategical possibility in one case and is not in another.

1.2. The second explanatory principle, which is the first to get special emphasis by the treatment of anaphora originates from the semantic idea of correlating a choice (sub)set of individuals (sometimes also of different kinds) such that certain game rules prescribe the introduction or the selection of certain members. Such rules are (G. the), (G. a(n)), (G. every), (G. he), (G. who) and a great many others. The new principle refers to the way how such a set can be used in the explanation:

- (EP2) A semantic reading of some sentence (s) can be the result of either the simultaneous application of one, or the progressive application of more rules — or of both — with respect to an accordingly changing (sub)set of individuals.

(EP2) is heuristic, as well. For one thing, the number of simultaneous applications of a rule can rarely be determined uniquely; for another thing, although the number of individuals within some (sub)set is determined by the order of rules applied up to a given stage of the game, there are two obscure points concerning them: first, the authors tend to conjure up cases for the application of respective rules which would add intuitively necessary individuals to the choice set at some moment of the game, and second, some individuals might sometimes rather indefinitely fall out of the set in question unapplied. In treating anaphora these points turn out crucial when a creative search for "heads" heavily weighs upon the strategical possibilities of the players.

1.3. The third, and last, explanatory principle which I treat here is the most fundamental for the selected data of the book. It stems from the idea of subgame introduced much earlier for the sake of accounting for conditional sentences (see Saarinen (1979)). The idea of the subgame says that there may be rules which partition the game correlated with some sentence(s) into two parts to be played in a left-to-right order, the first played to the end before the second should commence. The principle feeds on the possible relationship that may obtain between two subsequent subgames:

(EP3) A linguistic problem may be formulated in a way that can be accounted for by what is remembered of players' strategies from a subgame in some subsequently played subgame.

(EP3) is evidently a descendent of (EP1) for the left-to-right ordering of subgames presupposes a similar ordering of the component rules with the difference that certain rule applications stand out as functionally related to some other ones in the subsequent subgame. If applied together with (EP2), (EP3) can tackle the coreferential interpretation on any two referring expressions in a sequence of sentences by the informational dependence between the respective strategies in the subgames. It has its heuristic character, as well, in the form of specifying, for instance, that in the case of conjunctively connected sentences it is Myself's strategies that are remembered, or if it is Nature's, it induces a generic interpretation. Yet, there are once more two vague points to be examined: first, how are the boundaries of a subgame fixed? and second, how is strategic meaning, as the authors call the part that is remembered of a subgame in another, determined? Can ambiguities be justified?

2.0. I hasten to assert now that I find the basic idea that runs through Hintikka and Kulas' book very appealing: simple and straightforward as other findings of game-theoretical investigations it consists in treating definite descriptions and anaphora on a par extending the usual anaphoric relationship

in a way that it cover occurrences of definite descriptions apart from certain reduced cases of them. I also take my own examples, even if proposed as counter-evidence to some findings of the authors, as corroboration of this general principle of anaphora. Thus, what I will be doing is a kind of re-assessment of game-theoretical approach in front of a couple of examples more akin perhaps to discourse linguistics than to ordinary semantics, and I may question some of the authors' solutions for them, but I leave general idea of anaphora intact.

2.1. Apart from Part I, which is the usual introduction into game-theoretical semantics, the two major parts of the book are a storehouse of diverse examples to be explained with the help of the extended conception of anaphoric occurrences. I shall treat some of the examples, not in the order they appear there, but rather according to how they relate to the problems of the explanatory principles above. My first remark concerns then the problem of ordering rules; let me consider a sample case, the game rule for "each". It has often been stated that (G. each) can have priority over other rules, propositional or quantificational, yet there are cases which leave us confounded about the motivations of applying (G. each) after or before certain other rules; I reproduce here a slightly different version of the authors' 223. example (see p. 174) as (1):

(1) *Near him, each soldier found the loaded weapon.*

and compare it with (2):

(2) *Near Corporal Tim, each soldier found the loaded weapon.*

It seems clear that while in (1) (G. each) normally has priority over other rules in (2) both (G. name) and (G. the) come before it. If one feels slightly odd for (2) to talk of a single weapon, he may try to contemplate (3) and (4) from the similar standpoint:

(3) *Near the Parliament, each tourist found the hotel.*

(4) *Near his hotel, each tourist found the restaurant.*

While in (3) (G. each) again follows the application of other quantificational rules, in (4) there is a tendency to apply (G. each) before them in order to have a multiple reading of *the restaurant*. Now, it may be ventured that the relative order of rules depends on the absence of (G. name). This observation should be independent of possible anaphoric relation in (4) as it is shown by (5):

(5) *Near a hotel, each tourist found the restaurant.*

which demonstrates the same preference order as (4). The observation is, however, refuted by cases like (6):

(6) *To John, each soldier posted the letter.*

where (G. each) precedes (G. the) even though we have the same rule (G. name) to apply first as in (3). Moreover, we can think of a case when, on the contrary, (G. the) precedes (G. each) although we have the same genitive as in (4) calling for (G. he) and (G. gen):

(7) *Near his hotel, each tourist found the man.*

The basic question is, then, why and how to eliminate readings when different rule applications do not lead to syntactically illformed constructions; considering general ordering principles like (O.LR) and (O.Comm) compared with special ones said to be stronger, it seems counter-intuitive to say that while (6) is explained by (O.LR) (3) necessitates some special principle, for on the contrary, it is the rule ordering in (6) that seems to be governed by some separate principle such as what the lexical meaning of *post* (different persons usually post different letters) may be thought to define, whereas in (3) it is entirely the relationship of rules that counts. We are still left puzzled at the difference of (3) and (4) as well as at the status of eliminated readings. Moreover, turning to the difference of (4) and (7), how are we to account for the intuition that the singular interpretation of the phrase is somehow more possible with (7) than with (4), even if it may compete with a multiple reading in the former case? Again it may be ventured that it has something to do with the meaning of words, *man* allowing a coreference with *his*, while *restaurant* excludes one. Although it may partially explain the singular interpretation of *the man* in (7), it is by no means a source for the preference of the multiple reading of *the restaurant* in (4). On the other hand, while (EP2) can explain why the multiple reading of the phrase cannot be coupled with coreference with *his*, the idea of anaphora is not conclusive in case of (7) for some syntactically different sentence with the same left-to-right order of the same three crucial components reduces that anaphoric possibilities as seen from (8):

(8) *His hotel fascinated each tourist familiar with the man.*

This observation prompts one to say that what allows the anaphoric relation between *his* and *the man* in (7) has nothing to do with rule ordering in the game but rather with the syntactic fact that (7) has resulted by means of movement from (9):

(9) *Each tourist found the man near his hotel.*

This would entirely displace (EP1) as an explanatory principle and require an independent syntactic motivation, and perhaps a syntactic theory, as the input of the game-theoretical rules, in the same sense as certain lexical meaning considerations may be expected to influence the playing of the game rather than the other way round.

2.2 Let me now consider cases when (EP2) is meant to supplement (EP1); these can be the cases when pragmatic elements creep in and the extension of the semantical game to discourse data occurs. The rationale for incorporating such elements seems evident: there are examples when the interpretation of some referring expression requires the selection of an individual from the corresponding choice set which however no rule applicable to any phrase in the given sentence could have introduced. The authors' explanatory strategy at this point collides with some basic facts of semantical games. I shall contrast two remarks by them. First, they say in relation to a sentence like (10):

- (10) *Susan met Mrs. Carstairs when bringing up the tea, whereupon she had words with her.*

that the know which of the two respective interpretations of the pronouns lead to true atomic sentences may rest on factual observations while the truth of (10) means only "that there exists a winning strategy in the correlated game for Myself". (p. 117) Thus, the truth of (10) does not need the incorporation of some independent element but only a uniqueness which can be secured by the simultaneous application of the rule (G. she) to both of the pronouns. It is in conformity with this idea that they state elsewhere in their book that sentences like (11):

- (11) *Three men were walking down the street. Suddenly he stopped.*

are trivially false because the uniqueness of the pronoun cannot be secured, Nature can always choose an individual other than the one chosen by Myself who is a male (p. 93). Yet in treating other sentences they do not hesitate to rely on external information in order to make them true; neat examples are the following:

- (12) *Surely there is night life in Tallahassee. Unfortunately, this weekend the lady is in Tampa.*
 (13) *Clan Cambell prospered, but himself was still not satisfied.*

The uniqueness of the referring expressions requires additional knowledge about night life and clan membership. So far so good. But the question then arises whether we can use similar knowledge to secure uniqueness in cases which may have seen trivially false; for take the sentence-pair (14):

(14) *Three men came by car. He got out.*

What could prevent us from incorporating information that who got out was the driver if, for instance, *himself* in (13) were to be taken as referring to the head of the said clan? Why should not we rely on the useful idea of displaced reference as explained in Nunberg (1978) to establish referring functions which do the job of bridging in the game? This is no place to work this idea out but one should look to the consequences; as I see it, to look for some such function, which is the more explicit idea of what the authors are thinking about is just to make up a context for the given sentence(s) in which they are true. Thus, to arrive at such a context is exactly to know how one can win the respective game, which runs counter to the original idea explained further above. In other words, to reconstruct a context is in principle different from the deconstructive process of verifying sentences. To put it bluntly, one may try to give a context to some sentence(s) which first seem to be false thereby validating them. It result clear that the idea of reconstruction dissolves the idea of semantic truth at least as adumbrated within the framework of semantical games where truth means the existence of a winning strategy, whereas with the reconstruction of contexts truth becomes somewhat a shamanistic feat of adjusting what has been said according to certain standards. This methodological difference, I believe, is well demonstrated by Lauri Carlson's idea of how participants reconstruct dialogue game situations by induction on the game rules and with the help of what he has called "silent moves" and the topical question. The first is a dialogue game justification of what I tried to see as a referring function, the second will receive greater light in the last section of this paper. In a final word, I think what the authors are doing in the cases of sentences like (12), (13) and the like is a kind of guessing game of what dialogue game, rather than what semantical game, can be correlated with them.

2.3. To begin with, the idea of subgame leaves me most puzzled. I am convinced that a complete reversal to Carlson's dialogue games would have better served the authors' purpose. First, I cannot see the point of defining it as an independently played unit within a larger whole and allowing for its being interrupter in the middle (?) by the application of a rule to some other element external to it like it happens to *a fancy car* in (15):

- (15) *If a man can find the money to pay for it, he will buy a fancy car.*

Yet, the motivation is clear: (EP2) should supplement (EP3) in the sense that it provides the necessary individual — a car for some male in (15) — without which the subgame cannot be played on. Still I cannot imagine how it is possible to change a situation in a (sub)game (choice sets are part of the game situation!) by effecting a move somewhere else. But let me turn to my last examples, which, as I understand, break down all the three explanatory principles enlisted above. Consider then the following extensions of the sentences (16):

- (16) *If the president votes for himself, everybody will vote for Reagan.*
 (17a) *Although he is ignorant of it.*
 (17b) *And he is well suited for the presidency.*
 (17c) *And he is better suited for the presidency than him.*
 (17d) *Yet, nobody knows who will win the election for he hasn't been informed about this condition.*

Take first (16)–(17a); against the authors predication (see p. 106) *he* can easily and normally corefer with *the president* although the individual (co)referred to has been selected by Nature's strategy which either does not carry over to the following (sub)game or results in a generic interpretation; in this case, however, we deal with a very specific individual who happen to be the president. One may try to incorporate (17a) into the game correlated with (16), which would have *he* corefer, however, with *Reagan*, acceptable only for (17b). Yet, the incorporation should be blocked unless the meaning of (16) is open to change. The real explanatory strategy, I believe, is the one that takes full account of meanings of the components, not one-by-one, but so-to-say, at one fell swoop; this is what focusing on some topical question lead to as the reconstruction of some dialogue game context. The higher topical question which dominates the whole text is (18) or (19):

- (18) *Who will win the election?*
 (19) *Who vote for whom?*

while the move that plays a crucial role in the arrangement of (17a) in the dialogue game representation is the question:

- (20) *Does the president vote for himself?*

What (17d) makes explicit is the the rationale why (17a) is to be understood in that way. Obviously, many more sentences may come in between my (16) and (17a) or make explicit silent, pragmatically prompted moves in the originally reconstructed dialogue game. Similarly for (17b); while (18)–(19) may still be of concern, the required move to place it in the dialogue game is (21):

(21) *Will everybody vote for Reagan?*

Unfortunately I have no place here for the exact formal representation of the dialogue game contexts, which would, however, be needed to show how anaphoric relations are treated; in brief, they are determined mainly by the moves higher up in the branches they are situated in. As for (17c), we have a case similar to (17b) with the observation that while on the author's approach it can be associated with (10) and given a simultaneous application of (G. he) which would result in two respective interpretations the reconstruction of the proper dialogue game context clearly vouchsafes just one such interpretation. Although this last remark ultimately displaces the explanatory principles of game-theoretical semantics, it must be mentioned that to give full force to (EP2) in explaining (17c) as an extension of (16) one needs to dispense with (EP3) as the strategical meaning of (16) does not seem to cope with the situation in (17c): it provides the players only with the reference of *Reagan* for the time of the subgame correlated with (17c).

3.0. To conclude with, I may repeat that the crux lies in the difference between the normally left-to-right process of how sentences are understood and the way of setting limits to what should be provessed as a whole. Of course, sentence boundaries, as the authors rightly note, are not always reliable; but what I feel amiss is the attempt to amen this uncertainty of partitioning the text with the idea of the subgame. When either the boundaries of a subgame or the scope of its strategical dependence becomes unclear, the original idea of the semantical game collapses unless some principle is being provided to bridge the gap between ordinary semantics and discursive contexts. It is the lack of such a principle that particularly ails me in the case of "Anaphora and Definite Descriptions."

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CRITICA

Péter Hajdú-Péter Domokos: Die uralischen Sprachen und Literaturen. Bibliotheca Uralica 8. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest (Gemeinschaftsausgabe des Helmut Buske Verlages, Hamburg mit dem Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest) 1987, 608 S.

Das vorliegende Buch ist eine Synthese der neuesten und bedeutendsten Erkenntnisse und Ergebnisse der Uralistik. Est besteht aus zwei Hauptteilen: Teil I, verfaßt von Péter Hajdú, beschäftigt sich mit der Geschichte und Struktur der uralischen (finnougrischen und uralischen) Sprachen, mit der rekonstruierten uralischen Grundsprache und Urgeschichte der uralischen Sprachen, sowie mit den arealen und typologischen Untersuchungen in diesem Bereich. Dabei werden die neuen Forschungsergebnisse des Autors miteinbezogen. Das abschließende Kapitel (V) des ersten Teils präsentiert uns die Geschichte und den gegenwärtigen Stand der uralistischen Forschungen. Dabei wird angegeben, daß Kapitel III und IV dem Werk „Uráli nyelvrokonaink” [Unsere uralische Sprachverwandten]” (Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest 1978) von demselben Verfasser entnommen sind, das seitdem zu einem grundlegenden Werk für das Studium der Uralistik an ungarischen Hochschulen und Universitäten geworden ist. Dasselbe kann von dem „Handbuch der uralischen Literaturen” von Péter Domokos (Studia Uralo-Altaica 18, Szeged 1982) behauptet werden, aus dem Teil II stammt, der sich mit der Entstehung und kurzen Geschichte der uralischen Literaturen befaßt.

Nach dieser kurzen zusammenfassenden Präsentation wollen wir uns mit den einzelnen Kapiteln auseinandersetzen. Kapitel I behandelt historische und strukturelle Probleme der uralischen Sprachen (mit einer Sprecherzahl von ca. 25 Millionen), wobei die einzelnen Sprachen (4 ugrische, 2 permische, 2 wolgaische, 7 ostseefinnische, die lappische und 4 samojedische) nach dem neuesten Stand der Wissenschaft ausführlich dargestellt werden. Dabei erhalten wir nicht nur linguistische Informationen im engeren Sinn des Wortes, sondern auch wichtige historico-geographische, dialektologische und Sprachkontaktdaten; wie z.B. dem breiten Publikum weniger bekannt sein sollte, gibt es im Ungarischen iranische, kaukasische, türkische (aus der Zeit vor der Landnahme sind es ca. 300 an der Zahl), byzantinisch-griechische, slawische (500-600), deutsch (ca. 2000), lateinische (mindestens 2000), französische, italienische, rumänische und sonstige Lehnwörter. Die Zahl der Ungarn betrug 1968 14.500.000, die der Ungarisch Sprechenden und sich als Ungarn Bezeichnenden 1980 16 Millionen. Die andere größere uralische (finnougrische) Sprache ist die der Finnen, die eine Sprecherzahl von rund 5 Millionen aufweist. Im Finnischen gibt es vor allem baltische, germanische und slawische Lehnwörter (aus der urfinnischen Epoche ererbt), sowie jüngere schwedische (ca. 2000) und russische (ca. 100) Wortübernahmen.

Hier sei zu erwähnen, daß der Autor trotz des Hinweises auf die internationalen Kulturwörter auf die massenhaften Übernahmen aus dem Englischen kaum eingeht. Dabei handelt es sich um eine grundlegende Erscheinung in fast allen Sprachen Europas, die eine, wenn auch kritische, — s. die rege Diskussion in den 70er Jahren in Ungarn über den Gebrauch der Fremdwörter —, eindeutige Stellungnahme verdient hätte. Ein anderes Problem ergibt sich bei der lappischen Sprache, wo der Verfasser die Erkenntnisse der 80er Jahre (außer Mikko Korhonen „Johdatus lapin kielen historiaan” [Einführung in die Geschichte der lappischen Sprache], Helsinki, 1981) nicht in Betracht zieht, obwohl vor allem in Norwegen und Schweden sprachpolitische (Sprachplanung einer neuen nordsamischen Norm – Davvin) und Sprachkontaktergebnisse (FUSKIS, FIDUS) erzielt wurden. Die Nichtberücksichtigung der neuesten Forschungsergebnisse der 80er Jahre (vor allem außerhalb der drei großen Länder: Ungarn, Finnland und Sowjetunion) ist leider auch im Kapitel V bei der Geschichte und dem gegenwärtigen Stand der uralistischen Forschungen festzustellen, obwohl der Verfasser

in einer Fußnote (S. 450) auf die Kürze seiner Übersicht und auf die Uralistik als internationalen Wissenschaftszweig hinweist. Ein 1986 veröffentlichtes, grundlegendes Handbuch der Uralistik hätte eben diese neueren Ergebnisse in kritischer Form berücksichtigen und auf die älteren schon bekannten (s. die zusammenfassenden Werke des Autors in den 60er und 70er Jahren) nur hinweisen müssen.

Trotz dieser kritischen, vielleicht auch etwas subjektiven Bemerkung gebührt dem Buch ein voller Lob insbesondere für die mit Akribie und Präzision erarbeiteten Synthese der uralischen Sprachen, was auch für die nächsten Kapitel gilt.

Kapitel II ist eine moderne Darstellung der uralischen Grundsprache, während Kapitel III die Urgeschichte der uralischen Sprachen behandelt. Diese beiden Kapitel, sowie Kapitel IV sind wirklich nach dem neuesten Stand der Wissenschaften verfaßt und bringen die neuesten Erkenntnisse der Archäologie, Urgeschichte, Ethnographie und Sprachgeschichte. Sehr wertvoll ist dabei die Beschreibung der Gesellschaft der uralischen und finnougri-schen Zeit anhand des Wortschatzes; eine kulturhistorische Forschungsarbeit, die in Zukunft dank der interdisziplinären Forschungsergebnisse sicher mehr in den Vordergrund gelangen wird. Eine der wertvollsten Erkenntnisse des Buches ist das neue Entwicklungsmodell der uralischen Sprachen (S. 313), das eine „lineare“ Abstammung dieser Sprachen aus dem Proto-Uralischen darstellt. Dieses „lineare“ Modell wird dem bekannten Stammbaum-Modell gegenübergestellt. Péter Hajdú präsentierte sein neues Modell der wissenschaftlichen Öffentlichkeit auf dem XIV. Linguistenkongreß in Berlin (10.–15. August 1987). Er war der Meinung, daß zwischen den heutigen Sprachen und der Grundsprache hypothetische, sekundäre Grundsprachen eingeschoben sind, deren reale Existenz stark in Zweifel gezogen wird. Die uralischen Sprachen können mehr oder weniger direkt vom dem ebenfalls hypothetischen Proto-Uralischen abgeleitet werden. Das gegenseitige Verhältnis dieser Sprachen läßt sich aufgrund typologischer Parameter graphisch darstellen. (P. Hajdú: Möglichkeiten einer „linearen“ Abstammung uralischer Sprachen. In: Abstract der Sektionvorträge und Rundtischgespräche des XIV. Internationalen Linguistenkongresses. Berlin 1987, 470).

Die graphische Darstellung der uralischen Sprachen aufgrund typologischer Parameter erscheint im Kapitel IV („Arealtypologische Untersuchung der uralischen Sprachen“), wo folgende Unterpunkte behandelt werden: Sprachtypologie, Universalien, Areallinguistik, typologischer Überblick über die uralischen Sprachen. Die Tabelle mit 20 ausgewählten Sprachparametern (S. 394) bildet die Grundlage zur graphischen Darstellung des gegenseitigen Verhältnisses der uralischen Sprachen zueinander aufgrund typologischer Parameter: Die einzelnen Sprachen bzw. Sprachgruppen erscheinen in dieser graphischen Darstellung in bestimmter Ordnung, und die Isoglossen von acht Parametern (Quantität, Dual, Grundform mit mehreren Formen, Kasussuffixe für innere/läufere lokale Relationen, *4*-Präteritum, *-ni*-Infinitiv, Konversion, SVO-Tendenz) verlaufen so, daß sie die gewünschten Sprachen umgreifen. Eine Sprache, in der das betreffende Parameter fehlt, wird von der Isoglosse ausgeschlossen, eine mit dem Vorzeichen \pm charakterisierte wird dagegen nicht eingeschlossen, sondern durchschnitten. „Gegenüber den Schemata, die die genetische Abstammung illustrieren, wirkt diese Abb. freilich ein wenig kompliziert, doch stellt sie die typologischen Übereinstimmungen zwischen den Sprachen in ihrer — manchmal absurden — Realität dar“ (s. Seite 408: Typologische Gruppierung der uralischen Sprachen).

Teil II (von Péter Domokon verfaßt) skizziert die Entstehung und kurze Geschichte der uralischen Literaturen; ein einmaliges Unternehmen, daß vor allem die kleinen uralischen Literaturen der breiten Öffentlichkeit bekanntmacht und sie dadurch in den Kreislauf der Weltliteratur einführt. Der Autor ist der Meinung, daß heutzutage auch die Literatur als ein fester Bestandteil der Finnougistik (Uralistik) anzusehen ist. In der Einleitung untermauert er diese seine Auffassung mit konkreten, tatkräftigen Beispielen und Beweisen.

Nach der kurzen Darstellung der drei großen uralischen Literaturen (ungarische, finnische, estnische) folgen die kleineren (mordwinische, tscheremissische, wotjakische, syrjänische, permjakische, wogulische, ostjakische, jurakische, karelische, lappische, wotische, ingrische, wepsische, livische und sölkupische) Literaturen, in deren erstmalig zusammenhängenden Präsentation die wissenschaftliche Bedeutung von Teil II liegt. Schade nur, daß diesmal die literarischen „Sprachproben“ (zweiprachig: in der Originalsprache und in deutscher Nachdichtung) fehlen, die seinerzeit das literarische Gewürz des „Handbuches der uralischen Literaturen“ von Péter Domokos (Szeged 1982) darstellten.

Das vorliegende Buch schließt mit einem sehr nützlichen Register (mit sämtlichen Verfassernamen aus Teil I und II, während sich das Sachregister „aus praktischen Gründen“ nur auf Teil I beschränkt!?) von Magdolna Kovács. Und nicht zuletzt gebührt der präzisen, sachlichen Übersetzung von Lea Haader auch ein Lob.

Alles in allem kann dieses große (nicht nur an Seiten) Werk als unentbehrliches Handbuch für die Uralisten (Finnougriken) im In- und Ausland bezeichnet werden. Es stellt eine Einführung in die uralische Sprach-, Urgeschicht- und Literaturforschung dar, erörtert die Anwendbarkeit der verschiedenen linguistischen Forschungsmethoden und die notwendige Einbeziehung mehrerer Nachbardisziplinen, und eignet sich damit zum Universitätslehrbuch sowie zum Nachschlagewerk für Linguisten, Ethnologen und Philologen.

N. Bradean-Ebinger

Büky Béla: A pszichikumra vonatkozó szókincs korai rétege a magyarban [Die frühe Schicht des sich auf die Psyche beziehenden Wortschatzes im Ungarischen]. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1986, 192 S.

Der Wort- und Begriffsschatz, der sich im Denken des Ungartums im 9. Jahrhundert u.Z. auf die Psyche und deren Elemente bezieht, kann gewissermaßen mit Hilfe der konventionellen Sprachwissenschaft und Volkskunde, sowie der Religionsgeschichte erschlossen werden. Wir kennen die Bezeichnung fast ausschließlich nur der psychischen Erscheinungen, die irgendwie mit religiösen Vorstellungen in Zusammenhang stehen, infolgedessen kann man nur aufgrund der Kenntnis der religiösen Vorstellungen und der gesetzten Parallellität auf die Bezeichnung der psychischen Erscheinungen folgern. In diesem Vorstellungsbereich steht der Schamanismus nicht allein. Die Ungarn hatten Kenntnis auch von gewissen judaisierenden Religionsformen der Chasaren, von der Religion der Kabaren, von der islamischen Auffassung der Ismaeliten, von der zum persischen Religionskreis gehörenden Glauben der Jazygen, vom Christentum byzantinischen Typs, von den Jüngern des byzantinischen Patriarchen Nestorius. In diesem breiten und bunten Kreis begann die Vereinheitlichung mit der Ausrichtung auf die westliche Form des Christentums. Eingefügt in die sog. „europäische Denkweise“ unterliegt der sich auf das schamanistische Weltbild beziehende Wort- und Begriffsschatz einem tiefgreifenden Wandel. Die Folge dieses Wandels ist, daß ein Teil der Wörter und Ausdrücke, die die grundlegenden Begriffe dieses Weltbildes bezeichneten, aus dem ungarischen Wortschatz verschwunden ist: die Götternamen, die mit dem Seelenbegriff verbundenen Namen (íz 'Schattenseele'), die Wörter, die mit dem Schaman und seiner Tätigkeit verbunden waren (rejt 'in Verückung fallen', javasol 'wahrsagen' usw.), die mit religiösen Vorstellungen zusammenhängenden Personennamen (Numolohod 'nicht existierendes Kind') usw. Manche von ihnen sind aber aufbewahrt worden: egy~igy~ügy 'heilig', lélek 'Seele', Isten 'Gott' usw.

Nach dem Überblick des Forschungsgebiets und der Auflistung der Hauptzüge des historischen und gesellschaftlichen Hintergrundes des Wandels des sich auf die Psyche beziehenden Begriffssystems stellt der Autor fest: „[...] das genannte Begriffssystem verarmte, verlor seine unreligiöse Begriffsfülle“ (24). Dieser Verarmung steht die Sprache der Bibelübersetzungen gegenüber, genauer die der ersten bekannten ungarischen Bibelübersetzung, der sog. Hussitenbibel (= HtB.), deren Text in dem Münchner, Wiener

und Apocryphen erhalten geblieben ist. Béla Büky hat seine Aufmerksamkeit auf diese Sprachdenkmäler konzentriert, und sammelte für seine onomasiologische Abhandlung die ungarischen Bezeichnungsformen des genannten Begriffes und seiner Varianten aus der HtB.

Der Autor geht umsichtig vor: er überprüft zunächst die Ergebnisse der den Wortschatz der Hussitenbibel betreffenden bisherigen Forschungen (28–50). Neben der Auffassung über die hussitische Herkunft der Bibelübersetzung gab es auch andere Ansichten. Manche meinten, daß die Übersetzung Franziskanern, bzw. Pauliner-, Benediktiner- oder Prämonstratenser Mönchen zugeschrieben werden kann. Die Möglichkeit der Verbindung mit dem pataren-katharischen Ketzertum tauchte auch auf; die Klärung dieser Frage ist deswegen sehr wichtig, weil die oben genannte Häresie eine bedeutende Wirkung auf die damaligen Auffassungen und so — wenn ihr zugehörten — auch auf die Übersetzer der HtB. hat. Die patarenische Abstammung versuchte ein Forscher mit Hilfe der ungarischen Entsprechungen einzelner lateinischer Ausdrücke zu beweisen: ein solches Argument war z. B. die Übersetzung des Wortes *anima* durch *lélek* 'Seele' und *spiritus* durch *szellet* 'Geist', aber mehrere sprachwissenschaftlich wohlbegründete Abhandlungen bestreiten diese These. — Der Autor behandelt im folgenden die Ergebnisse der sich an die HtB. knüpfenden wortgeschichtlichen Untersuchungen (45–50). Obwohl Béla Büky — wie er es auch erwähnt (50) — selbständige Forschungen in der Frage der Glaubenszugehörigkeit der Übersetzer nicht angestellt hatte, führte er die Quellenkritik für den inhaltlichen Teil seiner Arbeit mit zuverlässiger Gründlichkeit durch.

Das Buch legt (52–100) die Angaben in alphabetischer Reihenfolge vor. In Betracht gezogen wurden nur Nomina und keine Verba. Der Verfasser gibt die lateinischen Wörter und die ungarischen Entsprechungen aus der HtB. an. Dem folgt die ungarische Bedeutungserklärung mit der dazugehörenden Textstelle im Kodex. Neben den hebräischen bzw. griechischen Pendanten teilt der Verfasser die entsprechenden Textstellen aus den heute gültigen zwei ungarischen Übersetzungen mit, denen auch noch die lateinische Form aus der Vulgata hinzugefügt wird. Die hebräischen Wörter und Ausdrücke bringt er in phonetischer Transkription, auch die Transkriptionsliste ist im Buch zu finden (163–4). In dem mehr als neunzig Stichwörter enthaltenden Register ist also der sich auf die Psyche beziehende Wortschatz der HtB. auf Grund der lateinischen Wörter und Ausdrücke zu finden. Grund dieses Verfahrens ist es, daß die Bibelübersetzer auch einen lateinischen Grundtext hatten. Wer unmittelbar ungarische Wörter oder Ausdrücke sucht, muß zuerst zum Magyar szó-és címszómutató [Ungarisches Wort- und Ausdrucksregister] (177–89) blättern. Die Suche nach den ungarischen Wörtern und Ausdrücken wird auch noch dadurch kompliziert, daß die Wörter, die sich auf die Stichwörter der Sammlung beziehen, aber auch aus der Zeit vor der HtB. dokumentiert sind, nicht im Register sondern in einer anderen Liste (103–4) zu finden sind. So verstecken sich einige Wörter: z.B. kommt *vigasztalándó* (*Szent Szellet*) 'trostbringender Heiliger Geist' weder im Register, noch für sich, noch beim *szent* 'heilig', noch beim *szellet* 'Geist' vor, ist aber sowohl in der Datensammlung, als auch in der genannten Liste unter dem lateinischen *Paralictus* zu finden (104).

Was die Bedeutungsangaben der Stichwörter betrifft, geht der Autor sehr umsichtig vor. Z.B. gibt der Wortartikel *cor=szív* 'Herz' die folgenden Bedeutungen und Bedeutungsvarianten an: „1. Herz als anatomisches Organ; 2. 'Lebenskraft'; 3. 'Gesamtheit der Seeleninhalte und -anlagen (beim Menschen) [...] a) 'als Zentrum der Austrichungen und Inhalte des Gefühls, des Willens und der Vorstellungen'; b) 'als Zentrum der Vernunftsfähigkeiten und -inhalte'; 4. 'die Mitte, der in der genauen Mitte liegende Teil (von etwas)'". Wenn man eine der Bedeutungsangaben in den entsprechenden Textteil einfügt, stellt sich heraus, ob die Bedeutungsangabe richtig ist oder nicht. Z.B. an der folgenden Stelle: *mezt megkœűedēt ē nepnēc ō zœűœc* [denn dieses Volkes Herz ist verstockt] (MünchK. 19va15); nach Meinung des Autors entspricht die Bedeutungsangabe 3.a) dem hiesigen Wort *zœű* 'Herz'. Ob es wirklich so ist, entscheidet die Interpretation der Metapher **megkœűedēt ō zœűœc* 'ihr Herz ist verstockt'; dabei ist uns die Vulgata behilflich: *Incrassatum est enim cor populi*

huius. Aber die Bedeutung des Wortes *cor~zü* ist sowohl im lateinischen, als auch im ungarischen Text nur in Abhängigkeit von der Bedeutung *incrassatum est~megkouèzedet* und mit Hilfe der semantischen Kohäsion des breiteren Kontextes festzustellen. Das können wir damit unterstützen, daß das im Beispiel stehende Verb in den späteren Übersetzungen als *meg tompult* (Pesti, Wý Teft.), *meg nehezédett* (Sylv., UT.), *meg-termékedett* (Káldi, Bibl.), *megkérgesedett* (Bibl. 1976.) usw. vorkommt. Das Wort *zü* [Herz] ist Teil einer Metapher, die einen klar umrissenen Gemütszustand (man wird gegen andere empfindungslos) ausdrückt, und infolgedessen verändert sich seine Bedeutung in Abhängigkeit vom anderen Teil der Metapher. So wird die Geltung der Bedeutungsangaben in großem Maße durch die schon erwähnte Tatsache bestätigt, daß der Verfasser den einzelnen Wörtern die Felder, in denen sie vorkommen, zuordnet, und dadurch eine Kontrolle durch den Leser ermöglicht. Übrigens berücksichtigt der Verfasser die Metapherkonstruktionen auch in der praktischen Analyse, z.B. im Falle von *a szellet megfordul* 'der Geist wendet sich um', *a lelket felemelik* 'die Seele wird erhoben' (101, 110, 137).

Durch die Analyse der Angaben weist Büky die Spuren der uralten psychischen Vorstellungen in der HtB. nach (*táltos*=*magus*, *rütet*=*exstasis*, *leletezet*=*languor* usw.), aber er stellt fest, daß es hinter diesen Wörtern keine unreligiösen Vorstellungen gibt (102). Die solche Vorstellungen erweckenden Wörter sind schon im Sprachgebrauch der christlichen Geistlichen verschwunden. Wenn trotzdem ein auf die Urreligion zurückgreifendes Wort gebraucht wurde, wurde es zu einem allgemeinbrauchbaren (*passe-partout*) Wort: *lélek* 'animus, anima, spiritus, flatu'. Tamás und Bálint haben aber durch ihre Arbeit den betreffenden Wortschatz nicht nur vermehrt, sondern auch eine philologische Genauigkeit der Übersetzung angestrebt. — Bei der Darstellung des erschlossenen Wort- und Ausdruckschatzes geht der Verfasser auf die ganze Psyche (Seele, Verstand, Geist, Herz usw.), den Begriff des Charakters (*szellet*=*spiritus*, *természet*=*natura* usw.), der Wahrnehmung, der Erinnerung und des Vergessens, der Aufmerksamkeit, des Lernens, der Phantasie, der Vernunft, des Gefühls, der Willenstätigkeit, der Begabung und der Anlagen, der seelischen Unausgeglichenheit und der besonderen Seelenvorgänge ein. Nach zahlreichen nützlichen Teilbeobachtungen behandelt er die grundlegenden Entwicklungstendenzen des Wandels des gegebenen Wortschatzes. Da die Benennung der körperlichen Änderungen in jeder Sprache zum Ausdruck der Seelenvorgänge und -zustände dient, ergeben sich durch dieses Verfahren allzuviel Wörter übertragener Bedeutung. Solche Wörter „[...] beginnen bei einem gewissen Niveau des menschlichen Bewußtseins [...] massenhaft auszusterben“ (136). Zur Zeit der HtB. ist dieser Vorgang schon eingetreten, so kommt z.B. das Wort **jonh* 'Magen' > 'Seele' nur ausnahmsweise vor. — Der Autor widmet einen separaten Abschnitt dem Weiterleben der aus der HtB. erschlossenen Wort- und Ausdruckschatzes (138–53). Er beweist, daß János Sylvester die Sprache der HtB. gekannt und in geringem Maße angewandt hat, ein gewisser Kontakt besteht auch zum Text der Übersetzung Károlis, ein naher Kontakt läßt sich aber — was den Text im Wiener und Münchner Kodex betrifft — besonders mit der Übersetzung Káldis aufweisen. Genau durch diese Übersetzung konnte sich jener Teil des behandelten Wortschatzes verbreiten, der als sprachlicher Neologismus der HtB. betrachtet werden kann. In diesem Abschnitt wird noch das Schicksal des genannten Wortschatzes zur Zeit der Spracherneuerungsbewegung, sowie der Teil des heutigen Wortschatzes der Psychologie, der bis zur HtB. zurückgeht und meistens nur als Rohstoff für die heutige Fachsprache dient, behandelt.

Die Zusammenfassung der Monographie (154–8) erörtert nicht nur die generalisierbaren Ergebnisse, sondern orientiert uns auch über die neuesten, den Münchner Kodex betreffenden Forschungen von László Hadrovics. — Außer dem schon oben erwähnten Wortregister und dem Register für die hebräische Transkription findet man noch am Ende des Buches die Auflösung der Quellenabkürzungen und eine Bibliographie (165–76). In der letzteren vermisste ich die Abhandlung von Gedeon Mészöly Über die Spuren des ugrischen Schamanismus in dem ungarischen Wortschatz (MNy. XLVIII 1952, 46–61). — Hier muß ich auch

bemerkten, daß ich im Buch etwa zwanzig Druckfehler gefunden habe. In der Belegsammlung habe ich, die ersten fünfundzwanzig Angaben kontrolliert; das Ergebnis ist: 55: *o lèlkèt akaranga*, richtig: *o*; ebenda: *ki ke' eluèztèndi*, richtig: *Ki*; 57: *lèlkem felmagasztatta*, richtig: *felmagasztat't'a*; 58: *zomoro èn lelkem*, richtig: *lèlkem*; ebenda: *lelkem meghaborodott*, richtig: *meghaborodot* 62: im Artikel *aspectus=személy* 'Person' sind bei Bedeutung 2 die Angaben nicht kursiv gesetzt worden. Eine ähnliche Kleinigkeit: der Verfasser weist auf die unsicher lesbaren, deswegen in der Ausgabe des Münchener Kodexes, aus dem der Autor seine Angaben zitiert, kursiv gesetzten *e*-Buchstaben (oder auf die Tatsache ihrer Weglassung) nicht hin, z.B. 55: *lèlketekèt* (18va28) 'eure Seele'; 57: *lelketet* 'deine Seele' usw. Wir haben übrigens im Buch viele Zeichen der philologischen Genauigkeit des Verfassers, an der Seite 92 korrigiert er z.B. in der Anmerkung 41 ein Zitat aus dem Münchner Kodex auf Grund des Faksimiles, leider gibt es aber auch in dieser Angabe einen Druckfehler. Und noch eine Anmerkung: aus dem Artikel *cor=szív* 'Herz' fehlt die folgende Angabe: *Tù zzuètecn^c kemen/egèietz i2ta tünètec moyfes* (46ra5) 'Wegen eures Herzens Härte hat Mose euch dies Gebot geschrieben'.

Das Buch von Béla Bükky ist eine hervorragende Leistung, es gereicht nicht nur dem Autor, sondern auch der ungarischen Onomasiologie zur Ehre. Gewiß wird es ein unentbehrliches Hilfsmittel der späteren wort- und stilgeschichtlichen Untersuchungen sein.

L. Bükky

András Vértés O.: Bevezetés a magyar hangstilisztikába [Einführung in die ungarische Lautstilisztik]. Nyelvtudományi Értekezések 124. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1987, 71 s.

„Die Lautstilisztik ist jener Zweig der Sprachwissenschaft bzw. der Literaturwissenschaft, der sich mit der stilistischen Rolle der menschlichen lautlichen Erscheinungen beschäftigt“ — definiert der Verfasser den sich formierenden Wissenschaftszweig, dessen Überblick er sich vorgenommen hat (3). In der Definition — wie er schreibt — faßt er den Laut in einem breiteren Sinn auf: nicht nur 'der Laut', sondern auch 'die Stimme' gehören dazu.

Nach dem bibliographischen Überblick (7–8) der sich an mehrere Bereiche (Lautlehre, Bedeutungslehre, Rhetorik usw.) knüpfenden Disziplin gibt er eine Übersicht über die Geschichte der ungarischen Lautstilisztik (10–13). Die Vorgeschichte führt von den lautästhetischen Bemerkungen von Mátyás Bél und János Gyalogi (XVIII. Jh.) in unsere Zeit, wo die Forschungen von Iván Fónagy gewiß den Vorrang haben.

Während der Verfasser die Zusammenhänge der Einheiten des Lautsystems und der stilistischen Wirkung erörtert (14–24), geht er — unter anderem — auf die Frage ein, woher jene Rolle der Sprachlaute stammt, daß mancherlei Empfindungen und Vorstellungen sich an sie knüpfen (können). Vértés faßt die zahlreichen Feststellungen (manchmal nur Hypothesen), die sich mit der Frage befassen, zusammen, und meint: „[. . .] es ist gewiß, daß die Grundvariante der Phoneme ihre Wirkung nur durch ihre Distribution, Häufigkeit in dem gegebenen Text ausübt, während manche emphatische oder evokative Varianten im allgemeinen schon selbst eine stilistische Wirkung haben“ (16). Seine Feststellungen — besonders in bezug auf die Emphase — beweist er auf Grund der Phonologie hervorragend.

Der Verfasser macht im Zusammenhang mit der stilistischen Wirkung der Aussprache der ungarischen Sprachlaute die bemerkenswerte Bemerkung, daß die Art der Artikulation — wenn sie im ganzen Sprachwerk zur Geltung kommt — ein nicht belangloser Faktor sei (26). Sind wir darauf aufmerksam, können wir auf Stil- und Geschmackswandlungen innerhalb einer Epoche folgern. Man darf die ästhetische Wirkung der Laute in einer Sprache

auch nicht unabhängig vom Geschmack untersuchen: die Zahl der intersubjektiv kontrollierbaren Meinungen ist sehr gering, und die scheinbar solche sind, basieren manchmal auf tausendjähriger Tradition, z. B. in bezug auf die musikalischen bzw. geräuschartigen Laute (so auf Dionysios Halikarnasseus). Die Forschungsergebnisse des sprachlichen Wohlklanges über Euphonie und Kakophonie umreißen deshalb nur die Probleme, anstatt daß sie in aller Hinsicht beruhigende Lösungen geben könnten.

Die Beschreibung der Lautstärke, des Akzents, der Lauthöhe und des Tonfalls kann und darf nicht von den Stilerscheinungen getrennt werden, denn all diese Charakterzüge sind meistens in engem Zusammenhang mit dem Ausdruck der Gefühle. Ein Mittel, eine Folgeerscheinung des Gefühlsausdrucks ist der Rhythmus. Der Verfasser überblickt die einschlägige Rolle des Rhythmus der Prosa. Die früheren — etwa Mitte des XIX. Jahrhunderts — Anforderungen an den Rhythmus der Prosa (z.B. in einer Festrede, aber auch in anderen Gattungen) sind für heute schon in den Hintergrund geraten. Die Geschichte des Prosarhythmus und die Gestaltung unserer Gefühlswelt hängen zusammen. András Vértés O. erörtert diese Frage ausführlicher in seiner Abhandlung „Érzelm világunk és a nyelv történeti változása [Unsere Gefühlswelt und die historische Wandlung der Sprache]“ (A Magyar Nyelvtudományi Társaság Kiadványai 179. Budapest 1987. 16 ff.). — Die Donnerstimme, die Ansehen und Würde ausdrückt, hatte vor einigen Generationen eine viel größere Rolle, als heute. Sich auf P.J. Moses berufend stellt der Verfasser fest, daß die Lehrer, die Priester, die Richter und (in der Familie) die Väter eine gewisse Donnerstimme sprachen, die Ansehen ausdrückte. Die „väterliche“ Stimme, die Autorität und Überlegenheit ausdrückte und suggerierte — erörtert András Vértés O. —, ist mit dem allgemeinen Untergang des Ansehens und mit dem Raumverlust des Vatermodells in der modernen Gesellschaft in den Hintergrund geraten. Seine Hypothese kann er (unter anderem) durch Beobachtungsangaben der heutigen ungarischen Schauspielkunst und der heutigen ungarischen klerikalen Festrede mit Tatsachen unterstützen (47). Die Zeit, genauer gesagt das Zusammenwirken der vorerwähnten Umstände, hat auch die Musikalität der Laute angegriffen. Nach Angaben von Vértés ist unser Sprechen etwa in den Jahren zwischen 1960–1980 in mehreren Gattungen und Sprechsituationen weniger klangvoll, als vor einigen Generationen. Auch das hängt gewiß mit seelischen und gesellschaftlichen Faktoren zusammen, deshalb hat der Reichtum der musikalischen Komponenten des Sprachlautes eine ausgesprochene und auffallende stilistische Wirkung.

In der Arbeit werden noch die wichtigsten Fragen der Lautnachahmung, der Onomatopöie, der stilistischen Rolle der außersprachlichen Lautzeichen (Husten, Räuspern usw.) und das Stil des sichtbaren Teils der Lautbildung (z.B. der Lippenbewegung) überblickt (49–58).

Zum Schluß faßt der Verfasser auf beherzigenswerte Weise die weiteren Aufgaben und Probleme zusammen (59). Unter den Aufgaben ist seiner Meinung nach die Beschreibung der ungarischen Gestik und Mimik am dringendsten; wie er sagt: „[...] wenn wir die Welt der ungarischen Gestik und Mimik jetzt nicht dokumentieren, wird später auch der heutige Lautstil in der Ganzheit der Kommunikation nicht analysierbar“ (a.a.O.). Das Buch endet mit einer ausführlichen Bibliographie (66–70).

In seiner Arbeit einführenden Charakters erschließt uns András Vértés O. den vollständigen Themen- und Problembereich der ungarischen Lautstilistik. Das ist besonders wichtig, denn wegen des Mangels an einer zeitgemäßen ungarischen Stilistik kann sich nicht nur der Universitätsunterricht, sondern auch die Forschung auf die Abhandlung stützen (vgl. István Szathmári: Magyar stilsztika (tervezet új egyetemi tankönyv kidolgozására) [Ungarische Stilistik (Entwurf zur Bearbeitung eines neuen Lehrbuchs für die Universitäten)]. In: Magyar Nyelv LXXXIII (1978), 284–97).

L. Büký

John A. Hawkins: A Comparative Typology of English And German – Unifying the Contrasts. Croom Helm, London & Sydney 1986, 244 p.

Placing himself in the tradition of "typological universal grammar", Hawkins presents a unifying comparison of German and English, claiming 1. that the patterns of variation between English and German contain proper subset relations, which are 2. related to all major areas of a grammar and which are 3. interconnected by a general difference in the relation between form and meaning, with English permitting a greater distance between the two. On a typological continuum of varying correspondence between surface form and semantic representations English is nearer the negative end and German nearer the positive end. And, according to Hawkins, there can be no pragmatic preference for either side, since the greater simplicity and generality of the rules producing the linear forms of English are necessarily bound to a greater complexity of the rules assigning meanings to these forms, while on the German side more formal distinctions are correlated to a greater simplicity in semantic interpretation. But over the time, languages can drift from one part of this typological continuum to the other, as was the case with English, which originally exhibited a greater tightness of fit between surface form and meaning.

In part I, Hawkins takes up about half a dozen of mostly interrelated classes of differences between English and German. Chapter 8 presents the gist of the whole book, after which the comparison of verb positions in part II reads like a parenthesis 'exbraciated' for length rather than relevance. The book is richly illustrated by examples (in part quoted from less well-known publications, as Rohdenburg 1974, or unpublished manuscripts, as Plank 1980), which support Hawkins' claims convincingly. Neither the data nor its interpretation can be seriously challenged. But despite its plausibility, the typological generalization concerning the language specific distance between form and meaning (let us call it: PD) may have to be revised in the light of counter-evidence, which the book fails to mention at all. But let us begin with Hawkins' evidence in favour of PD.

Due to case syncretism, i.e. the loss of inflectional morphology in the history of English, clause internal word order freedom is greater in German than in English: There are more movement rules and similar rules apply more productively in German. The more rigid word order in English is associated with a higher ambiguity of the individual linguistic form as numerous pragmatic and semantic distinctions are not any longer explicitly expressed in surface morphology. Concerning functional sentence perspective, there is a greater thematic/rhematic ambiguity or vagueness in English, and there is a greater semantic ambiguity concerning the semantic roles carried by object and subject as opposed to German sentence structures, where there is less semantic diversity for the basic grammatical relations of subject and object since the oblique roles of experiencer, instrument, goal, etc. are more often expressed by other grammatical relations.

Regarding selectional restrictions of German and English predicates, Hawkins demonstrates the greater selectional freedom of English predicates, quoting widely from Plank 1980, who claims "that the degree of specificity in the selectional restrictions of the predicates of a language is systematically correlated with the semantic specificity of its basic grammatical relations" (p. 33). As English subjects have increased beyond the set of semantic roles predicted by case syncretism, Hawkins cites Kirkwood 1978, who points to the pragmatic position, which due to the fixed SVO word order in English is identical with the position of subject.

Actually, the difference in the relations between theme, grammatical relation and semantic role constitutes a clear case of Keenan's principle of covariation of functional equivalents (quoted on page 41), which could be summarized as

- (a) German may use various grammatical relations as topic of a sentence; English prefers subjects as topics;

- (b) English subjects can carry a greater variety of semantic roles; German prefers an agentive role for the subject and realizes primarily non-agentive topics by other grammatical relations.

This means, however, that at least some of Hawkins' pragmatic differences carried by the greater freedom of German word order are taken over by the semantic diversity of the basic grammatical relations in English. As the latter manifests itself in the greater selectional freedom of English predicates, all pragmatic and semantic differences reviewed so far could be seen as two sides of a coin. But the positional differences between German and English sentences are not always compensated by differences in the grammatical relations. For example, adverbial topics of German sentences do not always correspond to subjects of English sentences, but may as well correspond to an English adverbial in the rhematic part of the sentence. As it is, the SOV/SVO difference between German and English seems to play a much greater part in the typological characteristics of the two languages than Hawkins' generalisation would lead us to expect. We will return to this aspect in discussing part II.

According to Hawkins, a greater semantic and pragmatic ambiguity of English surface structure is also associated with a greater freedom of clause external movements in English, applying in a large class of subject-to-subject raising, which in German is only possible for a few predicates like *scheinen*; a large class of subject-to-object raising, which is practically not possible in German at all; quite a productive class of *tough*-movements or object-to-subject raising, which is again limited in German as the class with fewer predicates is restricted to direct objects and the rule is bounded. The semantic result of raising are arguments of an immediate predicate in the surface structure which are not arguments of this predicate in semantic structure.

Comparing English and German extraction, Hawkins sets up a hierarchy of extraction difficulty where the least difficult case is that of the infinitive or object complement of a two-place predicate, followed by an infinitive or non-subject complement of a three-place predicate, then finite non-subject complements, infinitival phrases not strictly subcategorized with respect to the predicate of their clause, and, finally, finite clauses which are not strictly subcategorized. Only the last case restricts extraction in both languages. With some native speaker's uncertainties about the last but one case, all cases are possible in English in contrast to German where only the first case is accepted without any reservations. The result of extraction can be compared to that of raising structures with the position of arguments in the surface structure different from that of the semantic representations, which Hawkins summarizes as "argument trespassing".

As pied piping, in particular VP-pied piping, enables nominal phrases to take along their predicate, and pied piping structures of German include those of English, governed nominal phrases remain within their phrasal categories to a greater extent in German than in English. Again, Hawkins argues, it is the loss of morphonological case which facilitates extractions and reduces pied pipings in English. As a result of these differences, English surface structure deviates from the corresponding logical structure more than German surface structure.

Finally, Hawkins suggests that the number of deletions independent of raising and extraction may also be greater in English than in German: There is more conjunction in English as case syncretism produces more identical nominal phrases. English active sentences can more often be used with deleted or understood agents, German often employs a reflexive pronoun when patient arguments occupy the subject position. English can delete non-subject relative pronoun, German uses more overt pronominal heads of sentence complements. All this means again that English collapses semantic and syntactic distinctions kept apart in German. Thus, in Hawkins' terms, the loss of inflectional case and the more rigid word order in an English sentence as well as the greater freedom of clause external movements and deletions produce a higher degree of ambiguity/vagueness; at the same time deletion and

external movements lessen correspondence between surface clause structure and semantic clause structure. These conclusions can, no doubt, stand undisputed. But whether they justify PD as a generalization about the typological characteristics of both languages as a whole can only be decided after cases determining the relation between form and meaning have been taken into consideration. We will return to this question at the end of the paper.

In the second part of the book, Hawkins compares English and German verb positions, claiming that all contrasts can be traced back to case syncretism and the shift to SVO in English. While case syncretism is considered the main reason for the more fixed word order in English, it is considered a sufficient, not a necessary cause of the OV to VO shift as the order SVO is well established before the total loss of the case system.

While verb final order dominates in German, there are only some morphological compounds with verb final patterns, but no syntactic verb final rule in English, where are indicated subject vs. object by the position of noun phrases in relation to the verb. Despite the base-generated verb second structure, and three major verb-second rules of English (subject-aux inversion, subject-simple verb inversion participle preposing), English verb second structures are severely restricted compared to German, so that verb second structures of English are properly included in those of German. Many verb second structures in German correspond to verb third structures in English, where topicalization is much less often associated with subject-aux inversion. Verb third structures preserve the basic SVO pattern of English, i.e. XSVO. Moreover, the class of verbs which allow inversion is, with few exceptions, restricted to aux and modals which preserve SVO word order for the lexical verb. The inversed structures serve pragmatic functions: identifying or scene-setting, connective or emphatic respectively focus functions. Subject postposing is typically associated with verbs expressing existence, emergence or creation, as e.g. in sentences with *there is*. But altogether, the pragmatic rearrangement possibilities are fewer in English than in German.

Verb first structures are also more frequent in German than in English, but occur in both languages in the same environment: yes-no questions, imperatives, exclamations, counterfactuals and conditionals (as well as a stylistic case in dramatic narrative style in German). Except for a small class of sentence adverbs, verb first movements are in both languages incompatible with topicalizations (German being somewhat freer). But while German employs the tensed verb, English is again restricted to aux. Reasons and consequences of the verb-first contrasts are similar to those of the second-verb structures: the preservation of SVO word order with the lexical verb independent of the aux-subject or subject-aux order. However, except for yes-no questions, the productivity of first verb structures is highly restricted also in the environments mentioned above. In the context of *if*, counterfactuals and conditionals use SVO, and imperatives can be viewed as SVO structures with deleted subjects anyway so that the semantic range of SVO word order is again more ambiguous in English than in German.

Hawkins considers variation in verb position relative to other constituents a case of word order freedom despite the fact that German verb position has been strongly grammaticalized. Due to its different positions, the verb is an important surface structure indicator of different syntactic clause types in German, which is interpreted as another case of more meaning distinctions drawn in German than in English, particularly in regard to the pragmatic meaning concerning truth. As verb position alone is sufficient to distinguish main and subordinate clauses in German, it can also carry pragmatic differences, as is the case e.g. in German echo-questions and indirect commands realized by *daß*-clauses. In English the verb position alone is the same in sub- and main clauses and can therefore not carry the pragmatic difference. But, we have to add, the absence of aux-inversion can serve the same purpose and there are many native speakers of English who would accept examples like "Where the new mayor lives?" as echo-questions. It is obviously true that the different verb positions in German can carry semantic/pragmatic differences which are not expressed by

the invariant position of the (main) verb in English, yet this 'deficiency' is more than compensated by the semantic/pragmatic functions of the English auxiliary (and its substitute *do*).

Though German and English have similar rightward moving rules like extraposition from noun phrase, German rules can apply in more environments than English rules. With optional application, rightward moving rules placing constituents outside the finite/non-finite brace produce surface structure doublets which are often without parallel in English. These cases of 'exbraciation' follow a hierarchy of decreasing heaviness of constituents almost diametrically opposed to the extraction hierarchy mentioned above (tensed sentence to infinitive with argument to infinitive from non-strictly subcategorized to strictly subcategorized constituents). Hawkins shows that the hierarchy is related to processing aspects applying to the difference, between OV and VO languages in general: while the early appearance of the verb in a sentence helps to predict the structure of the clause following it, the precise interpretation of the verb depends upon its arguments, which are present first in OV languages. There can be no processing preference for either type. However, the more arguments there are before the verb or the heavier and longer a subordinated constituent, the greater the need for its postponement behind the verb. The relation seems to be quite straightforward and a similar phenomenon is well-known in English, where lengthy complements of verbs are postponed to shorted ones, inverting normal structural order (principle of endweight).

Now, the historical choice of a certain word order may only be indirectly co-determined by processing aspects — as in the case with the rigid position of the English verb in relation to subject and object; communicative resp. processing adequacy is, as a rule, secured by additional principles determining the (stylistic) use of a language. For example, the analysis of about 200 pages of rather perfect translation of English scientific texts into German has revealed a pattern of positional changes concerning adverbials and attributes which resembles that of the basic structural difference between German and English. Summarizing all extensions of categorial heads as complements, it can be generalized as

PA German complements tend to precede their heads, English complements tend to follow theirs.

Within the verb phrase, the difference is a systematic one in English (except for free adverbials), within the noun phrase and the sentence, the difference is one of use in both languages, including many cases of additional changes in the form of the complements, up to attributes rendered as determining morphemes of German compounds.

If PA is correct, it means that the basic word order of a language, which is determined relative to the verb, may recur as a stylistic rule determining preferences of modifiers that secure an order analogous to the basic one. The principle of 'analogous word order' is at work in English and German equally, its outcome differs according to the basic difference between VO in English vs. OV in German. As it is a dominant principle characterizing positional differences between German and English, it may even qualify for a typological feature distinguish the two languages.

Except for questions of quantifier scope, which were set aside in the book despite their significance for the relation between form and meaning, there seems to be no connection between PA and PO, which means that PD may be one of the principles unifying contrasts between German and English, but definitely not the only one.

Hawkins' claim that German has a closer fit between form and meaning than English seems to be proven sufficiently by the evidence presented in the book. We can even add some cases contributing to the greater explicitness of German structures, as e.g. the greater frequency of zero articles in English, which is to a certain extent predetermined by the contextual characteristics of English nouns and enhanced by the stylistic preference of indefinite plural nouns in many contexts where German would prefer definite nouns. Then

there is the class of text connective devices, which is more productive in German than in English, particularly in the field of epistemic particles like *ja*, *doch*, *denn*, etc. and is more often made use of in German than in English. On the other hand, asyndetic relations are far more common in English than in German.

There are, of course, also counterexamples making English more explicit than German, as e.g. the aux-substitute *do* or the pro-form *one* replacing nouns after adjectives. But a great deal of the differences between German and English producing different patterns of informational density in German and English texts are not directly bound to differences of the two systems but result from differences in their use. Although a typological contrast may be restricted to a comparison of systems, consideration of processing advantages or disadvantages make only sense if one extends the analysis onto principles characterizing the use of the languages contrasted. It is very unlikely that a language should be altogether less explicit and more ambiguous than another language. As any good translator will confirm, the potential of informational adequacy securing a well-balanced proportion between explicit and implicit information differs only between individual passages of source language and target language texts but not as a whole. Where differences between the systems do not compensate each other, they are compensated by differences in the use. Thus, the English potential to reduce the explicitness of sentence structure by non-finite verb phrases has no parallel in the German system and would automatically lead to a greater explicitness of German sentence structure if all English non-finite verb phrases were rendered as clauses in German. However, this is not the case. There are many examples where English non-finite phrases are rendered as noun phrases in German, partly by using deverbal nouns, partly by reducing the verb phrases to its nominal complements after deletion of the verb. Though English may use the same structures as German, it seems to prefer non-finite verb phrases ever so often and, certainly, not because they are characterized by a less tighter fit between form and meaning, but because the verb has a much more important role to play in the syntactic characteristics of noun phrases in English. The corresponding nominal structures in German are definitely not closer to the underlying semantic structures; with propositions converted into arguments through reinterpreted or deleted predicates, they might even be considered one step further away.

Other devices to reduce explicitness in German are the productivity of compounding, which has no parallel in English (except for certain registers like *journalese*), and the freer use of pronouns instead of fully specified noun phrases, of which there are many examples in good translations of English texts. Just as the difference in regard to inflectional case causes a relative preference of nominal or verbal structure, it leads to the preference of pronouns or specified noun phrases in certain passages of English and German texts.

As the different properties of the systems are reflected in the different uses of languages, we may be well advised to extend our comparative analyses to the latter, all the more so if the generalizations proposed are to be interpreted in terms of processing. Hawkins' idea of a typological continuum concerning the relation between form and meaning in different languages is highly implausible for the systems themselves, let alone for a comprehensive comparison of systems and use. However difficult an overall assessment of general differences between languages may be, it can be expected to yield more specific typological characteristics and protect us from oversimplifications like: English is more logical than German; German is more redundant than English; etc. Though Hawkins' unifying principle of a closer fit between form and meaning in German than in English seems well-motivated by some of the major differences between the two languages, it may yet prove an overgeneralization if all aspects of the relation between form and meaning are taken into consideration.

M. Doherty

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Richard Hogg and C.B. McCully: Metrical phonology: A coursebook. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987, 279 pp.

1. The volumes of the book series of Cambridge University Press surveying the state of the art in various fields of linguistics provide invaluable help to those who want to acquire up-to-date basic knowledge in an area of linguistics. Those who want merely to be familiar with the achievements of a given field, without contributing to them — e.g. researchers of related areas — find all the information they need in these volumes. Those who aspire to working knowledge in a field are prepared for individual work by these books, acquiring the ability to read, comprehend, digest, and evaluate primary literature by themselves.

A volume of this type published by Cambridge University Press is R. Hogg and C.B. McCully's *Metrical phonology*. Among the CUP linguistic surveys, it is most closely related to A. Radford's excellent, widely popular *Transformational Syntax: A Student's Guide to Chomsky's Extended Standard Theory* (1981). Like Radford's book, *Metrical phonology* is a coursebook of university level. It summarizes, exposes, and explains the primary literature on metrical phonology up to 1985/86. What is perhaps even more important, it also orientates the reader, by making him understand the history of ideas, their emergence and disappearance, and by making him able to distinguish the issues from ideas of less theoretical significance.

2. The topic of the book: metrical phonology, the most influential current theory of stress and rhythm, is a product of the past decade. The book, however, places metrical phonology into a wider context: the introductory chapter gives a summary of the standard segmental generative theory of stress as formulated in *The Sound Pattern of English* by Chomsky and Halle (1968). By way of illustrating the standard theory, chapter 1 also makes the reader acquainted with the regularities of stress assignment in English simple words, compounds, and phrases, i.e., with data a metrical theory must be able to account for.

Chapter 2, dealing with the syllable, already prepares the suprasegmental, syllable-based treatment of stress typical of metrical phonology. It defines the syllable as a particular, hierarchical structure of phonemes, and demonstrates by examples that the notion of syllable proposed is indispensable in the adequate description of various phonological phenomena.

Chapter 3 outlines the basic ideas and concepts of metrical phonology as proposed in Liberman and Prince (1977), focusing on how the innovations of the theory help to eliminate problems inherent in the segmental model of Chomsky and Halle. For instance, in the Chomsky-Halle model the stress feature is multi-valued, as a result of which a sentence can in principle display an infinite number of stress levels because of the possibly infinite iteration of the Stress Subordination Convention. Metrical phonology discards absolute stress

values (i.e., stress contours of the type "1 0 1"); it introduces instead a hierarchical, binary branching metrical tree, the nodes of which are associated with one of the values of a binary stress feature: they are either s(trong) or w(eak). As is shown in chapter 3, the adequate formulation of the rules of stress assignment in English also necessitates the introduction of the notions of 'mot' or metrical word, and 'stress foot', as well as the notion of 'extra-metricity'. The formulations of the actual stress rules through the subsequent stages of forming an inductive generalization, putting forward a tentative hypothesis, checking the hypothesis on wider and wider ranges of data, and, finally, modifying the hypothesis, are very instructive examples of the general methods of generative linguistics.

While chapter 3 discusses primary stress assignment, chapter 4 deals with the phonology of the English rhythm, i.e., mainly with the stress reversal processes triggered by the adjacency of strong stresses. The notion of metrical grid: a device representing rhythm graphically, is introduced, and stress reversal phenomena are explained by eurhythm: a tendency towards a particular, evenly spaced grid configuration.

Although the discussion is clear and easy to follow, it is by no means simplifying; in addition to the merits of the Liberman-Prince framework of metrical phonology, also its empirical inadequacies, e.g. its difficulties in the precise formulation of the stress reversal rules, as well as its theoretical problems, e.g. those concerning the status of the grid, or its relation to morphological and syntactic structure, are pointed out.

The last two chapters of the book present the four major recent alternative developments of metrical phonology aiming to solve the problems raised by the initial formulation of the theory, while maintaining its achievements. Thus chapter 5 introduces the theories of Prince (1983), and Selkirk (1984), which eliminate the device of metrical tree from the inventory of metrical phonology, deriving all metrical information from the grid, as well as the theory of Hayes (1983, 1984), which keeps both the device of metrical tree and the device of metrical grid, but assigns different roles to them. Chapter 6 exposes the theory of Giegerich (1985), which renders the device of the metrical grid superfluous, interpreting metrical processes as manipulations of the metrical tree.

Hogg and McCully attempt to present the competing theories without taking sides, and to evaluate and compare their merits and disadvantages unbiassed — although perhaps Giegerich's theory, to which a whole chapter is devoted, may have received more weight than the average reader, following the course of development of generative phonology mainly on the basis of the major generative linguistic journals and conferences, would have expected.

3. In each chapter of the book, the material is presented — after a very brief exposition of the background and the main new ideas — in the form of questions and answers. This way of presentation is extremely efficient: it triggers the active cooperation of the reader, it maintains his interest, and it also increases the depth of the imprinting of the material on the reader's mind.

Each chapter is followed by an appendix entitled "Notes and further reading", discussing the primary sources of the material presented, and by a list of "Essay and discussion topics", which makes the work of the teacher using the book at university courses very easy.

The style of the book is precise, explicit, and consequently, easily readable. The only factor that somewhat slows down the reader is the abundance of abbreviations. It is often tiring to keep in mind what LCPR, IBR, IDR, PRA, CE, NE, AE, ESR, FSR, SSA, etc. stand for. I do not think enough space can be saved by these abbreviations for their use to be worth-while. (Let me also point out a printer's error: on p. 200 some lines are exchanged.)

4. The book, if looked upon as a summary of the state of the art in the generative theory of stress and rhythm, suggests that the aims and methods of metrical theory correspond to the aims and methods of generative syntax in a former period, prior to the theoretical reorientation formulated in the Extended Standard theory, and most fully, in the Government and Binding theory. It gives the impression as if metrical phonology only aimed to

account for English stress and rhythm, using language specific rules constrained by rule specific conditions. Few general principles or conditions on rule application are formulated, and even in their case, no claims are made about their universality, or way of parametrization in Universal Grammar. No evidence from languages other than English is ever used.

This representation of metrical phonology is to a large extent accurate — nevertheless, more emphasis could have been laid on the application of metrical phonology to the description of metrical phenomena of other languages, and to the contribution of these applications to the development of the theory. At least the "Essay and discussion topics" could include tasks along these lines — especially because the book will certainly be widely used among non-native speakers of English, too.

All in all, Hogg and McCully's book is an excellent outline of metrical phonology, and a very efficient, enjoyable coursebook, indispensable both for students and teachers of linguistics.

Katalin É. Kiss

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Noam Chomsky: *Barriers*. *Linguistic Inquiry Monograph Thirteen*. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1986, 102 pp.

1. In the humanities a scholar changing his views is regarded as renouncing his principles. Therefore, the fact that Chomsky constantly modifies his theory, and the generative grammar of 1986 resembles in very few details the generative grammar of 1966 (though the basic principles, naturally, have remained the same) is often looked upon by linguists of other schools with distrust, and is used as a pretext by them for not getting to know the theory thoroughly.


Within the generative school, on the other hand, the constant change of the theory is regarded as natural, in fact, desirable; it is considered as evidence demonstrating that the generative paradigm is still alive, and active; it is still able to ask and answer meaningful questions about its topic. This is because generative theory looks upon itself as a science, and has adopted the approach of natural sciences in this respect, too. Generative theory works on formulating a model of the linguistic capacity that is common to all members of the human species, and is manifest in all natural languages; and it does so by confronting the current system of hypotheses with more and more facts of more and more languages. This process, naturally, involves the constant modification of the hypotheses at various points, and, from time to time, leads to a comprehensive change of the whole system. The latest

major restructuring of the generative model was the introduction of the Government-Binding Theory in 1981 (in Chomsky's *Lectures on Government and Binding*. Foris, Dordrecht). Chomsky's present book: *Barriers*, remains within the Government and Binding framework; i.e., it proposes to change various details of the model but leaves the organization of the whole intact.

2. The main purpose of *Barriers* is to unify the concept of locality that is involved in government (a relation underlying such grammatical processes as e.g. subcategorization, case assignment, thematic role assignment), on the one hand, and in movement, on the other hand. The basic insight on which the new proposal relies is that the same categories in the same configurations constitute barriers both to government and to movement; however, while one barrier suffices to block government, more than one barrier prevents movement.


3. What makes this unified approach to government and movement possible is an extension of \bar{X} -theory. It has been assumed since the seventies (cf. Chomsky 1970; Jackendoff 1977; Stowell 1981) that syntactic categories such as noun, verb, adjective, preposition/postposition are projected into phrasal categories along principles which are basically invariable within a language, and are, in fact, highly invariable across languages, too (the apparent differences resulting from the effect of other subsystems of the given grammars, such as case assignment, upon \bar{X} -theory). For instance, in English, complements appear as sisters of their head, on the right-hand side of the head, while specifiers appear as sisters of the node dominating the head and its complements, on the left-hand side of the head. That is:

(1)




where $X = N, V, P, A$

e.g. (2)



In the Government-Binding framework \bar{X} -theory has not been extended to the so-called non-lexical categories, e.g. the C(omplementizer), regarded as the head of the sentence, and the I(nflection), i.e. the tense+agreement complex, regarded as the head of the propositional component of the sentence. *Barriers* includes both C and I in the \bar{X} system in a principled way. It is claimed that the head of the sentence, C, also has a complement: the proposition, appearing on its right-hand side, dominated by \bar{C} , and has a specifier: e.g. the *wh*-phrase in questions and relatives, appearing on its left-hand side, dominated by \bar{C} . I, the head of the proposition, is analyzed as having the VP as its complement, and the subject NP as its specifier. Here is the structure of the (English) sentence:

(3)



4. The structure assigned to the English sentence in (3), which will play a crucial role in the formulation of the notion of barrier in the central chapters of the book, also has the 'fringe benefit' of allowing a more principled reformulation of the theory of movement, in which various constraints concerning the target position of movement can be derived from (3) instead of having to be stipulated. There are two types of movement: substitution and adjunction. Since there is a requirement of matching between the category of the moved element and the category of the target position, phrasal categories (XPs) cannot be moved into head (X) position. Movement into complement position is barred on more general grounds: complement positions are thematic positions, open only to constituents bearing a lexically determined thematic role to the given head, as a result of which they can only be filled by base-generation. So phrasal categories can only land in specifier position — as they do in the case of Passive, or Raising, or *wh*-movement. Head categories can only move to head position: e.g. the V may move to I in order to pick up the bound morphemes of tense and agreement, or the inflected V may move the empty C — in matrix question in English, or in all types of matrix sentences in German.

What is in the focus of interest of Barriers, of course, is what can intervene between the source and the target positions of a moved category; and whether the possible 'distance' between them can be formulated in the same terms as the possible distance of the governor and the governee in a government relation.

5. Government is, informally, the structural relation of a head to its 'subordinates', i.e., to the constituents which it subcategorizes, selects, and to which it assigns case and thematic role. The head-subordinate relation is formally expressed through the requirement of the governor *m*-commanding its governee. α *m*-commands β if α does not dominate β , and every maximal projection that dominates α also dominates β .

The governor and the governee also must be located within the same syntactic domain, i.e., they may not be separated by a barrier. The question to be answered in Barriers is what exactly counts as a barrier for government; and, more generally, what is the concept of barrierhood that operates both in government and in movement.

That this is not a trivial task is shown by the fact that efforts have been concentrated upon the identification of barriers for movement ever since Ross (1967) — cf. also Chomsky (1972), Koster (1978), Chomsky (1980, 1981), Huang (1982); and upon the identification of

barriers for government since Chomsky (1981) — cf. also Kayne (1981, 1983), Huang (1982), Lasnik and Saito (1984), Haider (1986) etc.

6. A great innovation of Barriers is the 'relativization' of the notion of barrierhood, i.e., the recognition that a category may be a barrier for some of the categories following it while not being a barrier for others of them. Consider, for instance, the following sentence:

- (4) How_i did John try [CP *t_i'* [IP PRO to convince him *t_i*]]

In (4) either CP or IP must be a barrier to the government by *try* of the material in IP — since we know that the empty PRO subject of non-finite clauses is always ungoverned. We also know that IP cannot be an inherent barrier to government, since for instance in accusative with infinitive constructions the matrix V can assign case across IP:

- (5) I expected [I_{phim} to see the movie]

However, there is also evidence that CP is not an inherent barrier to government, either — e.g. case assignment by the matrix V into the position of the specifier of CP has been shown to be possible in Kayne (1980, 1981). In (4), too, it is necessary that *t_i'* be governed by *how*, its antecedent, across IP — since the Empty Category Principle of Chomsky (1981) requires that a non-pronominal empty category be properly governed, i.e., be either thematically governed by a lexical head selecting it, which is not satisfied by *t_i'*, or be governed by an antecedent coindexed with it.

Therefore, it must be the case that neither IP nor CP is a barrier in itself, but IP dominated by CP is one.

The other basic insight on which the theory of barriers is built is that arguments and adjuncts behave differently with respect to the licensing of the long extraction of material out of them: arguments do not block movement; adjuncts, on the other hand, are inherent blocking categories. This insight is made explicit as follows:

- (6) γ , a maximal projection, is a blocking category for β if and only if γ is not L-marked [γ is not the selected complement of a lexical head] and γ dominates β .

Blocking categories, with the exception of IP, are inherent barriers. Any maximal projection immediately dominating a blocking category also becomes a barrier by inheritance. Here is the definition of barrier:

- (7) γ , a maximal projection, is a barrier for β if and only if (a) or (b):
 (a) γ immediately dominates δ , δ a blocking category for β ;
 (b) γ is a blocking category for β , $\gamma \neq \text{IP}$

The proposed definition of barrier figures both in the locality condition for movement and in the locality condition for government. The Subjacency Condition for movement requires that movement cross at most one barrier in one step. In the case of a government relation, every barrier dominating the governee must also dominate the governor.

Thus in (4), the material inside IP is not governed by the matrix V since CP, a maximal projection, dominating IP, a blocking category, functions as a barrier — and one barrier is sufficient to block government. *t_i'* in the specifier position of CP, on the other hand, is governed by the matrix V, since CP in itself, being a lexically selected complement of the matrix V, is not a blocking category and a barrier.

7. While the unification of the locality of government and movement has led to the overall simplification of the theory, the most trivial case of movement: movement out of the VP has become more complicated. Since the VP is not L-marked (being a complement to

I, a non-lexical head), it is a blocking category and a barrier for its constituents, and so is the IP, being a maximal projection immediately dominating a blocking category. Cf.:

- (8) *What_i* did [IP John [vpfix *t_i*]]

In (8) the preposing of the *wh*-phrase would cross two barriers in violation of the Subjacency Condition — if no additional assumptions were made. Therefore, it is assumed that movement out of the VP into the specifier position of CP takes place in two steps: the *wh*-phrase is first adjoined to VP, and then moves under CP, as follows:

- (9) *What_i* did [IP John [vp *t_i'* [vpfix *t_i*]]]

Domination, playing a crucial role in the definition of barrier, is defined in such a way that in the case of adjunction structures of the type [α β [α γ]], a category is only dominated by α if it is dominated by every segment of α ; thus in our example γ is dominated by α , but β is not. Consequently, in (9) *t_i'* is not dominated by VP; hence no barrier intervenes between *t_i* and *t_i'*. There is no barrier between *t_i'* and *what_i*, either.

Here is a more complex case of movement where the violation of the Subjacency Condition is avoided through successive cyclicity:

- (10) *What_i* did [IP John [vp *t_i'*] [vp tell you [CP *t_i'*] [IP to [vp *t_i'*] [vpfix *t_i*]]]]]

In (10) we find no barrier between any two links of the chain *what_i* *t_i'* *t_i'* *t_i'* *t_i*. Only one segment of the embedded VP intervenes between *t_i* and *t_i'*, and between *t_i'* and *what_i* — consequently, the VPs do not count as barriers. The IPs dominating *t_i'* and *t_i'*, though blocking categories, are exempted from barrierhood. The CP dominating *t_i'* is L-marked by *tell* — therefore it is not a blocking category or a barrier.

8. Let us also illustrate how the traditional 'island-violations' fall out as violations of the new concept of Subjacency. Consider first an example of extraction out of a subject (traditionally a violation of the Subject Condition):

- (11) * The man [CP *who_i* [IP [NP pictures of *t_i*] are displayed everywhere]] has been found by the police

In (11) the subject NP of the relative clause is not L-marked, and is therefore a blocking category and a barrier. IP inherits barrierhood; so *who*, when preposed into the specifier position of the embedded CP, crosses two barriers, violating Subjacency. The theory of Barriers claims that the more barriers are crossed by a moved category, the worse the sentence will be — so (11), with only two barriers transgressed, is predicted to represent only a mild degree of ungrammaticality.

Here is an instance of extraction out of an adjunct, formerly described as a violation of the Adjunct Condition:

- (12) *To *whom_i* did [IP they leave [pp before speaking *t_i*]]

The PP dominating *t_i* is not L-marked; hence a barrier. IP, immediately dominating the PP adjunct, will also become a barrier, so extraction out of the PP crosses two barriers, which results in a Subjacency violation.

For this analysis to go through, it has to be assumed that the *wh*-phrase cannot be adjoined to PP as an intermediate step. This assumption cannot be given a fully principled explanation — in view of the fact that *wh*-extraction from VP is made possible by the adjunction of the *wh*-phrase to VP (cf. (8)).

Of the cases traditionally analyzed as violations of the Complex NP Constraint, those involving extraction out of a relative clause are treated as Subjacency violations by the Barriers framework. E.g.

- (13) Which book_i did John meet [NP_a child [CP_{who} read *t_i*]]

In (13), the CP immediately dominated by the NP node is not L-marked, therefore it is a blocking category and a barrier. The NP immediately dominating CP also becomes a barrier — so at this point the *wh*-phrase *which book* crosses two barriers at the same time.

Complex NPs containing a complement clause are known to provide a weaker island effect than complex NPs containing a relative clause. E.g.

- (14) ? Which book_i did John hear [NP_a rumour [CP_{that} you had read *t_i*]]

In this type of complex NPs there is good reason to assume that the CP complement of the noun is L-marked by the noun; therefore, it is not a barrier. In (14) the complex NP itself is also L-marked by the matrix V, so the *wh*-phrase *which book* does not cross any barrier when preposed. This way the difference of grammaticality between (13) and (14) follows without any stipulation. What has to be accounted for by an additional auxiliary hypothesis in this framework is the reduced acceptability of (14).

9. In the case of the extraction of an adjunct, the Empty Category Principle also plays a crucial role, in addition to Subjacency. The intuitive content of the ECP is a requirement of identifiability for empty categories (other than PRO or pro). Namely, an empty category must either be the argument of a lexical head governing it, or it must be close enough to its antecedent: i.e., it must be either thematically governed, or antecedent governed.

The difference of grammaticality between (15), a case of argument extraction, and (16), a case of adjunct extraction, is a consequence of the ECP:

- (15) What_i did Bill wonder [CP_{how} [IP_{to} [VP_{fix} *t_i*]]]

- (16) *How_i did Bill wonder [CP_{what} [IP_{to} [VP_{fix} *t_i*]]]

Neither of the sentences violates the Subjacency Condition: *t_i* is separated from its antecedent by a single barrier: CP, which is a maximal projection immediately dominating IP, a blocking category. While a single barrier is not sufficient to block movement, it blocks the antecedent government of *t_i*. In the case of (15), the ECP is still observed, since *t_i* is thematically governed by *fix*: in (16), on the other hand, *t_i*, an adjunct, is neither antecedent-governed, nor thematically governed.

If an adjunct is extracted out of an adjunct, both the ECP and the Subjacency Condition are violated. E.g.

- (17) *How_i did [IP they leave [PP_{before} speaking to you *t_i*]]

In (17), *t_i* is separated from *how_i* by two barriers: PP and IP. This is, on the one hand, a violation of the Subjacency Condition on movement, and, on the other hand, a violation of the ECP: *t_i*, an adjunct, is not thematically governed, and it is not governed by its antecedent, either.

10. In addition to the notion of barrier common to movement and government, the book also introduces a concept of barrier operative only in the constraining of government relations. This is the so-called Minimality Condition. The intuitive idea underlying the Minimality Condition is that the government of a category β by a category α is blocked by the intervening of a closer potential governor for β . That is, in the following configuration:

- (18) ... α ... [γ ... δ ... β ...]

α cannot govern β if δ is a zero-level category functioning as the head of γ , and thus the governor of β .

In a narrower version of the Minimality Condition it is also required that γ immediately dominate δ . (The formulation of this qualification under (91) on p. 42 actually has β instead of δ , which is apparently a misprint.)

So the Minimality Condition extends the concept of barrier defined earlier so as to include the following case, too — for the theory of government, but not for the theory of movement:

- (19) γ is a barrier for β if γ is a(n immediate) projection of δ , a zero-level category distinct from β .

It is not required that γ be a maximal projection — unlike in the central definition of barrier.

Let us consider what prediction (19) makes, for instance, for the government of the constituents of a complex NP:

- (20) They saw [NP Bill's [NP picture of Tom]]

According to (19), \bar{N} is a barrier to the government of the PP of *Tom*, being the immediated projection of *picture*, a head category: consequently, *see* does not govern *of Tom*. The NP node, on the other hand, is not a barrier to the government of *Bill's* under the narrower formulation of Minimality, since it is not the immediate projection of *picture*, the head NP — therefore, *Bill's* is governed both by *see* and by *picture*.

The Minimality Condition, naturally, also has empirically more relevant consequences: e.g. it can explain the so-called *that*-trace effect, i.e., the ungrammaticality of (21b) as opposed to (21a).

- (21) (a) Who_i did you believe [_{CP} t_i ' [_C e [_{IP} t_i would win]]]
 (b) *Who_i did you believe [_{CP} t_i ' [_C *that* [_{IP} t_i would win]]]

t_i , not being thematically governed, requires antecedent government by t_i '. In (21b), t_i also has a closer governor: the complementizer *that*, so \bar{C} prevents the antecedent-government of t_i — by virtue of the Minimality Condition. In (21a), on the other hand, the potential intervening governor is missing, so t_i is antecedent-governed by t_i ', as required by the ECP.

11. The viability of the concepts of barrier proposed in the book is proved by demonstrating the role they play in various areas of grammar. For instance, barriers, more precisely, the Subjacency Condition, are shown to be involved in parasitic gap constructions, which were accounted for by means of different principles e.g. in Chomsky (1982).

It has been known since the work of Taraldsen (1981) that a chain headed by an operator can licence an additional empty category: a 'parasitic gap', in certain circumstances. Observe, for example, (22), in which the chain *which papers_i t_i* licences an empty object:

- (22) Which papers_i did you file t_i [before reading *pg*]¹

Only an S-structure operator-variable chain can licence a parasitic gap — cf.

¹ The phenomenon also exists in Hungarian. Cf.

- (i) Kiket_i vártál t_i , anélkül, hogy meghívtál volna *pg*
 who-pl-acc expected-you without-it that invited-you (cond.)
 'Who did you expect without inviting?'

The empty category in the embedded sentence cannot be a phonetically empty pronoun, since only singular accusative pronouns can be empty, and they trigger the definite conjugation; in the embedded clause of (i), however, we have a plural indefinite element missing.

- (23) *He filed several papers before reading *pg*

As Chomsky observes in *Barriers*, parasitic gaps cannot be embedded in a context from which extraction is prevented by the Subjacency Condition and/or the ECP. Thus the parasitic gap constructions in (24) show the same distribution of grammaticality as the corresponding *wh*-extraction cases in (25):

- (24) This is the man t_i John interviewed t_i
 (a) before expecting us to tell you to give the job to *pg*
 (b) *before expecting us to leave without meeting *pg*
- (25) (a) Who $_i$ did they expect us to tell you to give the job to t_i ?
 (b) *Who $_i$ did they expect us to leave without meeting t_i ?

This observation leads Chomsky to the conclusion that the subchain containing the parasitic gap in a parasitic gap construction involves operator movement: an empty (0) operator is moved up from the position of the parasitic gap into an operator position as high as is allowed by the Subjacency Condition. That is, this is the structure of (22):

- (26) Which papers $_i$ did you file t_i [_{PP} before [_{CP} O_j [reading t_j]]]

Thus parasitic gap constructions contain two independent chains, and also involve an operation of chain composition. The question is what conditions chain composition must meet. That such conditions exist is demonstrated by (27a–c) below. In these examples neither the licencing subchain, nor the parasitic subchain of the parasitic gap construction involves a violation in itself, so it is certainly the operation of chain composition that is prevented by some constraint.

- (27) (a) Which papers $_i$ did John decide to tell his secretary t_i were unavailable [before O_j reading t_j]
 (b) Which papers $_i$ did John decide [before O_j reading t_j] to tell his secretary [t_i ' t_i were unavailable]
 (c) *Which papers $_i$ [t_i were unavailable [before O_j you discovered t_j]]

Chomsky considers two alternative explanations for the ungrammaticality of (27c). One of the possibilities, which has already been raised by various authors in the literature, is that (27c) is out because a parasitic gap must be c-commanded by the licencing gap. In (27a,b) the adjunct clause containing the parasitic gap can only be interpreted as adjoined to the matrix clause; hence the licencing gap does not c-command the parasitic gap — as it does in (27c). Chomsky's proposal for chain composition makes it possible to derive the anti-c-command requirement in a principled way: if in a composed chain a chain link (other than the operator) is c-commanded by another chain link, principle C of the Binding Theory of Chomsky (1981) is violated, which rules out the sentence as ungrammatical.

The other possibility examined is the hypothesis that the condition which chain composition must observe is Subjacency: i.e., the root of the licencing chain, t_i , must be subjacent to O_j , the head of the parasitic chain. This condition is met both in (27a) and in (27b). In (27a) t_i is separated from O_j by a single barrier: the PP node dominating O_j . In (27b), again, there is a single barrier: PP that includes O_j without including t_i . In (27c), on the other hand, two barriers intervene between O_j and t_i : PP and VP — provided PP is generated as a daughter of VP, and not of IP.

The book considers various arguments for and against the two approaches to parasitic gap constructions, and leaves the choice between them open (though it seems to find the anti-c-command constraint more appealing).

12. In general, no attempt is made in *Barriers* to close all open questions; it is obviously more important for the author to raise all possible alternatives — for further checking in various languages — than to create a perfectly coherent system with every detail in place. Therefore, *Barriers* reminds many readers of *On Binding* (Chomsky 1980), in which the attempt to unify movement and anaphora resulted in a rather complicated system with several empirically problematic details. From today's perspective it is clear, however, that *On Binding* was an important intermediate step leading to *Lectures on Government and Binding*, an extremely coherent, rich and still simple construction of hypotheses about Universal Grammar, representing a qualitatively new stage in the development of generative theory.

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Психолингвистические проблемы семантики. Сборник статей под редакцией А.А. Леонтьева и А.М. Шахнаровича. Москва, Издательство «Наука» 1983, 285 стр.

Рецензируемая книга посвящена проблемам психолингвистического анализа семантики: методам изучения семантической стороны языка и речи, психолингвистической интерпретации семантики высказывания и текста. Особая роль в ней отводится философским проблемам психолингвистического анализа семантики и формам существования значения.

Несмотря на то, что проблема значения вот уже несколько десятков лет привлекает к себе острое внимание специалистов в области психологии, лингвистики, семантики и других наук, несмотря на то, что этой проблеме посвящено огромное количество статей и монографий, всё же, как отмечают составители этого сборника «... понятие 'значение' ... в современной науке не определено с достаточной чёткостью. Неопределённость этого понятия оказывается особенно ощутимой в связи с психолингвистическим подходом к значению, который диктуется современным состоянием лингвистики. Вместе с тем осознаётся необходимость такого анализа понятия 'значение', который предполагал бы рассмотрение его в рамках не одной конкретной науки и не одной научной области».

Составители и авторы этого сборника поставили перед собой задачу осветить проблему значения очень широко, т.е. дать возможность читателю ознакомиться с понятием значения и его анализом в различных областях науки. Вот почему в монографии представлены как большое число обзорных работ на эту тему, так и тот круг научных областей, в которых проблема значения занимает одно из центральных мест. Авторы статей этого сборника понимают значение по-разному, под углом зрения той дисциплины, представителями которой они являются. Одни трактуют значение как область идеального в знаках, другие как область, ограниченную цепочкой «смысл-текст», третьи, как область отношений знака и объекта. Однако, для всех авторов характерна единая концепция, а именно, подход к значению с позиции теории деятельности и анализ значения специфическими психолингвистическими методами.

В написании монографии «Психолингвистические проблемы семантики» принимали участие 17 авторов, в том числе 2 специалиста из Германии — К. Менг и Б. Крафт. Сборник разделён на четыре части.

В первой части монографии рассматриваются вопросы психолингвистического исследования значения.

Во второй части монографии рассматриваются вопросы психолингвистического анализа слова как основной значащей единицы языка и речевой деятельности.

Третий раздел посвящён психолингвистическим проблемам развития значения в онтогенезе, т.е. психолингвистическим закономерностям функционирования значения языковых единиц в процессе овладения языком.

Четвёртая часть книги включает разделы, анализирующие значение как составную часть коммуникативного процесса и как компонент при анализе текста.

Мы дали читателю возможность ознакомиться в общих чертах с содержанием и основным направлением монографии. Вполне понятно, что подробно описать содержание всех работ мы не можем, поэтому мы ограничимся лишь теми, которые вызвали у нас наибольший интерес.

Во всех монографиях в первом разделе даётся попытка описать и дать определение изучаемому явлению или понятию. Не обошла стороной этот приём и книга «Психолингвистические проблемы семантики». В первом её разделе, посвящённом об-

щим вопросам семантики и методологии её исследования, А.А. Леонтьев, используя дефиниции многих наук, предлагает читателю два крайних, экстремальных определения значения. Первое из них — узкое понимание значения, характерное для лингвистики и связанное с понятием знака. Опираясь на работы советских лингвистов последних десяти лет, А.А. Леонтьев определяет значение — как он подчёркивает «в узком, лингвистическом» понимании — через знак, в котором (в знаке) выделяется субстрат и функциональная, т.е. содержательная сторона. При анализе природы значения в узком смысле автор рассматривает языковой знак как «непосредственное тело идеального образа внешней вещи», подчёркивая, что знак или квазиобъект есть продукт «превращения...» таким образом, «...идеальная сторона знака есть результат перенесения, 'превращения' связей и отношений реальной действительности».

Однако возможна и более широкая трактовка понятия значения, выдвинутая известным советским психологом А.Н. Леонтьевым, которая разделяется не всеми психологами. Согласно определению А.Н. Леонтьева значение — это «идеализированные ... продукты общественной практики ...» значение — это «преобразованная и свёрнутая ... идеальная форма существования предметного мира, его свойств, связей и отношений, раскрытых совокупной общественной практикой». Наиболее известное определение значения А.Н. Леонтьева: «... значение — это ставшее достоянием моего сознания ... обобщённое отражение действительности, выработанное человечеством и зафиксированное в форме понятий, значения или даже в форме умения как обобщённого 'образа действия', формы поведения и т.п.»

Принятие узкого или широкого понимания значения зависит, как отмечает А.А. Леонтьев, от того, рассматриваем ли мы фило- и онтогенез языкового (предметного) значения или же разделяем их, т.е. либо мы утверждаем, что всякое значение является языковым, либо ищем у языкового и предметного значения различные корни. Таким образом, в каких формах существует значение в человеческой деятельности, определяясь прежде всего взаимосвязью языкового значения с практической или познавательной деятельностью человека.

А.А. Леонтьев предлагает выделить три основных формы существования значения.

Первое — языковое значение, — которое существует на чувственной базе языка как системы специфических квазиобъектов (знаков). В этом случае значение спроецировано на слово или же другой знак, т.е. «приписано» ему. Это в свою очередь позволяет производить с ними операции в отрыве от конкретной ситуации.

Вторая форма существования значения — это предметная. Эта форма значения существует на чувственной базе перцептивного образа, т.е. образа восприятия, памяти, воображения. В отличие от языкового значения, предметное предполагает обязательное «присутствие» реального предмета — в действительности или же в воображаемой форме.

Третья форма значения — ролевое значение, существующее на чувственной базе компонентов самой деятельности. Это, в первую очередь, социальные нормы и социальные роли.

Все эти три формы существования значения могут выступать, однако, как во «внешней» (материально-идеальная форма, объективная ролевая система), так и во «внутренней» (в психической сфере, в сфере сознания человека).

Языковое значение, как пишет А.А. Леонтьев, «...есть нечто существующее 'в слове' (внешняя форма), но оно же может быть и в 'голове' (внутренняя форма).

В свою очередь предметная форма значения...» существует как некоторая характеристика образа реального предмета (внешняя форма), ... но она может выступать и

в процессах идеальной сферы, например, памяти, воображения (внутренняя форма). Социальная роль, с одной стороны, имеет внешнюю форму значения (это система ролевых предписаний, которые обществом предъявлены к индивиду), с другой стороны внутреннюю (это представление о самой социальной роли, которое имеется в голове у индивида).

Как слово с его сложными формами существования значения проникает в нашу душу, как мы овладеваем этими формами и как мы передаём миру их — задача, которую ни в рамках лингвистики, ни в рамках традиционной психологии, ни в рамках логики или семиотики решить невозможно.

Эти заключительные слова А.А. Леонтьева Р.М. Фрумкина в своей статье «Психолингвистические методы изучения семантики» продолжает, как она пишет «еретическим высказыванием...» «собственно психолингвистических методов изучения семантики пока также не существует». К этому выводу она приходит, рассмотрев теоретические и экспериментальные подходы изучения семантики в лингвистике, психологии и психолингвистике применительно к изучению семантики цветообозначений. Даже лингвистическая семантика, которая в настоящее время имеет очень тонкие методы исследования, не смогла дать такого инструмента, с помощью которого можно было бы изучать семантику цветоназываний в психолингвистическом аспекте. В ходе поисков Р.М. Фрумкина и её сотрудники остановились на традиционном методе свободной классификации, широко применяемом в психологии. Суть этой методики состоит в том, что испытуемому предлагаются карточки с написанными на них русскими словами, выражающими цветоощущения, например, каштановый, лиловый и т.д. Испытуемому нужно разложить эти карточки на группы (число групп может быть любым и число карточек в группе — также) в соответствии с его представлением о сходстве данных слов по смыслу. В эксперименте приняло участие 63 человека — мужчины и женщины в возрасте от 15 до 55 лет, среди них были студенты, люди с высшим образованием, лингвисты, но не было лиц, работающих с цветами, например, художников. На слова-стимулы, написанные на карточки, налагались определённые ограничения, поскольку в любом языке существует множество возможностей образовывать наименования цветов, скажем, по типу: светло-серебристо-серый или же цвета старой бронзы. Обработка полученных данных осуществлялась статистическими методами. Прежде всего была составлена матрица, состоящая из 7 блоков, условно обозначенных основными цветами, например, красный, зелёный, синий и т.д., в каждый из которых вошло разное число элементов. Например, в первый блок красные вошло 23 элемента, в блок синие — 15 элементов и т.д. Эти элементы в каждом блоке связаны между собой по-разному. Сила связи отражает субъективное представление о сходстве значений цветоименований, существующее в сознании испытуемых. Рассмотрим полученную структуру блока красные. Он состоит из трёх областей: ядра, области сильных и области слабых элементов. В ядро блока красные вошло три элемента: алый, кровавый, багряный. Интересно отметить, что название основного цвета красный не вошло в ядро, а вошло в область сильных элементов наряду с такими, как малиновый, клюквенный, рубиновый и другими. В область слабых элементов вошли слова томатный, огненный. Некоторые слова составляют так называемые взаимнословно связанные подклассы. Это — бордовый-вишневый-свекольный и красный-кровавый. Как оказалось далее, в ядерные области блоков, которые условно обозначены основными названиями цветов, не всегда входят именно эти названия. Например, в ядро блока красные, как уже отмечалось, не входит слово красный, а входят кровавый, багряный, алый, в ядро блока жёлтые вместо него входит слово янтарный, в ядро блока белые вместо него — молочный, в ядро блока коричневый — кофейный.

Как отмечает Р.М. Фрумкина, с помощью методики свободной классификации удалось создать убедительную модель субъективного овладения смыслами слов-цветонаименований и показать организацию соответствующих сигнификатов в сознании испытуемых. Однако, на наш взгляд, с помощью этого эксперимента выявлена и ещё одна интересная деталь. В эксперименте Р.М. Фрумкиной были получены так называемые взаимнословно связанные пары. Приведём некоторые из них:

<u>красный</u>	—	<u>кровавый</u>
<u>оранжевый</u>	—	<u>апельсиновый</u>
<u>зелёный</u>	—	<u>изумрудный</u>
<u>голубой</u>	—	<u>небесный</u>
<u>синий</u>	—	<u>васильковый</u>
<u>чёрный</u>	—	<u>грифельный</u>
<u>белый</u>	—	<u>молочный</u>

Как отмечает далее Р.М. Фрумкина, жёлтый наиболее тесно связан с лимонным, а для розового такой связи найти не удалось.

Мы привели эти пары в столбик сознательно. Дело в том, что слова слева не имеют под собой чёткого концептуального ядра значения в голове у носителей данного языка, хотя эти цвета и обладают определенными физическими характеристиками (длиной световой волны, насыщенностью и другими), которые отличают их один от другого. Однако на практике словом красный мы можем обозначать многие оттенки этого цвета в силу того, что в голове мы не можем хранить те физические параметры, которые точно соответствовали бы красному цвету. В то же время, в мире вещей, в физическом мире, существуют предметы, цвет которых является как бы прототипом — пользуясь терминологией Эвелин Рош — по отношению к основным цветам. В самом деле, красный цвет тесно связан, например, с кровавым, с цветом крови, зеленый — с цветом драгоценного камня изумруда, а чёрный с цветом грифеля. Эксперименты Р.М. Фрумкиной не выявили для розового цвета взаимнословно связанной пары, как нам кажется, по вполне понятным причинам: ведь розовый цвет — это цвет самой розы!

Мы считаем, что помимо того, что Р.М. Фрумкиной получены очень интересные результаты, эти эксперименты проливают свет и ещё на одно явление: не только на организацию системных отношений между сигнификатами, но и на их ментальную структуру. Более абстрактное слово (название основного цвета, например, красный), имеет сильную связь в голове носителя с менее абстрактным или же конкретным цветословом (кровавый), который имеет уже под собой реальный предмет физического мира, денотат. И здесь мы наберёмся смелости предположить, что и у других абстрактных слов лексикона экспериментальным путём можно обнаружить выход на конкретные предметы, явления, благодаря сильным сигнификативным связям с менее абстрактными понятиями.

Во второй части сборника, посвящённой лексикону, в статье А.П. Василевича ставится проблема отбора материала для лексико-семантического описания цветонаименований. Источниками для отбора конкретной лексической группы слов послужили толковые словари русского языка, тексты художественной литературы и психолингвистические эксперименты (свободный ассоциативный эксперимент). Автор приходит к выводу, что три списка русских цветонаименований, полученные из трёх источников, отличаются друг от друга. С одной стороны, автору не удалось обнаружить группы слов, свойственных только художественному тексту или только разговорной речи. С другой стороны, настоящие толковые словари русского языка не достаточно эффективно

описывают ни значения цветоименований кодифицированного литературного языка, ни значения цветоименований разговорной речи. На этом основании автор предлагает скорректировать словарные данные, дополнив их полученными по текстам и в эксперименте. К работе прилагается список 254 русских цветоименований.

В этой же, второй части монографии мы находим статьи, затрагивающие вопросы семантики эмоциональных средств языка, синестезии и звуко-символизма, проблемы связи «знак-представление», экспериментальное исследование развития словесного значения.

Статья В.Н. Гридина касается общих вопросов семантики эмоционально-экспрессивных средств языка. Автор отмечает, что подход к вербальному выражению эмоций требует определения роли и места самих эмоций в общей речевой деятельности. Характерной чертой эмоций является их связь с мотивацией деятельности, т.е. они непосредственно отражают отношения между мотивами и реализацией деятельности. Является ли слово любь, например, «знаком мысли» или «знаком чувства» говорящего зависит от подхода к самому процессу порождения речи. Однако, теоретически любая значащая единица языка может стать носителем эмоционального заряда. В.Н. Гридин подчёркивает основную особенность психолингвистического подхода к изучению эмоционального выражения в рамках речевой деятельности: информацию об эмоциональном состоянии говорящего несут речевые действия и операции (в терминах теории речевой деятельности, разрабатываемой в советской психолингвистике), а способ выражения эмоций зависит от характера самого эмоционального процесса и его функции в общей деятельности человека.

Эмоции и чувства окрашивают речевую деятельность в целом. Средства языка (от морфем до грамматических форм), используемые для выражения эмоциональной активности, проходят через фильтр сознания. Семантика языковых средств говорящего определяется субъективным содержанием знакового образа и его процессуальным характером, поскольку значение с точки зрения психологического феномена есть не вещь и не система, а динамический процесс.

Языковые средства выражения аффективных реакций и состояний имеют другую семантическую природу. Аффект актуализируется на операционном уровне порождения речи, поскольку он ограничивается индивидуальным и речевым опытом, а вследствие этого характеризуется бедностью «языкового банка» для своего выражения.

Заканчивает вторую часть сборника экспериментальная работа Н.В. Уфимцевой о развитии словесного значения. В теоретическом разделе работы, рассматривающей развитие значения слова и понятий в детском возрасте, автор опирается на достижения культурно-исторической школы в советской психологии, созданной Л.В. Выготским и развитой его учениками А.Н. Леонтьевым, А.Р. Лурией, А.В. Запорожцем, П.Я. Гальпериным, Д.С. Эльконинным и другими. Согласно этому подходу развитие значения слова и понятий у ребенка формируется в процессе предметной деятельности и деятельности общения, при этом главное место в этом процессе отводится взаимодействию взрослого и ребёнка.

Целью исследования Н.В. Уфимцевой явилось развитие субъективного содержания знакового образа, что само по себе содержит сложность и многогранность данного феномена. При изучении развития значений у детей автор использовала три эксперимента: (а) свободный ассоциативный эксперимент, (б) эксперимент на группировку слов по общности значения, (в) эксперимент по объяснению значения слова. Испытуемыми были ученики 2-ого, 5-ого, 8-ого и 10-ого классов в возрасте от 8 до 16 лет с родным

русским языком. Всего было опрошено 120 человек по 30 детей в каждом классе (15 мальчиков и 15 девочек).

Нам хотелось бы остановиться на некоторых интересных результатах этой работы. Список слов-стимулов включал 10 существительных с общим элементом значения человек, 9 прилагательных с общим значением размер и 10 глаголов движения. Всего 29 слов. Результаты свободного ассоциативного эксперимента показывают, что для русского языка характерным оказалось преобладание в ответах детей парадигматических реакций по сравнению с реакциями взрослых и увеличение числа синтагматических реакций по мере взросления (по-разному для мальчиков и девочек). Проведённые ранее ассоциативные эксперименты на материале английского языка (Эрвин, Палермо) показали, что в ассоциативных реакциях детей преобладают синтагматические отношения по сравнению с ответами взрослых, у которых, наоборот, высокий процент составляют ответы парадигматического характера. Эксперимент Н.В. Уфимцевой не подтвердил этот универсальный феномен. Автор считает, что соотношение парадигматических/синтагматических реакций зависит от пола и возраста испытуемых, от конкретного языка и от принадлежности слова-стимула к той или иной лексико-грамматической категории. По данным автора наибольшее число парадигматических ответов появляется при стимуле-существительном (41%), а наименьшее при стимуле-глаголе (18,7%). Результаты для стимула-прилагательного занимают промежуточное значение (30,5%). Н.В. Уфимцева отмечает, что структуры значения существительного, прилагательного и глагола развиваются как принципиально разные, что говорит об их различной психолингвистической природе. Четыре возрастные группы показывают четыре этапа развития структуры значения существительных, прилагательных и глаголов. Например, развитие значения существительного на первом этапе характеризуется осознанием ребёнком словообразовательной парадигмы и самого значения слова-стимула посредством сравнения его с синонимом, т.е. на стимул-существительное дети чаще давали существительные-синонимы. Для второго этапа характерно расширение границ семантического поля слова-стимула, для третьего — более глубокое, по сравнению с предыдущими этапами, раскрытие значения стимула. На четвёртом этапе доминирующим являясь процесс осознания значения слова-стимула посредством так называемых ответов-синонимов, относящихся к проигрыванию социальной роли.

Третья часть книги посвящена онтогенезу семантики. Две первые статьи, написанные А.М. Шахнаровичем, рассматривают вопросы семантического компонента языковой способности и правил словообразования. Прежде всего А.М. Шахнарович даёт определение языковой способности — «это некая функциональная система, являющаяся следствием отражения (и генерализации) элементов системы родного языка, функционирующая по определённым правилам. Таким образом, языковая способность — это некоторая функциональная система элементов и правил их выбора». Эта система имеет иерархическое строение: фонетический, грамматический и семантический уровни. Семантический компонент языковой способности — это подсистема правил выбора адекватного значения. Эти семантические правила существуют отдельно от когнитивных структур и складываются относительно независимо от них. Развивая далее свою мысль, А.М. Шахнарович подчёркивает, что семантические правила определяются ситуацией и содержатся в практической деятельности ребёнка. Эти правила выводятся на основе анализа ситуации, в результате практики. «Перевод» правил деятельности из «внешних» во «внутренние» составляет основу формирования правил семантического компонента языковой способности. Выделяются элементы ситуации и им приписывается значение,

порождаемое данной ситуацией. Таким образом, «вращивание» и обобщение внешних действий — вот что лежит в основе семантических структур языковой способности.

Эта же мысль прослеживается и во второй работе автора, касающейся правил словообразования у детей. Согласно А.М. Шахнаровичу, ведущими процессами при овладении словообразованием в детстве являются процессы семантического анализа и семантического синтеза действительности. Эти процессы составляют главные компоненты программы словообразования, которая реализуется на основе психолингвистических правил. О каких психолингвистических правилах и механизмах идёт здесь речь?

При так называемом аналогическом типе словообразования имеет место обобщение языковых явлений и образование на этой основе «модели-типа» словообразования, т.е. формируется генерализованное отношение: аналогичные явления обозначаются аналогичным образом. При так называемом корреляционном типе словообразования также действует механизм «модель-тип». При дефиниционном словообразовании проявляется действие семантического компонента программы, который основывается на анализе самой действительности. В этом случае происходит преобразование словосочетаний или же их свёртывание в предикативную синтагму.

В этой же части монографии опубликована теоретическая статья Т.В. Ахутиной и Т.Н. Наумовой о смысловом и семантическом синтаксисе в детской речи в свете концепции Л.С. Выготского. Прежде чем раскрыть взгляды Л.С. Выготского на развитие детской речи, авторы дают краткую, но исчерпывающую характеристику различных направлений в психологии, лингвистике и психолингвистике, связанных с овладением языком, которые начали складываться с 60-х годов нашего века. В статье мы находим критический анализ формально-лингвистического подхода, возникшего под влиянием идей Н. Хомского, затем когнитивно-семантические модели овладения языком, опирающиеся на теорию Ж. Пиаже. Более подробно авторы останавливаются на анализе коммуникативно-прагматического направления в изучении развития детской речи, опираясь на работы Дж. Брунера, П. Гринфилда, М. Баурмана, Е. Бейтаса и других. Отмечая общность взглядов этих авторов на многие явления детской речи, Т.В. Ахутина и Т.Н. Наумова подчёркивают в то же время, что термины, которыми оперируют вышеупомянутые авторы, часто с трудом соотносятся друг с другом, однако, они находят естественную интерпретацию в рамках концепции Л.С. Выготского. Как известно, значение высказывания в значительной мере зависит от пресуппозиции данного высказывания. Во внутренней речи внутреннее слово всегда предполагает определённый субъективный контекст, оно всегда имеет глубокую пресуппозицию, а потому его значение не равно значению слова вне контекста. Значение, зависящее от контекста, которое отличается от языкового, Л.С. Выготский называет смыслом. Синтаксис внутренней речи по Л.С. Выготскому состоит из одних предикатов. Эти предикаты-смыслы «как бы вливаются друг в друга и как бы влияют друг на друга, так что предшествующие как бы содержатся в последующем и его модифицируют». Процесс овладения языком начинается с овладения смысловым синтаксированием, т.е. с выделения ребёнком самых значимых для него компонентов целостной ситуации и обозначения их словом. Этот первый в генетическом плане тип высказывания несёт в себе первичные пропозиции («психологическое сказуемое» — comment), а «психологическое подлежащее» — topic только подразумевается, не выражается, оно ясно из ситуации, в которой находится ребёнок. Этап семантического синтаксиса, который следует за смысловым, связан с операциями членения на значимые компоненты: агента, действие, объекта, инструмента и другие. Затем следует этап овладения формально-грамматическими средствами.

Т.В. Ахутина и Т.Н. Наумова подчёркивают, что эти три типа синтаксиса не развиваются параллельными путями независимо друг от друга: каждый из них закладывает основы для последующего, в тот же момент вступает с ним в противоречие. Так, смысловой синтаксис в период однословных высказываний функционирует и в период двусловных и трёхсловных высказываний ребёнка. Однако, когда членение ситуации становится более дробным, когда формируется понятие формально-грамматического субъекта, смысловое синтаксирование вступает в конфликт с семантическим. Это проявляется в смене порядка следования вербализации компонентов ситуации. Если на ранних этапах развития речи ребёнка наблюдался порядок: comment-topic, то теперь доминирующую роль получает порядок: topic-comment. А это уже свидетельствует об овладении моделями языка взрослых, моделями, которые рассчитаны на слушателя, находящегося вне данной, конкретной ситуации.

Заключительная часть сборника «Психолингвистические проблемы семантики» включает в себя вопросы коммуникации и анализа текста. Открывает этот раздел теоретико-экспериментальная работа, затрагивающая семантические проблемы вербальной коммуникации. Статья написана исследователями К. Менг и Б. Крафт, работающими в секторе коммуникации Центрального института языкознания Академии наук в Берлине. Теоретическую платформу исследовательской группы составляют теория деятельности, разрабатываемая в советской психологии, и направление интеракционизма, получившее широкое распространение в западной социальной психологии. В теоретической части статьи авторы пытаются дать определение таким неоднозначным понятиям как интеракция, коммуникация, общение. Целью эксперимента, выполненного К. Менг, было изучение функций речевых высказываний при решении практических задач в ходе проведения спортивных игр. Объектом наблюдения были группы, состоящие из двух человек: взрослый и ребёнок (возраст 6–7 лет) и ребёнок-ребёнок (возраст 6–7 лет). Анализировалась зависимость значений коммуникативных высказываний — при разъяснении смысла и правил спортивной игры — от структуры межличностной деятельности, т.е. изучение отношения: структура интерперсональной деятельности/семантика высказываний.

В экспериментальном исследовании Б. Крафт шести-семилетним детям предлагалось сделать из элементов детского конструктора определённые фигурки (например, собачку, человека). Был поставлен вопрос: способны ли испытуемые дать все необходимые указания для выполнения последовательности действий? Анализировались аспекты конструкторской и коммуникативной деятельности детей.

Работа Ю.А. Сорокина касается вопросов идентичности смыслов высказывания, сделанных на нескольких естественных языках. Для этой цели автор использовал оригинальное произведение одного из китайских писателей и три варианта его перевода — на английский, немецкий и французский языки, а затем сравнил их с оригиналом. Тексты анализировались с помощью использования понятий «номинатор» и «оператор».

Последний раздел монографии заканчивает статья О.Н. Селиверстовой о роли информантов в процессе семантических исследований на примере интерпретации некоторых моделей английских предложений с целью выявления скрытых условий их употребления.

Рецензируемый сборник статей «Психолингвистические проблемы семантики» несомненно вызовет широкий отклик у читателей: психологов, лингвистов, психолингвистов и специалистов в области коммуникации.

За последние годы во всем мире значительно возрос интерес к сравнительно новой междисциплинарной науке — психолингвистике. В связи с этим достижения советской школы психолингвистики были и останутся объектом пристального внимания учёных разных стран. Учитывая это, нам хотелось бы отметить, что легкий, понятный стиль изложения помог бы глубже понять «смысл» и «семантику» текста сборника, ведь его читают не только специалисты с родным русским языком.

А. Яровинский — П. Пёгл — Й. Тёрёк

Jan Baudouin de Courtenay: *Ausgewählte Werke in deutscher Sprache*. Mit einem Vorwort von Ewlin Malachowska. Herausgegeben von Joachim Mugdan. Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München 1984, 278. стр.

Творчество Яна Бодуэна де Куртенэ (Jan Ignacy Niecislaw Baudouin de Courtenay; 1845–1929), одного из самых оригинальных языковедов конца XIX и начала XX веков живой силой вошло в развитие современной лингвистики, её разных школ и направлений.

Интерес к многочисленным работам учёного (свыше 600 публикаций), его лингвистическим концепциям, результатам его изысканий по самым сложным вопросам языка, его функционирования велик в разных странах мира.

Значителен этот интерес и в странах, в которых в функционирует полинациональный немецкий язык. Поэтому языковеды этих стран, да и других стран мира, в частности Венгрии, где еще сильны позиции немецкого языка, как средства общения лингвистов и представителей других наук, тепло приветствуют выход в свет Избранных трудов Бодуэна де Куртенэ на немецком языке. Этот том является как бы второй частью монографии Йоахима Мугдана, Ян Бодуэн де Куртенэ (1845–1929), Жизнь и творчество, Мюнхен 1984: Издательство Вильгельма Финка (см. предыдущую рецензию). Он состоит из вступительной статьи Йоахима Мугдана (составитель сборника), краткого изложения концепций отбора работ для данного тома (кстати, недостаточно обоснованных), списка использованных источников, краткого очерка жизни и творчества Бодуэна де Куртенэ и репродукций семи его работ, написанных учёным на немецком языке.

В очерке Эвелины Малаховской, Ян Бодуэн де Куртенэ, одной из дочерей великого учёного, дан в сжатой форме его жизненный путь. Эта работа, специально написанная для данного тома, раскрывает перед нами сложный и тернистый путь «основателя Казанской польской лингвистической школы» (Р. Якобсон). Основываясь на многочисленных документах, воспоминания (в том числе воспоминания самого автора), Эвелина Малаховская с большим знанием дела и душевной теплотой любящей дочери раскрывает основные этапы жизненного пути Бодуэна де Куртенэ, его внутренний мир, его взгляды на жизнь, его привычки. И этими доселе неизвестными фактами, штрихами помогает дорисовать образ ученого, гражданина, борца за правду в науке и жизни.

За этим очерком следует репродукция следующих работ Бодуэна де Куртенэ, написанных им на немецком языке:

1. Обзор славянских языков во взаимосвязи с другими индо-европейскими языками (*Übersicht der slavischen Sprachwelt im Zusammenhang mit den anderen Ario-europäischen (Indogermanischen) Sprachen*. Antrittsvorlesung gehalten an der Universität Dorpat am 6/18. September 1883, Leipzig, T.O. Weigel 1884). Эта работа являясь, по сути, вступительной лекцией Бодуэна де Куртенэ, прочитанной им 6-го (по новому стилю 18-го сентября 1883г. в Дерпском (Юрьевском, Тартуском) университете по случаю занятия им должности профессора сравнительной грамматики славянских языков.

2. Об очеловечении языка (Vermenschlichung der Sprache — Ein Aula-Vortrag, gehalten zu Dorpat am (19. Februar) 2. März 1892, zum Besten des Hilfsvereins, Hamburg, Verlagsanstalt und Druckerei A.G. (vormals J.F. Richter), Königliche Hofverlagshandlung, 1893) доклад, прочитанный Бодуэном де Куртенэ 19-го февраля (по новому стилю 2-го марта 1892г.) в Дерпском (Юрьевском, Тартуском) университете.

3. Опыт теории фонетических изменений. Глава психофонетики (Versuch einer Theorie phonetischer Alternationen. Ein Capitel aus der Psychophonetik, Strassburg, Comissionverlag von Karl J. Trübner, 1895).

4. К вопросу о «мягкости» и «твёрдости» звуков языка вообще и в славянских языках в особенности (Zur Frage über die “Weicheit” und “Härte” der Sprachlaute im allgemeinen und im slavischen Sprachgebiete insbesondere. Petersburg, November 1907).

5. Классификация языков (Klassifikation der Sprachen. Mitteilungen. Bericht über die Grazer 50. Versammlung deutscher Philologen und Schulmänner).

6. О влиянии языка на мировоззрение и настроение (Einfluss der Sprache auf Weltanschauung und Stimmung. Odbitka z “Prac Filologicznych” t. XIV (Sonderdruck aus “Prace Filologiczne”, XIV, Warszawa 1929)).

7. Факультативные звуки языка (Fakultative Sprachlaute; “La notion de quantité dans le langage” (Symbolae grammaticae in honore Ioannis Rozwadowski. Vol. 1. Cracoviae 1927)).

Эти работы Бодуэна де Куртенэ, написанные им в разное время, убедительно показывают, что существенным признаком его научных изысканий было стремление к обобщению, стремление освободиться от анатомизма младограмматиков, стремление к системности, стремление к созданию общего теоретического языкознания. И хотя некоторые суждения Бодуэна де Куртенэ о славянских языках, об очеловечении языка, о влиянии языка на мировоззрение (ср. гипотезу Сэпира-Уорфа) и т.д. устарели, его основные концепции, теоретические выводы выдержали испытание временем.

III. Пот

Joachim Mugdan: Jan Baudouin de Courtenay (1845–1929). Leben und Werk. Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München 1984, 238 стр.

В поступательном ходе развития науки о языке имя Яна Бодуэна де Куртенэ (Jan Ignacy Niecislaw Baudouin de Courtenay), в жилах которого смешалась французская королевская кровь (его родословие восходит к королю Людовику V1) с кровью польских шляхтичей, вписано золотыми буквами. Основатель Казанской лингвистической школы или лингвистического кружка, французские предки которого в 1717 году переехали в Польшу, стал гордостью польской, русской и французской культуры.

И наследие этого крупнейшего учёного является не музейным экспонатом для истории науки о языке, а живой силой,двигающей лингвистику и наших дней.

Произведения Бодуэна де Куртенэ переиздаются в разных странах мира. В первую очередь в Польше и Советском Союзе издаются его труды по проблемам философии языка, вопросам языка и речи, статике и динамики языка, фонологии, конкретным явлениям отдельных языковых семей и языков.

Об этом свидетельствует и рецензируемая книга.

В монографии Йоахима Мугдана, Ян Бодуэн де Куртенэ: его жизнь и творчество, автор с глубоким знанием дела рассматривает сложный жизненный и творческий путь учёного, его вклад в науку о языке. Опираясь на значительный материал, в том числе и архивный, автор уверенной рукой рисует привлекательный образ Бодуэна де Куртенэ

языковеда и человека. Он перед нашими глазами развёртывает жизненный путь Яна Бодуэна де Куртенэ (по-русски Ивана Александровича), родившегося 1-го (по новому стилю 13-го) марта 1845 года в Радзимице у Варшавы, в семье землемера Александра Бодуэна де Куртенэ и Ядвиги Добжинской, дочери польского помещика. С юношеских лет он проявлял интерес к вопросам языка. После окончания реальной гимназии он в 1861 году поступает в подготовительный класс Варшавской Главной школы (Szkoła Główna), чтобы в 1862 году быть среди первых студентов этого университета. Трезвая оценка политических сил в стране молодым талантливым студентом — Бодуэном де Куртенэ, с увлечением занимавшегося проблемами физиологии человеческих звуков, санскритом, литовским и славянскими языками, подсказывала ему не принимать активного участия в Польском восстании против царизма (в 1863 году), к свободолобным идеям которого он всей своей пылкой душой примкнул. И несмотря на то, что Польское восстание было царскими сатрапами кроваво подавлено, Варшавская Главная школа (Варшавский университет) остался ещё некоторое время центром польской науки и культуры. Бодуэн де Куртенэ с ещё большей увлеченностью расширяет свой круг научных интересов, собирает материал по разным славянским языкам и, в первую очередь, по истории польского языка. В 1866 году он заканчивает университет и получает за свою научную работу по вопросам орфографии, написанную под руководством Франтишека Болемира Квет (1825–1864), ученную степень магистра. По инициативе этого ученого, чешского происхождения, Бодуэн де Куртенэ переводит в 1865г. на польский язык труд Я.Э. Пуркине «О пользе всеобщего распространения латинского письма среди славянских языков». На отрицательную критику этой работы темпераментный молодой ученый пишет и публикует 60 страниц ответа рецензентам. Это и является его первой самостоятельной публикацией.

После окончания Варшавской Главной школы, т.е. Варшавского университета, Бодуэн де Куртенэ едет за границу, чтобы после нескольких месяцев учебы на славном Карловском университете в Праге, в 1867–1868 годах слушать в Йене (Германия) лекции Аугуста Шлейхера (1821–1868) и Эрнеста Хэделя (1834–1919).

Йоахим Мугдан детально исследует йенский период жизни и творчества Бодуэна де Куртенэ. Он показывает как рождается там его интересная работа «Некоторые случаи действия аналогии в польском склонении» (1868). В этой книге, по словам известного языковеда М. Фасмера, особое внимание обращено на современное состояние польского языка и «впервые подчеркивается значительное влияние аналогии на звуковые изменения, т.е. впервые говорится о психологических изменениях в языке» (цитирую по Ф.М. Березин, История лингвистических учений, Москва 1984, стр. 134). И Л.В. Щерба высоко ценил этот труд Бодуэна де Куртенэ, назвав его «поворотным пунктом в истории языкознания» (Л.В. Щерба: И.А. Бодуэн де Куртенэ. Некролог, АН СССР, Известия по русскому языку и словесности. Ленинград, т. III./1 (1930), 311–326).

Разногласия, возникшие между молодым польским ученым и знаменитым Аугустом Шлейхером по существенным вопросам науки о языке, заставили Бодуэна де Куртенэ покинуть Йену. Он направляется в Берлинский университет, чтобы там под руководством видного санскритолога Альбрехта Вебера (1825–1901) усовершенствовать свои научные познания по санскриту.

Когда осенью 1868 года Бодуэн де Куртенэ вернулся в родную Варшаву, он с болью в душе констатирует, что царское правительство в своем стремлении обуздать непокорных поляков, лишить их научно-культурного центра превратило Варшавскую Главную школу, т.е. Варшавский университет из польского высшего учебного заведения

в русский университет и не разрешило ему, как и другим польским ученым преподавать там. Однако Бодуэн де Куртенэ не падает духом. Его преданность науке подталкивает его принять предложение властей и поехать в Санкт-Петербург, чтобы там под руководством известного лексикографа и текстолога И.И. Срезневского (1812–1880) расширить свои научные познания по древним славянским языкам и работать над диссертацией «О древнепольском языке до XIV столетия».

Поскольку его польская магистерская степень была царскими властями признана недействительной, он летом 1870 года отправляется в Лейпцигский университет и 6 июля 1870 года сдает у знаменитого Аугуста Лескиена (1840–1916) и Георга Курциуса (1820–1885) магистерский экзамен по церковнославянскому языку. В Лейпциге он публикует успешно защищенную диссертацию по древнепольскому языку — труд не потерявший научного значения до настоящего времени.

Далее благодаря кропотливому сбору материала и его всестороннему анализу, умело сделанному автором рецензируемой монографии, мы узнаем много нового доселе малоизвестного о жизни и деятельности Бодуэна де Куртенэ в Петербургском университете, где он, получив звание приват-доцента, стал читать лекции по сравнительной грамматике индоевропейских языков. Собранные в результате своих научных командировок в южнославянские земли богатые диалектологические и этнографические материалы Бодуэн де Куртенэ умело использовал в своей докторской диссертации «Опыт фонетики резьянских говоров», которую успешно защитил в 1874 году. После защиты докторской диссертации он едет в Казань, чтобы там «на голом месте» создать свою лингвистическую школу.

В казанский период (1874–1883) Бодуэн де Куртенэ ведет активную научную работу, сосредотачивая свое внимание на двух основных вопросах языкознания: на фонетике в её отношении к физиологии звуков и на сравнительной типологии. И хотя казанский период его творчества не богат созданием крупных научных работ, но в своих университетских лекциях, в горячих дискуссиях со своими коллегами-лингвистами и, в первую очередь со своим земляком поляком Н.В. Крушевским, русским В.А. Богородицким Бодуэн де Куртенэ высказал немало оригинальных суждений по фундаментальным вопросам фонологии, морфологии, а также типологии.

К началу 80-х годов жизни в Казанском университете становится для Бодуэна де Куртенэ «скучной» и он принимает решение переехать в Дерптский (Юрьевский, Тартуский) университет на кафедру сравнительной грамматики славянских наречий. В Дерпте он наряду с активной научно-исследовательской работой в различных областях науки о языке, с большим увлечением изучает высшую математику, армянский, арабский, эстонский и латышский языки.

В 1900 году Бодуэн де Куртенэ возвращается в Петербургский университет, где на кафедре сравнительного языковедения и санскрита проводит большую преподавательскую и научную работу, создает лингвистический кружок, сыгравший немалую роль в научной закалке таких выдающихся лингвистов как Л.В. Щерба, Е.Д. Поливанов, Л.П. Якубинский и др. Одновременно с работой в Петербургском университете он с увлечением читает курсы сравнительной грамматики индоевропейских языков и сравнительную грамматику славянских языков на Высших женских (Бестужевских) курсах столицы. В эти годы жизни и творчества в Петербурге (Петрограде), т.е. в 1900–1916 годы, Бодуэн де Куртенэ проявляет большой интерес проблемам психического субстрата языковых явлений, уделяет внимание вопросам лексикографии и лексиологии. К этому времени его научная работа, охватывающая большое количество самых жгучих

проблем науки о языке (свыше 600 публикаций) на многих языках (он свободно владел польским, русским, литовским, французским, итальянским, немецким, хорошо знал чешский, эстонский, латышский, лужицкие и др. языки), приобрела европейскую известность. Он избирается членом Краковской академии наук (в 1887 году), пожизненным членом Парижского лингвистического общества, и членом-корреспондентом Петербургской Академии наук (с 1879 года), поддерживал дружеские связи и переписывался со многими выдающимися европейскими языковедами, как например, Г. Паулем, К. Ягичем, Г. Шухардтом, О. Есперсеном, А. Мейе, Ф. де Соссюром и другими.

В 1918 году Варшавский университет пригласил Бодуэна де Куртенэ переехать в Польшу и занять в нем кафедру иноевропейских языков. Несмотря на преклонный возраст, он принимает это предложение, переезжает в Варшаву. Здесь он сразу же активно включается в научную и общественную работу. По его инициативе было создано «Общество друзей польского языка». Значительное место в его творчестве занимает публицистическая деятельность, пафос которой был направлен в защиту национальных меньшинств Польши, против великопольского державного шовинизма. В 1922–1923 годах Бодуэн де Куртенэ читает цикл лекций по актуальным вопросам функционирования языка в ряде знаменитых европейских университетов (в Карловском университете, Прага, в Копенгагенском университете и др.).

Бодуэн де Куртенэ весной 1929 года готовится выступить с докладом на 1 съезде славистов в Праге. Но состояние его здоровья все ухудшается, тяжелая болезнь мешает ему приехать в золотую Прагу, участвовать в этом важном форуме языковедов. 3 ноября 1929 года перестало биться сердце И.А. Бодуэна де Куртенэ — выдающегося лингвиста и деятеля культуры современности, творческое наследие которого является гордостью польской, русской и французской науки.

Таков привлекательный образ Бодуэна де Куртенэ, его жизненного пути и научного подвига, нарисованный рукой талантливого лингвиста и историка науки Йоахима Мугдана.

Во второй части рецензируемой монографии автор дает глубокий анализ языковедческих трудов Бодуэна де Куртенэ. Опираясь на значительный фактический материал его творчества, на данные специальной литературы, посвященной анализу этих трудов (работы Т. Бешты, Ф. Безлая, Г.Ф. Благовой, М. Хмурой-Клекотовой, Т. Добржинской, В. Ди Салво, В. Дорошевского, Л. Качмарека, С. Кани, В. Каракулова, В. Кодуховой, Э. Кернера, Э. Креховецкой, А. Кринского, Я. Кульчицкой-Салони, Р. Ленцека, А. Леонтьева, В. Лопатиева, Э. Малаховской, К. Нича, А. Поля, Р. Ротштейна, Я. Розвадовского, Т. Шарадзенидзе, Л. Щербы, В. Шкловского, Э. Станкевича, И. Тота, П. Тимошенко, М. Фасмера, Р. Якобсона и др.), он с большим знанием дела, шаг за шагом раскрывает философские взгляды ученого, его понимание сущности языка как общественного явления. В работах Бодуэна де Куртенэ всегда есть философская основа, тем более, что он считал языкознание философией языка. Но тот факт, что по его взглядам «язык существует только в индивидуальных мозгах, только в душах, только в психике индивидов или особей, составляющих данное языковое общество» (И.А. Бодуэн де Куртенэ, Избранные труды по общему языкознанию, Москва 1963, т. 1-2), что никакой язык «вовсе не существует, что существуют как психические реальности одни только индивидуальные языки, точнее, индивидуальные языковые мышления» (там же), то все это, без детального изучения его работ, дало повод многим исследователям обвинить его в вундтизме, субъективном идеализме. Сущность психологизма Бодуэна де Куртенэ пронизательно вскрыл Л. Щерба, показавший, что «психологизм не явля-

ется философской основой его лингвистического мировоззрения» (Л. Щерба: И.А. Бодуэн де Куртенэ. In: Языковая система и речевая деятельность. Ленинград 1974, стр. 385). Материалистический монизм составляет сущность философских взглядов Бодуэна де Куртенэ, основу его лингвистической концепции. И справедливо отмечает Ф.М. Березин, что монистическое понимание языка как психоло-социальной сущности, имеющей «коллективно-индивидуальное» или «собираательно-психическое» существование, предполагает, по мнению Бодуэна де Куртенэ, «нераздельность в языке индивидуального и социального, общего и частного в языке, языка и речи» (Ф. Березин: История лингвистических учений, Москва 1984, стр. 137).

Интересно, в сжатом стиле, раскрывает Йоахим Мугдан взгляды Бодуэна де Куртенэ на «язык» и «речь», на «системный характер языка», на проблемы фонетики и фонологии (антропофонии, психофонии), на сущность фонемы. Здесь много тонких наблюдений, важных выводов. Важные выводы имеются и в разделах рецензируемой монографии, в которых автор раскрывает учение Бодуэна де Куртенэ об орфоэпии, морфологии и синтаксисе, лексикологии и этимологии, классификации языков (генетической, географической, морфологической), о «смещении языков», диалектологии, происхождении языка, языковых изменениях и развитии языка, интерлингвистике, языке детей, языковой патологии, социолингвистике (в том числе о плурилингвизме), пропедевтике и истории языкознания и др.

В конце этой важной книги по истории науки о языке есть попытка автора показать место Бодуэна де Куртенэ и Казанской лингвистической школы, созданной им, и в поступательном ходе развития языкознания.

Выводы Йоахима Мугдана подкрепляются мнением А. Соммерфельта, что «Ф. де Соссюр и Бодуэн де Куртенэ ... являются прямыми вдохновителями современного структурализма» (A. Sommerfelt: The French school of linguistics — Trends in European and American Linguistics. Antwerp 1961, стр. 283). Они созвучны словам Б. Коллиндера, что «молодые казанские лингвисты образовали авангард современного структурализма» (B. Collinder: Les origines du structuralism. In: Acta Universitatis Uppsaliensis, Uppsala 1962 стр. 13). Список трудов И.А. Бодуэна де Куртенэ и богатая библиография вместе с предметным указателем заканчивают этот великолепный труд молодого немецкого ученого.

Ш. Рот

Ferenc Gregor: Die alte ungarische und slowakische Bergbauterminologie mit ihren deutschen Bezügen. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1985, 344 стр.

В своем поступательном ходе развития современная лингвистика уделяет все больше внимания синтезу различных методов изучения языка. Так, на извилистых путях науки о языке последних десятилетий, когда циники во весь голос кричат о том, что углубляется кризис в лингвистике, растут на перекрестке сопоставительно-типологического и ареального языкознания новые весьма эффективные методы изучения системы и подсистем языка, их диахронии и синхронии.

Этот новый синтез со всей силой показывает плодотворность идей изоморфизма (А.М. Ампер, Н. Винер) в научном познании мира вообще, и сложной системы функционирования языка (Л. Елмслев, Е. Курилович) в частности. В чем новизна и эффективность этого внутрилингвистического «брака»? Как известно, сопоставительно-типологическое языкознание изучает языки независимо от их генетического родства с целью выявления сходжений и расхождений их структур, способов выражения одних

и тех же значений и различных функций однотипных элементов структуры языка (В.Г. Гак). Ареальное языкознание же, сопоставляет языки независимо от степени их генетического родства с целью определения в них общих элементов и структур, образовавшихся в результате лингвистической интерференции взаимодействия самих языков (или языковых контактов) и стоящих за ними макроструктур культур. Объектом такого изучения являются заимствованные и проникшие элементы и структуры (В.В. Мартынов) всех языковых уровней, процесс языковых контактов (А. Мартыне), языковые союзы (К. Сандфельд), плурилингвизм (Н. Денисон). Если генетическое языкознание исследует первичное родство (*parenté*) то ареальное — их вторичное родство, т.е. сродство (*affinité*) (Н.С. Трубецкой), образовавшееся в результате лингвистической интерференции языковых контактов и воздействия внешнелингвистических факторов. Синтезом сопоставительно-типологического и ареального изучения языков лингвистика наших дней может увеличить эффективность поисков языковых универсалий и универсальных тенденций (Б. Комри).

Одним из пионеров синтезирования методов сопоставительно-типологического и ареального языкознания является Ференц Грегор — видный венгерский славист, имя которого известно во многих странах мира. Все его весьма плодотворные научные изыскания, в которых умело сочетаются кропотливый труд сбора и детального анализа языкового материала на тле экстралингвистических фактов, со взлетом мысли общего языковеда, были и предпосылками написания рецензируемой монографии. Они были как бы завязью тех плодов, которые так великолепно созрели в этом замечательном труде, комплексно исследуемом «старую» горнопромышленную терминологию венгерского и словацкого языков в её взаимосвязи с соответствующими лексико-семантическими микросистемами (Ш. Рот) немецкого языка.

В чем пафос рецензируемой монографии? В том, что огромный фактический материал, кропотливо собранный автором из свыше чем 360 лингвистических и внеязыковых источников, подвергся впервые в истории славистики, хунгаристики, германистики и общего языкознания комплексному лингвистическому анализу, в котором строгая научная методология проходит красной нитью. Развивая великолепные традиции венгерской славистики и этимологической школы (З. Гауптова), в достижения которой сам профессор Ференц Грегор внес большой вклад, он с максимальной этимологической надёжностью раскрыл доселе неизвестную «предысторию» свыше 800 венгерских и около 600 словацких терминов горной промышленности в их взаимосвязи с соответствующими немецкими терминами, т.е. роль соответствующих терминов немецкой горной промышленности как первично-исторических и генетических источников (А. Граур, Ш. Рот) их заимствования (около 250 немецких этимонов). И хорошо, что свое ареальное этимологизирование (А. Никонов) автор строит на надёжной основе новых достижений теории языковых контактов и их лингвистической интерференции.

В настоящее время исследования в области языковых контактов (межъязыковых отношений, взаимодействия языков) привлекают к себе внимание все большего количества лингвистов, «становясь одной из центральных задач нашей науки» (Р. Якобсон). Они призваны способствовать не только разработке теоретических принципов сравнительно-исторической лексикологии, теории лингвистической интерференции, но и могут в содружестве с историками и представителями других общественных наук содействовать снятию «белых пятен» истории материальной и духовной культуры носителей языка (О.С. Ахманова, В.В. Виноградова, В.В. Иванов). Теория языковых контактов была за последние десятилетия обогащена рядом интересных исследований. И тем не менее, в

лингвистической литературе, посвящённой вопросам взаимодействия языков, до сих пор сосуществуют не только противоречивые, но иногда и диаметрально противоположные суждения о том, какие явления следует включать в понятие «языковые контакты», каковы типы межъязыковых отношений и какова динамика их лингвистической интерференции. Так, для У. Вайнрайха, Э. Хаугена, В.Ю. Розенцвейга и др. «языковые контакты» — это повременное использование двух или больше языков одними и теми же индивидуумами. Тем самым рассмотрение межъязыковых отношений сужается до анализа явлений билингвизма и полилингвизма (мультилингвизма) или плурилингвизма. К тому же, эти исследователи не проводят различия между плурилингвизмом как процессом языковых контактов и плурилингвизмом как их результатом, не изучают тех общественных явлений, которые способствовали возникновению плурилингвизма.

Были также попытки сузить понятие «языковых контактов» до представлений о субстратных явлениях.

С другой стороны, О. Есперсен, Л. Хадрович, Б.А. Серебренников, Л. Киш, Е.В. Опельбаум, Р. Филипович, Г.И. Мелика, П. Кирай, О.Б. Ткаченко, Ф. Грегор, В. Фирек, Б. Карстенсен и др. понятию «языковые контакты» дают более широкое толкование, включая в него различные языковые связи на разных лингвистических уровнях, установившихся как между генеалогически родственными и типологически близкими, так и неродственными, типологически отдалёнными языками и диалектами. Нам представляется, что такое, более широкое толкование понятия «языковые контакты» полнее всего отражает многообразие межъязыковых отношений. В вопросе о классификации типов и подтипов языковых контактов взгляды ученых расходятся ещё больше. Это объясняется тем, что у них разные исходные позиции, критерии (Б.А. Серебренников, Ю.А. Жлуктенко, Б.В. Горнунг, Е.В. Опельбаум, Э. Петрович, В.М. Русановский и К.Ц. Целуйко, А. Доза, Х. Шухардт, А. Росетти, А. Соважо). Разумеется, что мы не можем подходить к многообразным явлениям межъязыковых отношений с готовыми формулами, заранее разработанными схемами, к которым подбираем лишь иллюстративный материал. Глубокое проникновение в сущность явлений языковых контактов, всестороннее изучение особенностей интерференции на разных языковых уровнях являются предпосылками успешного решения задач ареальной лингвистики. Поскольку в иерархии факторов развития языка межъязыковые отношения занимают особое место, являясь теми внеязыковыми факторами, действие которых, пропуская сцепление внутриязыковых факторов языка-рецептора, влияет непосредственно на принципы целесообразности его развития, классификации типов языковых контактов, следует, на наш взгляд, строить, исходя из нескольких экстралингвистических критериев, к которым приобщены и критерии интралингвистические.

Экстралингвистические критерии, помогая локализовать межъязыковые отношения или установить факты определенных языковых контактов между территориально несмежными языками и диалектами, предопределяют деление межъязыковых отношений на: (а) внутренние контакты (маргинальные или пограничные, интрарегиональные), (б) внешние контакты (немаргинальные или непограничные). Экстралингвистические критерии помогают установить: (а) продолжительность и интенсивность межъязыковых отношений (перманентные контакты, каузальные контакты), (б) условия протекания межъязыковых связей (естественные контакты, искусственные контакты). (См. А. Рот: Венгерско-восточнославянские языковые контакты, Будапешт 1973.)

Интралингвистические критерии, которые должны помочь изучению процесса влияния или «механизма контактов» взаимодействующих языков и диалектов, опре-

делить динамику лингвистической интерференции, её типы, разработаны, к сожалению, слабо. Исследователи удовлетворяются констатацией того факта, что в каждом случае возникновения контакта языки и диалекты ведут себя по отношению друг к другу очень активно, «в них развивается ряд сложных динамических процессов» (Жлуктенко). И поэтому не случайно в лингвистической литературе, посвященной проблемам языковых контактов, особенно много противоречивых взглядов и выводов имеется в вопросе динамики лингвистической интерференции и глубины проницаемости структур контактирующих языков и диалектов. (Ср. работы У.Д. Уитнея, К.Ш. Прицвальда, А. Доза, А. Мейе, Э. Сепира, Г. Шухардта, К. Базеля, А. Росетти, А. Соважо, У. Вайнрайха, Б.А. Серебrenникова и др.)

Разумеется, мы даём себе ясный отчёт в том, что нет и не может пока быть универсальной классификации типов языковых контактов, как и нельзя пока что с уверенностью предсказать динамику лингвистической интерференции у того или иного типа языковых контактов. Уж слишком многообразны соотношения факторов развития языка и роль лингвистической интерференции в нём, с одной стороны, структурные особенности контактирующих языков и диалектов систем различного статуса, с другой.

Конкретное, глубоко научное исследование самих явлений лингвистической интерференции — ключ к решению этих задач. Большинство исследователей языковых контактов, к сожалению, игнорируя углубленные «полевые изыскания» явлений разных типов межъязыковых отношений, сделало ряд поспешных и неаргументированных выводов по самым существенным вопросам взаимодействия языков. Всё это привело к некоторой дискредитации теории языковых контактов в глазах историков языка. Стали поговаривать о том, что эта молодая область лингвистики, успев сделать лишь первые шаги, зашла в тупик. Выход из этого тупика, в исследовании конкретных явлений взаимодействия различных языков и диалектов. Многое в этом отношении делается в последнее время учеными различных стран, в том числе и венгерскими лингвистами, включая автора рецензируемой монографии.

В лингвистической литературе, к сожалению, до сих пор не делают разницы между лексическим заимствованием и лексическим проникновением. А между тем, они являются результатом различных типов лингвистической интерференции и не различать их — значит не раскрывать подлинного характера межъязыковых отношений, которые способствовали их заимствованию или проникновению. Когда заимствуется название вместе с реалией, слово вместе с понятием, новая лексическая единица занимает пустую клетку в лексико-семантической подсистеме языка-рецептора. Она, по словам В. Мартынова, «переходит из языка в язык вместе с местом, которое оно (слово — Ш. Р.) занимало в языке-прототипе» (В.В. Мартынов, Славяно-германское лексическое взаимодействие древнейшей поры, Минск 1953, стр. 30). В этом случае лексические инновации, которые переходят как при интрарегиональных, маргинальных, так и немаргинальных контактах, являются заимствованиями.

Заимствование только нового названия, которое становится синонимом «старого» названия, следует считать лексическим проникновением.

Лексические проникновения усваиваются путём борьбы новой, проникшей единицы номинации в исконной лексеме. Между лексическим проникновением и исконным словом устанавливаются определенные отношения, которые А. Ломбард назвал «очень деликатными» (см. А. Lombard: Tradition latine et tradition slave. Le Roumain resultat de leur fusion. In: Acta Congressus Madvigani. Proceedings of Second International Congress of Classical Studies. Copenhagen August 1954. Copenhagen 1957, стр. 115), потому что в

конкурентной борьбе между лексемами синонимического ряда происходит перераспределение моносем. Во многих случаях лексическое проникновение захватывает всю сферу значений исконного слова, которое, будучи извлеченным от коммуникативной функции, отмирает. Усвоение проникновения происходит только в условиях внутрорегиональных и маргинальных контактов.

Таковы эталоны результатов лингвистической интерференции на лексическом уровне контактирующих языков, с учетом которых можно из познания предыстории слова делать выводы культурно-исторического характера. И хорошо, что профессор Ференц Грегор в своей великолепной монографии полностью учел все эти важнейшие предпосылки ареального этимологизирования — практически, а не только декларативно.

Какова же архитектура рецензируемой книги? Она глубоко продумана и подчинена основной цели дать научно-объективную картину предыстории старых терминов лексико-семантических микросистем горного дела в венгерском и словацком языках, являющихся результатами лингвистической интерференции их языкового взаимодействия на протяжении почти тысячелетия, т.е. со времён прихода венгров в Карпато-Дунайский бассейн (896г.) и до начала XX века, в их взаимосвязи с результатами лингвистической интерференции диалектов немецкого языка, которые начиная с XII века контактировали как с венгерским, так и словацким языками.

Каковыми же были венгерско-словацкие языковые контакты, лингвистическая интерференция которых и способствовала взаимному заимствованию и проникновению терминов лексико-семантических микроструктур горной промышленности.

Автор рецензируемой монографии со всей убедительностью показал, что это были, в первую очередь, внутренние языковые контакты генетически не родственных и структурно-типологически разных языков, функционировавших в течении почти тысячи лет в рамках одного государства. (Словакия с X до начала XX века входила в состав Венгрии.) Результаты динамики лингвистической интерференции этих контактов мы находим на всех языковых уровнях и, в первую очередь, на лексико-семантическом уровне контактирующих языков, в том числе в лексико-семантических микросистемах (Pot) их терминов горной промышленности.

Комплексное ареальное этимологизирование, в котором наряду с внутриязыковыми критериями (фонетический, семантический, морфологический, словообразовательный, лингво-географический и др.) умело вовлечены и экстралингвистические (исторический, географический, этнографический, психологический, фольклорный и др.) Принцип «Wörter und Sachen» дал возможность Ференцу Грегору по-новому осветить ряд сложных вопросов предыстории терминов горной промышленности не только в венгерском и словацком языках, в немецком языке, являвшимся во многих случаях генетическим или первично-историческим источником их заимствования или проникновения, но и в других языках Карпатского ареала, и даже за его пределами.

Научная объективность, которая исключает априоризм, лжепатриотизм шовинистического угара, лежавшие в основе попыток многих исследователей «доказать», что какой-то язык Карпатского ареала «влиял больше на соседний язык, чем испытал его влияния» (Хауген), были основным принципом кропотливого, многолетнего труда автора.

В 1 разделе, озаглавленном «Начало горной промышленности в Венгрии», автор на основе анализа экстралингвистических источников дает в сжатом виде (уж слишком сжато!) историю горной промышленности в Венгрии и в входящей в её состав Словакии. Он соглашается с мнением и выводами словацких ученых, что ряд языковых слепков

действительности понятий горной промышленности и, в первую очередь, её термины венг. *bánya*, слов. *baná* 'шахта', венг. *ruda*, слов. *ruda* 'руда', так и древние топонимы севера исторической Венгрии, как напр., *Rudno*, *Zlatno* и др., свидетельствуют о том, что ко времени прихода венгров в Дунайско-Карпатский бассейн (896г.) предки словаков уже занимались горным делом. И, естественно, что в знак благодарности за понятия горного дела, рожденные предками словаков, венгерский язык заимствовал и их названия (Белинский), напр., венг. *kahanyec*~*kahanec* < слов. *kahan(ec)* 'жировой глиняный светильник, шахтёрская лампа', венг. *karám* < слов. *krám* 'шалаш, жильё для шахтёров' и мн. др.

Начиная с XII века мастера горного дела переселялись из немецких земель в историческую Венгрию (получали большие льготы, особенно те, кто оседал на территории, опустошенные татарским нашествием). Они внедряли в горную промышленность свои реалии и понятия и вместе с ними их немецкие языковые слепки действительности, т.е. немецкие термины горного дела проникали в венгерский и словацкий языки, напр., венг. *arslédri*~*asléder*; *per(k)mester*~*bergmester* (гибридные кальки), слов. *bergmeister*~*peakmajster* < нем. *Bergmeister*, *Bergschaffer*: 'мастер горного дела', венг. *streka*, слов. *štreka* < нем. *Streck* 'штрек, выработка' и мн. др.

Во II разделе, названном 'Терминология отдельных понятийных (т.е. тематических — Ш. Р.) групп', являющимся сердцевинной всей монографии, автор группирует свои этимологии терминов горной промышленности, представляющие собой статьи объёмом от нескольких строк, например, венг. *contrascriba*, слов. *kontraskriba*, лат. *contra scriba* 'контролер' (стр. 86, всего 16 строк), до нескольких страниц, например, венг. *karám* < слов. *krám* 'шалаш, жильё для шахтёров' — (стр. 103–112, всего 10 страниц), тематически (лучше было бы объединять их в лексико-семантические микросистемы). Всего он выделяет 12 тематических групп: шахта; шахтер или горняк; владелец шахты, предприниматель горного дела; служащие; организация труда и вознаграждение за труд; жилище и одежда; основные фазы добычи; руда; орудия производства; вентиляция, освещение, снабжение водой; строительство шахты; транспортировка.

Преддстройка терминов этих тематических групп изложена четко. Этимологический анализ проф. Ференца Грегора помог увидеть как венгерский, так и словацкий языки образовали на протяжении многих столетий свою терминологию горной промышленности. Эти языки превращали аппелятивы, напр., венг. *bunkó*, *csákány*, *csiga*, *ék*, *ér*, *lyuk*, *nyíl*, *verő* и ряд др., слов. *dol*, *jalovina*, *klin*, *klopáčka*, *koryto*, *strela*, *stupa* и др. в термины горного дела. Жаль, что автор не коснулся здесь лингвистической сущности этого процесса терминологизации (Хаусенблас, Алтайская, Рот).

Затем автор детально исследует этимологию венг. *akna*, *hevér*~*hevier*~*heviar*, *klopácska*, *pöröly*, *moticska*, *kaszna*~*kasznya* и много др., имевших историческим, первоначально историческим или даже генетическим источником заимствования слов. или другой славянский язык. Автор здесь сделал значительный шаг вперёд в определении подлинных этимонов многих терминов горной промышленности, внёс поправки в специальную литературу, в том числе этимологические словари венгерского языка (напр., в словарь Bárczi Géza: *Szófejtő Szótár*, Budapest 1941; а также A magyar nyelv történeti-etimológiai szótára I–III. Főszerkesztő: Benkő Loránd. Budapest 1967–1976). Так он справедливо считает, что венг. *karám* 'шалаш, жильё для шахтёров' является лексическим проникновением из слов. *krám*, а не из тюрк. **qoram*, эта этимология Ференца Грегора может быть подкреплена явлениями изосемантизма карпатизмов, напр., венг. *kaliba*~*kalyiba*, слов. *koliba*~*kaliba*, карп.-укр. колиба, рум. *colibă*~*calibă* и др. (См. Рот, Особенности взаимодействия языков и диалектов Карпатского ареала, Ужгород 1973.)

Хорошо, что автор приводит параллели терминов из других соседних языков, в первую очередь, чешского, польского, сербо-хорватского, румынского. Некоторые изоглоссы терминов, рассматриваемых в монографии, например, венг. *kahanyes*, словц. *kahan(ec)* 'жировой глиняный светильник, шахтёрская лампа' имеет свое продолжение и в украинском языковом ареале, в том числе карп.-укр. (ср. укр. *каганець* 'то же') и много др.

Восстанавливая предысторию терминов горного дела словц., имевших историческим, первично-историческим или даже генетическим источником заимствования венг., как напр., словц. *čakan, bunko, sersam, čiga, veka* и много др., автор уделяет большое внимание функционированию этих терминов как в языке-источнике, так и языке-рецепторе. Выводы Ференца Грегора и здесь аргументированы и не вызывают возражения.

С особой благодарностью встретили читатели попытку, и добавим весьма успешную попытку, автора раскрыть ту роль, которую играли немецкие диалекты как исторический, первично-исторический или даже генетический источники заимствования венгерским и словацким языками терминов горной промышленности, напр., венг. *cerbstol(n)~erbstoll(ny)a, cetermány~cimmerman, hutman~hukmány, pár~pur*, словц. *haviar~hevér~hevír, handel~hendel, šifer~šiber, žompa~žumpa*. Кроме прямых (фонетических) лексических заимствований и транскрипций немецкие диалекты, функционирующие в Дунайско-Карпатском бассейне с XI века (см. Рот, Особенности взаимодействия языков и диалектов Карпатского ареала, Ужгород 1973), способствовали заимствованию венг. и словц. языками ряда лексических калек (в том числе гибридных и семантических, напр., венг. *hegymester, kutya, párfutó, verem, bányavas*, словц. *banské dielo, pustá robota, vrchný fervalter, jama* и др.

Такова эта весьма интересная монография. Разумеется, что как каждый новаторский труд она не лишена некоторых недочётов. Нам думается, что автор мог уделить больше внимание поистине древнейшему периоду образования терминов горного дела венг. и словц. языков, т.е. XII–XIV векам. И здесь неоценимым лингвистическим источником могут быть материалы, относящиеся к Солотвине (Akna Szlatina), солекопальни которых упоминаются уже в древних римских источниках и где с XII века по наши дни взаимодействуют венгерские, словацкие, немецкие, а также закарпатоукраинские и румынские народные говоры, внесшие свой вклад в развитие макроизоглосс терминов горной промышленности. Следует признать, что сам термин «alte Bergbauterminologie» является внешнелингвистической номенклатурой и может вводить в заблуждение: идёт ли речь об историзмах, архаизмах или терминах древневенгерского, средневенгерского, ранневенгерского или соответствующих периодов истории словацкого, а также немецкого языков. Однако, эти замечания имеют лишь второстепенный характер. Они никак не могут затмить факт, что проф. Ференц Грегор написал великолепную книгу — очень нужную для славистов, хунгаристов и германистов.

III. Рот

Atlas Linguarum Europae. Cartes. Volume I, premier fascicule, Red. Mario Alinei président, A. Weijnen ancien président. 19 cartes+commentaires. Van Gorcum, Assen 1983, XCVII+177 pp.

Dans mon compte rendu je me propose de présenter uniquement les 19 cartes et le commentaire mentionnés dans le titre, mais je dois signaler que durant les deux décennies de travaux consacrés à l'ALE, on a déjà publié deux volumes préparatoires, pour faire connaître les lignes directrices de l'enregistrement et de la rédaction et pour créer un accord méthodologique entre les comités nationaux — dont le nombre dépasse la trentaine — ainsi qu'entre les auteurs des cartes. Il s'agit des ouvrages suivants: 1° Atlas Linguarum Europae (ALE) — Introduction, réd. par A. Weijnen et M. Alinei. Éd. Van Gorcum, Assen (Pays-Bas), 247 p. Les langues utilisées dans ce volume sont au nombre de cinq (français, anglais, russe, allemand, espagnol). 2° ALE. Convention pour la présentation des réponses au premier questionnaire et pour la rédaction des cartes. Secrétariat Général. Nimègue, mars 1982. 54 p.

Une partie des atlas linguistique nationaux avaient déjà étendu l'enregistrement aux minorités linguistiques (ALF, atlas linguistiques hollandais, roumain, pyrénéen). L'idée d'un atlas linguistique embrassant l'Europe entière a été formulée pour la première fois par W. Pessler en 1929. Au congrès de linguistique général tenu à Oslo en 1939, R. Jakobson a présenté le projet d'un atlas phonétique européen. Le problème a été plusieurs fois débattu en 1945. L'idée de l'ALE a été au congrès international de dialectologie de Marburg, en 1965, par le président actuel, M. Alinei. Le projet a obtenu l'appui de l'ICD qui a confié l'organisation du travail à M. Alinei, L.-E. Schmitt, A. Weijnen et J. Bélić (Intr. pp. 3-6).

Avant de présenter l'ouvrage lui-même j'énumérerai les membres du comité de rédaction de l'atlas et des commentaires, ainsi que les auteurs des cartes. Vice-présidents du comité de rédaction: R.I. Avanesov†, Terho Itkonen et Mieczysław Szymczak; son secrétaire: Joep Kruijsen; ses membres: Jacques Allières, Manuel Alvar, Poul Andersen, Manuela Barros-Ferreira, Jaromir Bélić†, Dalibor Brozović, Boris Cazacu, David Clement, Nicolas Contosopoulos, Manlio Cortelazzo, László Deme, Witold Doroszewski†, Inger Ejskjær, Lennart Elmevik, T.V. Gamkrelidze, Jan Goossens, Corrado Grassi, Rudolf Grosse, Klaas Heeroma†, Reiner Hildebrandt, V.V. Ivanov, Pavle Ivić, G.A. Klimov, F. Kortlandt, A. Kostallari, Wolfgang Putschke, Ernest Schüle, B.A. Serebrennikov, E.R. Tenichev, Gaston Tuaillon, J.D.A. Widdowson et Werner Winter. Auteurs des cartes: M. Alinei, R.I. Avanesov†, D. Brozović, N. Donadze, T. Itkonen, V.V. Ivanov, J. Kruijsen, E. Mooijman, J. Saramago, B. Serebrennikov, I. Stan, G. Tuaillon, G. Vitorino et A. Weijnen.

Sur les cartes on trouve environ 2500 points d'enquête. Pour un nombre aussi élevé de points d'enquête il n'a pas été possible d'écrire sur les cartes les formes linguistiques elles-mêmes, l'usager est donc guidé par des symboles et une légende.

Dans le premier fascicule du volume I, les notions suivantes ont été enregistrées: 1 soleil, 2 lune, 3 brouillard, 4 nuage, 5 vent, 6-9 arc-en-ciel, 10 grêle, 11 neige, 12-13 flaque d'eau, 14 étang, 15 lac, 16 mer, 17 rivière, 18-19 sauterelle —, les noms de 14 notions, disposés sur 19 cartes. La plupart des cartes sont de type onomasiologique, les autres sont des cartes de motivation. La plupart groupent les matériaux du point de vue étymologique, tandis que les cartes de deux notions (arc-en-ciel et sauterelle) montrent les rapports qui existent entre celles-ci et d'autres notions dans une langue donnée. Ainsi, l'«arc-en-ciel» peut être un arc, une ceinture, un ruban, une courroie, une bande, un anneau, une couronne, un cercle, une roue, une cornette, du bois courbé, etc., lié à la pluie, au ciel, à une divinité, au fait du boire, à l'Éden, à l'eau; il peut être un animal (mythologique), un dauphin ou une baleine, un boeuf, une belette, un personnage mythologique, etc. Le nom de la sauterelle peut être en rapport avec le fait de sauter, le foin, le cheval.

Dans le volume des commentaires, on trouvera la liste des membres des comités nationaux, l'étude préliminaire (de langue anglaise) de M. Alinei, les abréviations françaises,

anglaises et allemandes des noms de langues et de groupes de langues, ainsi que la liste des points d'enquête par pays. (Il n'y a que les six points tziganes qui ne figurent pas sur les cartes des pays respectifs, mais seulement à la fin de la légende.)

Le système de la transcription phonétique est présenté ensuite, ainsi que les règles de la translittération des caractères latins. W. Putschke et R. Neumann décrivent le système des travaux faits par ordinateur et l'«organogramme» de l'ALE.

Enfin, les deux tiers du volume contiennent les commentaires des cartes en français (6 fois), en anglais (5 fois) et en allemand (trois fois).

Dans l'introduction (XV-XXXIX), M. Alinei exprime ses remerciements au comités nationaux, aux membres de la rédaction, ainsi qu'à A. Weijnen, qui était chargé de l'organisation et de la préparation des travaux de l'ALE durant presque vingt ans. C'est lui en effet qui a effectué les visites nécessaires dans les différents pays d'Europe. C'est encore lui qui a organisé le réseau des comités nationaux, élaboré les questionnaires avec ses collaborateurs et installé un secrétariat à Nimègue. Les remerciements de M. Alinei s'adressent également à l'UNESCO, pour son soutien moral et matériel. Il constate que l'activité de l'ALE est en accord avec les idéaux que le premier paragraphe de la charte de l'UNESCO formule de cette manière: «to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture». M. Alinei exprime également sa reconnaissance envers les académies des sciences et d'autres institutions des différents pays européens, qui ont fourni un appui moral et matériel pour l'entreprise.

M. Alinei présente les quatre «générations» des atlas linguistiques de notre siècle. Il considère comme point de départ la parution de l'Atlas Linguistique de la France (ALF), en 1903. Quant aux territoires envisagés, celui-ci s'est limité aux matériaux fournis par une seule langue, le français. Le second type est celui des atlas régionaux, consacré à l'analyse linguistique détaillée d'une unité géographique à l'intérieur d'un territoire plus vaste et possédant déjà un atlas. La troisième «génération» regroupe des atlas déjà internationaux, mais dont l'objet ne dépasse pas une seule famille linguistique, tel l'atlas des langues slaves. D'un point de vue méthodologique, l'existence d'une masse de données brutes constitue la condition de l'élaboration d'un atlas interprétatif.

Si l'ALE représente un grand progrès par rapport aux atlas nationaux, c'est aussi parce que les frontières politiques entre pays ne correspondent en général pas aux frontières linguistiques. En outre, deux langues voisines qui sont génétiquement proches se trouvent reliées par des dialectes intermédiaires. Le réseau des points de l'ALE dépasse les frontières politiques, et les minorités linguistiques trouvent généralement place sur les pages de l'atlas. Les atlas linguistiques et dialectologiques peuvent être consacrés en principe à la phonétique, à la morphologie, au vocabulaire ou à la sémantique. Mais dans la pratique, il se sont limités jusqu'ici aux études phonétiques et lexicales.

L'ALE assure 1° la solution du problème des atlas nationaux et régionaux qui n'ont encore pu être faits; 2° la solution du problème des atlas des familles linguistiques, dans la mesure où cela est possible à l'intérieur de l'Europe; 3° la synthèse de tous les atlas dans les limites géographiques de l'Europe. La plupart des atlas entrepris pour les groupes de langues (membres de la troisième «génération») n'ont pas encore paru. C'est la rédaction de l'atlas des langues slaves (*Obščeslavjanskij Lingvističeskij Atlas* = OLA) qui est le plus avancé, mais on entrevoit déjà les grandes lignes de l'atlas germanique et l'atlas de la Roumanie également.

Les atlas linguistiques parus jusqu'ici ne sont généralement pas de caractère onomasiologique (parmi les exceptions, mentionnons Jaberg 1936). L'ALE représente un progrès dans la mesure où il ne fournit pas seulement des matériaux bruts, mais aussi des étymologies; en outre, sur quelques cartes (arc-en-ciel, sauterelle), il ordonne les termes suivant la motivation (entre autres points de vue). Néanmoins, la motivation est plus ou moins indiquée sur d'autres cartes également. Pour les deux concepts cités ci-dessus, il existe beaucoup de

dénominations transparentes, qui peuvent être identiques dans les langues très éloignées, alors que la même langue peut présenter une grande variété de termes: p. e. portugais (dialectes divers) *arco-iris*, *arco de velha*, *arco celeste*, *cinta de abelha*, *arco virgem*. D'autre part, un sens de base 'caprin' est très répandu pour 'sauterelle' dans différentes langues: lit., fr., it., brus., pol., ukr., cf. dans une seule langue (pol.): *skoczek*, *skoczka*, *skaczka*, *skok*; *koza*, *koziolek*, *konik*, *koniak*; *konik polny*, *kon polny*; *pasikonik*.

L'ALE a publié les commentaires dans un volume à part, puisque la préparation des cartes demande un autre procédé que celle du livre, de petit format et de maniement facile. La rédaction se propose de publier également les matériaux bruts. En effet, les symboles ont été unifiés dans une assez large mesure; marquer chaque variante phonétique par un symbole à part aurait entraîné une situation chaotique dans la lecture des cartes. Les variétés différentes des symboles de base (cercle, carré, triangle, etc.) se répartissent sur trois niveaux, auxquels correspond dans la légende une numérotation décimale. Ainsi, 1.1 et 1.2 désignent deux mots ayant deux étymons différents, sur la carte. Le second chiffre décimal (p. e. 1.2 et 1.3.) indique des différences morphologiques pour des mots à étymologie commune (différence dans la suffixation), tandis que le troisième chiffre (p. e. 1.2.3 et 1.2.4.) renvoie en général aux particularités (p. e. anomalie phonétique) qui distingue des formes ayant par ailleurs un étymon commun et une structure morphologique identique. Le nombre des symboles de base est de 40, quantité généralement suffisante si l'on met à contribution les variantes diacritiques. Dans le premier volume, on trouvera le *hapax legomena* marqués par un cercle vide et énuméré dans une liste à part. Le volume des commentaires publie la liste des «Réponses doubles», avec indication des points d'enquête et renvoie à l'étymologie.

Les trente-neuf comités nationaux portent la responsabilité des matériaux bruts et de la première étymologie. Celle-ci est soumise à un examen plus profond et plus nuancé par les comités des groupes de langues (romanes, germaniques, slaves, finno-ougriennes, d'autres langues occidentales, d'autres langues orientales), qui fournissent également une bibliographie plus ample. La décision finale revient à la rédaction, en dernière instance au président.

Les limites fixées pour l'ALE sont des limites uniquement géographiques, sans considération des frontières politiques ou linguistiques. Ainsi, le territoire envisagé est limité à l'Est et au Sud-Est, (du côté de l'Asie) par la crête de la montagne Oural, la rivière Oural et par la crête de la chaîne médiane du Caucase. Une bonne partie de l'Union soviétique et de la Turquie est située hors des frontières de l'Europe. Certaines langues ouraliennes, turques, mongoles et caucasiennes se retrouvent de part et d'autre de la frontière séparant l'Europe et l'Asie. En même temps l'anglais (parmi les langues germaniques), l'espagnol, le portugais, le français (parmi les langues romanes), et le russe (parmi les langues slaves) ont étendu leur territoire loin dans d'autres continents.

Les langues de l'Europe se laissent ranger dans les grandes classes suivantes:

- 1° Altaïque: mongol, turc
- 2° Basque
- 3° Caucasien: abkhazo-adyghé, nakho-dagestanien
- 4° Indoeuropéen: albanais, balte, celtique, germanique, grec, indien (tzigane), iranien, roman, slave
- 5° Ouralien: finnique, lapon, permien, ougrien, samoyède, volgaïen
- 6° Sémitique: arabe (maltais)

Au total, le nombre des langues européennes dépasse la centaine.

La densité, du réseau est inégal, elle n'est proportionnée ni à l'étendue du territoire, ni au nombre des habitants. Le seul point fixé d'emblée, c'était de ne pas placer plus d'un point de recherche sur une étendue de 2000 km². On ne s'est écarté de ce principe que dans les cas où la diversité des langues est relativement grande pour un territoire donné (p. e. au Caucase). En Finland, il existe un réseau moins dense, suivant le nombre des

variantes. Le territoire vide s'étendant entre la Crimée et le Caucase s'explique par une décision de l'OLA, qui ne veut pas admettre les points d'enquête russes là où il n'y avait pas de population russe avant le XVII^e siècle. Pour des raisons semblables on a laissé de côté dans l'enquête les localités des polders hollandais, dont la population est également récent. Le réseau italien, trop peu serré pour le moment (65 points d'enquête) deviendra plus dense. Le premier volume ne contient pas les matériaux celtiques de l'Irlande ni les matériaux turcs de Chypre. Les données de ces points d'enregistrement seront rajoutées ultérieurement.

L'auteur de l'Introduction énumère les États qui ont été obligés de faire des enquêtes entièrement ou partiellement nouveau, étant donné que de nombreux pays européens n'avaient pas disposé d'atlas linguistique auparavant (ainsi l'Albanie, la Belgique, la Grande-Bretagne, la Grèce, le Luxembourg, la Norvège, le Pays Bas, le Portugal, la Turquie européenne) et que d'autre part, les données linguistiques des minorités nationales avaient manqué pour plusieurs pays. Là même où un atlas linguistique existait déjà, il a fallu faire des enquêtes supplémentaires pour pouvoir rédiger des cartes répondant à certains points du questionnaire de l'ALE.

L'atlas linguistique national a pu être mis à contribution dans une forte mesure en France, en Roumanie, en Hongrie et en Italie. Dans d'autres pays, les enregistrements en vue d'un Atlas étaient déjà faits, et bien que celui-ci n'ait pas été publié, une grande partie des matériaux nécessaires était disponible dans les archives. Se trouvaient dans cette situation: le Danemark, la RSS d'Estonie, la Finlande, les RSS de Lettonie et de Lituanie, la Norvège, la République Démocratique Allemande (Saxonie), les RSS d'Ukraine et de Biélorussie, la Bulgarie, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Yougoslavie (pour les langues serbo-croate, slovène et macédonienne) ainsi que la Suisse Romande.

Les travaux de l'atlas linguistique peuvent contribuer au développement des méthodes dialectologiques, à l'étude des langues en contact, à l'examen des rapports entre langue et culture; ils démontrent l'existence de lignes d'isoglosses indépendantes de la parenté génétique, et il peuvent donner naissance à la géographie linguistique là où elle n'a pas encore été créée.

Concluons par les dernières phrases de l'introduction de M. Alinei: «... the ALE will not only realize the possibility of international scientific co-operation on a large scale, but ... it will also help promote and increase a similar spirit of co-operation in every possible other forms, as an indispensable part of human endeavour toward peace, mutual understanding and friendship among the nations: a goal that may not only make science more human, but also human and international relationship more scientific» (Commentaires XXXIX).

Nous devons remercier tous ceux qui ont participé aux travaux de l'ALE, qu'il s'agisse d'individus ayant fourni le travail effectif ou d'institutions et d'organisations nationales et internationales qui ont assuré le succès de l'entreprise par leur soutien moral et matériel. Entreprise unique s'il en fut, qui n'a pu être menée à bien que grâce à la coopération de tous les États européens, sans égard aux divergences de leurs systèmes politiques et sociaux.

A la fin de ce compte rendu, on ne peut que formuler un souhait: que cette coopération internationale continue à être efficace et que les riches matériaux qu'on a pu rassembler puissent voir le jour au rythme prévu par les projets. Espérons que ce premier résultat palpable des travaux de l'ALE donnera un bel essor à la dialectologie internationale, en l'enrichissant de méthodes nouvelles. Nous attendons la suite avec impatience.¹

B. Kálmán

Rédei, Károly: *Uralisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch*. Unter Mitarbeit von Marianne Bakró-Nagy, Sándor Csúcs, István Erdélyi†, László Honti, Éva Korenchy†, Éva K. Sal und Edith Vértes. Lieferung 1. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1986.

¹ Le deuxième fascicule parut en 1986.

Das Wörterbuch der gemeinsamen Wörter der mit dem Ungarischen verwandten Sprachen hat unsere Sprachwissenschaftler bereits seit der Entstehung der vergleichenden Sprachwissenschaft beschäftigt. Sogar auch die Bahnbrecher des Sprachvergleichs befaßten sich mit dem Vergleichen der Vokabeln zweier Sprachen (M. Fogel, G. Stierhielm, O. Rudbeck 17. Jh. ungarisch-finnisch). P. J. Strahlenberg schwedischer Offizier, der 13 Jahre in russischer Kriegsgefangenschaft verbracht hatte, ging einen Schritt weiter. Nachdem er heimgekehrt war, gab er 1730 in Stockholm sein „Polyhistor“-Werk unter dem Titel „Das Nord und Ostliche Theil von Europa und Asia“ heraus. Darin bekam auch eine Tabelle Platz, die den Namen von fast 70 Begriffen in sechs finnisch-ugrischen Sprachen enthält, aber die Aufzählung ist außer dem Ungarischen und Finnischen ziemlich mangelhaft.

Auch in den Werken von J. Sajnovics und S. Gyarmathi waren die Wortlisten ziemlich mager. Man konnte aber auch keine wissenschaftliche Flenno-Ugristik betreiben, bis einem aus den finnisch-ugrischen Sprachen in Rußland nur ein sehr spärliches und unzuverlässiges Material zur Verfügung stand. Das hat bereits in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jh. dem Finnen M. A. Castrén und dem Ungarn A. Reguly bewogen, auf Sammelfahrt nach Osten zu reisen, um dort bei kleineren finnisch-ugrischen Völkern Sprachmaterial aufzuzeichnen. Beide namhaften Reisenden sind im Alter von 39 Jahren gestorben. Ihr Nachlaß wurde erst verhältnismäßig spät veröffentlicht. Gerade die Unbearbeitetheit der Nachlässe veranlaßte Ende des 19. Jh. und Anfang des 20. Jh. die große ungarische und finnische Forschergruppe zur weiteren Arbeit, die mehrere Jahre unter Sprachverwandten verbrachten und große Wörterbuch- und Textsammlungen durchführten. So bot sich die Möglichkeit, daß finnisch-ugrische vergleichende Wörterbücher entstehen konnten, als die Wörterbücher von J. Budenz (Magyar-ugor összehasonlító szótár [Ungarisch-ugrisches vergleichendes Wörterbuch] Budapest 1973–1881) und O. Donner (Vergleichendes Wörterbuch der finnisch-ugrischen Sprachen. Helsingfors 1874–1888) erschienen sind. Zu ihrer Zeit waren diese großartige zusammenfassende Werke, aber einerseits war der bis dahin gesammelte Sprachstoff nicht gleichförmig und zugänglich, andererseits steckte die Phonetik noch in den Kinderschuhen, schließlich wirkte sich auf die Methode des Sprachvergleichs die strenge, aber in der wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung zugleich unentbehrliche Theorie der „Lautgesetze“ nicht aus.

Im 20. Jh. haben die ungarischen, finnischen, syrischen und estnischen etymologischen Wörterbücher die Ergebnisse von finnisch-ugrischen Sprachwissenschaftlern berücksichtigt, die in Studien und Zeitschriften erschienen sind. In Ungarn begann in den 50er Jahren unseres Jahrhunderts das Sammeln des finnisch-ugrischen Wortschatzes. Dieses Sammeln lief parallel zu den Arbeiten am „Magyar történeti és etimológiai szótár [Historisch-etymologisches Wörterbuch] I–IV. (red. Loránd Benkő, Budapest 1967–84). Die Arbeitsgemeinschaft mußte also daher in erster Linie die Lemmata ausarbeiten, die auch ein ungarisches Element hatten. So konnte parallel zu dem vorher erwähnten das Wörterbuch dieser erscheinen: „A magyar szókészlet finnugor elemei“ [Finnisch-ugrische Elemente des ungarischen Wortschatzes] I–III. (Chefredakteur György Lakó, Redakteur Károly Rédei, im Bd. III. Redakteure: Károly Rédei und Éva K. Sal, Budapest, 1967–1978). Zum Buch wurde auch ein Wörterverzeichnis angefertigt (Budapest 1981), in der Zusammenstellung von Anna A. Jászó, redigiert von Éva K. Sal. Ich muß bemerken, daß das erwähnte Werk — obwohl in seinem Titel das Attribut „finnugor“ [finnisch-ugrisch] steht — auch die samojedischen Entsprechungen aufnimmt. Björn Collinder versuchte die Zusammenstellung eines Wörterbuches, das auf eine uralische und eine finnisch-ugrische Ebene geteilt wurde: „Flenno-Ugric Vocabulary“ (1. Aufl. Stockholm, 1955; 2. Aufl. Hamburg 1977). Die Artikel des Wörterbuches sind aber sehr wortkarg und Verfasser läßt die Etymologien weg, die nur innerhalb der einzelnen Schichten (ugrisch, finnisch-permisch, finnisch-wolgaisch) vorkommen.

Das Ziel des Uralischen Etymologischen Wörterbuches formuliert Rédei wie folgt: „Die Zielsetzung des Uralischen Etymologischen Wörterbuches (im weiteren UEW) ist, die uralische, finnisch-wolgaische und ugrische Schicht des uralischen Wortschatzes kritisch zu werten und zusammenzufassen... Das Wörterbuch enthält nicht die ausschließlich obugrischen, permischen, wolgaischen, ostseefinnischen und samojedischen Etymologien, obwohl es auch unter ihnen uralte Wörter uralischer, finnisch-ugrischer ... usw. Herkunft geben kann.“ Ich muß bemerken, daß die Verbindung zwischen den beiden wolgaischen Sprachen so locker ist, daß von den Etymologien, die im ersten Band des Wörterbuches vorkommen, die Zahl der gemeinsamen wolgaischen Entsprechungen nur 24 ist, also nur etwa die Hälfte der wolgaischen Etymologien im ersten Heft.

Das UEW stellt die sicheren und die unsicheren Etymologien dar. Bei den früheren ist das Stichwort fettgedruckt, in den letzteren einfach kursiv gesetzt. Die Mehrheit der unsicheren Entsprechungen ist lautnachahmend, zum anderen kommen sie nur in zwei voneinander entfernten Sprachen vor. Das Vorwort plant das Wörterbuch für drei Bände (es hat sich noch nicht herausgestellt, wie viele Lieferungen das ausmachen wird). Es gibt über die Phonologie und Bezeichnungsart der uralischen Grundsprache einen Überblick, denn — wo es möglich ist — gibt das Wörterbuch auch die rekonstruierte Form in der Grundsprache an. Gleicherweise in der Einleitung wird vom Redakteur die Geschichte des Werkes von 1966 an niedergeschrieben. Das Redigieren des ersten Bandes (uralische und finnisch-ugrische Etymologien) wurde Ende 1980 beendet.

Danach folgt: Hinweise für die Benutzung des Wörterbuches. Alle Lemmata stehen mit dem Angaben der wahrscheinlichen Bedeutung oder des Bedeutungskreises der rekonstruierten Grundform. Anschließend zählt das UEW seine Quellen für jede Sprache auf. Das Wörterbuch gibt beim Finnischen, Estnischen und Ungarischen nur die literarische Sprachform an, sofern die Entsprechung nicht ein Dialektwort ist; das wird mit der Abkürzung „(dial.)“ angemerkt. In den weiteren uralischen Sprachen sind die Angaben der wichtigeren Mundarten zu finden. Die Reihenfolge der uralischen Sprachen ist: a) Finnisch, Estnisch (karelische, olonetzische, lydische, wepsische, wotische und liwische Belege sind nur dann angeführt, wenn das Wort im Finnischen oder Estnischen nicht vorkommt), Lappisch Mordwinisch, Tscheremissisch, Wotjakisch, Syrjänisch, Ostjakisch, Wogulisch, Ungarisch, b) Samojedische Sprachen: Jurakisch, Jenissei- und Tawgi-Samojedisch, Selkupisch, Kamassisch (Koibalisch, Motorisch, Karagassisch und Taigi-Samojedisch). Wenn irgendeine Verbindung mit anderen Sprachfamilien (jukagirisch, altaisch, indoeuropäisch) vorauszusetzen ist, wird darauf im UEW hingewiesen. Später folgt: Modifizierungen und Ergänzungen zur phonematischen Transkription, Abkürzungen.

Im Wörterbuchteil befinden sich die uralischen oder finnisch-ugrischen Lemmata mit folgenden Anfangsbuchstaben: *a, ä, é, ê, ê', e, i* (die erste Hälfte), also ist das erste Wort *ača* '(Bach)wiese, Tal' FP, ?FU, das letzte Wort *irwə* 'lustig, froh; sich freuen' FU.

Obwohl es sehr riskant ist, die Aufteilung unter den Sprachen auf Grund der ersten 154 Lemmata als endgültig zu betrachten, — die Proportionen werden wohl nach der Beendigung des Wörterbuches modifiziert —, aber auch bis dahin ist ein Vergleich interessant. Auch für mich war überraschend, daß die meisten uralischen Wörter von der ugrischen Gruppe bewahrt worden sind; sie stehen an der Spitze der Liste. Uns stehen aus den bereits ausgestorbenen samojedischen Sprachen: Koibalisch, Karagassisch, Motorisch und Taigi so wenig Belege zur Verfügung, daß es sich nicht lohnt, sie in die Statistik aufzunehmen.

*Etymologien: Uralische und finnisch-ugrische Schicht**Finnisch-ugrische Sprachen*

Sprache	sicher	unsicher	insgesamt
Ostjakisch	74	15	89
Wogulisch	70	11	81
Ungarisch	46	30	76
Syrjänisch	55	19	74
Wotjakisch	48	19	67
Finnisch	48	17	65
Lappisch	42	18	60
Estnisch	39	5	45
Mordwinisch	34	11	45
Tscheremissisch	30	14	44

Samojedische Sprachen

Sprache	sicher	unsicher	insgesamt
Jurakisch	32	9	41
Selkupisch	30	5	35
Jenisse-S.	22	3	25
Tawgi-Sam.	21	4	25
Kamassisch	18	7	25

Wenn man das UEW mit den Ergebnissen des Buches MSzFgrE (1967–1978) von Lakó-Rédei-Sal vergleicht, dann kann man natürlich nur die 76 Lemmata vergleichen, die auch ein ungarisches Element haben. Ich habe keine besonders wesentlichen Unterschiede gefunden, die Mitarbeiter beider Wörterbücher sind ja fast dieselben. Sie haben auch schon anfangs die Etymologien ohne ungarische Elemente aufgezeichnet, haben aber diese bis zum Erscheinen von MSzFgrE beiseitegelegt und erst danach gingen sie an die Arbeit. Gemeinsame Mitarbeiter sind: K. Rédei, I. Erdélyi, Éva K. Sal, Edit Vértes. Unter den Mitarbeitern des UEW sind nicht zu finden: Gy. Lakó, F. Fabricius-Kovács, I. Gulya. Neue Mitarbeiter des UEW sind: M. Bakró-Nagy, L. Honti und É. Korenchy (siehe noch XII).

Durch dieses Wörterbuch wird der Stoff von MSzFgrE in großem Maße ergänzt. Auch die erste Lieferung bietet zweimal so viele Etymologien; und weil das UEW später erscheint, arbeitet es auch die etymologische Literatur der letzten Jahre auf. Ob das UEW für die ungarischen Sprachwissenschaftler die Existenz von MSzFgrE überflüssig macht? Nein. Zum ersten erschien das letztere in ungarischer Sprache, also ziehen es diejenigen, die Deutsch weniger können, auch im weiteren zu Rate, zum anderen enthalten sie mehr Information, außerdem findet man darin auch für die finnischen Sprachen und für die Mundarten weiterer Sprachen mehr Belege.

Mit wahren Vergnügen nahmen wir diese moderne Zusammenfassung zur Kenntnis, sie erleichtert nämlich auch die Anfertigung der etymologischen Wörterbücher jener uralischen Sprachen, die über so etwas bisher noch nicht verfügen. Da über zahlreiche finnisch-ugrische Sprachen gute Lehnwort-Studien vorhanden sind, soll man „nur“ noch den Wortschatz untersuchen, der von interner Entstehung ist und den gleichen Ursprung mit der nahverwandten Sprache aufweist. Wir warten ungeduldig auf die nächste Lieferung.

B. Kálmán

W. P. Lehmann (ed.): *Language Typology 1985 (Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 47)*. J. Benjamins, Amsterdam – Philadelphia 1986, 203 pp.

Le volume est édité sur la base des travaux présentés au Colloque de Typologie linguistique tenu à Moscou du 8 au 13 décembre 1985, avec la participation de linguistes soviétiques et américains. Les sujets à étudier (le type linguistique, la métalangue, le changement typologique) ont été prévus au cours du colloque précédent, à Austin en 1984.

Le fait que le volume ne contient que les conférences du colloque, explique son caractère un peu généralisant, évitant poliment les sujets de discussion, les points faibles de la typologie contemporaine.² Une plus grande importance peut être attribuée aux articles traitant de problèmes historiques (Gukhman, Hopper, Austerlitz) et au sommaire théorique de Lehmann.

Plusieurs articles sont relativement courts, d'un caractère plutôt terminologique, et ne visent pas à approfondir l'étude du sujet en question, comme ceux de G.A. Klimov (pp. 105–111) sur le type, de T.V. Gamkrelidze (pp. 43–49) sur la paléontologie linguistique, d'A.E. Kibrik (pp. 163–169) sur l'importance primaire de la signification dans la description grammaticale. Par contre, J. Nichols (pp. 141–163) conclut que la forme devrait jouer un rôle plus significatif en typologie. L'auteur révisé la notion de signe de Saussure pour prouver que cette relation n'est pas nécessairement un rapport rectiligne «contenu-forme», elle peut souvent être inverse ou réflexive.

Le rédacteur du volume, W.P. Lehmann (pp. 1–19) révisé en détail les principes de base de la typologie. Il constate que les approches typologiques sont jusqu'à présent quelquefois contradictoires; pour les évaluer il est nécessaire de se placer à l'intérieur d'une théorie linguistique incluant tous les principes de base. La définition de la notion de *langue* reste toujours de première importance. Les typologistes acceptent l'approche de L. Antal qui conçoit la langue comme "une réalité sociale objective" et c'est cette réalité qu'il faut analyser et expliquer. Cette approche est bien loin de celle de Chomsky, les résultats scientifiques actuels étant encore insuffisants pour la compréhension du cerveau humain, l'analyse de la langue n'est possible que dans ses constructions, à travers les relations entre les catégories. Parmi ces relations c'est la syntaxe — étant le moins influencée par des forces non-linguistiques — qui occupe une place centrale. Dans ce qui suit, Lehmann expose les principes de base à l'intérieur de la syntaxe, en comparant la terminologie et les concepts de Bloomfield à ceux de la typologie moderne (ordre des mots, concordance, modifications etc.). Non moins importants sont les caractéristiques morphologiques, surtout la relation entre la morphologie et le type syntaxique (VSO – préfixation, OV – suffixation).

A propos des unités de base de la typologie, V.N. Yartseva (pp. 19–27) est d'avis que le caractère abstrait des patterns syntaxiques et des catégories comme la relation sujet-prédicat limite la possibilité de relever les traits particuliers des langues différentes. Par conséquent il est important de tenir compte des paramètres comme la structure rythmique de la phrase et ses fonctions communicatives, la réalisation de la phrase au niveau morphologique, et le lexique, surtout s'il sert à résoudre l'ambiguïté des homonymes syntaxiques.

D'autres problèmes généraux sont traités par p. ex. A.C. Harris (pp. 55–77) qui étudie la commensurabilité des termes techniques typologiques en anglais et en russe; par A. Timberlake (pp. 77–105) qui examine la possibilité de la construction d'une métalangue pour la typologie syntaxique.

V.M. Solntsev (pp. 49–55) considère les universaux comme insuffisants dans la description du type et propose une autre unité, celle des spéciaux. Un *spécial* est la manifestation et le mode d'existence des universaux, p. ex. l'existence des éléments significatifs des auxiliaires est universel, mais leur manifestation, l'affixation ou l'inflection est spécial, existant dans plusieurs langues.

M.M. Gukhman (pp. 111–123) s'occupe des changements typologiques. Il considère l'hétérogénéité typologique d'une langue comme le reflet du trajet de son évolution. Le changement est moins facile à suivre dans la typologie orientée sur le contenu (p. ex. la transformation de l'indo-européen en nominatif-accusatif), tandis que dans le cadre d'une typologie formelle-structurelle, d'après des documents écrits le devoir est plus facile. Il est

² P. ex. la différenciation des typologies fondées sur le contenu ou sur la forme, les typologies holistiques, l'évaluation de la linguistique générative etc.

visible que l'intensité du changement dépend du type (p. ex. les langues indo-européennes à structure inflectionnelle sont, à cause de traits intérieurs, moins stables que les agglutinantes).

Le changement de l'ordre des mots reste toujours un sujet courant. P.J. Hopper (pp. 123-141) après quelques remarques générales sur les recherches précédentes propose d'établir une relation entre l'ordre des mots et les fonctions du discours d'une part afin d'expliquer les changements, d'autre part à cause des difficultés de la définition de l'ordre de base. L'auteur insiste sur l'importance de la position du verbe et sur celle de la morphologie verbale qui forme un lien entre la fonction discursive et la structure de la phrase.

Le volume contient deux analyses concrètes. M.E. Krauss (pp. 169-187) décrit — du point de vue phonologique, morphologique et syntaxique — les deux plus grands types linguistiques en Alaska qui sont en même temps les deux plus grandes familles linguistiques du territoire. R. Austerlitz (pp. 27-43), dans son article très riche en exemples présente une étude à la fois typologique, historique et relevant de la linguistique aréale. Dans une recherche précédente (1970) il a démontré que dans un groupe de langue en Asie du Nord et de l'Est l'agglutination est une innovation. Dans le présent article l'auteur essaie de rétablir une époque précédente de la carte phonétique et phonologique du même territoire, c'est-à-dire de rechercher le lieu d'origine de quelques traits phonétiques.

A. Sörös

Editors' note

The editors regret that, for reasons beyond their control, issue 35/3–4 of ALH contains a great number of printing errors.

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the publisher, the place and date of publication as well as the number of pages), the author's full name and address and an abbreviated title of the paper (not exceeding 45 characters including spaces). The contribution proper should begin on page 2.

Tables, diagrams and illustrations (with the author's name and an Arabic number) should be presented on separate sheets. Captions should be typed on a separate sheet and placed at the end of the manuscript.

Footnotes should be typed double-spaced on a separate sheet at the end of the article.

Please underline all emphasized words with a broken line (— — — —). Use double underlining for bold face (e.g. titles of sections). All language examples (and only these) are to be italicized (single underlining). Do not use capitals, small capitals or bold face for emphasis, authors' names or quotations.

Citations in the text should be enclosed in double quotation marks (" " in case of a paper written in English, „ „ in German and « » in French or Russian).

Reference to a publication should be made by the name of the author, the year of publication and, when necessary, page numbers in the following ways:

... as described by Schmidt (1967) ...

... as referred to by Hoover (1967, 56–78; 1976, 43).

... mentioned by several authors (Elgar 1978, 77; Williams 1981, 154–156) ...

An alphabetically arranged list of references should be presented at the end of the article, following the footnotes. If there are two or more books or papers published by the same author in the same year, lower case letters a, b, c etc. should be added to the year of publication both in the list of references and in the text proper. Avoid using abbreviations in the references; if they are essential, a list of explanations should be provided. For books, please include the name of the publisher, the place of publication and the year; for articles in journals, please include volume, year and page numbers in the following fashion:

Bárcezi G.: Magyar hangtörténet² [The history of Hungarian sounds]. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1958a.

Bárcezi G.: A szótövek [Word stems]. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1958b.

Lakoff, G. — Peters, P. S.: Phrasal conjunction and symmetric predicates. In: Reibel, D. — Schane, S. (eds): Modern Studies in English. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs 1969, 113–141.

Ross, J. R.: Constraints on Variables in Syntax. Ph. D. dissertation, MIT 1967.

Sauvageot, A.: Le problème de la parenté ougrienne. In: Etudes Finno-ougriennes 13 [1967], 123–142.

Vasmer, N.: Etimologičeskij slovar' russkogo jazyka IV. Nauka, Moscow 1973.

For marking subsections decimal notation should be applied. Do not use more than four digits if possible.

Titles of sections and their decimal notations should be marked by double underlining. Between sections leave out double the usual space.

Examples within the text of the article should be marked by single underlining, otherwise they are to be left unmarked and separated from the body of the text by spacing and placing them in a new paragraph. Meanings are to be rendered between inverted commas (‘ ’). If glosses are given morpheme by morpheme, the initial letter of the gloss should be placed exactly below that of the example. Grammatical morphemes can be abbreviated in small case letters connected to the stem or the other morphemes by a hyphen. No period should be applied in such abbreviations. For example:

(1) (a)	A	sólymaid	elszálltak
	the	falcon-gen-pl-2sg	away-flew-3pl
	‘Your falcons have flown away’.		

Examples can be referred to in the text as (1a), (1a—d), etc.

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